This article is based on two op-eds published in Russian in Nezavisimoye Voennoe Obozrenie (Independent Military Review).
After President Obama decided not to make the trip from St. Petersburg to Moscow this past summer, international events showed once again the crucial importance of U.S.-Russian relations. This sounds a dissonant note in the chorus that has echoed over recent years, which has emphasized the supremacy of global financial and economic problems, gave priority to the U.S.-China dialogue, and has proclaimed a general shift of everything to the Asia-Pacific region.
Security Is Back on the Agenda
It turns out that international security is still a global political priority and sometimes comes to the forefront. Here, relations between Washington and Moscow continue to play a decisive role. Russian diplomacy’s successful gambit regarding the Syrian crisis and Syria’s chemical weapons defused a volatile situation, even if many obstacles still remain ahead on the road to a long-term solution. Overcoming them will depend above all on the United States and Russia. The same can be said for the resumption of talks on Iran’s nuclear program—a key issue for the nuclear nonproliferation regime. U.S.-Russian relations are also crucial in the fight against international terrorism and settling crises in the Middle East, the South Caucasus, and Southern and Central Asia, especially after the NATO contingent’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014.
But although diplomatic cooperation is more active in specific areas, the overall political background in U.S.-Russian relations (as is also true in European Union-Russian relations) remains quite bleak. The main reason for this situation would appear to be the influence that Russian and U.S. domestic politics are having on the two countries’ relations.The wave of mass public protests in 2011–2012 led Russia’s ruling circles to conclude that active cooperation with the West (in the form of Dmitry Medvedev’s “alliances for modernization,” Barack Obama’s “reset,” the new partnership agreement with the EU, joint missile defense, and further nuclear disarmament) would let the United States and its allies erode the current Russian political system of “managed democracy.” The response was to change Russia’s course from its earlier proclaimed “European choice” to the “Eurasian way” and further east to economic, political, and military cooperation with Asia-Pacific region countries that are continuing their economic growth and care little for democracy and human rights.
Of course, this was not a turn toward confrontation on the Cold-War era model (otherwise neither the Syrian initiative nor the Afghanistan transit would have been possible). But a policy of distancing from and regular opposition to the West (verbally at any rate) has become very clear. Against a background of mass propaganda about foreign military threats, Russia has launched a 19-trillion-ruble ($ 600 billion) program of modernization and rearmament of its armed forces under the State Armaments Program-2020 (SAP-2020). Such a massive military modernization program has not been implemented since the late 1970s.
As for the United States, the arrival in the White House of the country’s first Afro-American president, who emphasizes socially-focused domestic reform, a foreign policy based on actions under the aegis of the UN, a cautious approach to using force, and nuclear disarmament, sent the nationalist and reactionary opposition into an unprecedented flurry of activity. This opposition has largely paralyzed the administration, has a hard-line anti-Russian outlook, and is seriously tying the president’s hands in both foreign and military policy.
U.S.-Russian relations have never had to deal with such a mind-bending combination of political factors in the entire two hundred years of their history, and this is reflected in the specific fields of cooperation between the two countries.
The Strategic Consequences
The nuclear arms control dialogue is still stuck in the dead end it reached in 2011 over differences regarding the U.S./NATO missile defense program. Since that time, strategic, geopolitical, and ideological contradictions all acted to further compound these differences.
Successfully removing Syria’s chemical weapons and preventing a new war in the Persian Gulf (against Iran) could open a “window of opportunity” for resuming serious dialogue on strategic arms. After all, even at a time of global confrontation, the Soviet Union and the United States conducted such negotiations for more than twenty years and signed a series of historic treaties. There could be no question of any strategic partnership back then. The two countries were guided by purely pragmatic notions: the desire to reduce the risk of war and limit the opponent’s nuclear forces and programs, and thus reduce their own spending on countermeasures.
Although Russia shows no interest in signing another treaty now, these same considerations are worth thinking about today too. In 2012, Vladimir Putin unveiled in quite some detail a program of modernization of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces,1 which will add 400 modern intercontinental ballistic missiles to the country’s arsenal by 2020. This means that Russia needs to deploy 44–45 such missiles each year. There are major doubts that the country’s budget and industry can actually withstand such a pace. For now at any rate, production is only half of that. Moreover, the burden on resources will grow considerably in the future because of a return to a multiplicity of system types. Work at various stages is simultaneously underway at present on six different types of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs): Yars (SS-29); Rubezh; a new liquid-fuel silo-based heavy missile to replace the Voyevoda (SS-18); a new rail-based ICBM; Sineva/Liner (SS-N-23); and Bulava (SS-N-32). In addition to the three Borei 955 (Delta V) strategic missile nuclear submarines that have already been built, there are plans to commission another five—practically one a year, even though construction of each submarine of this type takes many years. Meanwhile, technical glitches continue to plague the Bulava system.
