commentary

Tracking the German Nuclear Debate

Shortly after the election of Donald Trump as U.S. president in November 2016, several prominent German politicians, journalists, and scholars began to discuss whether Germany ought to explore options in case of U.S. retrenchment of its security guarantees.

by Ulrich Kühn, Tristan Volpe, and Bert Thompson

Published on August 15, 2018

Last Updated: March 5, 2020

Shortly after the election of Donald Trump as U.S. president in November 2016, several prominent German politicians, journalists, and scholars began to debate the potential impact on German security of changes in U.S. policy toward NATO and Russia. With Trump arguing for conditionality on the U.S. commitment to the security of Europe during the presidential campaign, the discussion in Germany focused on the credibility of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence and whether Germany ought to explore options in case of U.S. retrenchment of its security guarantees.

The debate gained steam in late November 2016 with an op-ed by the publisher of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Germany’s leading conservative newspaper, and prompted also by several interviews given by the special representative for foreign affairs of the German Bundestag’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, Roderich Kiesewetter (CDU/CSU). These and other protagonists pondered three potential options for Germany: (1) an indigenous German nuclear deterrent; (2) a pan-European deterrent (or Eurodeterrent); and (3) preserving Germany’s latent nuclear technology capacity. To be sure, most proponents underscored that these contingencies would only be applicable in the unlikely event of U.S. nuclear retrenchment from NATO. Most experts and commentators dismissed all three options for political, legal, and/or technical reasons, or otherwise brushed off the entire discourse as a “phantom debate.”

English-language media in the United Kingdom and the United States picked up the story after a lag of some weeks, which gave the debate both greater momentum and visibility, especially in the month following Trump’s inauguration on January 20, 2017, but also created something of a feedback effect.

The database below provides the first detailed overview of the German nuclear debate, based on primary sources. There are three reasons to track the debate in this way. First, the database provides an open research resource for experts, scholars, and the general public. Second, this information serves as the evidentiary record and permanently accessible appendix for scholarship on the topic by Ulrich Kühn and Tristan Volpe in Foreign Affairs and the Washington Quarterly. Third, the database enables other analysts to draw independent conclusions from the same comprehensive and transparent pool of information.

The database covers the period from November 2016 to December 2019 and lists all media content, as well as quotes and documents relevant to the debate, in ascending order, with a special emphasis on German- and English-language media and authors. The overview is coded along five sections per entry.

The first section lists the source and provides a link to the original online content, if available.
The second section lists the origin of the outlet and the author and, if possible, author’s affiliation.
The third section lists the type of media appearance (e.g., op-ed, reporting, or interview).
The fourth section provides a short, generalized assessment of the position the author or interviewee takes with regards to the three options outlined above. This section distinguishes between five positions. The first position is labeled “affirming,” meaning that the author or interviewee unconditionally affirms the need for Germany to explore one of the three nuclear policy options (German deterrent, Eurodeterrent, or latent capacity). The second position, “contemplating,” captures a position where those three policy options are pondered in case the U.S. security guarantee undergoes changes. The third position, “rejecting,” opposes to either pursue or even discuss the three options. The “denying” category is for those authors that deny the existence of the debate itself. Finally, “neutral” applies to those articles that report on a mostly neutral basis.
Coding of these positions is subjective and open to interpretation since some statements meander between several positions; hence the decision to make the raw information in this database transparent and readily accessible. To make the overview on positions more accessible to the reader, colors are assigned to each position (green=affirming; yellow=contemplating; red=rejecting; orange=denying; and gray=neutral).
In order to facilitate independent inquiry, each entry provides key quotes from most of the entries in section five (translations of quotes from German into English have been provided by Ulrich Kühn; he does not claim absolute rigor).

This database does not aim to be comprehensive and complete. For instance, we decided to exclude fringe outlets such as extreme right-wing or left-wing blogs or web pages. Instead, the focus is on the mainstream media outlets. If the debate continues and new participants join, we will update the database accordingly.

In the wake of U.S. President Donald Trump’s implicit threat to pull out of NATO at the alliance’s Brussels Summit (July 11-12, 2018) and the Trump-Putin Summit in Helsinki shortly thereafter, a second nuclear debate flared up in Germany.

As during the first debate in late 2016/early 2017, this second debate centered on the question of what might happen to German and European security if the United States leaves NATO. Again, Germany’s three (non-)nuclear options were debated: (1) an indigenous German nuclear deterrent; (2) a pan-European deterrent (or Eurodeterrent); and (3) preserving Germany’s latent nuclear technology capacity. The most controversial piece was published by German international relations scholar Christian Hacke in Die Welt am Sonntag (July 29, 2018).

In contrast to the 2016/2017 debate, the emphasis shifted away from the fundamental question of whether Germany should pursue an alternative nuclear option other than the current nuclear sharing arrangement with the United States at all. Instead, many contributors engaged with the question of how an alternative option might materialize, or, respectively, why it would not be feasible. In that regard, the indigenous option was again discarded. However, the option of Berlin cooperating with France (and Britain) on a future Eurodeterrent gained much more prominence and support.

Code for colors:

Affirm
Contemplate
Deny
Reject
Neutral

Database:

Source: Henrik Müller, “Wie Trump Deutschland zur Aufrüstung zwingen könnte,” Der Spiegel, November 6, 2016, http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/wie-donald-trump-deutschland-zur-aufruestung-zwingen-koennte-a-1119912.html#spRedirectedFrom=www&referrrer=https://t.co/J8tkDBM2kC.
Origin: German news website; German author (academic); written in German
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Contemplate [German Deterrent]
Key Quotes:
“In the event of a break-up of NATO and the complete abolition of the American security guarantee, even a new arms race could be the result, as already exists elsewhere in the world. Even a debate about indigenous German nuclear weapons would then be conceivable.

To prevent misunderstandings, all this is by no means desirable. Military instability and economic inefficiency would be the consequences. For Europe it would be much better and cheaper, the US remained involved. But in view of the isolationist sentiment on the other side of the Atlantic, we should be mindful of such a scenario.”
Source: Andrea Shalal, “German Lawmaker Says Europe Must Consider Own Nuclear Deterrence Plan,” Reuters, November 16, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/uk-germany-usa-nuclear-idUSKBN13B1GO.
Origin: British news agency; U.S. author (journalist); German interviewee (member of the Bundestag); written in English
Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]
Position: Neutral [Reporting]/Contemplate [Citations on Eurodeterrent]/Reject [Citations on Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“Europe needs to think about developing its own nuclear deterrent strategy given concerns that U.S. President-elect Donald Trump could scale back U.S. military commitments in Europe, a senior member of Chancellor Angela Merkel's conservatives said.

Roderich Kiesewetter, foreign policy spokesman for the conservative bloc in parliament, told Reuters that Germany could play an important role in convincing nuclear powers France and Britain to provide security guarantees for all of Europe.

‘The U.S. nuclear shield and nuclear security guarantees are imperative for Europe,’ he said in an interview. ‘If the United States no longer wants to provide this guarantee, Europe still needs nuclear protection for deterrent purposes.’. . .

Kiesewetter said he was not reassured by President Barack Obama's comments on Monday that Trump would maintain core strategic relationships, including with NATO. . . .

Kiesewetter said a Franco-British nuclear umbrella for Europe would be costly, but could be financed through a joint European military budget that is due to begin in 2019, along with joint European medical, transportation and reconnaissance commands. . . .

Rainer Arnold, defence spokesman for the Social Democrats in parliament, dismissed Kiesewetter's suggestion as “off base,” saying Trump's own U.S. Republican Party would never accept a weakening of NATO and would be sceptical about any plans to boost European nuclear capabilities.”
Source: Thorsten Benner, “Germany Can Protect the Liberal Order. Damage Control After Trump’s Election,” Foreign Affairs, November 16, 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/germany/2016-11-16/germany-can-protect-liberal-order.
Origin: U.S. foreign policy website; German author (Global Public Policy Institute); written in English
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Positon: Contemplate [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“If Trump proves serious about abandoning U.S. defense guarantees, European states may be compelled to rethink their nuclear postures. Berlin will need to consider whether to develop a European nuclear umbrella based on French and British capabilities. Germany should also increase its resilience against the influence of authoritarian states such as China and Russia. It should improve its cybersecurity capabilities and its readiness to confront misinformation and leaking campaigns (such as the one orchestrated by Russia during the U.S. election), and it should impose greater costs on the Western actors that enable authoritarian influence-peddling.”
Source: “EU-Verteidigungspolitik nach der US-Wahl: ‘Wir werden mehr Geld für unsere Sicherheit ausgeben müssen,‘“ Deutschlandfunk, November 18, 2016, http://www.deutschlandfunk.de/eu-verteidigungspolitik-nach-der-us-wahl-wir-werden-mehr.694.de.html?dram:article_id=371737.
Origin: German broadcaster; German author (journalist); German interviewee (member of the Bundestag); written in German
Type: Interview
Position: Neutral [Interview]/Contemplate [Citations on Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“Zagatta: How far should cooperation go, this Union you are talking about? You are now being quoted by the news agency Reuters, that one must even organize a nuclear deterrent, a European nuclear deterrent. How is this supposed to work?

Kiesewetter: This is not yet a question, but there must be no restrictions on free thought. If the United States, as Trump has implied, wants the Europeans to pay more for their security, or even retreat from Europe, then there should be no restrictions on free thought, and we have to strongly reach out to France and Britain then.”
Source: Michael Rühle, “Daydream Believers,” Berlin Policy Journal, November 23, 2016, http://berlinpolicyjournal.com/daydream-believers/.
Origin: German foreign policy website; German author (NATO official); written in English
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Reject [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“Many proponents of a stronger European effort in security and defense are making the case for a conventional force strong enough to deter Russia. But they seem to overlook that Russia is a nuclear power and can therefore trump whatever conventional improvements the Europeans might be able to muster. With the United Kingdom ‘Brexiting’, the EU (unlike NATO) cannot count on London’s nuclear support. France would never let an EU body decide over the ‘force de frappe.’ And EU members Austria and Ireland have championed a global ban on nuclear weapons that is fiercely opposed by the nuclear powers and other NATO members. In short, a European nuclear deterrent is a myth; Europe’s only credible nuclear umbrella remains the one ‘made in the USA.’”
Source: Berthold Kohler, “Das ganz und gar Undenkbare,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, November 27, 2016, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/nach-donald-trump-sieg-deutschland-muss-aussenpolitik-aendern-14547858.html.
Origin: German newspaper; German author (publisher of Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung); written in German
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Contemplate [German Deterrent]
Key Quotes:
“For allies and antagonists alike, the belief that America is intertwining its fate with its most crucial partners in Europe and the Pacific is already shaken up. Trump’s fueling these doubts is eroding one of the most important pillars of the Western security architecture: the peace-saving power of deterrence.

The term alone is what makes many Germans, still dreaming of ‘making peace without weapons,’ wince. But it was the policy of deterrence that prevented the Cold War from turning into nuclear apocalypse. Thanks to deterrence, stability was the basis for peaceful coexistence and those disarmament initiatives that also Steinmeier has put his hopes on. But only those who have the will, the resolve, and the capabilities to defend their interests, values, and allies can successfully negotiate with the Kremlin. . . .

If Trump continues down his line, America will leave the defense of Europe to Europeans to an extent that they have not known since 1945. This would not be too unnatural, but for many Europeans it would be an impertinence, because it would lead to unpleasant consequences, which so far have been avoided thanks to the often demonized but comfortable American security umbrella: higher expenses for defense, the revival of conscription, the drawing of red lines – and the utterly unthinkable for German minds, the question of an indigenous nuclear deterrent which could ward off doubts about America’s guarantees. The French and British arsenals are too weak in their present condition for doing that. Meanwhile Moscow is building up arms.

Ultimately at this point (‘No nuclear arms race!’) even those who consider Trump to be the worst mistake in American history will bet on that he will listen to his wise counselors, that he will be slowed down by the American political system or that the fairy godmother will give him political reason in his sleep. Germans and European foreign and security policy-makers who want to fulfill their responsibilities, indeed, must prepare themselves and their countries for the case that nothing of all that will happen.”
Source: Robin Alexander and Jacques Schuster, “Amerika wird uns nicht den Rücken zukehren,” Die Welt, December 4, 2016, https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article159950957/Amerika-wird-uns-nicht-den-Ruecken-zukehren.html.
Origin: German newspaper; German authors (journalists); German interviewee (minister of the Chancellery); written in German
Type: Interview
Position: Neutral [Interview]/Reject [Citations on Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“‘NATO is the most important visible element of the transatlantic partnership. It ties the U.S. to Europe. That is why we, as Europeans, have an interest in keeping NATO alive,’ said Altmaier. However, Europe in general, Germany in particular, should increase its fighting power.

Despite some irritating news from Trump, Altmaier is sure that ‘America will not turn its back on us, also out of its own security political interest’. The Minister of the Chancellery said: ‘There will certainly be more political continuity’ than is assumed now.

A discussion on the question of whether Europe would have to build up nuclear arms if the United States were to withdraw is rejected by Altmaier. The nuclear capacity of America in Europe is not a ‘protection of the European countries by an act of grace’, but also serves as an ‘important strategic defense against potential nuclear threats to American territory’.

In addition, with Great Britain and France there were two EU member states with nuclear weapons. ‘Taken together with the nuclear umbrella of the Americans within NATO, this is enough.’”
Source: Xanthe Hall, “Emanzipation ja, Atomwaffen nein,”Frankfurter Rundschau, December 4, 2016, http://www.fr.de/politik/meinung/gastbeitraege/ruestung-emanzipation-ja-atomwaffen-nein-a-728945.
Origin: German newspaper; Irish/German author (International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War); written in German
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Reject [German Deterrent]
Key Quotes:
“The election victory of Donald Trump and his utterances in the election campaign frighten many people. To others, he provides a welcome opportunity to drive their own agenda forward. Some reactions to these statements are therefore to be treated with extreme caution. The ‘FAZ’ publisher Berthold Kohler pleads for German nuclear weapons, should the U.S. withdraw from Europe. This would be highly dangerous: it violates the international nuclear arms treaty as well as the German law and could lead us into a global catastrophe. Europe should see the U.S. election rather as an opportunity to develop a peace and security alternative than building up arms. Emancipating from the U.S. in terms of nuclear weapons would be good for Germany.”
Source: Ulrich Kühn, “The Sudden German Nuke Flirtation,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 6, 2016, http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/12/06/sudden-german-nuke-flirtation-pub-66366.
Origin: U.S. think tank; German author (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace); written in English
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Neutral
Key Quotes:
“While the United States is still coming to terms with President-elect Donald Trump’s potential domestic and foreign policy, U.S. allies worldwide are becoming increasingly nervous about the incoming administration’s stance toward U.S. alliance commitments. Spurred by Trump’s warm words for Russian President Vladimir Putin, his implicit threat that Washington could scale back U.S. defense commitments to Europe if NATO members do not pay more for their own security, and his lax remarks that certain U.S. allies should perhaps be allowed to go nuclear, some prominent voices in Germany are suddenly openly flirting with the nuclear option.

Given the country’s long-term support of nuclear disarmament, a debate about a possible German nuclear deterrent is virtually unprecedented. So far, these voices represent an extreme minority view—currently, neither the government nor the vast majority of German experts is even considering the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons—but with continued uncertainty about Trump’s commitment to Europe, this could change during the coming years.”
Source: “Europeans Debate Nuclear Self-Defense after Trump Win,” Der Spiegel, December 9, 2016, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/europe-responds-to-trump-win-with-nuclear-deterrent-debate-a-1125186.html.
Origin: German news website; German authors (journalists); written in English
Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]
Position: Neutral [Reporting]/Contemplate [Citations on Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“In European capitals, officials have been contemplating the possibility of a European nuclear deterrent since Trump's election. The hurdles—military, political and international law—are massive and there are no concrete intentions or plans. Still, French diplomats in Brussels have already been discussing the issue with their counterparts from other member states: Could the French and the British, who both possess nuclear arsenals, step in to provide protection for other countries like Germany?

‘It's good that this is finally being discussed,’ says Jan Techau, director of the Holbrooke Forum at the Americn Academy in Berlin. ‘The question of Europe's future nuclear defense is the elephant in the room in the European security debate. If the United States' nuclear security guarantee disappears, then it will be important to clarify who will protect us in the future. And how do we prevent ourselves from becoming blackmailable over the nuclear issue in the future?’

Kiesewetter argues that Europe must prepare for all eventualities. ‘There can be no limits placed on our security debate,’ he says. The CDU security policy expert is a former colonel in the German armed forces and also did stints at both NATO headquarters in Brussels and at the alliance's military headquarters in Mons, Belgium. After Trump's election, he spoke not only to French and British diplomats, but also explored views within the German government.

He says he spoke with Christoph Heusgen, Merkel's security adviser, and with Defense Ministry Policy Director Gésa von Geyr. Kiesewetter says the issue is not one that either the Chancellery or the Defense Ministry is taking up. At the same time, he says, he also didn't get the impression that his ideas had been dismissed as fantasy either.”
Source: Gunther Hellmann, Carlo Masala, Frank Sauer, and Reinhard Wolf, “Deutschland braucht keine Atomwaffen,” Der Spiegel, December 11, 2016, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/gastbeitrag-deutschland-braucht-keine-atomwaffen-a-1125247.html.
Origin: German news website; German authors (academics); written in German
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Reject [German Deterrent]/Contemplate [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“It is correct that Europeans in general and the Germans in particular must rethink their security and defense policy due to the worrisome developments in their security political neighborhood. However, neither at the beginning nor at the end of such considerations should be a nuclear power Germany. . . .

. . . That one has to think about how the French and British nuclear arsenals might perhaps become part of a European deterrence strategy if the United States really closes Europe’s nuclear umbrella altogether, is right, but is a different story.”
Source: Michael Rühle, “Raketenträume,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, December 13, 2016, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/aussenansicht-raketentraeume-1.3292505.
Origin: German newspaper; German author (NATO official); written in German
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Reject [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“Is it now time to turn the hitherto only virtual ‘European option’ into reality? The answer is a clear ‘no’. The notion that a Europe weakened by economic crises and populist temptations could now crack particularly the hardest nut of a common foreign and security policy because it has become inevitable, is in the best sense of the word ‘post-factual’: a diffuse discomfort over the future foreign and security policy course of the United States does not overcome the enormous hurdles that stand in the way of European nuclear deterrent.”
Source: “ECFR’s World in 30 Minutes: Towards a German Nuclear Option?,” European Council on Foreign Relations, December 14, 2016, http://www.ecfr.eu/podcasts/episode/ecfrs_world_in_30_minutes_towards_a_german_nuclear_option.
Origin: Pan-European think tank; British author (think tanker); German interviewees (journalists/think tankers); conducted in English
Type: Interview/Analysis
Position: Neutral [Interview]/Contemplate [Citations on Eurodeterrent]/ Reject [Citations on Eurodeterrent]/Reject [Citations on German Deterrent]
Key Quotes:
Ockrent: “I don’t think it [Eurodeterrent] works at all. It is a scheme because after all, both the British and the French nuclear deterrents are very much linked to NATO. It took the French many decades to agree to the fact that their own nuclear deterrence on its own was getting obsolete and that in strategic terms, it took after the discourse about nuclear independence, which runs very deep in how the French think about their own country . . . I think that the mere fact that the debate is happening in Germany is because of ‘America First,’ Mr. Trump, and it also has to do with Brexit, because there is no way at all that we as Europeans can strengthen our defense capacities, either conventional or nuclear, without the Brits.”

Puglierin: “I think Kiesewetter addressed the elephant in the room, in my opinion. I think we have to talk about this [Eurodeterrent] and address the problem ahead. If Trump will end the nuclear option for Europe or end nuclear sharing with NATO or whatever, then we have a problem. . . . I wanted to explain that this whole debate is just a minority debate and is totally disconnected from the German public because 90 percent of the Germans out there support the idea of Global Zero, want to end nuclear sharing . . . I think that Roderich Kiesewetter has a good strategic point here, and I think we have to address this. I would prefer a NATO solution first, and the British and the French nukes are already part of a European deterrence strategy . . . so I would prefer a NATO option, but if there is none, I fear that we will have to create a European one.”

