Comment on the draft Treaty on European Security proposed by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev
The draft Treaty on European Security published on November 29, 2009, on the Russian President’s website finally gives a “story” to the headline created by Dmitry Medvedev’s initiative first announced in Berlin on June 5, 2008. Ever since then, other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area have been wondering about the exact nature of the Kremlin’s idea. Now they have a text. This is a positive development.
The goal of the Medvedev initiative, as stressed again in the cover note to the draft, is to create an undivided Euro-Atlantic security space and in so doing to finally bury the legacy of the Cold War. This is exactly right. This goal answers to the interests of all nations in the region and needs to be supported by their governments and publics. It is also good that Medvedev remains open to comments and suggestions on his text and anticipates a serious conversation on this important subject. Such a conversation is essential if we are to move forward to a secure and undivided Euro-Atlantic space.
Now, to the draft itself. The general idea behind the treaty, namely, that in order to make Europe more secure we need a new overarching legally binding document, raises questions. The Preamble to the draft refers to the 1945 UN Charter; the 1970 Declaration on the Principles of International Law; the 1975 Helsinki Final Act; the 1982 Manila declaration on peaceful resolution of territorial disputes; and the 1999 Charter on European Security. These documents are all very specific on such issues as the use of force or the threat of such use, which are a central concern of the Medvedev draft. Restating the same norms and principles again and again does not add to their validity.
Medvedev evidently perceives that weakness and attempts to eliminate it by means of a legally binding instrument. That is fine: he is a lawyer by training. The central objective of the proposed treaty is to create effective mechanisms to settle disputes and remove concerns. The text specifically refers to the UN Security Council and makes it clear that the Council’s authority shall not be affected. However, the draft does not mention many other multilateral mechanisms that have been created for the purpose, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Russia-NATO Council and others. This suggests Moscow’s lack of confidence that these mechanisms are up to their tasks. The Kosovo and Caucasus crises attest to that.
Instead, Medvedev proposes a mechanism which – very importantly – stands above any other alliance or association and is based on the principle of undivided and equal security for all (Art.1). All international actions, whether by individual states or groups of states, will be obliged to heed the security interests of all other states. This is a commendable principle, but it leaves open the interpretation of what constitutes a legitimate security interest. One need go no farther than the South Caucasus to illustrate how diverse these interpretations can be. This is the cardinal flaw of the entire approach the treaty’s drafters have taken.
It was said almost from the outset that the Medvedev initiative would not seek to replace NATO or other multilateral organizations, nor would it try to drive a wedge between Europe and America. True, the draft does not call for NATO’s dissolution or U.S. withdrawal from Europe. However, it actually proposes (Art. 2) that members of alliances place their allegiance to the proposed treaty above their alliance obligations and work within their alliances to promote the objectives of the treaty. Again, the stated objectives are not a problem; they are commendable. It is the realism of this expectation which is the issue. Medvedev’s treaty, if enacted, would de facto abolish other treaties, including the Washington one.
Much of the treaty text (Art. 4-9) is devoted to the detailed procedures of conflict resolution and dispute settlement: bilateral and multilateral consultations, a members’ conference and an emergency conference are proposed as mechanisms. Qualified majorities – from two-thirds to four-fifths – are set for various cases, consensus decisions are expected in others, time frames are mentioned, etc. This may or may not become useful at some point, but, again, it is widely removed from the Euro-Atlantic realities of today.
One article in the draft (Art.10) looks particularly bizarre. It provides for accession to the treaty by all the states in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian regions, from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Thus, the original focus on the Euro-Atlantic space becomes diluted, and the search for security becomes even more complex. It also proposes that “international organizations,” such as the European Union, the OSCE, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, NATO and the CIS, sign the treaty alongside their member states. This confuses things even more, unless the unstated idea is that these “organizations,” including the EU, will cede their security prerogatives to the new compact.
The final provisions (Art.11-14) deal with the procedures for withdrawing from the treaty. They need not concern us now. Indeed, we have not even discussed the chances of ratification of the proposed text, an important consideration for any treaty drafter.
Beyond the text itself, the conversation on the important issue raised by President Medvedev is just beginning. It is likely to be a long one, but certainly interesting.
It should be clear that an issue as important as creating an undivided security space in the Euro-Atlantic area and finally burying the Cold War can not be resolved simply by concluding a new treaty, even a legally binding one. A document such as this can, in principle, be signed, but it will end up more like the 1990 Paris Charter for a New Europe (interestingly not mentioned in the Preamble of the draft) and the European Security Charter of 1999 than a “treaty to replace all other treaties” that Dmitry Medvedev has put on the table.
This is not something that Medvedev, or Russia, or all other countries in the Euro-Atlantic space want, or need. Rather than working on the legal architecture and fine-tuning the niceties of qualified majorities, we need to get to the heart of the matter. Countries have problems not only because they have no reconciliation mechanisms to turn to or because they fail to understand one another – which sometimes happens, of course – but also because they have different interests, different perceptions, have different historical experiences.
The two salient security issues in the Euro-Atlantic area today are Moscow’s suspicions of U.S. intentions and motives vis-а-vis Russia (e.g., NATO enlargement, Washington’s support for Georgia, Ukraine, et al., the Bush administration’s proposed BMD deployments in Central Europe and the like), and Russia’s neighbors’ equally dark suspicions regarding Russia. Both sets of suspicions are real, if largely baseless, but each deserves hard thinking and a realistic strategy before they can be put to rest.
It is high time that this thinking begins and is followed by concrete action. Governments will not be able to do it alone, so the interested public in Russia, the rest of Europe, and in North America needs to engage in a joint effort. As to Mr. Medvedev, he should be thanked for raising the issue and setting the ball rolling. His treaty proposal is not perfect, but his initiative must not be ignored.