Colossal sums will also be spent on information and command systems, air-space defense, re-equipping general purpose forces, expanding contract service, improving combat training, raising service pay, and providing servicemen with housing. And this is all at a time when the economy has entered a period of stagnation and the budget deficit is growing.
If money could be saved on modernizing strategic nuclear forces that will never be used in an actual war (this is the whole point of nuclear deterrence, after all), it would free up more resources for other military needs, above all for the general purpose forces that are most likely to get involved in actual local or regional military operations in the foreseeable future. It would be easiest of all to save money without detriment to strategic parity and stability by signing another strategic offensive arms reduction treaty (while at the same reducing the multiplicity of weapon systems that duplicate each other).
As far as U.S. plans go, after 2020 it will follow Russia in starting a new modernization cycle of its strategic nuclear forces triad. A new bomber will be developed first, followed by the next generation of ground-based ICBMs after 2030, and finally a new sea-based missile system to replace the Trident submarines and missiles. Preliminary unofficial cost estimates for this whole modernization cycle come to more than $900 billion. With a huge budget deficit and public debt, Washington also ought to have an interest in saving money, including on strategic nuclear programs. A new strategic offensive arms treaty would help here, as the current one expires in 2020.
Russia too cannot be indifferent to the potential scale of the future U.S. strategic nuclear modernization, or to the systems that will replace the current ones. After all, this has a crucial impact on the cost to Russia of maintaining parity and the survivability of Russia’s nuclear deterrent force—in other words, the stability of the strategic balance. Concluding a new treaty could have a tangible effect here.
Signs emerged recently that the United States is also starting to move away from the strategic arms reduction course after Moscow showed no interest this last summer in Washington’s proposal to sign a new treaty that would lower the ceiling for warheads from 1,550 to 1000. In November, a high-level Pentagon spokesperson expressed “a pessimistic attitude” on the prospects of new agreements in this area.2 The United States will likely set a course on modernizing its strategic nuclear triad with its hands untied and no new strategic arms treaty in place after 2020.
The current new generation of politicians and specialists often thinks that history begins with them, and they either do not know the past or do not consider it important. But a look back over the nearly fifty years of strategic arms reduction talks between the two powers shows that they periodically change roles regarding interest in the matter as a whole and in specific technical issues and weapon systems. In the middle of the last decade, for example, Moscow was eager to sign a new treaty, while the United States was indifferent. Now the situation is directly opposite. It is entirely possible that positions would reverse again in a few years, though Russia’s position will be objectively weaker than it is now: the results of the State Arms Program-2020 will be clearer, and the United States will begin its twenty-year modernization cycle.
Whatever the situation, the dream of complete nuclear disarmament—the subject of intensive recent debate in the United States and Russia—will have to be left for the more distant future. In the next few years, the best thing to do would be to reach just another agreement on a nuclear arms limitation treaty—the ninth since 1972. No romantics, just “business as usual.”
But if the needed window of opportunity opens soon enough, it is very unlikely that it would be possible to pick up where things were left in 2011. The situation has changed a lot since then and is being shaped by new factors that must be taken into account to avoid “stepping on the same rake.”
The Missile Defense Saga
Since 2009, Moscow has been pushing its idea of developing a joint (“sectorial”) missile defense system. Seeing that it was not getting anywhere, Russia came up with a demand of receiving legally binding guarantees that U.S. missile defenses would not be directed against Russia’s missile forces. This amounted essentially to concluding a new antiballistic missile limitation treaty. In November 2011, then president Medvedev clarified this idea: “These commitments… would need to be formulated in such a way so that Russia can be sure not on the basis of promises and assurances, but on objective military-technical criteria, that U.S. and NATO activities in the missile defense area are in keeping with their declarations… are not in detriment to our interests, and do not undermine strategic nuclear parity.”3
The Obama administration did not accept this idea either (and Congress would never have ratified such a treaty anyway). But to be fair, the missile defense dialogue was not entirely futile. It was given an impetus by Vladimir Putin’s proposal in 2007 to cooperate in using the Russian radar stations in Gabala (Azerbaijan) and Armavir.