Janning: “I don’t think we should get a German bomb, not least because in the last formal treaty that deals with Germany’s international policy, the 2 + 4 Treaty, which ended the post-war status of a divided Germany, Germany reconfirmed again that it would never seek position and control of nuclear or other conventional weapons. But I think there is a good reason for the Europeans to reflect among themselves whether they would not need a nuclear deterrent and whether they already have one, which doesn’t label as one. In particular the nuclear capabilities of the United Kingdom and France . . . I’m not so skeptical because it is not without precedent. Within NATO we have, in part driven by Washington, we had the Nuclear Planning Group and the idea to involve more NATO partners than those holding nuclear weapons to get engaged on this, to share the strategic rationality that comes with the possession of nuclear weapons with a wider group of allies. Not with everyone, but with those whose responsibility one would like to kind of shape.”
Source: Fredy Gsteiger, “Der atomare Schutzschild könnte fallen,” SRF News, December 30, 2016, http://m.srf.ch/news/international/der-atomare-schutzschild-koennte-fallen.
Origin: Swiss broadcaster; Swiss author (journalist); written in German
Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]
Position: Neutral [Reporting]/Reject [Citations on Eurodeterrent]/Reject [Citations on German Deterrent]
Key Quotes:
“Ischinger, a man with much influence, finds a discussion about European nuclear weapons is the last thing that is needed. He knows that in Germany, but not only there, public opinion strongly rejects a European atomic bomb. Even less a ‘German bomb,’ which the ‘Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung’ speaks of, is under consideration.”
Source: Ulrich Speck, “Wenn Amerika Deutschland seinen Schutz entzieht,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, January 4, 2017.
Origin: German newspaper; German author (Elcano Royal Institute); written in German
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Contemplate [German Deterrent]
Key Quotes:
“With the election of Donald Trump, the end of the liberal international order becomes a possibility. . . . Germany as an economic giant and a military dwarf, devoid of its own nuclear weapons and endued with a deep-seated aversion to power-political, military assertiveness would face a choice: either aspiring to become a great power itself or becoming the puppet of other great powers. The ‘German question’ would be re-opened and with it the fate of Europe.”
Source: Doug Bandow, “Time for a European Nuclear Deterrent?,” National Interest, January 13, 2017, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/time-european-nuclear-deterrent-19053?page=show.
Origin: U.S. foreign policy website; U.S. author (Cato Institute); written in English
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Affirm [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“Rather than expect the United States to burnish NATO’s nuclear deterrent, European nations should consider expanding their nuclear arsenals and creating a continent-wide nuclear force, perhaps as part of the long-derided Common Security and Defense Policy. . . .

One policy which deserves rethinking is extended deterrence in Europe. The continent already has two European nuclear states as members of NATO. Instead of expecting the United States to risk a nuclear exchange to protect Europe, the Europeans should take over that risk. With their continent already hosting two nuclear states, it is time to ask whether that number should grow.”
Source: Jost Kaiser, “Amerika, du wirst uns fehlen,” Der Spiegel, January 22, 2017, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/donald-trump-bedeutet-das-ende-der-alten-bundesrepublik-a-1130794.html.
Origin: German news website; German author (journalist); written in German
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Neutral
Key Quotes:
“For what do we do if we can no longer discuss NATO because it no longer exists? And NATO is gone, and Trump has already announced that, the second he takes the principle of collective defense guarantees off the table.

What are we doing now in a country in which the former Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, just a few years ago, raised the withdrawal of nuclear weapons, stored in Germany, as one of the most important demands of his term of office – evidently in ignorance of their strategic function as link between German and U.S. military commands (‘nuclear sharing’)? Maybe Trump just withdraws them. Satisfied?

What do we do in a country in which the future President of the Federal Republic is describing the tentative attempt to maintain a mild form of deterrence as ‘saber-rattling’, and thus sees himself in the tradition of Brandt's ‘Ostpolitik’ (which only had a chance being backed by nuclear arms), once the Americans no longer provide the means for saber-rattling?”
Source: Maximilian Terhalle, “Deutschland braucht Atomwaffen,” Tagesspiegel Causa, January 23, 2017, https://causa.tagesspiegel.de/politik/europa-und-die-weltweiten-krisen/deutschland-braucht-atomwaffen.html.
Origin: German news website; German author (academic); written in German
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Affirm [German Deterrent]
Key Quotes:
“If Trump were to continue its pro-Russian course in office—and it all looks like this—the central strategic basis of German security policy would be rattled, i.e., conventional and nuclear deterrence against Russia by NATO. The answer to the lack of strategic protection for our national security must therefore be that Germany needs nuclear weapons.”

Indeed, the threat posed by Putin's Russia comes from the strategic and conventional imbalance that would arise when the [US] deterrence ceased. It is thus easy to see that Putin would relentlessly exploit such a military imbalance to his political advantage. . . .

“A Germany, which wants to limit the power of Putin's Russia in order to be preserve Europe in an independent and unbending manner, thus preserving German domestic and foreign political leeway, has to do that militarily and thus in a nuclear way. . . .

. . . [Talking about Germany’s neighbors to the East] The purpose of [German] nuclear power projection is legitimate because it will be shared [by those states]. . . .

Other critics say that any consideration should be made with France and the United Kingdom. Looking at the arsenals of the two members of the Security Council, however, it is striking that they are too small, too much of a tactical nature, and partly obsolete, and thus cannot provide comprehensive deterrence. And on the other hand, the realistic realization of relying on oneself is also valid here. The concept of extended deterrence always involves the central weakness of alliances: can the weaker partner (here a non-nuclear Germany) really rely on the fact that the stronger partner (e.g., Great Britain) guarantees for him and stands up against Russia? In a worst-case scenario, however, Germany must be able to stand for itself. It owes it to its people. . . .

. . . Comprehensively arming Germany with nuclear weapons is the central means of preserving a Europe, which is not secured by the USA anymore, one that reflects our liberal way of life. . . . Possibly, however, a German debate on nuclear weapons could have a taming effect on the United States (which does not want a nuclear Germany) and an accelerating effect on actual European defense efforts. With that, already much would have been won.”
Source: Roderich Kiesewetter, “Trump’s ‘Deal-Making’ Strategy and Opportunities for Europe,” European Leadership Network, January 26, 2017, http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/trumps-deal-making-strategy-and-opportunities-for-europe_4401.html.
Origin: British think tank; German author (Member of the Bundestag); written in English
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Affirm [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“If, against all odds, Trump put into practice his proposal that all, especially Baltic States, have to share higher financial costs to enjoy security under the nuclear umbrella, Europe must re-think some formerly taboo issues. Following this line of argumentation, Europe would have to verify if alternative models of nuclear protection are possible—not by building new nuclear capabilities, but in terms of increasing, modernizing and commonly financing existing arsenals.”
Source: Stefan Fröhlich, “Looking to Germany: What Berlin Can and Can’t Do for the Liberal Order,” Foreign Affairs, January 29, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/germany/2017-01-29/looking-germany?t=1487344984.
Origin: U.S. foreign policy website; German author (academic); written in English
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Contemplate [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“Although boosting Europe’s nuclear deterrence capabilities seems unrealistic, it is possible that France might consider the possibility more seriously after the United Kingdom leaves the EU. French and British nuclear weapons have been part of a European strategy of deterrence since NATO’s Ottawa Declaration of 1974, in which the two nuclear powers expressed their willingness to contribute ‘to the overall strengthening of the deterrence of the Alliance.’ Since Germany has agreed not to develop and acquire nuclear weapons under the Nonproliferation Treaty and the Two Plus Four Treaty, it is likely that it would be willing to pay for the French force de frappe and to do everything possible to keep the United Kingdom included in any plans for European nuclear deterrence.”
Source: Robert Bongen, Johannes Jolmes, and Volker Steinhoff, “Donald Trump und US-Atombomben in Deutschland,” ARD Panorama, February 2, 2017, https://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/archiv/2017/US-Atombomben-in-Deutschland-und-Donald-Trump,atombombe100.html.
Origin: German broadcaster; German authors (journalists); written in German
Type: Reporting
Position: Neutral
Key Quotes:
“No small number of experts urge a debate about the question, what to do if Trump withdraws nuclear protection. What if Trump withdraws nuclear weapons from Europe? . . .

What about security? For decades Germany could slip under the U.S. nuclear umbrella and legally renounced its own nuclear weapons. Should Europe now build up its own nuclear umbrella by integrating the nuclear arsenals of Britain and France? A European option, meaning to rely on already existing nuclear arsenals, is already under debate behind closed doors in Berlin.”
Source: “US-Atombomben in Deutschland: Trumps unberechenbare Macht,” ARD Panorama, February 2, 2017, http://www.ardmediathek.de/tv/Panorama/US-Atombomben-in-Deutschland-und-Donald-/Das-Erste/Video?bcastId=310918&documentId=40422862.
Origin: German broadcaster; German authors (journalists); German interviewees (think tanker); broadcasted in German
Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]
Position: Neutral [Reporting]/Contemplating [Citations on German Deterrent]/Contemplating [Citations on Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
Kühn: “The idea of a German nuclear weapon or perhaps even a European nuclear weapon is not completely absurd, should the security environment in Europe and in Germany continue to seriously change to the negative. That means, Russia continues to threaten the peace in Europe and the Americans retreat at the same time – then I don’t want to exclude that people also in Germany start to think about how to really defend against Russia.”
Source: Karl Kaiser, “Abbruchunternehmen Trump – Eine Handlungsanweisung zur Rettung der transatlantischen Beziehungen,” Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, February 2, 2017, http://www.ipg-journal.de/regionen/nordamerika/artikel/detail/abbruchunternehmen-trump-1820/.
Origin: German foreign policy website; German author (academic); written in German
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Contemplate [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“If there was ever an ‘hour of Europe,’ then now. It is about a reorganization of Europe, in which Russia's security policy challenges, cyber threats and terrorism must be tackled. To this end, it will be necessary to develop a self-sufficient European defense structure in cooperation with NATO. The French nuclear power, which would be financially supported by Germany and other EU members, could be assigned to it.”
Source: Hans Kundnani, “The New Parameters of German Foreign Policy,” Transatlantic Academy, March 3, 2017, http://www.transatlanticacademy.org/sites/default/files/publications/Kundnani%20-%20The%20New%20Parameters%20of%20German%20Foreign%20Policy_1.pdf.
Origin: U.S. think tank; German author (Transatlantic Academy); written in English
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Neutral
Key Quotes:
“The withdrawal of the U.S. security guarantee would force Germany to rethink its security policy — and perhaps even its attitude to nuclear weapons. . . .

Germany is likely to seek to delay a more radical rethink of security policy for as long as possible—not least because it would inevitably involve the question of nuclear weapons. Since the election of Trump, several influential figures in Germany have already reopened the question. A week after the election, Roderich Kiesewetter, a Christian Democrat member of the Bundestag, proposed a European nuclear deterrent. At the end of November, Berthold Kohler, one of the publishers of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, went even further and called for an independent German nuclear deterrent. Others have since made similar arguments. But these voices are likely to remain a tiny minority. Public opinion makes it difficult to imagine—even now—Germany seeking to develop nuclear weapons.”
Source: Max Fisher, “For Germany, Trump Poses a Problem With No Clear Solution,” The Interpreter (blog), New York Times,February 6, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/06/world/europe/germany-prepares-for-turbulence-in-the-trump-era.html?rref=collection%2Fcolumn%2Fthe-interpreter&action=click&contentCollection=world&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=1&pgtype=collection&_r=1.
Origin: U.S. newspaper; U.S. author (journalist); written in English
Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]
Position: Neutral [Reporting]/Neutral [Citations]
Key Quotes:
“Behind closed doors, according to a senior German government official, officials are preparing for the day that Berlin could be forced to treat its longtime ally as a threat, necessitating radical changes in German foreign policy.

The official asked to remain anonymous because of another predicament Berlin faces with Mr. Trump: Its leaders must prepare Germany by enunciating the stakes, but they fear that overtly stepping away from Mr. Trump would anger him, risking the very breakup they wish to avoid.

Others are beginning to think about the day after.

Roderich Kiesewetter, a former military officer who is now a lawmaker with the Christian Democratic Union, is among a small but growing group pushing these questions into the public debate.

Germany should focus on persuading Mr. Trump to drop his hostility toward Europe, Mr. Kiesewetter said, but ‘we should not wait’ to consider acting.

Mr. Kiesewetter hopes to hasten military integration across the European Union. He acknowledged that a European-only defense against Russia would be far weaker than the status quo. Still, he argued it could be a sufficient deterrent — if Germany takes enough of a role to bring along the rest of Europe.

Though few lawmakers have joined Mr. Kiesewetter’s public calls for considering a post-American Europe, policy analysts say that such discussions are becoming widespread in official Berlin.”
Source: Frederick Studemann, “Thinking the Unthinkable on Germany Going Nuclear,” Financial Times, February 6, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/277695dc-ec52-11e6-ba01-119a44939bb6.
Origin: British newspaper, German author (journalist); written in English
Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]
Position: Neutral [Reporting]/Reject [Citations on Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“Almost all observers have been quick to note that there is almost zero public support in Germany for nuclear weapons. Even those who have raised the issue acknowledge this. Mr Kiesewetter says that Europe does not need another nuclear power.”
Source: Konrad Schuller, “Es gilt, dass Frau Merkel für uns das Beste wäre,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 7, 2017, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/kaczynski-wuenscht-sich-fuer-polen-einen-sieg-merkels-14859766.html?printPagedArticle=true#pageIndex_2.
Origin: German newspaper; German author (journalist); Interviewee (Polish politician); written in German
Type: Interview
Position: Neutral [Interview]/Affirm [Citations on Eurodeterrent]/Reject [Citations on Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
Schuller: “The migration crisis has become a weapon between East and West, and now some are even concerned that America's nuclear umbrella is in question. Does Europe have to become a nuclear power?”
Kaczynski: “A nuclear power Europe would have to be able to compete with Russia. We are a long way from that. But if there were something serious, I would support it. Europe would then become a super power. I would welcome this. But just one or two nuclear submarines would not be enough for that. One would have to be ready for huge expenditures, and I do not see that. I am therefore more inclined to cultivate relations with the Americans and to reform the EU.”
Source: Barbara Wesel, “Poland Wants Nuclear Weapons for Europe,” Deutsche Welle, February 7, 2017, http://www.dw.com/en/poland-wants-nuclear-weapons-for-europe/a-37449773.
Origin: German broadcaster; German author (journalist); written in English
Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]
Position: Neutral [Reporting]/Reject [Citations on Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“‘It’s not surprising that we’re seeing this kind of debate now,’ said Nick Witney, former head of the European Defense Agency and now a senior fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. In principle, it’s about the question of whether US President Donald Trump is prepared to sacrifice Chicago to save Warsaw. And what would his answer to that be? The political situation has changed so quickly, and with it the current state of defense policy.

But how credible would a European nuclear deterrent be? Thirty years ago, London and Paris would have been flattered to be chosen as the defenders of the European continent. But what EU state would be prepared to accept such a nuclear defense force now? Never mind what Britain’s decision to leave the EU has done to whatever credibility that idea still had.

For his part, Witney says he doesn’t believe in a common European nuclear power. ‘You would need institutions for that which the EU doesn’t have,’ he said. That leaves just France with its nuclear weapons which, in an emergency, could perhaps still just about ‘rip the arm off of a Russian bear.’ Witney’s conclusion: ‘The discussion is very much one that is on the fringe, if not completely out of the realm of the possible.’”
Source: “Stellungnahme: Donald Trump und US-Atombomben in Deutschland,” ARD Panorama, February 7, 2017, https://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/aktuell/Stellungnahme-Donald-Trump-und-US-Atombomben-in-Deutschland,atombombe104.html.
Origin: German broadcaster; German authors (journalists); written in German
Type: Response to public reactions
Position: Neutral [comments on critiques of previous broadcasting]
Key Quotes:
“No question: ‘nuclear weapons’ are a sensitive and highly emotional topic about which we could argue for hours. We do understand our viewers when they write that the policy of deterrence is highly dangerous, extremely inhuman, and on top of that quite stupid.
But the debate about nuclear deterrence is real: the logic of deterrence is dominant if one looks at the current political situation. Suppressing urgent questions and discussions will only result in the opposite: decisions will be made without consultation. We, here at ‘Panorama’ think that this is undemocratic and that is why we wanted to provide for transparency in this debate—i.e., before a new security political concept has been introduced to the parliament.”
Source: Vincenzo Capodici, “Europa als Atom-Supermacht?,” Basler Zeitung, February 7, 2017, http://bazonline.ch/ausland/europa/europa-als-atomsupermacht/story/21898647.
Origin: Swiss newspaper; Swiss author (journalist); written in German
Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]
Position: Neutral [Reporting]/Reject [Citations on Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“The idea of a nuclear super power Europe is absurd and there is no serious debate about that, says Stephan Israel, correspondent of baz.ch/Newsnet in Brussels. ‘If you see how difficult it is for the EU countries to cooperate in military matters at all, this idea seems to be abstruse.’”
Source: Justin Huggler, “Merkel Forced to Deny Germany Planning to Lead a European Nuclear Superpower,” Telegraph, February 9, 2017, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/09/merkel-forced-deny-germany-planning-lead-european-nuclear-superpower/.
Origin: British newspaper; British author (journalist); written in English
Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]
Position: Neutral [Reporting]/Reject [Citations on Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“The German government has been forced to deny it is interested in acquiring nuclear weapons amid calls for it to lead a European ‘nuclear superpower’.

‘There are no plans for nuclear armament in Europe involving the federal government,’ a spokesman for Angela Merkel said.

The highly unusual statement comes amid growing calls for the European Union to invest in its own nuclear deterrent in the wake of President Donald Trump’s comments that Nato is ‘obsolete’.”
Source: Thorsten Benner, “Über Atomwaffen reden,” Wirtschaftswoche 7, February 2, 2017, 6–7, http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/user_upload/media/pub/2017/Benner__2017__Wir_mu__ssen_u__ber_Atomwaffen_reden__Wirtschaftswoche.pdf.
Origin: German newspaper; German author (Global Public Policy Institute); written in German
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Affirm [Eurodeterrent]/ Affirm [German Latent Nuclear Hedge Capacity]/Contemplate [German Deterrent]
Key Quotes:
See English translation in Benner, “Germany’s Necessary Nuclear Debate.”
Source: Hanno Kautz, Karina Mößbauer, and Peter Tiede, “Wegen Äusserungen von US-Präsident Trump zur NATO: Ist es Zeit, dass Deutschland Atommacht wird?,” BILD Zeitung, February 8, 2017, http://www.bild.de/bild-plus/politik/inland/atombombe/sollte-deutschland-atommacht-werden-50172416.bild.html.
Origin: German tabloid; German authors (journalists); multiple German interviewees; written in German
Type: Interview
Position: Neutral [Interview]/Reject [German Deterrent]/Affirm [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
Roderich Kiesewetter, member of the German Bundestag (CDU/CSU), special representative for foreign affairs of the German Bundestag’s Committee on Foreign Affairs: “We have to preserve the nuclear umbrella for Europe. For that, we need the United States. […] A German nuclear bomb would be a disaster because it would lead to a new nuclear arms race.”

Hans-Lothar Domröse, former NATO general: “With that we would open Pandora’s Box and start a race. It would be even harder to deny other states, such as Iran, nuclear weapons.”

Gustav Gressel, European Council on Foreign Relations, Berlin office (think tank): “Europeans have to clearly re-define their nuclear interests. Should the United States not be willing anymore, to contribute its part to nuclear deterrence, particularly Germany and France have to fill that vacuum.”

Horst Teltschik, former adviser to Helmut Kohl: “The debate is not surprising, given the current state of affairs: The U.S. President questions NATO and the protective status of the United States for Europe, Great Britain as a nuclear power opts out and also it’s still not clear what to expect from France in the future.” But nuclear weapons? “That is the completely wrong answer to the right question.”
Source: Thorsten Benner, “Germany’s Necessary Nuclear Debate,” Global Public Policy Institute, February 10, 2017, http://www.gppi.net/publications/peace-security/article/germanys-necessary-nuclear-debate/.
Origin: German think tank; German author (Global Public Policy Institute); written in English
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Affirm [Eurodeterrent]/ Affirm [German Latent Nuclear Hedge Capacity]/Contemplate [German Deterrent]
Key Quotes:
“Yes, any debate on nuclear strategy should proceed with great caution and care, but it is one Germany cannot and should not avoid. Those rushing to argue that Germany needs to quickly acquire nuclear weapons disregard the need for caution and care. Yes, Germany should preserve its latent capability to build nuclear weapons. But a German bomb can only be the last resort in case of a total breakdown of the Euro-Atlantic security arrangements. . . . A European nuclear umbrella, as demanded by Polish governing party leader Jarosław Kaczynski this week, is not in the cards politically at this stage. But that does not mean that Germany should not push in this direction. The UK as a nuclear power should remain an integral part of European security after Brexit. The decisive factor is France and its force de frappe. Should Marine Le Pen fail with her bid to move into the Élysée Palace, Germany should seek talks on nuclear cooperation with the new French president in May. Approaching Paris on an issue where Germany is needy would also help to put Franco-German relations on a more equal footing – a more than welcome side effect.”
Source: Katie Mansfield, “Merkel Urged to Make ‘Germany a Nuclear Superpower for Europe’ Over US-Exit Fears,” Daily Express, February 10, 2017, http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/765679/angela-merkel-germany-nuclear-superpower-united-states-nato.
Origin: British tabloid; British author (journalist); written in English
Type: Reporting
Position: Neutral
Key Quotes:
Repeats key quotes from earlier articles.
Source: Malte Göttsche, ““Mehr Bomben, mehr Abschreckung”: Warum jede Diskussion um atomare Aufrustung brandgefährlich ist,” Huffington Post, February 10, 2017, http://www.huffingtonpost.de/malte-goettsche/atom-waffen-abruestung-deutschland-atomkrieg_b_14672440.html?utm_hp_ref=germany.
Origin: U.S. news website (German version); German author (academic); written in German
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Reject [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“The discussion of how Europe can make itself more independent from the USA in terms of security is certainly necessary, regardless of how strongly the US will ultimately turn away.

