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Bin Laden Is Dead—the Jihad Lives On

Osama bin Laden’s death will not immediately deal a fatal blow to Islamic extremism, but it could potentially help to improve the situation in Afghanistan.

Published on May 3, 2011

Osama bin Laden is dead. People will be busy writing books and articles about him for some time to come, but for now it’s worth sharing a few thoughts of the moment on what we can expect following his death.

First, bin Laden’s death will not immediately deal a fatal blow—either politically or conceptually—to Islamic extremism. Al-Qaeda, the terrorist group he headed, is an organizationally complex institution comprised of many different components, a synthetic edifice developed along both network lines and centralized principles. It will not instantly crumble apart, and, though not an easy task, it will find a replacement for bin Laden. There is no shortage of ambitious figures for whom bin Laden’s death opens the door to fulfill their own leadership ambitions. In any case, al-Qaeda is not the only extremist organization in existence today.

In addition, it’s worth noting that Russia’s experience shows that systematically killing off the most prominent North Caucasian extremist leaders—as it did with Salman Raduyev, Khattab, Shamil Basayev, and Said Buryatsky—has not radically changed the situation in the North Caucasus at all. Extremism has a habit of breeding charismatic figures. Recall, too, that Bolshevism certainly did not disappear after Vladimir Lenin’s death.

So, the jihad will continue. 

It will be very interesting in this respect to watch the reaction to bin Laden’s death in the “Muslim street.” Of course, no politician will be bold enough to express sorrow over the event, but how will ordinary Muslims react to this latest American success?

The Taliban, bin Laden’s ideological friends and supporters, have already promised revenge, and are entirely capable of carrying it out. The immediate terrorist threat has therefore increased and promises potential danger for more countries than Pakistan, where bin Laden was killed, and the United States, which killed him.

Second, bin Laden’s death could potentially benefit the international coalition in Afghanistan and the president of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai. The “foreign Taliban” there—Arabs, people from Central Asia, and others—who were led by bin Laden could find their position weakened; they may even think about leaving Afghanistan and taking their fight somewhere else. In any case, the Afghan authorities’ idea that it is possible to hold talks with all opposition groups—except for the foreign Taliban—will gain new life and could leave the foreign Taliban increasingly marginalized.

Third, bin Laden’s death scores points for U.S. President Barack Obama, compensating in a way for the lack of professionalism in the NATO allies’ actions in Libya, demonstrating an ability to achieve even the most difficult goals, and, finally, symbolizing the consistent and firm stand to combat terrorism.  

Bin Laden was an enigmatic figure in many respects. Some people asserted long before May 2 that he had been dead for a while; others claimed he had never been a real person in the first place. But even if bin Laden himself is dead now, his work still lives on.

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.