The Obama administration twice revised the program unilaterally. In 2009, it canceled plans to deploy GBI strategic missile interceptor missiles in Poland and radar in the Czech Republic, which had provoked Moscow’s strong opposition. At the start of 2013, the United States abandoned the fourth phase of the missile defense program in Europe: deployment of the most effective type of interceptor missile—the SM-3 Block IIB—in Poland and on ships in northern waters. This was the phase that worried Russia most of all, because Russian ICBMs launched from the western part of the country follow a trajectory that takes them over the North Atlantic.
In light of the prevailing mood in Congress, which considers missile defense a “sacred cow,” these decisions were justified by technical reasons, but they were clearly aimed at addressing Russia’s concerns (this is confirmed too by the episode in 2012, when President Obama whispered to Medvedev, “Tell Vladimir that after the election I’ll be more flexible on missile defense,” and unwittingly got caught by the microphone, setting off a squall of criticism). These unilateral military steps by Washington in Moscow’s favor are unprecedented in the history of strategic dialogue between the two countries (the exception being the initiative to reduce tactical nuclear weapons in 1991, but Moscow responded with reciprocal steps on that occasion).
The United States also made concessions in the 2010 New START Treaty, earning sharp criticism from Congress during the ratification process. Article 5, point 3 of the Treaty states that each party shall not convert and shall not use ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers for placement of missile defense interceptors. This means that missile defense interceptors such as the GBI or SM-3 Block IIB cannot be placed in the hundreds of converted Minuteman-2 silo launchers to form a dense anti-missile defense of the territory of the country.
But these concessions were not enough for Moscow. In the end, it would seem that strategic considerations were not as much of a decisive factor as the political motives mentioned before. Russia’s most competent specialists not bound by service subordination are unanimous in their conclusion that the planned U.S. missile defense programs will not be able to weaken Russia’s nuclear deterrent capability as long as it undergoes reasonable modernization. (Missile constructors general such as Yuri Solomonov and Gerbert Yefremov, generals and admirals from the missile forces such as Viktor Yesin, Vladimir Dvorkin, Pavel Zolotarev, and Valentin Kuznetsov, and civilian experts such as Academician Sergey Rogov and others have all written about this on many occasions.4)
It is a different matter altogether that, judging in retrospect, the idea of joint U.S.-Russian missile defense was quite premature and in a sense even utopian. It has run up against two obstacles, one political and the other strategic.
The first obstacle lies in the fact that joint missile defense essentially means that in protecting millions of its citizens one country relies on the other country’s political commitments and the highest technical effectiveness of all its missile defense systems. This kind of mutual dependence implies nothing less than an alliance of the closest kind, which would have to include not just missile defense but also the countries’ general military and foreign policy postures. Even the current U.S. missile defense program in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region is not a joint program with its allies in the full sense of the term, but is rather an American program, part of which is deployed on allied countries’ territories, and which in some cases involves allies in operating components of the system or is complemented by allies’ systems.
Russia and the United States do not have such close relations and will not in the foreseeable future. In hindsight, it is obvious that it was rather naïve to expect that the various proposed technical solutions to combining particular missile defense components would make it possible to get around the basic military-political realities of relations.
Even partially interlocking missile defense systems would require agreement on the types of missile threats to oppose and on the direction they would come from. The United States makes no secret that its BMD system is intended to defend against missile threats from Iran, North Korea, and possibly, though it is not stated openly, also from China. Russia has never officially recognized any threat to its national security from these countries, but Moscow has on many occasions openly expressed concern about the nuclear missile potentials of Britain, France, Israel, and Pakistan, which, for obvious reasons, are not countries against which the U.S. missile defense system is directed (on the contrary—it is deployed in cooperation with the first three nations).
Russia’s proposal of a sectorial missile defense system, discussed at the talks in 2009–2011, was surprising in the way it ignored these issues. Since the proclaimed idea was that each country would protect the other from missiles flying toward the other over its own space, would this mean that Russia would be ready to intercept Chinese ICBMs passing over Russian territory toward the United States or Western Europe, for example? And if so, would this imply anything less than an alliance with NATO against China? Or was the plan to develop a joint missile defense system in Europe, but keep BMD separate in Asia? This would be patently absurd however, given the need to achieve the highest possible integration of all components of missile defense systems with global reach and on the principle of completely automatic operation. These contradictions in Russia’s position are still in need of explanation, if the sectorial concept had been serious.
The second, strategic obstacle toward developing a joint missile defense system is the state of Russia’s military-political relations with the United States and NATO. Mutual nuclear deterrence still forms the foundation of these relations. This nice-sounding concept hides a harsh reality—that of missiles armed with thousands of nuclear warheads, to this day still aimed at each other and capable of killing millions and millions of the other’s citizens over just a few hours of exchanging strikes. These nuclear arsenals have been considerably reduced since the end of the Cold War, and the reality of nuclear deterrence has faded into the background behind many other current political issues. But it has never disappeared completely and still hovers behind the scenes in strategic relations between the two powers.