It is nevertheless reckless, that this debate occasionally provokes thoughts about its own nuclear deterrence capacity. The equation ‘more nuclear weapons’ equals ‘more deterrence’ equals ‘more security’ is wrong. Rather, nuclear weapons are ticking time bombs.”
Source: Thomas Gutschker, “Nato gegen Atom-Supermacht Europa,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 12, 2017, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/f-a-s-exklusiv-nato-gegen-atom-supermacht-europa-14873920.html.
Origin: German newspaper; German author (journalist); written in German
Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]
Position: Neutral [Reporting]/Reject [Citations on Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“‘Throughout the world leaders have to think about what best serves stability, security, and defense. The development of new nuclear weapons does not contribute to these objectives,’ Deputy Secretary General of NATO, Rose Gottemoeller, told the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Instead, destabilization and further crises would be encouraged.”
Source: Alex Rosen, “Nur Deeskalation schafft Sicherheit,” Frankfurter Rundschau, February 12, 2017, http://www.fr-online.de/gastbeitraege/atomwaffen-nur-deeskalation-schafft-sicherheit,29976308,35154196.html.
Origin: German newspaper; German author (International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War); written in German
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Reject [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“A nuclear-armed Europe cannot be the solution to our legitimate security needs. We should strive for a Europe without weapons of mass destruction, a Europe in which all countries, including Russia, diplomatically solve their differences and protect their legitimate interests. This includes security guarantees from Russia for the Baltic States as well as NATO security guarantees for Russia. It is difficult to conceive that the needs for security of the conflict parties can be satisfied by the deployment of missile defense systems in Eastern Europe or by nuclear weapons-capable short-range missiles in Kaliningrad.”
Source: Josef Joffe, “Germany Has Taken Itself Out of the Nuclear Running,” Financial Times, February 13, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/4a60efd8-f1fd-11e6-95ee-f14e55513608.
Origin: British newspaper; German author (publisher of Die ZEIT); written in English
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Reject [German Deterrent]/Reject [German Latent Nuclear Hedge Capacity]
Key Quotes:
“So, the unthinkable has become the undoable. By 2023, Germany will have none of the wherewithal for a weapons option, except a limited low-enrichment capability doomed to go when the last power reactor goes. You cannot build a bomb without a complete fuel cycle . . .”
Source: Christine Leah, “A European Nuclear Deterrent?,” American Interest, February 14, 2017, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/02/14/a-european-nuclear-deterrent/.
Origin: U.S. foreign policy website; Australian/French author (academic); written in English
Type: Analysis
Position: Neutral
Key Quotes:
“In both Europe and Asia, the overarching question looms: Can a non-superpower nuclear weapons state like France, even in league with other states in its region, provide a European deterrent? Can India, even in league with other states in the region, do so in Asia?”
Source: Christine Heuer, “Diese Unsicherheit löst Nervosität auf europäischer Seite aus,” Deutschlandfunk, February 15 2017, http://www.deutschlandfunk.de/treffen-der-nato-verteidigungsminister-diese-unsicherheit.694.de.html?dram:article_id=378978.
Origin: German broadcaster; German author (journalist); interviewee (German think tanker); written in German
Type: Interview
Position: Neutral [Interview]/Neutral [Citations]
Key Quotes:
“Techau: No one would officially confirm that this is really being discussed. But of course this is something that is being discussed. Nobody would take this up at the moment as part of any official political program. Nobody writes it in official papers. But those who are concerned with these strategic questions think about these things. And as I said: a tentative debate has begun. This always shows that there is already a lot going on under the surface.

Heuer: Can you tell us, Mr. Techau, how the federal government views that?

Techau: The federal government is in a relatively easy position. It can always go back to the position that Germany has renounced nuclear weapons in the two-plus-four treaty, which has paved the way for unification, and that, of course, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is, of course, also an obstacle to arming Germany with nuclear weapons. No way would the federal government get involved in this discussion. In Germany this would trigger a moderate political earthquake. That is why this is not addressed, not even in an extremely cautious way.

It has something to do with the fact that in such a debate in Europe, one would just trigger the nervousness that one does not actually need. The Federal Government is back on the assumption that the American security guarantee is stable and does everything behind the scenes to ensure that this remains the case. It has also massively extended its outreach activities to Washington, in order to make it clear how important the American presence in Europe is. At the same time, the government is trying to discuss conventional cooperation amongst the Europeans. But not only the German federal government, but also the other governments in Europe, will probably not be willing to tackle the nuclear question in the mid-term.

Heuer: Mr. Techau, let me pose the question again: is it indeed totally unrealistic that this might happen, even though experts might deem it necessary. I hear that from your comments. You take the situation pretty serious.

Techau: Yes, the situation is serious.”
Source: Wolfgang Ischinger, “How Europe Should Deal With Trump,” Project Syndicate, February 15, 2017, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/european-security-relations-with-trump-by-wolfgang-ischinger-2017-02?barrier=accessreg.
Origin: International foreign policy website; German author (Munich Security Conference); written in English
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Reject [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“Finally, calls for Europe to become a strategic counterweight to the US are purely aspirational; in reality, no such option exists. In the short and medium term, Europeans cannot do without the US security guarantee. As a result, we must work to convince the new administration of the importance of a united and peaceful Europe.

Nonetheless, the mere speculation about decoupling European security from the US is giving rise to uncertainty, reflected in the emerging debate about a European – or even German – nuclear bomb. It’s a sham debate, because it assumes what must be questioned: Is it really in Europeans’ interest to cut the cord proactively now, before we have even been presented with any concrete US decisions that directly affect us?”
Source: Peter Dausend and Michael Thumann, “Braucht die EU die Bombe?,” Die Zeit, February 16, 2017, http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2017-02/trump-nato-atomwaffen-europa/komplettansicht.
Origin: German newspaper; German authors (journalists); written in German
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Contemplate [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“Germans could soon face a tough decision. Either they are financially involved in a modernized French Force de Frappe and get limited influence over a Europeanized French deterrent in exchange. Or they decide to suppress the problem as much as NATO currently does and see Donald Trump—no matter what he does—as a reliable partner who guarantees the security of Europe.”
Source: Josef Joffe, “Atommacht D?” Die Zeit, February 17, 2017, http://www.zeit.de/2017/08/ruestung-atomwaffen-atommacht-deutschland-zeitgeist.
Origin: German newspaper; German author (publisher of Die Zeit); written in German
Type: Op-ed/analysis
Position: Reject [German Deterrent]/Reject [German Latent Nuclear Hedge Capacity]
Key Quotes: For translation, see Josef Joffe, “Germany Has Taken Itself Out of the Nuclear Running,” Financial Times, February 13, 2017. Although the articles are not identical, they are largely the same in content.
Source: Jan Techau, “Als Moralapostel droht Deutschland zu zerreißen,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 17, 2017, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/sicherheitskonferenz/als-moralapostel-droht-deutschland-zu-zerreissen-14880255.html?GEPC=s3.
Origin: German newspaper; German author (think tanker); written in German
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Contemplate [German Deterrent]
Key Quotes:
“How is nuclear blackmail to be prevented? And finally, what is a country going to do that is perhaps even forced to discuss the issue of its own nuclear weapons? How is nuclear blackmail to be prevented if one day the American nuclear shield is gone and Europe is again an open security political space? Who fills the vacuum? Is there enough confidence in the European political market to rely entirely on France and Great Britain? How should a country with a great hunger for moral clarity accept exactly that weapon which it views as the most immoral of all?”
Source: “Was Experten von einer deutschen Atombombe halten,” BILD Zeitung, February 19, 2017, http://www.bild.de/bild-plus/politik/inland/atombombe/umfrage-sicherheitskonferenz-braucht-deutschland-die-atombombe-50505650,var=a,view=conversionToLogin.bild.html.
Origin: German tabloid; German authors (journalists); multiple interviewees from different countries; written in German
Type: Interview
Position: Neutral [Interview]/Reject [Eurodeterrent]/Reject [German Deterrent]
Key Quotes:
Ulrike Demmer, government vice spokesperson: “There are no plans for nuclear armament in Europe involving the federal government.”

Former security policy advisor in the chancellery, Erich Vad: “A Europeanization of nuclear policy would decouple Europe from North America and is therefore not in the German interest. A participation or ‘having a say’ of Germany in French nuclear policy – apart from Berlin’s financial support – will not be accepted in Paris. A German bomb would also not be favored by either Paris or London or any other European partners. In particular, it would not be accepted by the majority of the German people. Therefore the nuclear umbrella for Germany is only possible within NATO and with the United States.”

Wolfgang Ischinger, head of the Munich Security Conference: “Reaching for nuclear weapons, either directly or indirectly through the EU, would be a major violation of international law by Germany. Germany has repeatedly renounced nuclear weapons.”

Michael Chertoff, former U.S. secretary of homeland security: “What you mean by nuclear power is that Germany is developing nuclear weapons. I think, it makes a great deal of sense if the current number of nuclear powers does not increase. Now, Germany is a democracy and a country that we trust, but it is the wrong message, which is being sent to Iran and North Korea when Western countries suddenly decide, to join the nuclear club. In my opinion, Germany should not join the nuclear club. That would be perceived as violating the rules of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.”

Tobias Lindner, member of the German Bundestag and defense expert of Alliance ‘90/The Greens: “No. This is not only an absurd but particularly dangerous proposal. This world does not need more but less nuclear weapons.”

Petr Pavel, chairman of the NATO Military Committee: “There is currently no need on the part of NATO to have Germany go nuclear. The current constellation of three nuclear powers is absolutely sufficient for nuclear deterrence. But it is a fact that Germany is the strongest economic power and one of the three most important military powers in Europe and therefore needs to take on some kind of a leadership role. It is not sufficient to only lead by example; Germany has to participate in a concrete way.”
Source: Oliver Thränert, “No Shortcut to a European Deterrent,” ETHZ CSS, February 2017, http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/PP5-2.pdf.
Origin: Swiss think tank; German author (Center for Security Studies, ETHZ); written in English
Type: Analysis
Position: Neutral
Key Quotes:
“Even these brief considerations show that any change in the status quo of nuclear deterrence in and for Europe would not only be expensive, but also a political minefield full of undesirable potential political consequences. Europeans would have to ask themselves whether their concerns are exclusively related to Donald Trump as a person or whether they go deeper. Only if they find that their doubts in the United States’ nuclear commitments are structural in nature (that is, if they believe that Trump’s eventual successor could not be relied upon as well), should they even seriously consider the enormous difficulties and problems of European nuclear deterrence. This step would be too significant to be taken in the heat of daily politics.”
Source: Jakob Augstein, “Die deutsche Bombe,” Der Spiegel,February 23, 2017, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/aufruestung-die-deutsche-bombe-kolumne-von-jakob-augstein-a-1135917.html.
Origin: German news website; German author (journalist); written in German
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Reject [German Deterrent]/ Reject [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“Nuclear power Germany? Again and again there have been reflections on the participation of the Germans in the French Force de Frappe. But so far it was taken for granted that the home of the Holocaust does not touch the nuclear fire. And in the future? The ‘ZEIT’ already quotes the complaint of a ‘nuclear expert’ about the weakness of the Germans: They had forgotten to think in nuclear categories.

That way, the nuclear logic returns from the crypt of history.

The whole Dr. Strangelove insanity of nuclear game theory. The other is the enemy. You do not know what the opponent is planning. Prepare for the worst. This is the return of Cold War paranoia. For if everyone only pursues his immediate gains, the result is not the best of all worlds, but the world becomes either a madhouse or a slaughterhouse.”
Source: “Germany’s Nuclear Weapons,” YouTube video, posted by “Brent Goff Reports,” February 23, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kfPDH2y_HKk.
Origin: German broadcaster; U.S. author (journalist); German interviewee (Transatlantic Academy); conducted in English
Type: Interview
Position: Neutral [Interview]/Neutral [German Deterrent]/Neutral [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
Kundnani: “I struggle to see how Germany would then suddenly decide to develop nuclear weapons on its own. There is a debate about that. All to spend the amount of money it would need to spend in order to become strategically autonomous. . . .”

Goff: “Are you saying that the inevitable, if we play this out with what Trump wants, that Germany has to become a nuclear power if it wants to ensure its security?”

Kundnani: “Well, I think everyone is still hoping that Trump’s foreign policy won’t be as radical as people fear, but if it does turn out to be . . . then Germany has two options: one is a kind of European nuclear deterrent, and essentially given the complication of Brexit, it means depending on the French nuclear deterrent . . . that would raise all kinds of difficult question about what France would want in exchange for that . . . Or the alternative would be for Germany to develop its own independent nuclear deterrent, and there have been some people since the election of Trump, like the publisher of the [Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung] who have called for that, but I find that impossible to imagine, not least for economic reasons, but also for reasons of identity.”
Source: “Atomwaffen für Deutschland?,” Heise Telepolis, February 24, 2017, https://www.heise.de/tp/features/Atomwaffen-fuer-Deutschland-3633813.html.
Origin: German news website; German author (journalist); written in German
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Reject [German Deterrent]/Reject [German latent nuclear hedge capacity]/Reject [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“The last chance for an indigenous German deterrent was wasted when Angela Merkel decided in 2011 after Fukushima to get rid of nuclear energy. The nuclear fuel cycle a country would need to produce its own nuclear weapons is therewith gone in Germany. That is good.

Now it clearly shows what blessing it was that both the peace and the anti-nuclear movements insisted on the nuclear phase out. Therewith, the danger of a nuclear-armed Germany is gone. The fast breeder is gone, the reprocessing plant as well, and so is the fuel elements firm.

. . . The dream of a German deterrent is once and for all over, and the world won’t miss a bit.

. . . France and England insist on their national deterrents which they do not want to share with anyone.”
Source: “Eine deutsche Atombombe: Germans Are Debating Getting Their Own Nuclear Weapon,” Economist, March 2, 2017, http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21717981-donald-trumps-questioning-natos-credibility-has-berlin-thinking-unthinkable-germans-are?fsrc=scn/tw/te/rfd/pe.
Origin: British journal; unknown author; written in English
Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]
Position: Neutral [Reporting]/Reject [Citations on German Deterrent]
Key Quotes:
“The different dangers posed by Mr Putin and Mr Trump have raised the question of ‘how to deter whom with what’, even though German nukes are not the best answer, says Karl-Heinz Kamp of the Federal Academy for Security Policy, a government think-tank.”
Source: “Brauchen wir die Bombe? Europa vor einer neuen atomaren Bedrohung,” der Freitag, March 2, 2017, 6–7.
Origin: German newspaper; German author (journalist); interviewee (think tanker); written in German
Type: Interview
Position: Neutral [Interview]/Reject [German Deterrent]/Reject [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“der Freitag: Kaczyński even wants a ‘nuclear super power’ Europe. A response to the transatlantic reluctance of the US government or more?

Otfried Nassauer: I do not think that Kaczyński really wants what he says. In the same breath he stated that a European arsenal would have to be strong enough to compete with Russia, which is totally unrealistic. The Brits and the French have roughly a combined 550 nuclear weapons, which is a fraction of what the United States or Russia have. Where should the resources for the Europeans come from to increase their nuclear arsenals in that way? Not talking about the political will. Because of Brexit doubts about the resources of one nuclear power in Europe are likely to grow.

der Freitag: Nevertheless, there are speculations about Germany somewhat participating in the ‘force de frappe.’

Otfried Nassauer: Indeed, Paris has repeatedly flirted with the idea of letting Germany under the French nuclear umbrella—perhaps in the hope for a co-financing. But that was not attractive for the Federal Republic so far because Germany sees its interests better represented by NATO. There Germany is part of the nuclear planning and believes that it has a sufficient say through the principle of nuclear sharing. Whether that would be the same in cooperation with Paris is doubted by many.

der Freitag: And what is the role of the British nuclear arsenal?

Otfried Nassauer: The British are technically dependent on cooperating with Washington. The design of their nuclear warheads comes from the United States, parts of their submarine technology as well. The missiles for the warheads are leased from Washington—those are not good preconditions for a truly independent European nuclear power. The British contribution would be one by the grace of Washington.

der Freitag: Is that why there are also voices calling for an indigenous German deterrent?

Otfried Nassauer: Excuse me? A German nuclear weapon? Renouncing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons in the 1990 Two Plus Four Treaty was a significant condition for the victors of the Second World War to accept German unification—particularly the European victors. In addition, Germany is a non-nuclear member of the NPT. Those calling for a German nuclear weapon either do not know the international legal obligations or think that Germany could simply back out. If it would come to this, the global nonproliferation regime would unravel rather quickly.

der Freitag: But they do exist, the proponents of a nuclear power Germany . . .

Otfried Nassauer: Sure, extreme conservatives, nationalists or right-wingers that either have no knowledge of international law or falsely believe that Germany would profit from withdrawing from the NPT. Behind all that is either megalomania or the pure desire to open once again Pandora’s Box. Germany not having nuclear weapons is a security-political wise form of self-restraint which also contributes to our European neighbors being rather relaxed about German economic preponderance.”
Source: Anthony Faiola, “In the Era of Donald Trump, Germans Debate a Military Buildup,” Washington Post, March 5, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/in-the-era-of-trump-germans-debate-a-military-buildup/2017/03/05/d7fc2ef6-fd16-11e6-a51a-e16b4bcc6644_story.html?utm_term=.984561b8a6d1.
Origin: U.S. newspaper; U.S. author (journalist); written in English
Type: Reporting
Position: Neutral
Key Quotes:
“Chancellor Angela Merkel has called for cool heads, but also for increased military spending. Her defense minister, Ursula von der Leyen, has been more forceful, saying recently that Germany cannot ‘duck away’ from its military responsibility. Although considered a distant possibility, some outlier voices are mentioning the once-inconceivable: the advent of a German nuclear bomb.”
Source: Max Fisher, “Fearing U.S. Withdrawal, Europe Considers Its Own Nuclear Deterrent,” The Interpreter (blog), New York Times, March 6, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/world/europe/european-union-nuclear-weapons.html?rref=collection%2Fcolumn%2Fthe-interpreter&action=click&contentCollection=world&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=1&pgtype=collection.
Origin: U.S. newspaper; U.S. author (journalist); written in English
Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]/Analysis
Position: Neutral [Reporting and Analysis]/Contemplate [Citations on Eurodeterrent]/Reject [Citations on Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“Jana Puglierin of the German Council on Foreign Relations said that a handful of senior European officials had ‘for sure triggered a public debate about this, taking place in newspapers and journals, radio interviews and TV documentaries.’

She added: ‘That in itself is remarkable. I am indeed very astonished that we discuss this at all.’ . . .

But the most important support has come from Roderich Kiesewetter, a lawmaker and foreign policy spokesman with Germany’s ruling party, who gave the nuclear option increased credibility by raising it shortly after President Trump’s election.

In an interview in the German Bundestag, Mr. Kiesewetter, a former colonel who served in Afghanistan, calibrated his language carefully, providing just enough detail to demonstrate the option’s seriousness without offering too much and risking an outcry from German voters or encouraging the American withdrawal he is hoping to avoid.

‘My idea is to build on the existing weapons in Great Britain and France,’ he said, but acknowledged that Britain’s decision to leave the European Union could preclude its participation.

The United States bases dozens of nuclear warheads in Germany, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands as both a quick-reaction force and a symbol of its guarantee to protect the Continent. Mr. Kiesewetter said his plan would provide a replacement or parallel program.

This would require, he said, four ingredients: a French pledge to commit its weapons to a common European defense, German financing to demonstrate the program’s collective nature, a joint command and a plan to place French warheads in other European countries.

The number of warheads in Europe would not increase under this plan, and could even decrease if the United States withdraws.

‘It’s not a question of numbers,’ Mr. Kiesewetter said. ‘The reassurance and deterrence comes from the existence of the weapons and their deployability.’

He envisioned a program designed to deter nuclear as well as conventional threats—a clear nod to Russia’s military superiority.

This would require a doctrine, he said, allowing Europe to introduce nuclear weapons to a non-nuclear conflict. He compared it to the Israeli program, which is believed to allow for a nuclear strike against an overwhelming conventional attack.

‘These are political weapons. Their use must be unpredictable,’ he said. Smaller nuclear powers often maintain vague doctrines to deter more powerful adversaries.

The goal, he said, would be to maintain Europe’s defense, seen as crucial for its internal unity, as well as its international diplomatic standing. . . .

Mr. Kiesewetter said he had heard interest from officials in the Polish and Hungarian governments, at NATO headquarters in Brussels and within relevant German ministries, though he would not say which. . . .

These sorts of problems are why Bruno Tertrais of the Foundation for Strategic Research in Paris said, ‘In other times I would have told you don’t bother, there’s no story here.’ . . .

‘There’s already a bit more interest in Berlin and in Paris,’ Mr. Tertrais said, though he emphasized that this talk would become action only if there were ‘a serious loss of trust in the U.S. umbrella.’

But a joint European command or funding scheme would most likely be impossible, he warned. The French government would insist on maintaining ‘the final decision to use nuclear weapons.’”
Source: Theo Sommer, “Nukleare Phantomdiskussion,” Die Zeit, March 7, 2017, http://www.zeit.de/politik/2017-03/atomwaffen-deutschland-aufruestung-the-economist-5vor8/komplettansicht.
Origin: German newspaper; German author (former editor Die Zeit); written in German
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Deny [Debate]/Reject [German deterrent]/Reject [German latent nuclear hedge capacity]/Reject [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“The Federal Government has now put a stop to the discussion about the delicate issue. For good reason: it is a phantom discussion. . . .

