Source: Al Ahram Weekly
In the press conference following the International Quartet Committee meeting last Friday, US Secretary of the State Condoleezza Rise insisted that it is too early to set a date for establishing the Palestinian state and reiterated the importance of reaching a security understanding between the Palestinians and Israelis. As one could expect, the Quartet meeting ended with no concrete mechanisms established for resuming the peace process or plans to help the Palestinian people overcome the severe existing social and economic crisis. In contrast, it re-emphasised the same misleading foundations for resuming negotiations between the Palestinians and Israelis, contributing more to the suffering of the Palestinian people and adding more obstacles to the possibility of establishing a viable Palestinian state and economy. This type of intervention by the international community demonstrates the failure of the whole approach to the peace process.
From the outset, the focus on security issues and demanding from the oppressed, the Palestinians, strict security measures to protect the oppressor, Israel, as a precondition for resuming negotiations is not only misguided but also eliminates the possibility of reaching any viable political and economic agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. Viewing the conflict through a "security lens" reduces it to a security problem rather than one of a brutal and longstanding occupation and the denial of national, political and economic rights. Security for the Palestinians and the Israeli people is one of the promised outcomes of building a viable Palestinian state and economy. The security measures and practices of the Israeli occupation that take, among other forms, the character of collective punishment and the separation wall in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, destroy the possibility of building a state and economy and deepen unrest on both sides.
The existing approach of the international community in dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict is obstructing the possibility of resuming the peace process. The roadmap is not only built on the wrong foundations -- focussing on security issues as preconditions for political progress, instead of focussing on political and economic agreements as a means for achieving security -- but it lacks also a clear and well defined enforcement mechanism for the implementation of components of this "map" and monitoring progress. The lack of an enforcement mechanism is characteristic of all international resolutions and initiatives that deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict. Hence, from the beginning all these initiatives and resolutions failed to achieve their objectives.
What the international community is demanding from the Palestinian Authority (PA) as a precondition for resuming the peace process is impossible to achieve. The main puzzle is that the international community in general, and the US in particular, is fully aware of the nature of the PA and its limited capacity. Despite this awareness, they keep demanding from the PA to take certain security, political and economic measures to meet the requirements of Israel, putting these measures as preconditions for resuming the peace process.
Since its establishment in 1994 as a result of the Oslo Accords, the PA has very limited security, political and economic control over the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Oslo Accords specified the mandate of the PA and its ability to determine security, political and economic policies. The accords also set out the institutional nature, structure and capacity of PA institutions. The terms and conditions of these accords have tremendously contributed to institutionalising the dependence of the West Bank and Gaza Strip on Israel. It gave the PA full control of only 18 per cent of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, dividing the whole into three zones: A, B and C. Zone A (18 per cent) is under full PA control. Zone B is under the administrative control of the PA and the security control of Israel, Zone C is under the full control of Israel. Zone A contains many districts effectively separated from one another. Zones B and C surround these districts, which gives Israel effective control over the whole West Bank and Gaza Strip. However, since 2000, the PA no longer even controls Zone A since Israel reoccupied most of it. Moreover, Israel has violated the Oslo Accords by frequent invasions of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the destruction of the institutional structure of the PA, and the constriction of the separation wall. In addition, the Oslo Accords left the PA with no control over borders and natural resources, no currency, and no power to determine fiscal and monetary policy, or foreign policy. It also left the PA with no power over determining citizenship, and forced it to be highly dependent on, and restricted and regulated by, the government of Israel.
The international community, by demanding from the PA impossible benchmarks, is indirectly adding more obstacles to the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and denying its responsibility for the daily suffering of the Palestinian people and the injustices that gave birth to the Palestinian cause. What makes the situation more complex is the fact that certain groups within the PA and main political parties have convinced themselves that the PA is sovereign and often tried to act nationally, regionally and internationally as a sovereign state. Having a strong leader like Yasser Arafat allowed the PA to achieve positive outcomes from playing such a role. However, after the death of Arafat and the victory of Hamas in the most recent elections, playing such a role is becoming counterproductive, simply used by all parties to exercise more political and financial pressure on the Palestinians.
The dispute between Fatah and Hamas over the overarching political programme and controlling certain ministries in the proposed national unity government is a great example of such misjudgement of internal and international contexts. This dispute has generated clashes between both parties that resulted in hundreds from Hamas and Fatah being killed and injured. Of course, this analysis is not by any means underestimating the divisive role external actors have played in actively contributing to blocking the possibility of forming a unity government. However, it is more likely that forming a unity government headed by Hamas will not lead to the resumption of direct financial aid from the international community to the PA, or the resumption of negotiations between the Palestinians and Israel. The international community will continue to boycott this government and to avoid exercising pressure on Israel to ease collective punishments against the Palestinians and to offer a plausible political comprise.
It may be best for the Palestinians to form a technocrat government, with limited duration, that can deal with the international community and manage the daily life of, and deliver services to, the Palestinian people. These should be the objectives of such a government. Political issues should be determined and dealt with by the political parties and the Palestine Liberation Organisation. Both Hamas and Fatah should seize the opportunity to reach a common vision to address internal issues and to manage Israeli excuses. The last few months have demonstrated strongly that a consensus is slowly being reached in the international community, and among major players in the region, on the urgent need to revive the peace process. The Baker-Hamilton Commission's recommendations considerably contributed to the consolidation of this viewpoint.
While it is crucial for the Palestinians to organise their internal affairs, the international community should redefine its role regarding its role in the Arab- Israeli conflict. Solving the ever-present conflict requires unbiased mediators. The international community should engage directly with both sides to resume peace negotiations on fair and clear principles and in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions. It needs also to develop well-defined mechanisms to implement agreements between both sides and to monitor the implementation process so that prospects for reaching peace become more realistic.
It is imperative to have fresh thinking and a new approach to the peace process, one that goes beyond the assumptions and working premises that underlie the roadmap. The trouble with the roadmap -- in insisting on symmetry and mutuality -- is that it equalises the oppressed and the oppressor, expecting from both the same level of delivery and ignoring the history of the conflict. Yet talk about organising the internal affairs of the Palestinians, and the need to redefine the role of the international community, is useless if Israeli policies of building settlements, bypasses, the separation wall, of controlling natural resources and imposing closures, continue. These are the main obstacles for building a viable Palestinian state and economy and hence achieving security and sustaining peace between the Palestinians and Israelis.
* The writer is a specialist on Palestinian and Middle Eastern economic affairs at the Carnegie Middle East Centre.