Recently, Russian policy has started putting increased emphasis on nuclear deterrence in technical programs and in official declarations. In his policy article published during the 2012 presidential election campaign, for example, Vladimir Putin said, “So long as the ‘gunpowder’ of the strategic nuclear forces that our fathers and grandfathers put such huge effort into building remains ‘dry,’ no one will dare to launch a large-scale attack against us.” Further, he continued, “The nuclear deterrent forces will keep their role and importance in our Armed Forces, at least until such time as we develop new types of weapons and a new generation of strike systems.”5
In its official rhetoric the United States puts less emphasis on nuclear deterrence, but certainly is not about to give it up. The current U.S. military doctrine states that “the fundamental role of America’s nuclear weapons, so long as nuclear weapons exist, is to deter a nuclear attack against the United States and its allies and partners.”6 In this situation, it would be difficult to develop a joint missile system, to put it mildly. It might be possible to establish a joint missile launch data exchange center (JDEC), a sort of common database. An agreement was signed on this in 2000, but it was never actually carried out. However, even without going as far as a fully joint missile defense system, even establishing interfaced missile launch warning systems operating in real time would create a number of problems. The main one is that these systems are still predominantly watching each other’s missile launches, and real-time exchange of information on such launches would be a dubious proposition. Detaching these separate space- and land-based early warning systems from the cooperative ones, detecting third states’ missile launches, would encounter technical and political difficulties.
True, in the previous decade there was a project to cooperate on tactical missile defense (theater missile defense) systems, which was started by Russia conducting joint computer exercises together with the United States/NATO. The political climate was better at that time, however, and the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty also gave an invisible helping hand. Under that Treaty, the United States and Russia eliminated all ground-based missiles that could be the objects of interception by tactical missile defense systems. Hence the fact that the two sides’ remaining missile forces were directed at each other did not contradict cooperation on tactical missile defense against the third states possessing medium and tactical ballistic missiles. The situation is clearly different though when it comes to strategic missiles and missile defense systems.
Still, if the governments had the necessary political will, the experts on both sides would probably be able to draw up a “roadmap” for the gradual convergence of missile defense systems and a parallel movement away from strategic relations based on mutual nuclear deterrence. But at the moment and in the foreseeable future, the two countries are heading not toward military rapprochement but in the opposite direction instead.
The situation is thus quite different now from what it was in 2010–2011. Moscow is still repeating its objections to the NATO missile defense program. Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said recently, “There are still unresolved problems in Russia’s relations with NATO. European missile defense is one of them. Joint work in this area has not been successful, the European missile defense program is developing, and our concerns are not being taken into account… We still support the idea of mutually advantageous cooperation in missile defense… But before we begin any common missile defense projects, we need firm and reliable legal guarantees that the American missile defense system will not be used against Russia’s nuclear deterrent forces.”7
Thus the basic position is still being repeated, but more like a routine mantra. At the practical level, the Russian leadership seems to have lost interest in the idea of joint missile defense and in talks in general with the United States on this matter. Further evidence of this can be seen in media reports that in October 2013 President Putin disbanded the inter-agency working group headed by Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, which was responsible for talks on the missile defense issue with the United States.8
New Priorities
It is not difficult to guess the reasons. First, the U.S. program was previously the only major missile defense program in the world, but Russia now has a program of its own, which is being carried out as part of the air-space defense program. In April 2011, a meeting of the Russian Defense Ministry’s board decided to reorganize the Space Forces as the Air-Space Defense Force, and this decision was sealed by a presidential decree in May 2011.
The program to develop and deploy the Air-Space Defense Force is one of the largest components of the State Armaments Program-2020 and will get around 20 percent of the program’s total budget, that is to say, around 3.4 trillion rubles ($106 billion). Under the Air-Space Defense program, space- and land-based missile attack early warning systems will be modernized and get new components. There are also plans to deploy close-range air-defense systems such as the Pantsir-S1, 28 air/missile defense missile regiments armed with S-400 Triumph systems (around 450–670 launchers), and 38 battalions with the new S-500 Vityaz system (300–460 launchers). Three new antimissile production plants are to be built to handle these procurement contracts. Other plans include establishing a new integrated air-space defense command-control-information system and thoroughly overhauling the Moscow BMD system (A-135) to enable it to carry out non-nuclear kinetic-kill interception of ballistic targets.9 There is some doubt as to whether these plans can actually be implemented by 2020, but the evidence is certainly there that in terms of arms purchases and earmarked funds, air-space defense is one of the State Armaments Program’s top priorities.