. . . Germany no longer has the technical infrastructure for nuclear weapons production. Rebuilding the indispensable fuel cycle - uranium enrichment, fuel elements, reprocessing, fast breeder to produce fissile material - would take decades. . . .

. . . Without the technical support of the United States, neither a German nor a European deterrent would be feasible. France and England's deterrence arsenals are still dependent on this. Detaching from America would thus be no real option.”
Source: Macer Hall, “‘It Is Insanity’ Plans for EU nuclear weapons arsenal Condemned by Senior Tory MP,” Express, March 7, 2017, http://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/776220/plans-EU-nuclear-weapons-arsenal-control-Brussels-condemned.
Origin: British tabloid; British author (journalist); written in English
Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]
Position: Neutral [Reporting]/Reject [Citations on Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
But Tory backbencher Dr Julian Lewis, chairman of the Commons Defence Committee, condemned the plan as a federalist plot to undermine the Nato alliance.

Dr Lewis said: ‘This is an idea that first came to attention 20 years ago—I thought it was insanity then and I think it is insanity now.

‘It only goes to show how determined the fanatical EU federalists are that they wish to try and create a separate from Nato and nowhere nearly as powerful as Nato.

‘This is all about the political ambitions of the European federalists and has nothing to do with the critical defence of Europe and deterring any possible nuclear attack.’”
Source: Jonathan S. Tobin, “The Price of ‘America First,’” National Review, March 8, 2017, http://www.nationalreview.com/article/445585/trump-america-first-costs-dangers-european-nuclear-deterrence.
Origin: U.S. foreign policy website; U.S. author (journalist); written in English
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Neutral [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“But the Europeans aren’t sounding reassured. Some of their leaders are publicly questioning what it would mean to live in a world in which they could no longer rely on the United States as a reliable security partner. The most graphic expression of their disquiet is the debate about whether the European Union should seek to create its own nuclear-deterrent force. The idea is a long way from being put into effect, but the mere fact that Jaroslaw Kaczynski (the head of Poland’s ruling party) and Roderick Kiesewetter (foreign-policy spokesman for German chancellor Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union) are openly advocating such a notion ought to be a wake-up call for Trump and anyone else who thinks that Trump’s rhetoric about NATO isn’t being noticed.”
Source: Andre Seifert, “Auslandspresse sieht Atombombenstimmung in Deutschland,” Über Medien, March 10, 2017, http://uebermedien.de/13764/auslandspresse-sieht-atombombenstimmung-in-deutschland/.
Origin: German critical media website; German author (journalist); written in German
Type: Reporting/incl. Citations
Position: Neutral [Reporting]/Deny [Debate]/Deny [Citations on Debate]/Reject [Citations on German Deterrent]/Contemplate [Citations on Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“Germany apparently is discussing whether it would need the nuclear bomb, but Germany has not even heard of it.

Do you have to learn everything from the foreign press?

If you missed the big nuclear discussion, like almost everyone, you are sure to ask: Why this debate, with whom, when, how and with what results so far? . . .

The spokesperson of CDU Member of Parliament Kiesewetter explains on the telephone: Yes, indeed a journalist from the ‘Economist’ has only recently asked for an interview. And that was, because yes, one could read that Kiesewetter was seen as ‘proponent of a German nuclear bomb.’ The spokesperson explains:

‘This is completely out of context. Our position is very clear. One would have to withdraw from the NPT and one would encourage states, for instance like Turkey, to go nuclear. Against this background, this is totally absurd. Therefore, we are, and Kiesewetter has tried to make that clear, in favor of a multilateral coordination of the arsenals of Great Britain and France.’

He would not see a debate in parliament or in the administration, the spokesperson said. And the Chancellor did not have to call Kiesewetter off. And anyway, there will be no German bomb. The policy of the Federal Government is clearly aimed at nuclear disarmament. . . .

FAZ publisher Berthold Kohler sees himself correctly cited by both the ‘Washington Post’ and the ‘Economist’, as he writes in an email. However, the ‘Economist’ escalates his statements ‘obviously towards the headline “A German Nuclear Weapon.”’ As for Berthold Kohler, it is not recognizable that meanwhile there is a big debate happening:

‘In my op-ed, I have described the revision of German foreign policy and its security-political aspects as necessary, “if that tectonic shift is occurring which seems to announce itself in world politics.” Also the part which concerned itself with the “unpleasant consequences” for Europeans, onto which I counted the question of an indigenous nuclear deterrence capacity, started with a conditional sentence: “If Trump continues along his line…” The firmness with which the appreciated colleagues of the “Economist” found out months later that “Berlin is thinking the unthinkable” (the sub-heading of the online version) has surprised me.’”
Source: John R. Deni, “An EU Nuclear Deterrent Won’t Serve Western Interests,” Strategic Europe (blog), Carnegie Europe, March 10, 2017, http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/68242.
Origin: U.S. think tank; U.S. author (U.S. Army War College); written in English
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Reject [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“Although European deliberations over how to better provide for European security are positive, an EU nuclear deterrent wouldn’t solve inequitable burden sharing. In fact, it would do virtually nothing to enable Europe to deal with today’s most likely, most compelling security challenges on the continent and beyond.”
Source: Rudolph Herzog, “German Nukes Would Be a National Tragedy,” Foreign Policy, March 10, 2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/10/german-nukes-would-be-a-national-tragedy/.
Origin: U.S. foreign policy website; German author (artist); written in English
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Reject [German Deterrent]/Reject [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“In a post-Trump, post-Brexit world, many citizens across the globe are turning their hopes toward Chancellor Angela Merkel and her government to uphold moral principles and lead on matters such as European unity and the refugee crisis. These are major challenges. To rise to them, Germany must stick to its principles as a peaceful nation that works hard to eradicate nuclear weapons. Should it veer off this path, huge damage would be inflicted not only on the world order, but on Germany itself.”
Source: Max Fisher, “The Two European Nuke Plans,” newsletter, The Interpreter (blog), New York Times, March 15, 2017.
Origin: U.S. newspaper; U.S. author (journalist); written in English
Type: Reporting/Analysis
Position: Neutral
Key Quotes:
“Mr. Kühn, who was the first to seriously examine this phenomenon (he published a paper on it in December and is planning more), put us on track to report it out in Germany. We found real talk, at a whisper but growing, of exactly what Mr. Kühn had described, which we wrote about last week. We wanted to elaborate, in this space, on a wonky but important detail. There are actually two versions of the ‘Euro-deterrent’ that you hear discussed. We’re calling them the ‘French plan’ and the ‘German plan,’ for the country where that version seems to be most prevalent and whose strategies it best serves.”
Source: Karl-Heinz Kamp, “Nuklearwaffen für Deutschland? Die Atom-Phantomdebatte,” Neue Zürcher Zeitung, March 17, 2017, https://www.nzz.ch/meinung/nuklearwaffen-fuer-deutschland-die-atom-phantomdebatte-ld.151845.
Origin: Swiss newspaper; German author (think tanker); written in German
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Reject [German Deterrent]
Key Quotes:
“Nothing is more far-fetched than such considerations. For several good historical and political reasons Germany has renounced the possession of weapons of mass destruction, most recently in the two-plus-four treaty on German unity. The reservation, expressed by Konrad Adenauer, that Germany must be able to have a say in common nuclear weapons within the framework of the ‘United States of Europe’ is idle—such a European super-state will not exist. Also, the German public would probably never be able to accept the idea of German nuclear weapons. It was not for nothing that a German nuclear option had never been conceived in the last quarter of a century. The new leadership in Washington does not change this either.”
Source: Elizabeth Llorente, “Will Europe Form Its Own Nuclear Deterrence Program? US Experts Doubt It,” Fox News, March 17, 2017, http://www.foxnews.com/us/2017/03/17/will-europe-form-its-own-nuclear-deterrence-program-us-experts-doubt-it.html.
Origin: U.S. news website; U.S. author (journalist); written in English
Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]
Position: Neutral [Reporting]/Reject [Citations on Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“‘It’s an expression of nervousness on the part of the Europeans,’ Gary Samore, the executive director for research at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, told Fox News. ‘It’s floated by academics who are trying to send a message to the U.S.’”
Source: Hans Rühle and Michael Rühle, “German Nukes: The Phantom Menace,“ National Institute for Public Policy, March 22, 2017, http://www.nipp.org/2017/03/21/ruhle-hans-and-michael-ruhle-german-nukes-the-phantom-menace/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=EBB%203.23.17&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief.
Origin: U.S. think tank; German authors (one is a NATO official); written in English
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Deny [Debate]
Key Quotes:
“According to some recent press reports, Germany is considering acquiring nuclear weapons. If this were in fact the case, the prospects for international security would indeed be grim: fears of German nuclear militarism would haunt Europe; the European integration process might well be over; NATO could be thrown into a terminal crisis; Russia’s reaction would be intense, and global nuclear non-proliferation efforts might be dealt a fatal blow.

Fortunately, this gloomy scenario will not come true because the specter of a ‘German bomb’ remains as implausible as it has been for over half a century. As a closer look reveals, Germany’s so-called nuclear debate is actually a non-debate: After one editor of the respected conservative newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine speculated about the fading US commitment to European security and, consequently, the need for Germany to think the ‘unthinkable’, most of those who felt compelled to comment empathically rejected his views. Only a handful of observers, including a conservative Member of Parliament, some journalists, and an associate professor, appeared to make the case for German nukes.

At closer inspection, even this crew was not talking about the same thing. While some demanded that Germany acquire a national nuclear deterrent, others were championing a European deterrent based on the British and French nuclear arsenals. Throughout this peculiar non-debate, the German public displayed sound instincts: it ignored the talking heads. The nuclear dog didn’t bark.”
Source: Anna Kwiatkowska-Drożdż, “Merkel in Washington: A Cool Reception,” Center for Eastern Studies, March 22, 2017, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2017-03-22/merkel-washington-a-cool-reception.
Origin: Polish think tank; Polish author (Center for Eastern Studies [OSW]); written in English
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Neutral
Key Quotes:
“Germany will also make more frequent appearances in the public debate on previously taboo subjects, such as the issue of whether Germany needs its own nuclear weapons. However, Berlin is aware that this would not comply with international law, and moreover there is determined and persistent resistance to such an idea from the German public, so there is no consensus on the implementation of such ideas. Nevertheless, they have also emerged in a ‘lighter’ version; for example, the chairman of the CDU’s working group on foreign policy, security and development, Roderich Kiesewetter (CDU) has declared himself in favor of a European nuclear deterrence system, guaranteed by the British-French nuclear umbrella and co-financed by Germany.”
Source: Doug Bandow, “The Case for a European Nuke: Why the Continent Needs Its Own Deterrent,” Foreign Affairs, March 27, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2017-03-27/case-european-nuke?cid=int-lea&pgtype=hpg.
Origin: U.S. foreign policy website; U.S. author (Cato Institute); written in English
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Affirm [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“Europe is also the most obvious place for Washington to close at least one of its nuclear umbrellas. None of the United States’ Asian allies possesses nuclear weapons, and their development would have unpredictable regional effects and be more likely to trigger proliferation. Further, Asia lacks a regional organization such as NATO that could manage a broader, more stable deterrent. Europe, in contrast, already contains two nuclear powers, and the European Union, despite its challenges, could provide a possible continental defense framework. More important, the U.S. nuclear umbrella makes sense only as long as it doesn’t rain. There is no reason for the United States to risk its own security when Russia is no longer an ideological, global competitor and NATO extends up to Russia’s borders.”
Source: Maximilian Terhalle, “If Germany Goes Nuclear, Blame Trump Before Putin,” Foreign Policy, April 3, 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/03/if-germany-goes-nuclear-blame-trump/.
Origin: U.S. foreign policy website; German author (academic); written in English
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Contemplate [German Deterrent]/Affirm [German Deterrent]/Reject [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“We might ask why the Germans don’t figure something out with the British and the French, both of whom already own nuclear weapons. But the U.K.’s and France’s nuclear stockpiles are partly outdated, too small, and largely tactical (i.e., short-range). And, critically, would the two countries really step in and shield Germany and Eastern Europe against a Russian attack? Extended deterrence is a fine thing—as long as it works when push comes to shove. The question that the U.K. and France would most likely ask themselves in such a scenario is why not stay out and make peace with Russia, rather than risk war for the sake of interests in Eastern Europe that they see as distant from their own concerns. Such a self-protective reaction would be understandable (and predictable). But it also underlines Germany’s need to acquire nuclear weapons that provide it the ability to independently protect itself and its neighbors to the east. . . .

Nuclear weapons are expensive, contentious, potentially contagious, and dangerous. Germany is in no rush to get them. But if the shelter of the U.S. nuclear umbrella is removed while Russian weapons are still pointed at Berlin, it will have no choice.”
Source: Claudia Bracholdt and Jan Lüthje, “Braucht Deutschland eigene Atomwaffen?,” Die Zeit, April 5, 2017, http://www.zeit.de/politik/2017-04/verteidigung-atomwaffen-deutschland-pro-contra.
Origin: German newspaper; German authors (journalists); conducted in German
Type: Online Click Poll
Position: Contemplate [German Deterrent]/Contemplate [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“As of now, the debate about German or European nuclear weapons is conducted in a very encoded way. As an example, the president of the federal academy for security policy, Karl-Heinz Kamp, reminds us that British and French nuclear forces contribute to deterrence. ‘It is us non-nuclear states that will have to agree amongst themselves whether that is enough.’

Take a look at the video and then decide for yourself which position you would support.”
Source: Christian Mölling, “German Armed Forces Modernize, Build Cyber Defenses,” Cipher Brief, April 5, 2017, https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/german-armed-forces-modernize-build-cyber-defenses-1093.
Origin: U.S. foreign policy website; U.S. interviewer (journalist), German interviewee (think tanker); written in English
Type: Interview
Position: Neutral [Interview]/Reject [Citations on German Deterrent]
Key Quotes:
“[The Cipher Brief]: One thing that could frighten European neighbors is if Germany were to develop a nuclear weapon. That’s not on the table right now, but Roderich Kiesewetter, a member of the German parliament, has been talking about creating a European nuclear deterrent in case the U.S. decides to retreat from Europe. How credible is this idea of a European bomb?

[Christian Mölling]: That’s the least feasible option I can imagine, simply because there are legal obstacles. First of all, we are bound by international treaties to not do it, so we would basically have to cut up all these treaties, which would involve Russia, as a party to the treaties. It’s not only UN Security Council resolution on that, but there’s also the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or the NPT. There’s also the Two Plus Four Treaty. These international agreements bind Germany into remaining a non-nuclear state, so a bomb is definitely not in the cards.

Plus, developing nuclear capability would meet tremendous resistance in German society. It would be many bridges too far to think of Germany as a nuclear weapon state. We would leave that to the French and to the Brits.”
Source: Leon Mangasarian and Jan Techau, “Germany’s Strategic Frivolousness,” Handelsblatt Global, May 10, 2017, https://global.handelsblatt.com/opinion/germanys-strategic-frivolousness-763246.
Origin: German newspaper; U.S. and German authors (journalist/think tanker); written in English
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Contemplate [German Deterrent]/Contemplate [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“. . . Germans deny the role of nuclear deterrence. They feign astonishment at Berlin’s nuclear sharing with the US and ignore the importance of the American nuclear umbrella in staving off Russian nuclear blackmail. Now the question is whether President Trump will maintain NATO and the nuclear umbrella for allies. Germany needs a discussion on what it will do if it’s dumped by its nuclear protector in Washington. Can British and French nuclear weapons serve as a European deterrent? If not, the ‘unthinkable’ will happen: the nuclear arming of Germany. Either way, German leaders need a plan against nuclear blackmail.”
Source: Deutscher Bundestag Wissenschaftliche Dienste, “Völkerrechtliche Verpflichtungen Deutschlands beim Umgang mit Kernwaffen. Deutsche und europäische Ko-Finanzierung ausländischer Nuklearwaffenpotentiale,” May 23, 2017, http://www.bundestag.de/blob/513080/c9a903735d5ea334181c2f946d2cf8a2/wd-2-013-17-pdf-data.pdf.
Origin: German Bundestag; Bundestag Research Service; written in German
Type: Review by the Bundestag’s Research Service, commissioned by the office of Roderich Kiesewetter (CDU/CSU)
Position: Neutral
Key Quotes:
“The current international obligations of Germany under the NPT and the ‘Two-Plus-Four Treaty’ are limited to prohibiting the acquisition of its own nuclear weapons (‘German bomb’). ‘Nuclear sharing’, as it is already common practice with regard to US nuclear weapons deployed in Germany, does not violate the NPT as does the co-financing of a foreign (e.g., French or British) nuclear weapons arsenal. Such funding could not be derived from the EU budget, but from the German defense budget and on the basis of a respective bilateral international agreement, which also regulates the ‘service in return’ of the financing.”
Source: “The New Germany: An Interview with Wolfgang Ischinger,” Economist, May 30, 2017, https://www.economist.com/blogs/kaffeeklatsch/2017/05/new-germany.
Origin: British journal; British author (journalist); German interviewee (Head of Munich Security Conference); written in English
Type: Interview
Position: Neural [Interview]/Reject [Citations on German Deterrent]/Reject [Citations on Eurodeterrent]/Contemplate [Citations on Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
Economist: “Does Germany need a nuclear deterrent?”

Ischinger: “No!”

Economist: “It doesn’t?”

Ischinger: “No. We rely on the US. It would be great if there were additional options. But there aren’t. There have been some in this country who believe that this is the time to cut the umbilical cord across the Atlantic because the Americans are the bad guys. That’s classic anti-Americanism. It goes back to the Vietnam War. But the truth of the matter is that there are no viable alternatives. We are married to the American nuclear security umbrella, whether we like it or not. Germany is legally and politically bound to remain a non-nuclear nation. Full stop.

There have occasionally been tentative discussions with the French about the nuclear deterrent, under Mitterrand, Chirac and Sarkozy. Do I think that the French nuclear force could evolve into a serious option for Germany? Well, one should never say never. But that would require fundamental changes in how the French think about their own role and their nuclear deterrent. So not only is there no way that would open the door for a German nuclear weapon, but there is also no sensible, meaningful, reasonable European nuclear option. We don’t have a European decision maker—not even to send 1,000 soldiers to Mali.”

Economist: “Who pushes the button?”

Ischinger: “That’s it. Britain has its PM. France and the US have their presidents. But the there are no button-pushers at the EU or Franco-German levels. I don’t see it as an option. Do I think we should keep talking with the French about possible future options? Yes. And we should also talk about the vision of a European army as a long term option. But this is a matter of decades.”
Source: Stanley R. Sloan, “Don’t Count on Germany to Save the West,” War on the Rocks, June 6, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/06/dont-count-on-germany-to-save-the-west/.
Origin: U.S. foreign policy website; U.S. author (think tanker); written in English
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Reject [German Deterrent]/Reject [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“One of the early German reactions to Donald Trump’s assaults on the NATO allies was speculation about Germany becoming a nuclear weapons state. Suggestions that Germany should ‘think the previously unthinkable,’ raised by a prominent German newspaper and a conservative member of the German parliament, were met with cautionary responses and alternative proposals. One proposal envisioned creating a European deterrent on French and British nuclear capabilities, with Germany funding the operation. Chances are neither an autonomous German nuclear force nor a European deterrent force are on the table. They are simply too potentially destabilizing in the former case (as well as a breach of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) and most likely, in the latter, a bridge too far beyond sovereign control of nuclear weapons for France and the United Kingdom.”
Source: Francisco Aldaya, “‘Germany Can’t Run the EU as a Vehicle for Its Own interests,’” Buenos Aires Herald, June 9, 2017, http://www.buenosairesherald.com/article/225927/%E2%80%98germany-can%E2%80%99t-run-the-eu-as--a-vehicle-for-its-own-interests%E2%80%99.
Origin: Argentinian newspaper; Argentinian author (journalist); German interviewee (think tanker); written in English
Type: Interview
Position: Neural [Interview]/Contemplate [Citations on Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
Hans Kundnani: “. . . Now that there’s this question of security as well, France is now much more powerful relative to Germany than it was before the election of Trump. France is now the only country in the EU that has significant military capability, that is a nuclear power. So, on November 9 the power balance completely changed, and suddenly Germany was much weaker than it was. Germany needs France in a way that it didn’t before, and particularly its nuclear deterrent. So, Germany needs to make even more concessions to France than it did before. It’s not just about the Eurozone anymore. It’s about: ‘What would a deal look like whereby France would be willing to extend its nuclear deterrent to include Germany, and perhaps the rest of the EU?’”
Source: Leon Mangasarian and Jan Techau, Führungsmacht Deutschland. Strategie ohne Angst und Anmaßung (Munich: dtv, 2017), 105–7.
Origin: German book publisher; U.S. and German authors (journalist and think tanker); written in German
Type: Analysis
Position: Contemplate [German Deterrent]/Contemplate [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“The continued necessity of nuclear deterrence is not being understood [in Germany]. The Federal Government’s 2016 White Paper clearly laid out the problem: ‘As long as nuclear weapons can be employed in military conflicts, there will always be a need for nuclear deterrence,’ it says there. ‘The strategic nuclear capabilities of NATO, and in particular those of the United States, are the ultimate guarantee of the security of its members. NATO remains a nuclear alliance. Through nuclear sharing, Germany continues to be an integral part of NATO’s nuclear policy and planning.’ At the same time, German audiences are regularly astounded if one talks about nuclear weapons in foreign and security policy talks. Doesn’t that mean remaining in the mindset of the Cold War, one is being asked. Fact is that the countries of Europe are safe against Russian nuclear blackmail because they are under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Two European countries, Great Britain and France, are nuclear powers themselves and continue, albeit with high costs, to cling on to these weapons. Whether they would suffice in order to secure Europe, in case the United States withdraws its protection, is more than questionable. As a result of the ‘Trump shock,’ Europe, and therewith Germany, is facing a debate about nuclear deterrence. It is high time to engage on that topic in a proactive and competent way. Up until now, German politicians try to avoid that debate under all circumstances. Nothing in Germany is so emotionally loaded and inaccessible to sober reflection as a discussion about ‘the bomb.’ But this is, at first, not about the question of German nuclear weapons, but about how to prevent nuclear blackmail in case the U.S. umbrella might be gone. Could it be possible to organize nuclear deterrence in a European fashion? Would British and French nuclear forces be sufficient for that task? Would they be made available for the whole of Europe? Would Europeans fully trust each other in that regard? At the end of such a debate even the nuclear arming of Germany could again become a topic. Right now, such a debate is unthinkable. Germany has renounced nuclear arms in the 2+4 Treaty and the NPT does not allow the country to acquire or produce them. But all of this is dependent on the reliability of American protection. If this is gone, and Germany, at the same time, observes its abdication, it has to give an answer to the question of how to guarantee that Europe won’t be prone to nuclear blackmail. This won’t be easy.”
Source: Julia Berghofer, “Euro-Atlantic Security Under the New US Administration: Will Trump Destroy the International Security Architecture?,” Heinrich Böll Stiftung, June 16, 2017, https://eu.boell.org/en/2017/06/16/euro-atlantic-security-under-new-us-administration-will-trump-destroy-international.
Origin: German political party foundation (The Greens); German author (Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament); written in English
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Neutral
Key Quotes:
“At the same time in Germany, officials from the Foreign Office, Bundestag and Chancellor’s Office resolutely rejected the idea of a European or even a German nuclear weapon. Though admittedly this topic is causing most of them a real headache, because Germany finds itself in the uncomfortable position of having some 20 US nuclear warheads on its soil, which it wants to keep in order to have a say on nuclear issues in NATO. Since approval for nuclear weapons could hardly be lower in Germany (according to a recent opinion poll, 85 percent would like to see the American bombs being removed from the military base in Büchel), they prefer not to have a broad public debate about a ‘German bomb’.

