Source: Carnegie
Originally published in the Financial Times,
Feburary 4, 2002
What does al-Qaeda have in common with Amnesty International and Greenpeace?
All three are loose networks of individuals united by a shared passion for a
single cause, and, thanks to cheaper communication and transport, each can project
its influence globally. Their funding comes from small contributions made by
thousands of sympathisers and from large sums given by a few big donors. Their
effectiveness derives from the single-minded devotion of their idealistic activists.
The difference, of course, is that while al-Qaeda's suicidal terrorists want
to bring western civilization down, the members of Amnesty, Greenpeace and other
such non-governmental organisations want to make it better. Most, in fact, do.
By any reckoning, the 1990s were a good decade for NGOs. The rise of these nimble
organisations has - with the exception of the al-Qaedas of this world - been
a generally positive development. But it also highlights a troubling decline
in the fortunes of political parties. Indeed, the weakening of broad-based parties
that aggregate disparate interests at the national level and that help stabilise
domestic politics is unfortunate.
Moreover, at a time when countries are periodically destabilised by foreign
shocks, from financial crashes to terrorism, the domestic volatility that usually
coexists with a weak party system is even more troubling. Fittingly, the best
way for political parties to recover their lost vigour may be by emulating some
of the practices that have made NGOs such a success.
During the 1990s, angry voters, from Germany to Peru, threw out long-dominant
political parties. Why? Because the 1990s were bad for ideological politics
and good for political corruption.
The end of the cold war blurred the ideological lines that gave many parties
their identity. As electoral platforms became indistinguishable, candidate personalities
became the main, and often the only, differentiating factor. To win elections,
political parties relied less on the popular appeal of their ideals and ideas
and more on marketing techniques and the telegenic prowess of candidates.
Meanwhile, freer media and more independent parliaments and judiciaries ensured
that corrupt practices once carefully hidden or silently tolerated became clearly
visible and obviously criminal. Political parties that could no longer distinguish
themselves ideologically from their opponents increasingly relied on scandals
to define rivals in the minds of voters. It is impossible to know if corruption
actually increased in the past decade, but it certainly was more exposed than
ever. Remember Helmut Kohl? Giulio Andreotti? Noboru Takeshita? Carlos Salinas
de Gortari?
While parties struggled, pressure groups thrived. As the ties between political
parties and their electorates weakened, those between NGOs and their supporters
became tighter. As the public standing of politicians and political parties
continued its secular decline, the prestige and influence of NGOs grew. As NGOs
pursued their single issues with monomaniacal zeal, political parties chased
a multitude of different goals and seemed monomaniacal only in their pursuit
of campaign contributions.
Political parties are expected to have positions on all aspects of national
and international affairs, a situation that often forces them to defend somewhat
contradictory policies - strong defence, generous social security and fiscal
restraint, for example. A broad agenda is also a fertile ground for political
compromises that further blur a party's identity and values.
In countries where political parties remained banned or stifled, NGOs became
the only channel of political participation - the case in much of the Middle
East. In most other countries, NGOs grew rapidly because they were less tainted
by corruption, often belonged to a larger international network and generally
had clearer ideals, a less hierarchical structure and a closer relationship
with their members.
NGOs also had the advantage of having a clear mission. Whether dedicated to
the protection of human rights, the environment or the control of population
growth, members rarely lost sight of what their organisations stood for. All
these factors led new cohorts of activists, who in the past would have gravitated
towards political parties, towards NGOs instead.
The growth of NGOs is, on balance, a welcome trend. What is far less welcome,
and indeed ought to be reversed, is the erosion in the public standing of political
parties, which in many countries - Italy, Russia, Venezuela - has led to their
virtual disappearance and replacement with ad hoc electoral machines. Strong,
broad-based and well-institutionalised political parties that address a multitude
of issues, aggregate competing interests and provide organised channels of political
participation are indispensable. Without them, unbridled pragmatism and social
Balkanisation ensue, aggravating the instability of domestic politics, economics,
public policy and institutions.
Breaking the addiction of political parties to the money of big business and
special interests is the obvious precondition to making them stronger. Big money
from strong groups reduces the parties' autonomy, transparency and accountability
and weakens them. Reliance on such contributions undermines the resolve of parties
to create and sustain the kind of close connections that successful NGOs have
with their grass-roots members.
Political parties must also be willing to adapt their structures and methods
to a more networked world. While the war-room tactics of rapid response, message
discipline and spin control may serve to win over pundits, they do not do much
for the grass roots. Just as relatively flat, non-hierarchical structures with
more independent cells have helped NGOs, so they might also help political parties
reach new members and advance their agendas.
Of course, political parties will never be the same as NGOs. They cannot blindly
copy such tactics and approaches, but they may be able to learn something from
NGOs - perhaps even from al-Qaeda.