Therefore, it should be no surprise at all that in contrast to 2009–2010, Russia’s possible participation in the U.S./NATO system is no longer on the agenda. The most that could be envisioned now is working out the possible compatibility of some elements between the two programs and their respective systems. But even this runs up against the political and strategic obstacles mentioned above. Moreover, the U.S. missile defense system is officially being developed to counter missile threats from third countries (although Russia suspects it is actually directed against Russia’s forces), but in Russia’s case it has been openly proclaimed that its air-space defense system is directed against the United States. In such a situation, creating a joint system is clearly out of the question, routine repetition of past statements notwithstanding.
In June 2013, while visiting a plant manufacturing air defense missiles, President Putin said, “Effective air-space defense is the guarantee of strategic nuclear deterrent forces’ survivability and our country’s protection against attacks by the air-space systems.”10 The only nation in the world capable of threatening the survivability of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces is the United States, and no other country has air-space systems, whatever is meant by this romantic term.
Second, after starting its own air-space defense program, it seems that the Russian leadership has not only abandoned the idea of a joint sectorial missile defense system, but has also lost interest in the idea of receiving U.S. guarantees that its missile defenses “are not directed” against Russia. No doubt, Moscow would be happy to put limits on the U.S. missile defense system. But Russia would probably be most unwilling to accept reciprocal limits on its own system by providing guarantees that it would not be directed against the United States, given the fact that the Russian system is openly designed for just such a purpose. Washington shows no interest in agreements of this sort and for whatever reason seems unconcerned about Russia’s air-space defense program (as it is also about Russia’s strategic offensive arms programs). This could suggest that either the United States is not actually pursuing the aims that Russia is trying to counter with its offensive and defensive systems, or that it does not consider Russia’s countermeasures effective. Either way, both premises are worth more serious analysis in Moscow.
In a 2012 election campaign article, Putin said, “We can guarantee against upsetting the global balance of power either by creating our own very expensive and as yet not very effective missile defense system, or, much more productively, by ensuring our capability to penetrate any missile defense system and protect Russia’s retaliation potential. This is the aim that our strategic nuclear forces and the air-space defenses will pursue.”11
Assuming that this statement is not just another piece of rhetoric, but contains thought-through strategic substance, it is worth analyzing in more detail. If missile defense systems are considered “expensive and not very effective,” then the air-space defense program is not about building missile defense systems to protect Russian strategic nuclear forces from attack by U.S. nuclear-armed land- and sea-based strategic ballistic missiles. (The only exception seems to be the above-mentioned plans for modernizing the A-135 BMD system that protects the Moscow region, where no strategic nuclear forces are based.) In the past, U.S. nuclear ballistic missiles were considered the greatest threat to the Soviet/Russian strategic deterrence/retaliation capability. Following this logic then, the main task for Russian air-space defense now is to protect the country’s strategic nuclear forces from U.S. offensive systems of a different kind. These seem to be represented by the long-range conventionally-armed precision-guided weapons.
Judging by the evidence, the Russian authorities now consider these weapons, and not U.S. missile defense systems, to be the main high-tech threat.
It is noteworthy that this is the area in which Russia has the biggest technology gap to close, and the declining role of nuclear deterrence, to which the Russian authorities give such a prominent part, must look like an alarming prospect. Furthermore, the new weapon systems would make it much harder to clearly evaluate the stability of the strategic balance and calculate the sufficiency of the nuclear deterrent forces. They will create even more complications for arms control talks and even for preserving treaties currently in force (such as the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty or the 2010 New START Treaty).
Current Threats
According to available data, there are around 3,000 conventional subsonic Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs) called Tomahawk of various modes with an operational range of up to 1,800 km deployed on U.S. submarines, cruisers, and destroyers. There are also around 500 Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs) with an operational range of 1,500 km (AGM-86 C/D) on U.S. heavy bombers.12
Given the current political and economic situation, the probability of a war between the United States and Russia is vanishingly small. However, even in purely military terms it is very doubtful that such systems are capable of implementing a disarming strike against Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. Preparations for such an operation would take a long time and would be visible to the other side, leaving it with the opportunity to maximize the combat readiness of its forces. The attack itself would take many hours or even days (a nuclear ballistic missile attack would take only 20–40 minutes), which would allow the other side to initiate a retaliatory nuclear strike while being attacked by cruise missiles.