The debate about European nuclear weapons might seem odd and unrealistic, but it becomes more understandable if you look at the fact that Trump is able and willing to erode one of NATO’s key features: its credibility. No matter if you support or oppose the concept of nuclear deterrence, it is obvious that deterrence only works if it is credible. And there is no credible deterrence if the US questions the persistence of the nuclear umbrella for its non-nuclear partners. Instead of reassuring them of US assistance, the new US president openly suggested that more countries (including Japan and South Korea) should have nuclear weapons, which would not only mean a breach of the NPT obligations but could also lead to a new nuclear arms race in Asia.”
Source: Ulrich Kühn and Tristan Volpe, “Keine Atombombe, Bitte: Why Germany Should Not Go Nuclear,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2017, 103–12, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/germany/2017-06-13/keine-atombombe-bitte.
Origin: U.S. magazine; German and U.S. authors (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace); written in English
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Reject [German Deterrent]/Reject [German Latent Nuclear Hedge Capacity]
Key Quotes:
“. . . Germany would have to surmount major technical, political, and security hurdles before acquiring one. It would need to either repurpose its nuclear energy infrastructure for weapons production or sprint to the bomb from new military facilities. Either path would take substantial time and effort. Each would involve activities that, if detected, would ring alarm bells. Germany would struggle to keep any effort to build nuclear weapons in military facilities secret given the vast construction work this would involve. Nor could it simply rely on its civil nuclear infrastructure. In the wake of the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan, Merkel’s government decided to phase out all of Germany’s nuclear power plants by 2022. This decision makes it difficult for Germany to take technical steps toward the bomb under the guise of a peaceful program. Even seemingly innocuous moves, such as keeping a few large reactors online past the deadline, would raise suspicions. . . .

Worst of all, the pursuit of a German nuclear arsenal, rather than deterring aggression, could increase the risk of conflict in Europe, since Russia would likely work to prevent Germany from acquiring the bomb.”
Source: Ulrich Kühn and Tristan Volpe, “Keine Atombombe, bitte. Warum Deutschland nicht zur Nuklearmacht werden sollte,” Internationale Politik 72, no. 4 (July/August 2017): 90–97, https://zeitschrift-ip.dgap.org/de/ip-die-zeitschrift/archiv/jahrgang-2017/juli-august/keine-atombombe-bitte.
Origin: German journal; German and U.S. authors (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace); written in German
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Reject [German Deterrent]/Reject [German Latent Nuclear Hedge Capacity]
Key Quotes:
See Ulrich Kühn and Tristan Volpe, “Keine Atombombe, Bitte. Why Germany Should Not Go Nuclear,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2017, 103–12 for a complete translation.
Source: Rafael Loss, “The Folly of a German Bomb,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 26, 2017, http://thebulletin.org/folly-german-bomb10865.
Origin: U.S. journal; German author (academic); written in English
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Reject [German Deterrent]/Reject [German Latent Nuclear Hedge Capacity]
Key Quotes:
“Shortly after the US presidential election in November 2016, several opinion pieces in German newspapers argued that Berlin should acquire nuclear weapons. Given Donald Trump’s campaign rhetoric, and particularly his talk of NATO obsolescence, the authors suggested that the nuclear assurances the United States had provided for nearly seven decades were no longer credible.

Though claiming to offer a purely rational analysis of the Trumpian new world order, these authors not only ignored German public opinion, long-standing treaty commitments, and the reality of Germany’s nuclear infrastructure, but also the lack of strategic utility for nuclear weapons within Germany’s foreign and security policy. As an instrument of force, a German nuclear weapon would be an impractical approach to deterrence, defense, and other military and political objectives.”
Source: Anna Sauerbrey, “Deutschland will die Bombe...,” Der Tagesspiegel, June 30, 2017, http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/atomare-aufruestung-deutschland-will-die-bombe-/20000364.html.
Origin: German newspaper; German author (journalist); written in German
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Deny [Debate]
Key Quotes:
“Under the headline ‘Keine Atombombe, Bitte,’ [Kühn and Volpe] are considering how long Germany could keep construction works at nuclear sites secret and attest at the end that there is ‘a sudden desire for nuclear weapons in Germany.’

A brief survey amongst defense policy-makers from different Bundestag groups shows: no one considers this a topic. CDU foreign policy politician Roderich Kiesewetter, who had to serve the role of a witness for the ‘Economist’, feels effectively misunderstood. The issue of arming Germany with nuclear weapons was never his to consider, he says—and actually he never spoke of nuclear weapons for Germany. His statement shortly after Trump’s election in November 2016 was meant to discuss how a European nuclear deterrent could be organized and how British-French nuclear cooperation could be financed, according to Kiesewetter: in case – and only in case – that Donald Trump would put into question the U.S. nuclear umbrella for Europe. Now, with Trump confessing himself to NATO, with U.S. forces remaining in Eastern Europe, and with no radical shift in U.S. defense policy in sight, one should not even have to talk about that anymore.”
Source: Max Fisher, “European Nuclear Weapons Program Would Be Legal, German Review Finds,” The Interpreter (blog), New York Times, July 5, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/05/world/europe/germany-nuclear-weapons.html?utm_content=buffer285c7&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer&_r=0.
Origin: U.S. newspaper; U.S. author (journalist); written in English
Type: Reporting
Position: Neutral
Key Quotes:
“A review recently commissioned by the German Parliament has determined that the country could legally finance the British or French nuclear weapons programs in exchange for their protection. The European Union could do the same if it changed its budgeting rules, the study found.

The German assessment comes after months of discussion in Berlin over whether Europe can still rely on American security assurances, which President Trump has called into question. Some have called for considering, as a replacement, a pan-European nuclear umbrella of existing French and British warheads.

The assessment provides a legal framework for such a plan. Britain or France, it finds, could legally base nuclear warheads on German soil. . . .

The legal review was requested last year by Roderich Kiesewetter, a lawmaker, a former colonel and a foreign policy spokesman with Germany’s governing party. Mr. Kiesewetter’s office said it was unclear why the assessment was made only now, months later.”
Source: Michael Stürmer, “Das Nukleare bleibt unteilbar,” Die Welt, July 12, 2017, https://www.welt.de/print/die_welt/debatte/article166547591/Das-Nukleare-bleibt-unteilbar.html.
Origin: German newspaper; German author (academic); written in German
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Reject [German Deterrent]/Reject [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“Germany renounced to acquire, develop or possess nuclear weapons in 1954 for the first time, in 1990 for the second time, and would be wise to seek security – as long as this is possible – under the cover of the Pax Americana. Everything that could encourage the United States, be it with Trump or post-Trump, to abandon Europe to its nuclear fate would be a jump into the darkness. As Chancellor Kohl once said, alliance competence remains the German raison d’état.”
Source: Maximilian Terhalle, “Atom-U-Boote für die Ostsee,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, July 27, 2017, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/militaerpolitik-klare-strategie-und-einige-kehrtwenden-notwendig-15123726.html.
Origin: German newspaper; German author (academic); written in German
Type: Affirm [German Deterrent]
Key Quotes:
“Rest assured, Germany should significantly increase its efforts to tackle the greatest security-political risks. Together with Poland and the Baltics, Germany has to use its know-how on nuclear-capable submarines, which it provides since a long time to Israel, now also for its own security. For the purpose of deterrence, such nuclear-equipped submarines should operate in the Baltic Sea. In addition, the security of Europe has to be newly conceptualized with France and Great Britain. In doing so, Germany’s contribution has to be based on its own capabilities.”
Source: Alexander Lanoszka, “Why Eurodeterrent Will Not Work,” East West Institute, September 14, 2017, https://www.eastwest.ngo/idea/why-eurodeterrent-will-not-work.
Origin: U.S. foreign policy website; Polish author (academic); written in English
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Reject [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“These issues highlight only some of the controversies that European defense planners would need to tackle if they do seriously intend on pursuing an independent nuclear force. Domestic politics and moral concerns present further complications. In light of all these challenges, talk of the Eurodeterrent will bear no fruit since European decision-makers will inevitably want to avoid the troubling policy considerations it would involve. Like most other pan-European defense initiatives that came before it, this idea’s time will soon be up.”
Source: Maximilian Terhalle, “Für eine europäische Atommacht,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung no. 265, November 15, 2017, p. 8, https://twitter.com/IRmt74/status/1024318775045369856.
Origin: German newspaper; German author (academic); written in German
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Affirm [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“In order to credibly strengthen NATO and for its own strategic security, Berlin must show responsibility by making a European force its priority. Provided by France and Britain, Germany must emphatically seek to negotiate co-decision making for itself.”
Source: Maximilian Terhalle, “Europas Augenblick ist gekommen,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 15, 2018, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/sicherheitskonferenz/gastbeitrag-eine-strategische-vision-fuer-europa-15446611-p2.html?printPagedArticle=true#pageIndex_1.
Origin: German newspaper; German author (academic); written in German
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Affirm [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“Effective German co-decision making as regards the French strategic nuclear forces would be a clear signal to Russia, a signal which could significantly strengthen Berlin’s deterrence policy.”
Source: Michael Hänel, “Atommacht Europa?” SWR odysso, March 1, 2018, https://www.swr.de/odysso/neues-nukleares-wettruesten/-/id=1046894/did=20997644/nid=1046894/x0t1fg/index.html.
Origin: German broadcaster; German author (journalist); German interviewees (academics); broadcasted in German
Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]
Position: Neutral [Reporting]/Affirm [Citations on Eurodeterrent]/Reject [Citations on Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
Maximilian Terhalle: “I think some see it that way but are afraid to say it in public. As I said, there won’t be any communiqué tomorrow from May, Macron, and Merkel, saying that we need a European nuclear force. That develops slowly; but crisis awareness is already there, and therefore I believe that the possibility for a European nuclear force is indeed real.”

Götz Neuneck : “The question is should one take the wrong steps, those already taken by Russia with regards modernizing its armed forces, and react to those in a similar fashion on the side of the Europeans – because that would indeed lead to an arms race.”
Source: Christian Hacke, “Falsches Hoffen auf die Zeit nach Trump,” Cicero, July 20, 2018, https://www.cicero.de/aussenpolitik/donald-trump-deutschland-usa-atommacht-nato-verteidigung-christian-hacke.
Origin: German newspaper; German author (academic); written in German
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Reject [Eurodeterrent]/Contemplate [German Deterrent]/Contemplate [German Latent Nuclear Hedge Capacity]
Key Quotes:
“Neither France nor Britain would be willing to guarantee German security with their national nuclear forces. Thus, a French or British nuclear umbrella, guaranteeing German security, is a highly questionable alternative.

There are many and good reasons that Germany deliberately renounced weapons of mass destruction in the past. But all contractual, moral and political obligations can, indeed must be, reviewed in the light of new developments and insights. The crisis in recent years in the US, in the Alliance and in the world is forcing those responsible to do so. This includes considering whether and under what conditions Germany could become a nuclear power in order to strengthen its own security and that of the Alliance.

In addition , the precipitous exit from nuclear energy in the wake of Fukushima has led to particularly fatal consequences: as a result, Germany has frivolously lost its role as a civil nuclear power in the world. The debate about the pros and cons of nuclear energy also needs to be reopened. ”
Source: Claudia Major and Christian Mölling, “Und wenn Trump den Nato-Ausstieg wahr macht?” Der Tagesspiegel, July 21, 2018, https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/transatlantische-beziehung-und-wenn-trump-den-nato-ausstieg-wahr-macht/22824766.html.
Origin: German newspaper; German authors (think tankers); written in German
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Contemplate [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“Nor can the US nuclear umbrella be easily replaced. Not the sophisticated procedures in NATO, not the weapons themselves. France and Britain would use their nuclear weapons in an attack on Europe, at the latest when their own survival is at stake. But under what circumstances nuclear use would take place, by whom, how extensive: all these questions will remain unclear for a long time. At the same time, the uncertainty expressed that way has a security impact far beyond Europe. For the NATO states, which were previously under the US umbrella, reliability of their protection is decreasing. For the outside world, uncertainty about when and how Europe reacts increases. The stability of the nuclear order is in decline. Ultimately, Europe would become more unpredictable for the rest of the world, but also for itself.”
Source: Theo Sommer, “Was Europa von Indien, China und Russland lernen kann,” Die Zeit, July 24, 2018, https://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2018-07/transatlantische-beziehungen-donald-trump-angela-merkel-eu-usa.
Origin: German newspaper; German author (former editor Die Zeit); written in German
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Affirm [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“The project of a European Defense Community - Eurocorps, Safe, CSDP, Pesco, EU Defense Fund and what not - must now be speeded up. And at the same time, the question of how French nuclear weapons (and even after a Brexit the British nuclear force) are put into the service of European deterrence can no longer be left out of the equation. The Federal Republic has renounced indigenous nuclear weapons in a number of treaties, but it should be granted at least the same planning participation in the Force de frappe and the British Nuclear Deterrence as in NATO.”
Source: Christian Hacke, “Eine Nuklearmacht Deutschland stärkt die Sicherheit des Westens,” Die Welt am Sonntag, July 29, 2018, https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/plus180136274/Eine-Nuklearmacht-Deutschland-staerkt-die-Sicherheit-des-Westens.html.
Origin: German newspaper; German author (academic); written in German
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Reject [Eurodeterrent]/Affirm [German Deterrent]/Affirm [German Latent Nuclear Hedge Capacity]
Key Quotes:
“As a replacement for the dwindling US nuclear guarantee, a European variant is being discussed in Berlin. Either a common European nuclear force is to emerge or France or England as nuclear powers should guarantee a deterrent for Germany. Germany could support a European nuclear force by agreeing to co-finance British and / or French nuclear weapons projects if, in return, the two powers agreed to guarantee Germany's security with an extended nuclear deterrent. But is that proposal convincing?

Europe has been waiting in vain for a common defense policy for 70 years. It will continue to be illusory in the future because of the different national interests. Above all, neither France nor Great Britain are inclined to guarantee Germany’s security with their national nuclear arsenals. A French or British nuclear umbrella, which ensures Germany's security, is therefore probably no alternative and no substitute. Charles de Gaulle's maxim, "Nuclear power should not be shared," continues to hold true, not only in France. Here too, Berlin is inclined to embrace an illusion.

Since the American nuclear guarantee has become doubtful and presumably no European deterrent variant seems feasible, the conclusion follows: Germany can only rely on itself in extreme cases. Extended deterrence comes with a fundamental key weakness: Under current circumstances, the weaker partner Germany can no longer rely 100% on the fact that an allied nuclear power would intervene with nuclear weapons in an emergency where Germany’s security is at stake. Thus, the view turns to the white elephant in the room, about which nobody wants to speak in Germany: How do we think about a potential nuclear power Germany?

In the past, Germany was able to renounce weapons of mass destruction because its security was guaranteed by others. This seems very doubtful today. On "Pacta sunt servanda," today, inevitably follows: "Rebus sic stantibus!" The new crises and structural changes must necessarily trigger a review of Germany’s contractual obligations in the realm of defense policy.

But for reasons of political correctness, lack of civil courage, and inadequate military strategic considerations, the nuclear component of our security is being suppressed. Instead, those responsible in Berlin behave like the three monkeys: say nothing, hear nothing, see nothing.

… The phase out of nuclear energy must also be reviewed in the face of the controversial energy transition. [That decision has] eliminated Germany's exemplary role as a civil nuclear power in the world. ”
Source: Ansgar Graw, Thorsten Jungholt, and Jacques Schuster, “’Noch immer wird Deutschland misstrauisch beäugt,” Die Welt am Sonntag, July 29, 2018, https://www.welt.de/politik/article180142080/Atomdebatte-Muss-Deutschland-Nuklearmacht-werden.html.
Origin: German newspaper; German authors (journalists); multiple German interviewees; written in German
Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]
Position: Neutral [Reporting]/Reject [German Deterrent]/Contemplate [German Deterrent]/Contemplate [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
Michael Wolffsohn, historian/publicist: “[Nuclear considerations must be addressed] otherwise Germany will become the plaything instead of a player on world politics. It's ultimately about Germany's survival.”

Alexander Graf Lambsdorff, Member of the German Bundestag (FDP): “[It is critical] to discuss the issue of nuclear weapons publicly. For with the end of the Cold War, the age of nuclear weapons did not end - you can regret it, but that is the reality. … [From the point of view of the FDP, Germany's security is guaranteed at least by NATO and the EU] It is there where our allies know us, where it must be made clear that we support the nuclear doctrine of the alliance, but do not strive for Germany to acquire nuclear weapons.”

Horst Teltschik, former Advisor to Chancellor Kohl (CDU): “The rearmament of Germany as a nuclear power would lead to a domestic political ordeal and shake the power-political overall structure in the EU as well as in the whole of Europe.”

Peter Ammon, former German Ambassador to the United States and the United Kingdom: “The wild tweets of U.S. President Trump would certainly not be accepted by our allies as a sufficient reason to destroy the global non-proliferation regime which has always been a key interest of Germany. The loss of confidence would be catastrophic. …

[If one day the U.S. actually does not guarantee Germany's national security anymore, he would argue] for a radically European solution, [that is, a] fundamental and courageous deal with France, which envisages a very deep integration of both states. … Similar plans, which at first glance may seem shockingly radical, have been considered already in the 1950s. We need the courage to think in terms of foreign policy in new dimensions.”

Harald Kujat , former Inspector General of the Bundeswehr: “A national effort to become a nuclear power endangers [the] solid foundations of our security … Because Russia would build a Euro-strategic, nuclear counterweight, with significant security and strategic risks for us and our allies.” ;’
Source: Sebastian Christ, “Wenn Deutschland eine eigene Atombombe baut, steht Europa in Flammen,” Huffington Post, July 29, 2018, https://www.huffingtonpost.de/entry/wenn-deutschland-eine-eigene-atombombe-baut-steht-europa-in-flammen_de_5b5db1fee4b0b15aba9994fc.
Origin: U.S. news website (German version); German author (journalist); written in German
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Reject [German Deterrent]/Affirm [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“As late as 1990 mistrust about the power of a reunited Germany was running high. In economic terms, we have not delivered many arguments in the past decade that would contradict this. And now that nationalists are on the rise all over Europe, Germans are supposed to start building nuclear bombs? It would only take a short while before the regimes in Poland and Hungary would start working on their own nuclear weapons. …

… We should strive for a European solution. France could take a leading role here, after all, the country is already a nuclear power.”
Source: Wolfgang Ischinger, “Ein atomares Deutschland wäre verhängnisvoll,” Die Welt, July 30, 2018, https://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/plus180159046/Nato-Ein-atomares-Deutschland-waere-ein-Verhaengnis.html.
Origin: German newspaper; German author (Munich Security Conference); written in German
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Reject [German Deterrent]/Reject [German Latent Nuclear Hedge Capacity]/Contemplate [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“There are chess moves through which one - involuntarily - sets oneself checkmate. To open a debate about a German nuclear weapons would be such a fateful move. …

… imagine : another complete turnaround after the nuclear phase-out! - would be extremely questionable. …

… An entirely different question would be whether, for example, France - in addition to the roles of the USA and the United Kingdom in NATO - could be ready and able to assume an extended nuclear role in the sense of "extended deterrence" in Europe. This would require a fundamental reorientation, expansion and Europeanisation of the French nuclear strategy, which could probably only be justified by comprehensive progress and political decisions in the direction of a European defense union: from today's perspective, therefore, a pie in the sky!

