Despite the deadlock in negotiations and the growing influence of Iran in the Middle East, moderate Arab states still believe in the viability of a just and comprehensive peace with Israel. They hope that the Obama administration will move swiftly to resume its role as an impartial mediator in and active advocate of negotiations toward a two-state solution. These countries are questioning the usefulness and sincerity of the superficial peace efforts undertaken by the United States since the 1991 Madrid Conference. The latest of these superficial efforts are the recent visits to the region by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and by the members of the Quartet. This latest surge of diplomacy is no different, as it aims to fill a political vacuum or avoid setbacks in the peace process during the transitional period between governments in the United States and Israel.
After meeting with Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli foreign minister Tzipi Livni in Sharm el-Sheikh in Egypt on November 9th, the Quartet appealed for the resumption of the peace process within the framework of the Annapolis Conference initiative and agreed to hold an international peace conference in Moscow next spring. But the Quartet knows, as does the rest of the world, that the Annapolis peace charade has come to an end. Moderate Arab countries led by Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt have resisted admitting publicly the failure of the peace efforts, although this seems increasingly inevitable, because there is no real strategic alternative. Such an admission, they fear, would only cement the credibility of the Iran-led axis of opposition comprising Syria, Hamas, and Hizbollah. The popular support of these actors is the result of the tensions in the region caused by Washington’s futile and destabilizing policies in Palestine, Iraq, and Iran.
If the past years have proven anything, it is that the unresolved Palestinian issue remains the root cause of the volatility and tensions in the Middle East. It fuels a general feeling of injustice, creates regional conflicts, and encourages extremism and terrorism. These consequences are exacerbated by the failure of the ruling regimes to establish rule of law, end corruption, improve their human rights records, and collectively strengthen democracy.
The Arab–Israeli conflict augments anti-Americanism and encourages terrorist ideology, threatening U.S. strategic interests. It is true that the Arab countries know that the economy will be Obama’s top priority following the economic crisis that swept the United States and the world after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers two months ago. Addressing the economic crisis will strengthen Obama’s legitimacy domestically, particularly as polls show that 63 percent of Americans consider the economy a top concern.
However, the Arab countries believe that Obama will soon realize that his administration has to draw up a new strategy to restore U.S. influence in the world, which have been sapped by two terms of neoconservative rule under Bush. Obama needs to move quickly to rebuild Western alliances, overcome obstacles with Iran and Russia, manage the two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq he inherited from the outgoing administration, together with the unstable situation in the Palestinian territories, and deal with Israel’s security concerns. The volatile situation in the Middle East will impose itself as a priority for the president-elect on his first day, because what happens in the region inexorably affects the U.S. economy, as well as the country’s security and stability.
Resolving the Arab–Israeli conflict is the key to solving the regional crises. Obama will not make much progress if he listens to Condoleezza Rice’s advice and follows the Annapolis approach in order to establish an independent Palestinian state. That approach only perpetuates negotiations, with unpredictable results in view of the forthcoming Israeli elections in February. The Israeli elections may lead to the victory of right-wing hardliners who oppose peace talks, which could trigger a third Palestinian uprising that may spiral out of control and affect neighboring countries. The so-called roadmap was nothing but a vehicle for President Bush to stall for time and allow his ally Israel to impose new realities on the ground: building the separation wall and new Jewish settlements; destroying the Palestinian National Authority; and deepening internal Palestinian divisions. This strategy placed Israel’s interests above those of the United States. By continuing these failed initiatives, the new administration will miss yet another opportunity for achieving peace.
Once president of the United States, Obama should force Israel to stop building settlements and return to pre-2000 conditions. He should return to the “blueprints” drafted by Bill Clinton shortly before the end of his second term. The “blueprints” called for an end to occupation, the establishment of a non-militarized Palestinian state, and the restoration of the pre-1967 borders with minor modifications to allow the annexation by Israel of major settlement blocs on the basis of a land-for-peace principle. The plan divided Jerusalem based on the understanding that “whatever is Jewish is for Israel, and whatever is Arab is for Palestine” in East Jerusalem, leaving “Greater Jerusalem” as Israel’s capital. These ideas recognize the Palestinian right to statehood but do not allow Palestinian refugees to return to their homes inside Israel.
These points were the essence of the peace plan President Clinton had proposed to late Palestinian president Yasser Arafat and former Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak at the Camp David summit. Reluctant to accept the plan, both men missed a golden opportunity. “Clinton’s blueprints” could serve as a starting point and the foundation for a genuine peace process on a reasonable timetable. The negotiation process would encompass clear details that meet the minimal expectations of all sides, and would be accompanied by efforts from the United States as a “fair and effective” broker. The U.S. administration can broker a peace agreement between Palestinians and Israelis, while simultaneously reviving the Lebanese–Israeli and Syrian–Israeli tracks and bolstering the 1994 Jordanian–Israeli and 1979 Egyptian–Israeli peace accords.
All of Bush’s initiatives, on the other hand, had been inspired by a “divine vision” and were only of service to Israel, as they ignored Palestinian demands and aspirations. They destroyed what was left of the spirit of the peace process from the 1991 Madrid conference. The Bush administration was never interested in achieving a comprehensive peace settlement based on international resolutions. The roadmap, therefore, led to failure: the intention of the Bush administration was not to pave the way for a fruitful peace process but rather to appease Arabs before the invasion of Iraq in 2003.
If Obama carries on with these failed policies, the peace process will continue to falter. This will cost moderate Arab states public support, increase the influence of opponents of peace, and undoubtedly lead to a third uprising. Instead, the new administration should adopt Clinton’s ideas and any new proposals by its own team. This will encourage implementing the Arab peace initiative, which offers Israel recognition by all 22 Arab states and security guarantees in exchange for withdrawal from occupied territories.
But Obama will not achieve his foreign policy agenda by entrusting the Middle East file to the likes of Dan Kurtzer and Dennis Ross, who wasted time for twenty-five years to the benefit of Israel. Arabs, for their part, should not remain divided, passively anticipating Obama’s next move. They should sponsor reconciliation between the Palestinian factions, paving the way for forming a unity government that lifts the siege on the Gaza Strip and ends a destructive two-government situation. Arabs should work on a clear and well defined strategy for a two-state solution to meet Obama halfway and work in the best interests of the Palestinians, Arabs, Israelis, and Americans. The gap between 2001 and 2009 should not justify stalling and opting for partial or interim agreements.
Rana al-Sabbagh, independent journalist, Jordan.