Nevertheless, in case there is any doubt that nuclear arms would be used in response to a conventional strike, the air-space defense (VKO) system could be helpful. With good command-control-information support, such systems as the close defense Pantsir-S1 or air defense S-400 can possibly defend both mobile and fixed nuclear deterrence sites (command centers, silo-based and mobile ICBMs, submarine and bomber bases). In any case, the VKO system can provide additional time for decision-making and will make the opponent’s disarming strike planning much more uncertain, which enhances nuclear deterrence.
Advanced Systems
In addition, the United States is currently developing several new systems, which are at different experimental stages, in the framework of the conventional Prompt Global Strike (PGS) program. Various systems in the program could become operational after 2020. These elements include boost-glide (or aero-ballistic) systems with hypersonic re-entry vehicles such as the Hypersonic Technology Vehicle (HTV-2) with an expected operational range of up to 17,000 km (with speeds of up to Mach 20) and the Advanced Hypersonic Weapon (AHW) with an operational range of up to 8,000 km. The former can be based in the United States, while the latter can be deployed on the islands of Guam and Diego Garcia, and also on ships and submarines. Both systems are launched by a ballistic booster and then reenter stratosphere with maneuverable guided hypersonic glide vehicles. HTV-2 tests were unsuccessful, but the project continues with reduced funding, while experiments with the AHW continue with a relatively high level of funding.
In addition, Sea-Launched Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles (SLIRBMs) with gliding or maneuverable re-entry vehicles (operational range up to 3,700 km), which can be launched from ships and submarines, are under development. The X-51A WaveRider hypersonic cruise missile (with an operational range of up to 1,800 km and a speed of Mach 5) is undergoing tests outside the framework of the PGS program.13
As in the case of the BMD program, Washington justifies these developments by the need to counter extremist regimes (Iran, North Korea) and terrorists. Some independent Western experts assume that these weapons could be used in a military conflict with China. The Russian side does not believe it and considers current and future conventional U.S. weapons primarily as a threat to the Russian nuclear deterrence potential.
Apparently, this is what Putin meant when he wrote in his article: “All this will provide fundamentally new instruments for achieving political and strategic goals in addition to nuclear weapons. Such weapon systems will be as effective as nuclear weapons but will be more ‘acceptable’ from the political and military point of view. Therefore, the strategic balance of nuclear forces will gradually lose its significance in the matter of deterring aggression and chaos.”14
In fact this is not quite true. Such weapons will never be even remotely as destructive as nuclear ones, both in a disarming strike against hardened targets and in attacks on industrial and residential areas.
Besides, these systems enter space at lower altitudes and travel shorter distances than ICBMs and SLBMs, so they cannot be called air-space weapons. The probability of making a disarming strike with these systems against a nuclear superpower is as questionable in political and military terms as is the case today when only subsonic cruise missiles are available. However, it is perfectly understandable why the Russian leadership is concerned about a whole range of these projects—in technical terms boost-glide systems pose new and specific technical problems to Russia.
New Challenges
Modern nuclear Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles are faster (speeds up to Mach 21–22) and have shorter flight times (15–30 minutes), and they are virtually impossible to counter in a massive attack. However, their trajectories are predictable, they only attack pre-programmed targets, and their launches are detected by satellites after a few minutes of the flight and then are confirmed by land-based radars 10-15 minutes before the warheads’ impact. Therefore, there is a theoretical possibility of a launch-on-warning retaliatory strike. In addition, mobile land- and sea-based missile forces can survive and deliver a second strike too.
The launch of a boost-glide system may also be detected from satellites. But they then dive into the stratosphere and proceed at hypersonic speed along an unpredictable trajectory. Because their trajectories are lower than those of ICBMs and SLBMs, early warning land-based radars will detect them only 3–4 minutes before approach, while air defense radars, due to these missiles’ higher speed, will detect them only 3 minutes or less in advance.15
According to many Russian experts, U.S. boost-glide systems pose a threat, as along the longest part of their flight trajectories they remain in a “blind spot,” in between beams of missile attack early warning radars and air defense radars.
In contrast to current cruise missiles, future hypersonic ALCMs can be detected at a greater distance due to their higher trajectories, but their speed will complicate the actual interception.
It remains unclear whether new conventional weapons will be accurate enough to hit such hard targets as ICBM silos, command centers, or road-mobile missile launchers. In the final phase of the trajectory these gliding weapons will have to be guided by satellites or aircraft, which will give the other side an opportunity to use electronic countermeasures. It is also not yet clear whether there will be enough of these weapons deployed by the United States to create a viable threat to Russia’s strategic forces.