In this context, one could then ask the question to what extent partners such as Germany could contribute to the then necessary French expenses - without breaching the abovementioned obligations under international law. Such long-term reflections on a nuclear-backed European Defense Union, which seem to make sense, would be something completely different than steps towards German nuclear arming.”
Source: Christian Thiels, “Ein Atomgespenst geht um in Deutschland...,” Linkedin, July 30, 2018, https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/ein-atomgespenst-geht-um-deutschland-christian-thiels/?published=t.
Origin: Personal web page; German author (journalist); written in German
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Deny [Debate]/Reject [German Deterrent]
Key Quotes:
“The absurdity of such proposals is obvious. In the case of the "German bomb", however, there are actually serious researchers who insist almost stubbornly (and apparently particularly when there is a slow news cycle during the summer) that there is a "political debate" about this question. But apart from a few researchers and a few journalists, no one is involved in this supposed debate - neither politicians nor military personnel. …

… Even if one assumes hypothetically that the preconditions under international law make nuclear armament possible (which they do not), then there would still be the question of political will. No party represented in the Bundestag is currently pursuing the nuclear armament of Germany. So there is no chance at all in parliamentary terms that this topic could be seriously discussed - apart from the fact that there would not be a majority in the Bundestag for such a step in the foreseeable future.”
Source: Rudolf Adam, “Atommacht Deutschland? Nein danke!” Cicero, July 31, 2018, https://www.cicero.de/node/18126.
Origin: German newspaper; German author (former German diplomat); written in German
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Reject [German Latent Nuclear Hedge Capacity]/Reject [German Deterrent]
Key Quotes:
“In 2011 , Germany clearly stated with the nuclear phase-out that it would renounce any use of nuclear energy. We have neither scientists nor engineers who could compete in modern nuclear technology. The few who are still being trained have as their professional goal the dismantling of facilities and the securing of interim storage facilities, not the construction or operation of nuclear facilities.

However, the military use of nuclear technology requires the mastery and the ongoing application of civilian nuclear technology. Who wants to produce nuclear weapons, needs at least one enrichment and a reprocessing plant. How and where you want to build and operate such facilities in Germany after the disastrous experiences with Wackersdorf and Hanau, remains a mystery. Germany has to export its nuclear waste to France to decay. Germany has problems with Castor transports and interim storage. There is still no repository and there will not be one too soon. Left, Greens and the SPD together make up a majority of the population. All three parties are decidedly anti-nuclear. …

If Germany claims the right to possess nuclear weapons, what should other European countries do? If Germany questioned the pledge from the Two Plus Four Treaty, it would sow new suspicions amongst all its neighbors. In addition to the already pronounced economic-financial dominance in Europe a military supremacy would come, one from which nobody would know against whom they would eventually turn. Even our closest friends could no longer be safe from Germany.”
Source: Stephen F. Szabo, “Should Germany Go Nuclear?” American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, August 1, 2018, https://www.aicgs.org/2018/08/should-germany-go-nuclear/.
Origin: U.S. foreign policy website; U.S. author (think tanker); written in English
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Reject [German Deterrent]/Affirm [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“If a future German government were to renounce [its treaty] obligations it would reopen the German Problem and lead to an escalation of tensions not only with Russia, but with Berlin’s European partners. Would a Polish bomb be far behind? Germany would once again face encircling alliances. There is also the domestic political context. Only the Alternative for Germany (AfD) would openly welcome such a move; the reaction from the other parties and the public would be overwhelmingly negative. Chancellor Merkel’s policy to close all nuclear power plants has been widely supported and reflects a deeply anti-nuclear and anti-nationalist public. …

… French doctrine is now necessarily European given the weakness of the American guarantee. Germany is not limited by the NPT or the Two Plus Four treaty from cooperating with a European deterrent and should explore ways to work more closely with France toward this goal, including helping to finance French nuclear modernization as Ischinger, Kiesewetter, and others in Berlin advocate.”
Source: Matthew Karnitschnig, “German bomb debate goes nuclear,” Politico, August 3, 2018, https://www.politico.eu/article/german-bomb-debate-goes-nuclear-nato-donald-trump-defense-spending/.
Origin: U.S. foreign policy website; U.S. author (journalist); written in English
Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]
Position: Neutral [Reporting]/Reject [Citations on German Deterrent]/Affirm [Citations on Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“It would be easier to dismiss the article as the ramblings of an eccentric academic were Hacke not a fixture of Germany’s foreign policy establishment and a respected university professor. That the debate is happening at all speaks to how unnerved Germany’s security community has become in the face of Trump’s threats, including his warning at last month’s NATO summit that the U.S. might “go it alone.” …

… “If Germany was to relinquish its status as a non-nuclear power, what would prevent Turkey or Poland, for example, from following suit?” Wolfgang Ischinger, the head of the Munich Security Conference and a former German ambassador to the U.S., asked in response to Hacke’s essay. “Germany as the gravedigger of the international non-proliferation regime? Who can want that?” …

… Ischinger and others have suggested that instead of building its own nuclear capability, Germany might consider helping to fund France’s arsenal as part of a Europe-wide “extended deterrence” strategy under the banner of a European defense union.”
Source: Guy Chazan, “How Germany became Donald Trump’s European punchbag,” Financial Times, August 3, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/8f87c03c-93dc-11e8-b67b-b8205561c3fe.
Origin: British newspaper; British author (journalist); written in English
Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]
Position: Neutral [Reporting]
Key Quotes:
“An idea that was once unthinkable is, in the age of Trump, now beginning to seem like a sensible policy option. Should Germany acquire a nuclear bomb? The answer is yes, according to Christian Hacke, one of the country’s most distinguished political scientists. In an article for Die Welt am Sonntag in July, he said Germany was, “for the first time since 1949, without a US nuclear umbrella”. He added: “In an extreme crisis [we] are defenceless! In the worst-case scenario, Germany can only rely on itself.” Many in Berlin dismissed the piece as silly season nonsense. But the anxiety it reflected is real enough. US President Donald Trump’s furious attacks on Germany have sown panic in Berlin, calling into question alliances and allegiances that once seemed inviolable, and forcing a rethink of security arrangements that have underpinned Germany’s world view for more than 60 years.”
Source: Abigail O'Leary, “Germany could develop nuclear weapons as nation asks itself: 'Do we need the bomb?',” Mirror, August 3, 2018, https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/germany-could-develop-nuclear-weapons-13027101.
Origin: British tabloid; British author (journalist); written in English
Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]
Position: Neutral [Reporting]/Contemplate [Citations on Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
Ulrike Franke (European Council on Foreign Relations): “It’s crucial for Germany and Europe that we have a strategic debate. What Germany is slowly realizing is that the general structure of the European security system is not prepared for the future.”
Source: “Sicherheitsexperte warnt vor Debatte über deutsche Atombombe,” N-TV, August 5, 2018, https://www.n-tv.de/ticker/Sicherheitsexperte-warnt-vor-Debatte-ueber-deutsche-Atombombe-article20559371.html.
Origin: German news broadcaster; anonymous author; written in German
Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]
Position: Neutral [Reporting]/Reject [Citations on German Deterrent]
Key Quotes:
Karl-Heinz Kamp (President of the Federal Academy for Security Policy): “Certain questions are so sensitive that by thinking about them, you are breaking more glass than you are actually doing good.”
Source: Christopher Woody, “Trump has Germany thinking about getting nuclear weapons, but some think it's a 'totally phoney debate',” Business Insider Deutschland, August 5, 2018, https://www.businessinsider.de/doubts-about-trump-us-defense-spark-nuclear-weapons-debate-in-germany-2018-8?r=UK&IR=T.
Origin: U.S. financial and business news website (German edition); U.S. author (journalist); written in English
Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]
Position: Neutral [Reporting]/Reject [Citations on German Deterrent]
Key Quotes:
Jim Townsend (Center for a New American Security): “Germany developing nuclear military capability, a nuclear weapon, a nuclear deterrent, will never be in the cards ever.”
Source: Constanze Stelzenmüller, “Germany faces its worst security dilemma since the 1950s,” Financial Times, August 5, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/de7fcc78-964f-11e8-95f8-8640db9060a7.
Origin: British newspaper; German author (journalist); written in English
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Reject [German Deterrent]/Contemplate [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“Given the US president’s increasingly ambivalent attitude to Nato, the debate over nuclear deterrence in Europe has been simmering in Berlin for two years. …

… today’s debate is not about Germany acquiring a bomb. When the author of the aforementioned essay suggested this, experts swiftly denounced the idea as “reckless, foolish and incendiary”, in the words of a former deputy director of the Federal Intelligence Service. For a country so sensitive about finding itself isolated in Europe, such a step would be strategic suicide. No mainstream party would endorse it.

All this does not mean the debate is not serious. A more viable proposal argues that Germany should convince nuclear powers France and Britain to provide a nuclear security guarantee for all of Europe by offering to co-finance it. A 2017 advisory assessment by the national legislature’s research service concluded this was legally feasible — and showed how far discussions had progressed among policymakers.

Still, huge political, technological and financial obstacles would remain. A euro nuclear group in Nato, much less a nuclear-based European defence union, is a long way off. The notion that Europeans together might replace the US nuclear deterrent is fanciful.”
Source: Hannes Stein, “Europa muss Supermacht werden,” Die Welt, August 4, 2018, https://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/plus180431182/Verteidigung-Europa-muss-Supermacht-werden.html.
Origin: German newspaper; German author (journalist); written in German
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Affirm [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
[behind paywall]
Source: “Drohnen, KdB und die deutsche Bombe,” Sicherheitshalber – der Podcast, Folge 2, August 9, 2018, https://augengeradeaus.net/2018/08/sicherheitshalber-der-podcast-folge-2-drohnen-kdb-und-die-deutsche-bombe/.
Origin: German defense podcast; German authors (journalists/think tankers/academics); in German
Type: Debate/Analysis
Position: Reject [German Deterrent]/Contemplate [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
[No script available.]
Source: Tobias Fella, “Warum wir keine Bombe brauchen,” Der Tagesspiegel, August 9, 2018, https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/atomwaffen-warum-wir-keine-bombe-brauchen/22893880.html.
Origin: German newspaper; German author (think tanker); written in German
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Reject [German Deterrent]
Key Quotes:
“But what would that look like? First and foremost, a withdrawal from the German nuclear phase-out of 2011 would be necessary. At least one enrichment and reprocessing plant would have to be created. Specialists in the field of nuclear technology would have to be trained and promoted. Because bombs do not appear out of nowhere. Under what conditions would they be used, for whom, and against whom? And how would they be delivered – land-based, under water, air-delivered? Would tactical weapons be developed to react in a flexible and gradual manner, such as a limited nuclear strike against an aircraft carrier in the Baltic Sea, against a German one, that would likely be present then? …

… However, steps well below the nuclear threshold are possible, from increased efforts for conventional deterrence to fostering dialogue with European and other partners on what strategic stability means today. And arms control and disarmament could be revived in another step.”
Source: Elisabeth Braw, “It’s time to put an end to the phantom euro-nukes debate,” European Leadership Network, August 10, 2018, https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/its-time-to-put-an-end-to-the-phantom-euro-nukes-debate/.
Origin: British foreign policy website; Swedish author (think tanker); written in English
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Reject [German Deterrent]/Reject [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“At a more practical level, even if France and the UK agreed to extend a nuclear umbrella and turn their weapons into euro-nukes, we Europeans would still rely on America – as the United States has for years played an important part technically supporting the French and British arsenals. In case of a German nuke, that reliance on America would, of course, be larger still, unless France and the UK rapidly acquired additional skills that would allow them to help the Germans along.

That raises the question of whether the UK and France would be willing to be the anchor of a euro-nuke arrangement. If so, should it be both of them? Or just one? Should euro-nukes be developed within an EU framework? That seems a no-starter, given that a number of EU countries that are not members of NATO have signed the UN General Assembly’s nuclear ban treaty. It would thus have to be a coalition of the wiling. But would France and the UK, or one of them, be prepared to take on the burden sharing their nuclear arsenals? And would the resulting arrangement be superior to the current US-anchored one? As things stand, no non-nuclear European government has posed the question to Paris or London – and until they do, any discussion of euro-nukes (or indeed German nukes) is a moot point. What’s more, the phantom euro-nukes debate steers attention away from extremely urgent issues such as development of European conventional capabilities.”
Source: Christian Hacke, “Why Germany Should Get the Bomb,” National Interest, August 12, 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-germany-should-get-bomb-28377 [Translation of Hacke’s article, published first in Die Welt am Sonntag, July 29, 2018].
Origin: U.S. foreign policy website; German author (academic); written in English
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Reject [Eurodeterrent]/Affirm [German Deterrent]/Affirm [German Latent Nuclear Hedge Capacity]
Key Quotes:
“Germany’s new role as enemy number one of the United States president forces it to radically reconsider it security policy. …

… Since the U.S. nuclear guarantee has become increasingly doubtful and a common European deterrent does not seem to be forthcoming, only one possible conclusion can be drawn: in a serious crisis the only one Germany can truly rely on is itself. After all, extended deterrence has one major weakness: under the current circumstances, non-nuclear allies like Germany can no longer be certain that an allied nuclear power would still be willing to guarantee their safety in the event of a crisis. Thus, our attention turns to the elephant in the room, which nobody in Germany wants to acknowledge: What about Germany as a nuclear power? …

… The foreseeable loss of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, the lack of a European nuclear deterrent, the erosion of Western institutions like NATO and the European Union, as well as Germany’s inadequate defense culture call for a complete reassessment of Germany’s defense policy. This also begs the question: under which circumstances and at what cost could Europe’s central country become a nuclear power?

The personnel and structural changes in the United States and in the world are forcing Germany to make difficult choices, from which decision-makers in government and society can no longer shrink. The nuclearization of the twenty-first century is threatening to make Germany defenseless. Rather than engaging in disarmament, the world is threatened with the proliferation of nuclear dictatorships based on the model of North Korea. Thus, Germany must arm itself against this threat.”
Source: Ulrike Franke, “Germany Discusses Security and Defense Policy – Silly Season or Real Change?” East West Institute, August 15, 2018https://www.eastwest.ngo/idea/germany-discusses-security-and-defense-policy-%E2%80%93-silly-season-or-real-change.
Origin: U.S. foreign policy website; German author (think tanker); written in English
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Reject [German Deterrent]
Key Quotes:
“Whether the debate about reintroducing conscription will survive the summer remains to be seen, but both this and the debate about the German bomb need to be taken seriously. To be clear, Germany will not get a nuclear weapon. It would mean leaving the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (which would place it alongside North Korea, the only country to have done so), it could even lead to a renegotiation of the 2+4 treaty that allowed for German reunification. Acquiring a nuclear weapon would also require a substantial financial investment, which the German public would not be willing to make. In fact, Germany is closing down all its nuclear power plants as Germans reject the technology, so it is inconceivable that Germany could acquire nuclear weapons.”
Source: Maximilian Terhalle, “Here's How France and Germany Could Have a Joint Bomb,” National Interest, August 17, 2018https://nationalinterest.org/feature/heres-how-france-and-germany-could-have-joint-bomb-29042.
Origin: U.S. foreign policy website; German author (academic); written in English
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Affirm [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“Berlin now must take charge to protect the culture of its Western way of life and indeed to help sustain the order of the ‘free world,’ however modestly. NATO remains the most (powerful and) appropriate framework, if adapted, for a German-French initiative for a joint nuclear deterrent. …

… Germany's so-called nuclear participation as NATO member is very important as a means of consultation about strategic questions; though, as such participation only applies to short-range—and thus tactical nuclear weapons—it does not provide any deterrent effects. Therefore, in light of Trump's foreseeably unchanging approach, Germany must undertake an overall policy change. To strengthen NATO's credibility again and safeguard its strategic security, it needs to step forward and make the establishment of a European nuclear force the centerpiece of a new strategic planning process. This would not, as it was suggested by the French in the past, be aimed at financing their force de frappe, but rather Germany would now have equal standing in joint nuclear decision-making and, quite literally, one hand at the nuclear trigger.”
Source: Heather Hurlburt, “Having Decided It Can’t Rely On America, Germany Debates Acquiring Its Own Nuclear Weapons,” New York Magazine, August 17, 2018http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2018/08/why-germany-is-talking-about-getting-its-own-nuclear-weapons.html.
Origin: U.S. politics website; U.S. author (journalist); written in English
Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]
Position: Neutral [Reporting]
Key Quotes:
“Remarkably absent from the German nuclear debate were voices saying this is all overblown, Trump will be gone, the Americans will be back, everything is fine. Americans are still telling each other that, including very prominent senators from both parties. But our European allies are not. The cumulative weight of bad faith and bad policy has collapsed trust that, while imperfect all around, had lasted seven decades.”
Source: Tobias Fella, “A Nuclear Armed Germany Would Be a Mistake,” National Interest, August 18, 2018https://nationalinterest.org/feature/nuclear-armed-germany-would-be-mistake-29047 [Translation of Fella’s article, published first in Der Tagesspiegel, August 9, 2018].
Origin: U.S. foreign policy website; German author (think tanker); written in English
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Reject [German Deterrent]
Key Quotes:
“But then what? First, Germany’s plan to shut all its nuclear reactors by 2022, a decision taken after the Fukushima accident in 2011, has to be revoked. Thereafter, nuclear bombs could be technically built: URENCO has already made Germany one of the world's leaders in uranium enrichment. Strategically, things would be more difficult: When would the bombs be used, for and against whom? How would they be carried to the target? On land, on water, on air? Would tactical nuclear weapons be fabricated to be able to react flexibly and gradually, i.e., to a limited nuclear strike on an aircraft carrier in the Baltics? How about a German one that might almost certainly be already on patrol the ocean in this scenario? How would a German government balance lives and cities against each other? Would (and should) it be in its power to sacrifice Berlin for Warsaw or vice versa? Who would accept a value judgment like that? …

… A Germany armed with nuclear bombs would be a fatal signal and jarring break with a hard-won post-war identity, which includes renouncing weapons of mass destruction. It would put the ‘German question’ back on the international agenda. Not just any country would have chosen to acquire nuclear weapons and thus take another shot for ‘single-hegemony’ in Europe, but one whose recent austerity and migration policies weren’t praised by anyone, to say the least. A German nuclear bomb must be prevented, today as in 1957.”
Source: Mark Fitzpatrick, “Germany is now talking about nukes. Thanks, Trump,” IISS The Survival Editors’ Blog, August 29, 2018, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/survival-blog/2018/08/germany-nukes-trump.
Origin: British foreign policy website; U.S. author (think tanker); written in English
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Neutral [German Deterrent]; Neutral [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“Let us hope that Washington’s partners will have patience until it comes back to its senses under a normal president who understands that America is greatest when its alliances are strong and that credibility is a force multiplier. Every other US president in the nuclear age has understood the dangers from the spread of this civilisation-threatening technology and the crucial role of US security guarantees in maintaining nuclear non-proliferation.”
Source: Thomas Jäger, “Nicht ohne Amerika,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, August 30, 2018, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/donald-trump-macht-hoffnungen-auf-eine-europaeische-nuklearmacht-15761018.html?printPagedArticle=true#pageIndex_0.
Origin: German newspaper; German author (academic); written in German
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Reject [German Deterrent]; Reject [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“Thus, if deterrence by the EU is unlikely, Germany acquiring nuclear arms is to erode its EU integration agenda, and at the same time adequate deterrence of Russia is to be provided, there is no alternative to extended US deterrence. Therefore, the crucial foreign policy task is to shape the transatlantic relationship in such a way that mutual reliability is stabilized. This is easier with some US Presidents and more difficult with others.”
Source: Jana Puglierin, “Rolle rückwärts. Deutschland droht ein sicherheitspolitischer Ansehens- und Vertrauensverlust,” Internationale Politik, no. 5, August 31, 2018, pp. 8-13, https://zeitschrift-ip.dgap.org/de/ip-die-zeitschrift/archiv/jahrgang-2018/september-oktober-2018/rolle-rueckwaerts.
Origin: German foreign policy journal; German author (think tanker); written in German
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Reject [German Deterrent]
Key Quotes:
“And as important as it is to talk about a German nuclear strategy: Instead of discussing the chimera of a German nuclear bomb, one should rather talk about what is really at stake during this legislature period: German nuclear sharing in NATO. After all, Germany’s aging Tornados, which are kept by Berlin to transport American nuclear weapons, will be retired in 2025. The currently favored Eurofighter successor, however, is so far not nuclear capable, and the fighter jet planned with the French will only take off in 2040 at the earliest. Enough material for an honest discussion about the German position on nuclear weapons - if one wanted that.”
Source: Manuel Lafont Rapnouil, Tara Varma, and Nick Witney, “Can Europe become a nuclear power?” European Council on Foreign Relations, September 3, 2018, https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_can_europe_become_a_nuclear_power.
Origin: European foreign policy think tank; European authors (think tankers); written in English
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Reject [German Deterrent]; Contemplate [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“Should they wish, then, to offer themselves as joint nuclear guarantors of European security, Britain and France have only to carry on down this path – deepening their nuclear partnership (to cover, for example, nuclear propulsion, and joint targeting), and developing their joint declaratory policy to make it explicitly clear that they see the “vital interests” of their European partners as, in effect, their own.