At the same time, Russian military and civilian officials, responsible for Russia’s defense, must consider the worst-case scenario. It is possible that they assume that boost-glide systems will be equipped with nuclear warheads, which will solve the problem of their accuracy in the final flight stage, at least for destroying fixed targets. (But in this case it will not be possible to claim that the use of these weapons is more “acceptable” in military and political terms in comparison to nuclear ones, which was emphasized by Putin.) The boost-glide systems’ flight trajectory will make the ICBM launch-on-warning retaliatory strike more difficult to implement. Otherwise ICBMs would have to be launched after receiving only a warning from satellites with no confirmation from land-based radars. This might increase the probability of an outbreak of accidental nuclear war due to a false alarm.
According to information available, the A-135 system deployed around Moscow has been modernized for non-nuclear interception, allegedly to defend the military-political leadership against conventional ballistic and boost-glide systems. The advanced S-500 surface-to-air systems will specifically defend strategic nuclear forces against the above-mentioned weapons and conventional hypersonic cruise missiles. For this purpose, they have to be integrated into a single command-information system with space- and land-based early warning assets.
Future Prospects
If a political window of opportunity opens in the future, then the key to resolving the current impasse in the negotiations will not be an agreement on BMD systems, but rather an agreement on modern conventional long-range offensive weapons. The threat of these weapons is, apparently, the greatest concern for Moscow that makes it reluctant to accept U.S. proposals to further reduce strategic nuclear weapons following the New START Treaty and limit non-strategic (tactical) nuclear arms.
In order to be able to make a disarming strike, new conventional hypersonic weapons must be deployed in large numbers (at least several hundred missiles). The deployment of such systems can be significantly downscaled by including them in the next START treaty ceilings. The United States would probably be unlikely to decide to seriously downgrade its nuclear triad after 2020 by deploying many new conventional strategic arms within the limits of the next START treaty. There is a precedent for this in the 2010 New START—strategic ballistic missiles are limited by the Treaty regardless of whether their warheads are nuclear or conventional.
It will be much harder, but not impossible, to agree on confidence- and security-building measures in relation to the current cruise missiles and future hypersonic ALCMs. For instance, since SLCM-equipped submarines, unlike strategic ballistic missile boats, are mostly not on permanent sea patrol, it would be possible to agree on providing notification of a massive deployment (exceeding the routine) of SLCM-equipped attack submarines with an explanation of the reasons and purposes for such actions. Such confidence-building measures would dissipate fears that the other side is covertly preparing a surprise disarming strike with the use of thousands of conventional cruise missiles. The same procedure should be extended to a massive takeoff of non-nuclear heavy bombers or their redeployment to forward bases.
Another significant problem is connected with the development of the AHW and Submarine-Launched Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles (SLIRBMs), which may be deployed on the islands of Guam and Diego Garcia, as well as on ships and attack submarines. If in terms of their range they do not fall under the limitations of the next START treaty (as was suggested above), then they will be perceived by Russia as a new threat, similar to the way U.S. ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles were perceived in the early 1980s. This will further undermine the fundamental and historically significant 1987 INF Treaty, which is already under attack in Russian official and expert communities.16 One arms control solution could be to prohibit land-based systems with a range of less than 5,500 km (the lowest ICBM range threshold under the START Treaty counting rules) and apply the confidence-building measures described above with regard to attack submarines and ships equipped with such weapons.
In addition, transparency and confidence-building measures could be applied for preventing the arming of hypersonic systems with nuclear warheads, which will surely be a source of concern in Moscow.
As for defensive systems, if the arguments listed above correspond to actual strategic rationale, then the Russian program and future VKO (air-space defense) system can be considered as a stabilizing factor in the context of the basic understanding of strategic stability (as the state of strategic relations between the parties that makes a first disarming strike impossible). Unfortunately, such reasonable explanations are not provided on the official level. Instead, superficial arguments (for example, that the VKO system is “better” than the U.S. BMD because it is built inside Russia and does not advance toward U.S. borders) are being reiterated.
There is no doubt from a strategic and technical point of view (in contrast to political biases) that the U.S./NATO BMD system cannot counter a large-scale nuclear missile strike. However, as its purpose is to defend the territories of the United States and its allies, and as it is being developed in an open-ended mode, it creates a much greater sense of uncertainty in the longer term than the Russian VKO. This uncertainty may be dispelled through confidence-building measures, as well as certain agreed quantitative, technical, and geographical criteria that would separate a stabilizing system against third countries from a destabilizing system against each other’s second-strike potentials.
It is high time for the United States and Russia to begin a meaningful discussion of the new principles of strategic stability. As long as nuclear weapons are to be further reduced, strengthening strategic stability by increasing their survivability by way of improved mobility, active defensive systems, and enhanced negative and positive command-control,17 as well as arms control agreements, will become even more important. The strategic environment has drastically changed since the initial understanding of the concept of strategic stability, elaborated by former U.S. secretary of defense Robert McNamara in his famous San Francisco speech of September 1967 and later formalized in the U.S.-Soviet Joint Statement of June 1990.18 It is necessary to revise and update it accordingly as a basis for further nuclear arms control.
In the case of a substantial limitation of advanced U.S. conventional arms, Russia’s VKO system might be reoriented to other important and realistic goals: protecting the population and industry from single or small-scale strikes by missiles and aircraft carrying nuclear or conventional weapons and coming from third countries, radical regimes, and terrorists. The same planned VKO technology can be used for these purposes, but with a wider geographic deployment and higher effectiveness. This would create conditions for the integration of certain U.S./NATO and Russian early warning systems and later of other missile defense elements in order to enhance the effectiveness of national defenses in combating new, common missile threats.
In case there is political will that is complemented by strategic and technical expertise, it would be possible to draw a dividing line between the stability of the central strategic balance and the options of the regional employment of weapon systems by combining treaty restrictions and confidence-building and transparency measures. In the course of forty years of arms control, the sides have a record of tackling more difficult tasks.
Notes
1 Vladimir Putin, “Being Strong: National Security Guarantees for Russia,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, February 20, 2012, http://archive.premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/18185/.
2 Rachel Oswald, “U.S. Pessimistic About Missile-Defense, Arms Control Progress with Russia,” Global Security Newswire, November 13, 2013, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-pessimistic-about-progress-missile-defense-arms-control-russia/?mgs1=1ddbdJhNb4.
3 Statement in Connection with the Situation Concerning the NATO Countries’ Missile Defence System in Europe, President of Russia, November 23, 2011, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/3115.
4 Sergey Rogov, Viktor Yesin, Pavel Zolotarev, and Valentin Kuznetsov, “Rossiya i SShA na Razvilke” [Russia and the U.S. at a Fork in the Road], Nezavisimoe Voyennoe Obozrenie, August 2–8, 2013, No. 27 (768), PP. 1, 3.
5 Putin, “Being Strong.”
6 US Nuclear Posture Review Report, Department of Defense, April 2010, http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20nuclear%20posture%20review%20report.pdf.
7 Viktor Litovkin, “Kaska dlya General’nogo Sekretarya” [A Helmet for the Secretary General], Nezavisimoe Voyennoe Obozrenie, November 1, 2013, http://www.ng.ru/nvo/2013-11-01/1_nato.html.
8 “Putin Dissolves Task Force for Missile Defense Cooperation with NATO,” Global Security Newswire, October 31, 2013, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/russia-moving-deepen-air-defense-ties-ex-soviet-republics/.
9 Alexander Khramchikhin, “Vozdushno-Kosmicheskaya Oborona kak Vozmozhnost’” [Air-Space Defense as an Opportunity], Nezavisimoe Voyennoe Obozrenie, March 4, 2013, No. 11, P. 3.
10 Vladimir Putin, “Rossiya Budet Narashchivat’ Vozmozhnosti VKO” [Russia Will Develop Its Air-Space Defense Capabilities], Natsional’naya Oborona [National Defense], No. 7 (July 2013): P. 22.
11 Ibid.
12 See: Eugene Miasnikov, “The Air-Space Threat to Russia,” in Missile Defense: Confrontation and Cooperation, ed. Alexei Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin, and Natalia Bubnova, 121-146 (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2013).
13 See: James Acton, “Silver Bullet? Asking the Right Questions About Conventional Prompt Global Strike” (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013), PP. 33–63.
14 Putin, “Russia Will Develop Its Air-Space Defense Capabilities.”
15 Acton, “Silver Bullet.”
16 Alexei Arbatov, “Sem’ Raz Otmerit” [Measure Twice, Cut Once], Nezavisimoe Voyennoe Obozrenie, August 2, 2013, http://nvo.ng.ru/armament/2013-08-02/1_7times.html.
17 “Negative control” means prevention of unauthorized use of nuclear weapons; “positive control” means assurance of their use if authorized by national authorities.
18 In the cited speech, R. McNamara argued that deployment of ballistic missile defense systems might be destabilizing by fueling the arms race and increasing the possibility of a first strike. In the 1990 Joint Statement, strategic stability was qualified as a state of strategic relationships that made a first (disarming) strike impossible. It encouraged the two parties to implement strategic arms reductions while emphasizing survivable weapon systems and reducing the ratio of the number of warheads to delivery systems.