Of course, to command credibility where it truly matters – in the eyes of the potential aggressor – such “extended deterrence” requires both parties to the arrangement to make consistent demonstrations of mutual confidence. Here, NATO has established the model. The nuclear guarantors must involve beneficiaries in all aspects of nuclear doctrine, policy development, and planning, thereby sharing the relevant risks and burdens. In NATO, this has meant providing bases and aircraft to deliver nuclear bombs; in the European context, where most of the French and all the UK capability is submarine-based, cost-sharing may be an adequate alternative.

“Eurodeterrence” may never come to be. But the UK and France should prepare for the possibility, deepening their existing nuclear partnership and reiterating that Europe’s vital interests are increasingly congruent with their own. Other Europeans, meanwhile, should come out from under the duvet and resume a serious debate about their responsibilities for their own security. Popular speculation about a German bomb may not survive beyond the slack news days of summer – but it has been a welcome provocation nonetheless.”
Source: John Ashley, “Mein Gott! Would Germany Build a Bomb?” Charged Affairs, September 3, 2018, https://chargedaffairs.org/german_bomb/.
Origin: .S. foreign policy website; U.S. author (think tanker); written in English
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Reject [German Deterrent]
Key Quotes:
“With all this in mind, the United States should remember that leaving NATO could have major consequences, even if the likelihood of Germany going nuclear is quite slim. North Korea withdrawing from the NPT to go nuclear did not have a great deal of impact on the treaty due to the “rogue” status of the Pyongyang government. But if Germany, one of the leading voices for disarmament, left the NPT to develop nuclear weapons, the treaty would be dealt a body blow that it may not recover from. The United States leaving NATO would significantly increase the possibility of this happening.”
Source: Jean-Dominique Merchet, “L´Allemagne veut-elle la bombe atomique?” l´Opinion, September 9, 2018, https://www.lopinion.fr/edition/international/l-allemagne-veut-elle-bombe-atomique-161420.
Origin: French newspaper; French author (journalist); written in French
Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]
Position: Neutral [Reporting]
Key Quotes:
“These mavericks of German strategic thinking are divided into two groups. Some are in favor of Germany becoming a full-fledged nuclear power, which would pose insurmountable political and legal difficulties in the current context. Others, more realistic, are in favor of a "wider" or "shared" deterrence in Europe, relying in particular on French nuclear weapons. So sending the ball back to the other side of the Rhine... where nothing moves. For the time being. [..] But in Paris, some are working behind the scenes to convince the Elysée to introduce the issue of German deterrence into the Franco-German relationship, thanks to a "spectacular initiative" that would open the strategic debate with Berlin. […] "We need to brutalize the Germans a little bit on the theme: if you have confidence in us, accept to talk about nuclear power," says Jean-Dominique Giuliani, president of the Robert Schuman Foundation. Admiral Guillaud, former Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, also thinks that we must "try something, but do it with the necessary finesse. This will eventually come to mind because in Germany, the wounds of history are healing.”
Source: Marco Giannangeli, “Nuclear EU: Macron´s military demands could see blocwide ‘nuclear power’-experts,” Express, September 23, 2018, https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1021456/eu-nuclear-power-security-brexit-politics-uk-us-france.
Origin: British newspaper; British author (journalist); written in English
Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]
Position: Neutral [Reporting]/Contemplate [Citations on Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
Roderich Kiesewetter: “If the United States no longer wants to provide this guarantee, Europe still needs nuclear protection for deterrent purposes. My idea is to build on the existing weapons in Great Britain and France.”

Emmanuel Macron: “France is ready to enter into concrete discussions with European states on the nature of reciprocal solidarity and mutual defence relations under our Treaty commitments. Europe can no longer entrust its security to the United States alone.” President Macron did not refer to nuclear weapons but Sir Adam Thomson, of the European Leadership Network, said: “The inference may be taken.”
Source: Rainer Pörtner, “Weniger Vertrauen als im Kalten Krieg,” Stuttgarter Nachrichten, October 16, 2018, https://www.stuttgarter-nachrichten.de/inhalt.atomare-aufruestung-weniger-vertrauen-als-im-kalten-krieg.fc259724-4a79-47ea-ba0a-ebf0ff7a36b7.html.
Origin: German newspaper; German author (journalist); German interviewee (Head of Munich Security Conference); written in German
Type: Interview
Position: Neutral [Interview]/ Reject [Citations on German Deterrent]
Key Quotes:
Rainer Pörtner: “Experts are already discussing whether Germany should also gain nuclear weapons in the long term. What is your opinion on this?”

Wolfgang Ischinger: “Absolutely not. This is a ghost debate. Germany has permanently and bindingly renounced nuclear weapons under international law. We would be the gravedigger of the Non-Proliferation Treaty if we were to question our obligations, with enormous negative consequences! That is why we cannot cut our ties with the US, we need them as a NATO partner and as security guarantors.”
Source: Michael Stürmer, “Die deutsche Frage ist zurück,” WELT, October 22, 2018, https://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/article182499488/Krise-des-Westens-Deutschland-muss-die-Schmerzen-des-Erwachsenwerdens-bewaeltigen.html.
Origin: German newspaper; German author (journalist); written in German
Type: Op-ed
Position: Reject [German deterrent]
Key Quotes:
“It is not clear to what extend it can still be relied upon the US today. A rendezvous in Rapallo, where in 1922 Germans and Russians provided the West with a counter-proposal, won´t propose anyone of reason. The same applies to German nuclear armament: at best, thought playing, at worst, a path to strategic loneliness.”
Source: Michael Rühle, “Debatte der Extreme,” Internationale Politik, November 1, 2018, https://zeitschrift-ip.dgap.org/de/ip-die-zeitschrift/archiv/jahrgang-2018/november-dezember-2018/debatte-der-extreme.
Origin: German foreign policy journal; German author (NATO official); written in German
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Reject [German deterrent]
Key Quotes:
“In view of these very different developments, the question of the future nuclear location of Germany should actually be discussed with the greatest intellectual discipline. But this is not the case. The German debate - if it can be called that at all - currently seems to consist of only two extreme positions: the demand for a German bomb and the call for Germany to join the Nuclear Ban Treaty. […] The negative consequences of German nuclear armament, on the other hand, are hardly problematized - from the hurdles under international law and the consequences for nuclear non-proliferation to the serious intra-European and transatlantic conflicts to be expected. The same applies to the question of which German government - and which population - would dare to take such a serious step at all.”
Source: Bruno Tertrais, “The European Dimension of Nuclear Deterrence. French and British Policies and Future Scenarios,” Finnish Institute of International Affairs, November 2018, Nr. 106, https://www.fiia.fi/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/wp106_tertrais_european_nuclear_deterrence.pdf.
Origin: Finnish think tank; French author (academic); written in English
Type: Analysis
Position: Contemplate [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“It would be consistent with French views of the EU to state more clearly that the French force protects Europe as a whole. At the very least, the same logic that applied to the joint UK-French “Chequers” declaration of October 1995 (see above) could be transposed to the European level: again, it seems compatible with the French view of what the EU is about that aggression against Finnish, Estonian or Polish “vital” interests would jeopardize the very foundations of what our existence is about in the 21st century. Another way of putting it would be to make it clear that Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty the mutual defense clause of the EU could be exercised by any means, thus including nuclear weapons. This would not be an “extended” deterrent in the traditional sense of the term. From the French standpoint, one cannot compare the protection conferred by a distant superpower to the recognition of a de facto reality: the idea is that “dying for Helsinki” is a more credible deterrence proposition for a European nuclear power than “dying for Hamburg” for the United States. This could possibly be supplemented by rotations of Rafale fighter-bombers (without their nuclear missiles) of the French Forces Aériennes Stratégiques (FAS) to allied bases, including on the territory of the most eastern countries of the Alliance in order to demonstrate its solidarity.”
Source: Manuel Lafont Rapnouil, Tara Varma, Nick Witney, “Eyes Tight Shut: European Attitudes towards Nuclear Deterrence,” European Council on Foreign Relations, December 2018, https://www.ecfr.eu/specials/scorecard/eyes_tight_shut_european_attitudes_towards_nuclear_deterrence.
Origin: European think tank; authors (French and British think tanker); written in English
Type: Analysis
Position: Reject [German deterrent]/ Contemplate [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“Indeed, rather than Germany developing its own bomb and breaking its commitments under the NPT and the Two Plus Four Agreement (which led to German reunification) –

the Europeanisation of the French deterrent is a topic of discussion in Berlin. Over time, the two European nuclear powers could hope to draw relatively receptive EU partners into nuclear discussions, eventually firming these up in into nuclear consultation (rather than a simple unilateral extension of the nuclear umbrella) and some form of burden-sharing.

No one expects Germany to overcome its nuclear taboo any time soon: the newly sparked debate about a German bomb has seen no enthusiasm for such a proposal. […] Still, moving along on conventional defence while leaving aside decisions and even discussions on the nuclear issues is not a sustainable approach.”
Source: Adérito Vicente, “Euro-nukes? A difficult but perhaps necessary debate,” European Leadership Network, December 7, 2018, https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/euro-nukes-a-difficult-but-perhaps-necessary-debate/.
Origin: British think tank; Italian author (academic); written in English
Type: Op-ed
Position: Affirm [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“The current security environment demands a serious discussion on European nuclear security, without undermining the Atlantic Alliance or NPT regime. After all, any real European ‘Strategic Autonomy’ will require two essential features: 1) an ability to be independent from the US in terms of security, and 2) the capacity to deter Russia (and in the long-term, China) both politically and militarily. It currently succeeds in neither. With that being said, if the strategic autonomy of the EU ultimately relies on having a sovereign nuclear option, how could Euro-nukes come about? I see two possible answers. First, the creation of a new, independent, multilateral nuclear force: A scenario in which European nuclear weapon state(s) share their arsenal and encourage others to contribute to burden sharing. This would fulfil Europe’s ambition to gain control over its own security, without increasing the number of nuclear weapon states in Europe. […] However, if this is deemed unnecessary from the transatlantic position, another possible option remains: EU member states demanding more involvement in NATO’s nuclear command and control.”
Source: Francois Heisbourg, Maximilian Terhalle, “6 post-Cold War taboos Europe must now face,” Politico, December 28, 2018, https://www.politico.eu/article/6-post-cold-war-taboos-europe-must-now-face-merkel-macron-trump-nato-eurozone-reform/.
Origin: U.S. foreign policy website; authors (French and German think-tanker and academic); written in English
Type: Op-ed
Position: Affirm [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“The second, related taboo pertains to the role of France’s nuclear deterrent in defending its European Union allies, beginning with Germany. […] Europe needs a deterrent alongside NATO’s existing American nuclear capabilities. France would explicitly extend its nuclear umbrella to its non-nuclear European partners. This commitment could involve the rotational presence of French nuclear-capable combat aircraft on the territory of NATO allies in Europe, including Germany. Great leadership skills will be required to convince the respective domestic constituencies while avoiding prompting the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe.”
Source: Joachim Krause, “Deutschland braucht keine Kernwaffen aber eine strategische Neubesinnung,” Hans Seidel Stiftung, January/February, 2019, https://www.hss.de/publikationen/deutschland-braucht-keine-kernwaffen-minus-aber-eine-strategische-neubesinnung-pub1428/.
Origin: German political party foundation; German author (academic); written in German
Type: Op-ed
Position: Reject [German deterrent]
Key Quotes:
“In fact, it makes no sense to demand a German nuclear armament. This option is no longer available to today's Germany. In this country there are no longer any experts who could manufacture nuclear weapons (it is even punishable to take part in the construction of such a weapon), no test site, no suitable carrier systems, no national control, reconnaissance and command facilities, no safe firing platforms and also no safe and remote place where the construction of nuclear weapons could be implemented. [...] It is to be assumed that the political debate within Germany will unfold such a self-destructive potential that this circumstance alone will deter any reasonable politician from considering such a project.”
Source: Reinhard Meier-Walser, “Braucht Deutschland Atomwaffen?” Hans Seidel Stiftung, January/February, 2019, https://www.hss.de/publikationen/braucht-deutschland-atomwaffen-pub1426/.
Origin: German political party foundation; German author (academic); written in German
Type: Reporting
Position: Neutral [Reporting]
Key Quotes:
“A lively, multifaceted and controversial discussion developed in which, in addition to the legally and politically fiercely controversial question of a nuclear weapons option for the Federal Republic of Germany, further questions such as aspects of Berlin's nuclear participation in a multilateral European project were also considered.”
Source: Daland Segler, “Gefährlicher Unfug,” Frankfurter Rundschau, February 5, 2019, https://www.fr.de/kultur/tv-kino/neue-kalte-krieg-11735006.html.
Origin: German newspaper; German author (journalist); written in German
Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]
Position: Reject [Reporting on German Deterrent]/Reject [Citations on German Deterrent]
Key Quotes:
“The right-wing conservative political scientist Christian Hacke takes it to the extreme: The taboo of a German atomic bomb must finally fall, which would strengthen our democracy - although he is quiet about the fact that Germany has committed itself not to possess nuclear weapons. And to cover up his demand, he claims that a German A-bomb should not be ‘interpreted anti-Russian’, but ‘in defence policy in all directions’. Was he thinking of Malta or Greenland? It is not surprising that experts like Ulrich Kühn from the Hamburg Institute for Peace Research speak of ‘dangerous nonsense’.”
Source: Christian Trippe, “Could France take the lead in Europe´s nuclear security?” Deutsche Welle, February 16, 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/could-france-take-the-lead-in-europes-nuclear-security/a-47549878.
Origin: German broadcaster; German author (journalist); written in English
Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]
Position: Neutral [Reporting]/ Contemplate [Citation on Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“It's not enough to say: The French will provide the nuclear deterrence and the Germans will provide the money," Francois Heisbourg of the Foundation for Strategic Research think tank in Paris told DW. There needs to be a strategic debate, he said, over doctrine, participation and how the weapons would be deployed. When asked whether that kind of debate could take place in Germany, Heisbourg simply laughed.”
Source: William Drozdiak, “France is prepared to extend its nuclear deterrent to Germany,” Washington Post, February 28, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/02/28/france-is-prepared-extend-its-nuclear-deterrent-germany/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.709ade9af7cf.
Origin: U.S. newspaper; U.S. author (journalist); written in English
Type: Reporting [incl. Citation]
Position: Neutral [Reporting]
Key Quotes:
“France has taken the bold and unprecedented step of pledging to extend its nuclear deterrent to cover German territory in the case of armed aggression. The French action comes as perhaps the strongest signal yet that European governments are reevaluating basic defense doctrines that have underpinned the Western alliance for the past 70 years. Senior officials in France and Germany say Europe needs new security concepts that address the rise of China, the return of Russia as a belligerent actor and the disengagement of the United States. The implicit French promise is contained in a 16-page treaty signed in the town of Aachen, Germany,[…]
The treaty commits the two countries to “providing aid and assistance by all means at their disposal, including armed forces, in case of aggression against their territory.” During an hour-long interview at the Elysee Palace in Paris, for a book I am writing about him and the future of Europe, Macron acknowledged that “all means” would include the French nuclear deterrent force.
The idea of France and Britain, as Europe´s sole nuclear powers, expanding the scope of their deterrent forces to cover other partner countries has long been considered as a possible alternative to Europe´s continued reliance on American nuclear weapons. […] But mounting alarm in Berlin and Paris about the reliability of the United States is pushing both governments to take actions that once seemed inconceivable.”
Source: “What would happen if America left Europe to fend for itself?” Economist, March 14, 2019, https://www.economist.com/special-report/2019/03/14/what-would-happen-if-america-left-europe-to-fend-for-itself.
Origin: British journal; unknown author; written in English
Type: Op-ed
Position: Neutral [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“Like it or not, for the first time this century Europeans are having to brace themselves for a serious debate about the role of nuclear weapons on their continent. Taboos could tumble. In a paper last November for the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, a French expert, Bruno Tertrais, suggested a range of “realistic” scenarios for expanding French and British nuclear protection, with or without NATO. Maximilian Terhalle, of the University of Winchester, and Mr Heisbourg recently argued that France should extend its nuclear umbrella to its European partners, including Germany. They acknowledge that “great leadership skills” would be needed to win support for this at home while not “prompting the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from Europe”.”
Source: Nick Witney, “Building Europeans´ capacity to defend themselves,” European Council on Foreign Relations, June 25, 2019, https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/building_europeans_capacity_to_defend_themselves.
Origin: European think tank; British author (think tanker); written in English
Type: Analysis
Position: Affirm [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“Beyond this, they need to revisit the old question of whether and how Europe should develop its own nuclear deterrent capability. For, as then French president François Mitterrand’s Defense White Paper expressed it in 1994, “with nuclear power, Europe’s autonomy in defense matters is possible. Without it, it is excluded.” The ECFR report referenced above discusses the “Euro-deterrent” issue in some detail, concluding that the ultimate answer must be for France and the UK to offer extended deterrence to their European partners and neighbors – and for these partners and neighbors to welcome, support, and engage with it. The ultimate model for this is current NATO arrangements for risk- and responsibility-sharing with the American deterrent.

The difficulties with, and objections to, such a course are obvious. And any such development would take years to accomplish. But Europeans should take the first steps now. Broadly, France and the UK should tighten their nuclear partnership and develop their declaratory policy, to make it increasingly clear that they see their partners’ “vital interests” as coterminous with their own. They might also (as suggested in another recent ECFR report) give thought to developing a new dual-capable, air-launched cruise missile. Meanwhile, other European countries should re-engage with nuclear issues, relearn the grammar of deterrence, and renew strategic thinking that they have been only too happy to outsource to others since the end of the cold war.”
Source: Bruno Tertrais, “Will Europe Get Its Own Bomb?” Washington Quarterly, 42:2, June 28, 2019, https://cpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/blogs.gwu.edu/dist/1/2181/files/2019/06/Tertrais.pdf.
Origin: U.S. journal; French author (academic); written in English
Type: Analysis
Position: Contemplate [Eurodeterrent]/ Reject [German deterrent]
Key Quotes:
“Let us be clear: a number of options and scenarios should be taken off the table of strategic forecasting, given that they have almost zero chance of becoming real in the coming two decades. These include a German bomb, a French-German one, a EU-wide common deterrent, and a British-French deterrent. […]

The perspective would change in case of a significant alteration in the transatlantic security relationship, directly affecting its nuclear arrangements. As German expert Oliver Thränert put it, “a decisive Europeanization would only make sense if European governments arrived at the conclusion that the US no longer constituted a reliable Alliance partner in terms of extended nuclear deterrence.” Without going that far, dramatic changes in NATO would indeed affect the range of realistic scenarios. Think, for instance, of a unilateral withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe—an irrational decision for sure, but which is not unthinkable in the current U.S. administration. Or think of an unraveling of the NATO nuclear basing and sharing mechanisms following a unilateral decision of a member country (such as Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands or Turkey) to cease being a part of it. Both are reasonable “what if?” hypotheses. In such scenarios, it is likely that France would be ready to consider playing a stronger, visible role in ensuring that Europe continues to feel protected by nuclear deterrence. In concrete terms, France could base part of its airborne arsenal (say, on the order of 10 missiles) in Germany or in Poland (basing) and/or agree that they could be carried by European fighter-bombers (sharing). For both political and technical reasons (the small size of the French airborne arsenal, about 40-45 missiles), it is unlikely that Paris and its European partners would seek to mirror the exact scope of current NATO arrangements.”
Source: Klaus Geiger, “EU-Atomwaffen werden eine Option sein” WELT, August 2, 2019, https://amp.welt.de/politik/ausland/plus197810389/Ende-des-INF-Vertrags-EU-Atomwaffen-werden-eine-Option-sein.html?wtrid=onsite.onsitesearch&__twitter_impression=true.
Origin: German newspaper; German author (journalist); German interviewee (academic); written in German
Type: Interview [incl. Citations]
Position: Neutral [Interview]/ Affirm [Citations on Eurodeterrent]/ Contemplate [Citations on German deterrent]
Key Quotes:
“Terhalle: A German atomic bomb would surely only be the Ultima Ratio. But common EU nuclear weapons will be an option.

WELT: You don't seriously believe that the British or the French will communitize their nuclear weapons?

Terhalle: There can certainly be no communitarisation without tough negotiations. But precisely because Poles, French and British see Russia as a strategic threat, we could basically do it together. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty - which has so far de facto prohibited Germany from possessing nuclear weapons - is based on the view that Germany can rely on the American security promise. If this basis is lost, the treaty cannot prevent us from thinking in this direction.

WELT: Away from the subtleties of international law: Such an option would never be capable of winning a majority in the German population.

Terhalle: At the moment, the German population's sense of strategic threats has been severely eroded. It is necessary to raise awareness among the German population that democracy and freedom are under severe threat. We have built a great deal of prosperity for ourselves. But freedom and prosperity are not free of charge in the world. They need protection because others want to displace our way of life. ”
Source: Arnold Schölzel, “Liebe zur Bombe,” Junge Welt, August 3, 2019, https://www.jungewelt.de/artikel/360076.liebe-zur-bombe.html.
Origin: German newspaper; German author (journalist); written in German
Type: Op-ed [incl. Citations]
Position: Reject [Eurodeterrent, German deterrent]/ Affirm [Citations on Eurodeterrent]/ Contemplate [Citation on German deterrent]
Key Quotes:
“Terhalle also knows again who is actually thwarting his love of the German bomb: "At the moment the feeling for strategic threats among the German population has been severely eroded. One must awaken in her the awareness "that democracy and freedom are strongly threatened". And he already has one who can do that: "Friedrich Merz certainly thinks differently than Mrs. Merkel at this point". And perhaps also Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer. Bright hopes. It would be better if Terhalle would look for a new population.”
Source: Nick Witney, “Nothing to see here: Europe and the INF treaty,” European Council on Foreign Relations, August 5, 2019, https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_nothing_to_see_here_europe_and_the_inf_treaty.
Origin: European think tank; British author (think tanker); written in English
Type: Op-ed
Position: Affirm [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“As the ECFR report cited above argues, Europeans need to take their heads out from under the duvet and start thinking seriously about how to create a “Euro-deterrent” – that is, about how to effectively extend the deterrence capacity of the French and British nuclear arsenals to cover European partners and allies. No one pretends that such a goal will be quick or easy to achieve. But, without it, all talk of European “strategic autonomy”, or of a Europe able to exercise any real degree of strategic sovereignty in the twenty-first century, is ultimately vacuous.”
Source: Lorenz Hemicker, “Deutsche wollen europäischen Nuklearschirm,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, November 26, 2019, https://m.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/umfrage-deutsche-fuer-europaeischen-nuklearschirm-16491570.amp.html?GEPC=s3&__twitter_impression=true.
Origin: German newspaper; German author (journalist); written in German
Type: Reporting
Position: Neutral [Reporting]
Key Quotes:
“Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, a clear majority of Germans again consider nuclear deterrence essential. This is the conclusion of the latest study by Kantar Public on behalf of the Körber Foundation, which will be presented this Tuesday in Berlin. According to the study, more than two thirds of citizens support the nuclear protection of their own country. Opinions differ as to how this should be ensured. The classic and still supporting variant - the American nuclear shield - is only desirable for 22 percent of the respondents. Instead, a European variant is favoured, with France and Great Britain as guarantors. 40 percent would like Berlin to focus primarily on nuclear protection by these two states, which have nuclear weapons, but significantly less than the United States. Only a small minority supports the idea that Germany should protect itself and develop its own nuclear weapons. Seven percent would welcome such a step.”
Source: Hans-Jürgen Moritz, “Frankreichs Präsident Macron wirbt mit seinen Atomwaffen - aber braucht Europa sie?” Focus, November 27, 2019, https://www.focus.de/politik/sicherheitsreport/alternativen-zur-nato-macron-wirbt-mit-seinen-atomwaffen-wie-weit-wird-er-fuer-europas-sicherheit-gehen_id_11391571.html.
Origin: German foreign policy journal; German author (journalist); written in German
Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]
Position: Neutral [Reporting]/Contemplate [Citations on Eurodeterrent]/Reject [Citations on Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“So how far does France want to go in redefining European security policy? Does it want to offer its European partners its Force de Frappe ("force of force"), the country's 300 nuclear warheads, as a protective shield?

"That's not a wild idea," says Ian Lesser, Vice President of the think tank German Marshall Fund. It was born against the background of an "unpredictable American commitment to European security" under US President Donald Trump. The protective umbrella of the Force de Frappe could one day be "part of a European strategic autonomy under French leadership".

Classic transatlantic experts among the European defence experts warn against this path. Michael Gahler, security policy expert for the CDU in the European Parliament: "As far as the nuclear sector is concerned, I cannot imagine with the best will in the world how Macron would like to inspire confidence in cooperation on French nuclear weapons. Over the last 70 years, the Americans have credibly placed the nuclear umbrella over Europe." This should be maintained and "the European pillar of NATO should be strengthened through deeper cooperation in the conventional field".

The SPD defence expert in the European Parliament, Joachim Schuster, points out: "Should the US really turn its back on Europe, the nuclear umbrella could only be guaranteed through close cooperation between the European Nato states, including Great Britain".

Instead of discussing expanding the functions of the Force de Frappe, it would be better to intensify talks with Russia on a new European security architecture based on arms limitation and disarmament.”
Source: Bruno Tertrais, “Braucht Europa einen eigenen Nuklearschirm?” Die Welt, November 29, 2019, https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article203903222/Verteidigungsstrategie-Braucht-Europa-einen-eigenen-Nuklearschirm.html.
Origin: German newspaper; French author (academic); written in German
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Contemplate [Eurodeterrent]/Reject [German deterrent]
Key Quotes:
“Two possibilities should be explored. First, interested European states could start a dialogue on deterrence issues outside the EU framework. It is difficult to discuss nuclear policy issues in Brussels given the wide range of opinions on nuclear weapons within the EU. Moreover, the EU framework would exclude Britain after the Brexit. One way forward could be to create a forum similar to the European intervention initiative.

Secondly, Paris could explain a stronger European role for its national deterrent. For the European Nato partners, it would be a supplement to the existing protection and a new safeguard for EU members who are not in Nato, such as Finland. The logic of the Franco-British Declaration of 1995 could thus be elevated to a European level - as an assurance that a serious attack on Poland's or Portugal's vital interests would endanger the very basis of Europe.

It could also be made clear that the corresponding Article 42 of the Lisbon Treaty also includes the use of nuclear weapons. Finally, Paris should declare that it will consult with its European partners on the cases in which the use of nuclear weapons for the defense of Europe could be considered. France's strategic fighter planes could also be rotated in other countries to show solidarity. In parallel, more discussions on nuclear policy in the North Atlantic Council should convince allies that Paris is not about duplicating or replacing Nato's nuclear policy. ”
Source: Konrad Schuller, “Die zögernde Atommacht,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, December 1, 2019, https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/frankreich-in-der-eu-die-zoegernde-atommacht-16512226.html?printPagedArticle=true#pageIndex_2.
Origin: German newspaper; German author (journalist); written in German
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Contemplate [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“‘Every help’ - that is a very far-reaching promise, and according to the laws of semantics it includes nuclear protection. However, there are two problems with this formula. First, France has never offered for its loyalty to the Alliance all the pawns that America has deposited: neither the stationing of nuclear weapons on the ground of allies, nor a two key system modelled on nuclear sharing. Secondly, even if the Aachen promise of protection were meant seriously, it would only refer to Germany. From the point of view of the other allies in the EU and NATO, the whole thing therefore looks like a special pact in which two parties join forces to let the others down. This is something the Poles and Balts, in particular, who feel threatened by Russia, fear. So if Germany were to actually rely on France instead of America in the future, its reputation as a reliable NATO partner would be ruined. The Eastern Europeans would then seek special alliances with America, and NATO would finally be divided. If Trump really wanted to drop the alliance one day, he would now have an additional reason. Putin could let the Crimean sparkling wine get cold.”
Source: Johann Wadephul, “Europa braucht auch französische Nuklearwaffen,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, January 17, 2020, https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/gastbeitrag-von-johann-wadephul-europa-braucht-auch-franzoesische-nuklearwaffen-16586907.html.
Origin: German Newspaper; German author (Member of the Bundestag); written in German
Type: Op-ed
Position: Affirm [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“Even if the French president’s “brain death” analysis of the state of NATO is mistaken: two central demands of Emmanuel Macron should be debated. [...] strategic orientation of NATO on the one hand; and greater efforts by Europeans for the Alliance and for their own security on the other.

[...] the statement of the French Foreign Minister [that France had made the security interests of all its European partners „entirely its own“], as well as the promise in the Aachen Treaty that Germany and France would give each other “every assistance in their power” in the event of an attack on their territories, raises the question of a European nuclear deterrent. As a consequence, this means on the one hand that Paris will integrate its nuclear forces - in addition to the existing NATO umbrella of America - either into NATO’s nuclear strategy or into a European system. This should be discussed in a dialogue of interested European states, which should also include Great Britain. .

On the other hand, a German contribution to a European pillar of the transatlantic nuclear umbrella should not be denied. This can be done in a continuation of nuclear sharing, which would then also include French nuclear weapons. In any case, Germany would also have to provide the necessary capabilities and the material, logistical and financial means for this. ”
Source: René Schlee, “Mut zum Wechsel,” Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, January 28, 2020, https://www.ipg-journal.de/rubriken/aussen-und-sicherheitspolitik/artikel/mut-zum-wechsel-4023/.
Origin: German foreign policy website; German author (think tanker); written in German
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Affirm [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“The assertion of the necessity of an increased conventional armament in case of a [European deterrent] is not plausible. For it is completely irrelevant under which nuclear defence shield a state is placed. In order to credibly maintain an extended French deterrent for Germany and other European states, there is no need for massive nuclear armament. France alone currently has some 300 nuclear warheads that could be deployed both sea- and air-based. If 300 nuclear warheads are not enough, how many would be enough?

A withdrawal of Germany from nuclear sharing with the Americans would have further advantages. Coordinated with other countries of nuclear sharing, such as Belgium or the Netherlands, one could send the important political signal to the Eastern European NATO countries that even a minimal nuclear deterrent under French leadership would satisfy German as well as European security interests. Moreover, it would enable Germany to present itself with new credibility in matters of nuclear disarmament. At present, Germany is in the dilemma of only being able to commit itself internationally to nuclear disarmament with half its strength, since nuclear weapons are on its own territory. However, the withdrawal from nuclear sharing could give new impetus to the debate on the Non-Proliferation Treaty.”
Source: Jacques Schuster, “Deutschland sollte Macron nicht über den Weg trauen,” Die Welt, February 1, 2020, https://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/plus205504069/Frankreich-Deutschland-sollte-Macron-nicht-ueber-den-Weg-trauen.html.
Origin: German newspaper; German author (journalist); written in German
Type: Op-ed
Position: Reject [Eurodeterrent]/ Contemplate [German Deterrent]
Key Quotes:
“Paris is neither willing to share its permanent seat on the Security Council with Berlin, nor can Berlin hope to have a say in the deployment of French nuclear missiles. The Germans should help the French to compensate for their growing weakness. Nothing more.

If the USA under Trump or a similarly poled successor should at some point release Germany from its nuclear protective shield, Berlin must become a player in the system of mutual deterrence for its own sake. If France really thinks in European terms, there would be no getting around allowing the Germans to participate in the "Force de frappe". France is absolutely not prepared to do so. If it continues to do so, a European Defence Community, which must be based on the principles of equality, will fail. […]

For the foreseeable future, therefore, what Helmut Schmidt wrote decades ago applies to Germany: Paris is our closest ally, Washington our most important ally.”
Source: Hans Monath, “Wir sollten uns an nuklearer Abschreckung beteiligen,” Tagesspiegel, February 2, 2020, https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/interview-mit-unions-fraktionsvize-johann-wadephul-wir-sollten-uns-an-nuklearer-abschreckung-beteiligen/25500266.html.
Origin: German newspaper; German author (journalist); German interviewee (Member of the Bundestag); written in German
Type: Interview
Position: Neutral [Interview]/Affirm [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
Johann Wadephul: “We must consider cooperation with France on nuclear weapons. Germany should be prepared to contribute to this nuclear deterrent with its own capabilities and resources. In return, France should place them under a joint EU or NATO command.” … “I observe that the political left in Germany is reacting to this debate with excuses. But excuses do not provide more security. The reality is that we need a nuclear deterrent. It is in Germany's interest that we can influence the nuclear strategy that protects us. It would be wise to try that with France as well.”
Source: “Unions-Fraktionsvize löst viel Kritik mit Vorstoß zu Atomwaffen-Kooperation aus.” Stern, February 3, 2020, https://www.stern.de/news/unions-fraktionsvize-loest-viel-kritik-mit-vorstoss-zu-atomwaffen-kooperation-aus-9120208.html.
Origin: German foreign policy website; unknown author; written in German
Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]
Position: Neutral [Reporting]/ Reject [Citations on Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“With his push for a Franco-German nuclear weapons cooperation, Union vice faction leader Johann Wadephul (CDU) has also triggered opposition within his own party.

CDU leader and Minister of Defense Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer rejected bilateral agreements in the area of nuclear weapons, referring to the nuclear protective shield of the NATO alliance, on which Germany continues to rely. “Germany is and will remain dependent on NATO’s nuclear umbrella and not on the umbrella of individual, bilateral agreements,” she said at a meeting of Bundeswehr commanders in Berlin. “Therefore, Germany should continue to make its contribution in the framework of nuclear sharing.”

The Left Party sharply criticized Wadephul's move and warned against “dangerous big man addiction" and against attempts to make Germany a “nuclear power". Anyone who now “strives for nuclear weapons alongside France is playing with fire,” explained Left Party member Sevim Dagdelen. “The Federal Government is called upon to stop the irresponsible sabre-rattling and war crying from the Union.”

Criticism also came from the coalition partner SPD. “There is absolutely no reason for a debate on whether Germany should participate in the French nuclear weapons program,” said SPD foreign affairs expert Nils Schmid. “Especially since France is unlikely to be willing to share its control over nuclear weapons with other states”.

The CDU foreign policy expert Roderich Kiesewetter also expressed criticism of the initiative of his parliamentary group colleague. “A German-French nuclear initiative would be a signal of mistrust towards the USA,” he told the RND newspapers. “Europe alone cannot organize its security. We must not endanger the transatlantic nuclear umbrella. “France's nuclear armament would not be enough to replace US capabilities in Europe”.

The environmental organization Greenpeace also reacted indignantly to the initiative. “Wadephul's call for German nuclear deterrence means making mass murder from Germany thinkable and plannable again,” explained Greenpeace spokesman Christoph von Lieven. “Germany's historic responsibility is to secure peace. This can only be done without nuclear weapons.” Germany therefore also had to sign the UN Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.”
Source: “SPD-Fraktionschef lehnt gemeinsame Atomwaffen mit Frankreich ab,” Oldenburger Onlinezeitung, February 4, 2020, https://www.oldenburger-onlinezeitung.de/nachrichten/spd-fraktionschef-lehnt-gemeinsame-atomwaffen-mit-frankreich-ab-32325.html.
Origin: German newspaper; unknown author; written in German
Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]
Position: Neutral [Reporting]/ Reject [Citations on Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“SPD faction leader Rolf Mützenich has rejected any thought games about joint nuclear weapons with France. However, France and Germany must "continue to coordinate and complement each other", Mützenich told the newspapers of the Funke media group […].

Nuclear weapons and a nuclear option for Germany are, however, an unsuitable field in this regard. Nuclear weapons and their proliferation remain one of the greatest security risks.

The goal of the SPD remains its complete elimination, said the faction leader. The Libya conference in Berlin had shown that Germany's strength lies above all in the diplomatic handling and resolution of international conflicts. "We want to continue on this path with all our strength and concentration", Mützenich said.”
Source: Barbara Kunz, “Nicht einfach eine Lebensversicherung,” Die Zeit, February 6, 2020, https://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2020-02/atomwaffen-deutschland-frankreich-kooperation-abschreckung-nuklearwaffen.
Origin: German newspaper; German author (academic); written in German
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Reject [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“A Franco-German nuclear bomb is a recurrent theme in security policy debates. Mostly, however, both countries discuss separately and often without convincing security policy arguments. It is simply assumed that nuclear deterrence makes sense. The interest of the respective other side in a cooperation is also claimed - although this is not necessarily the case. Moreover, nuclear deterrence cannot and must not be viewed in isolation from the security situation as a whole. A Franco-German nuclear bomb would have far-reaching effects on Europe as a whole, the partners in the European Union and, of course, on Franco-German relations.

German debates tend to ignore the fact that French nuclear policy is not designed for cooperation. France does not even participate in NATO's Nuclear Planning Group; the French President is master of his force de frappe - interference is undesirable. There are better conditions for cooperation.”
Source: Paul-Anton Krüger, “Ein wehrhaftes Europa,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, February 7, 2020, https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/sicherheitspolitik-ein-wehrhaftes-europa-1.4788566.
Origin: German newspaper; German author (journalist); written in German
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Contemplate [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“… It would be foolish if the German response to Macron's wake-up call were to be reduced to the question of whether Bundeswehr jets could one day carry French nuclear bombs. Macron's offer to involve the nuclear forces is a political signal: France is ready to contribute all its resources to make Europe a serious security actor. Macron knows that France cannot do this alone. But he represents France's claim to leadership in Europe.

The demand for strategic autonomy for Europe is also very well received in Germany. Berlin should now turn words into deeds. That would mean responding to Macron's offer.”
Source: Jacques Schuster, “Frankreich muss die Macht über seine Atomwaffen teilen,” Die Welt, February 7, 2020, https://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/article205696391/Nukleare-Teilhabe-Paris-muss-die-Macht-ueber-seine-Atomwaffen-teilen.html.
Origin: German newspaper; German author (journalist); written in German
Type: Op-ed
Position: Contemplate [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“[…] If the existence of this country is at stake, Germany must have a say. It cannot put its security entirely in other hands. This nuclear sharing is the least, the basis, the be-all and end-all of German security policy.

Should the Americans under Donald Trump or one of his successors get the idea of abandoning the Europeans to their fate and declaring NATO superfluous, a European Defence Community must ultimately decide jointly on the use of nuclear weapons. If France, the EU's last nuclear power, refuses to accept this insight, it will no longer be just a single publicist who considers the German signature to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to be a folly.”
Source: Leo Hoffmann-Axthelm, “Keine Atombombe für die EU,” Frankfurter Rundschau, February 9, 2020, https://www.fr.de/meinung/keine-atombombe-13530455.html.
Origin: German newspaper; German author (ICAN); written in German
Type: Op-ed
Position: Reject [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“But a stronger role in the world does not mean, as proposed by Wadephul or Macron, acquiring weapons of mass destruction for Europe. Multilateralism is important not only in climate and trade policy, but also when it comes to our security. If the United States and Russia are cashing in on one bilateral agreement after another, the Europeans should make it clear that only multilateral action is capable of containing the superpowers grandiosity. It is irresponsible of us to hold on to nuclear weapons without ever having had a debate on the costs, benefits or humanitarian implications.

Fortunately, the rest of the world has not stood idly by: At Austria's initiative, two thirds of the states have banned nuclear weapons under international law, and the treaty will enter into force in the course of 2020. It would be good for Germany's credibility to join the ban on nuclear weapons as soon as possible.”
Source: Matthias Naß, “Europa schaffen ohne Atomwaffen.” Die Zeit, February 12, 2020, https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2020-02/muenchner-sicherheitskonferenz-atomwaffen-verteidigung-europa.
Origin: German newspaper; German author (journalist); written in German
Type: Op-ed
Position: Reject [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“The attempt to intensify European cooperation in security policy through a common nuclear strategy would be exactly the wrong way to go. Especially since Macron leaves no doubt that he, the French President, alone decides on the deployment of the "force de frappe".

The "strategic dialogue" proposed by Macron could further damage the Atlantic Alliance without advancing common European defence in the slightest. It distracts attention from areas where closer cooperation is useful and necessary, indeed overdue.”
Source: Michael Thumann, “Europa muss sich selbst verteidigen.” Die Zeit, February 14, 2020, https://www.zeit.de/politik/2020-02/muenchner-sicherheitskonferenz-usa-frankreich-emmanuel-macron-akk-steinmeier.
Origin: German newspaper; German author (journalist); written in German
Type: Op-ed
Position: Affirm [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“The USA no longer protects the EU. Now French President Emmanuel Macron is making an offer to the other Europeans. Especially the Germans should not miss it.

After all what Macron is proposing is nothing less than a comprehensive rethink of Europe's security in a world where Americans are wriggling out of commitments and no longer want to take responsibility for the EU. For Germany, this does not mean changing the nuclear umbrella immediately. Nor is it enough simply to want to disarm. The Europeans and the Germans will have to defend themselves. All this can certainly be done within the framework of NATO. But no longer paid for, protected and strategically pre-chewed by the USA.”
Source: Daniel Hamilton, “Das Risiko eines Atomwaffeneinsatzes steigt” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 14, 2020, https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/sicherheitskonferenz/nukleares-zeitalter-risiko-eines-atomwaffeneinsatzes-steigt-16632533.html.
Origin: German newspaper; U.S. author (academic); written in German
Type: Analysis
Position: Neutral [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“The nuclear policy debate in Germany remains trapped in the tight corset of a rapidly disappearing age. Because Germany has no nuclear weapons, or does not want to have them, it remains a recipient rather than a donor country in questions of nuclear deterrence and arms control. German concerns can be reduced to one question: If the Americans prove to be unreliable, who will protect us from the Russians? …

"We must not remain spectators," said Macron. He is right. Germany can make a contribution in which the debate here in Germany is not just about who protects the Germans, but how Germany can actively shape the new rules of the second nuclear age with its allies and other partners around the world. Germany will not play the leading role, but can and must, for its own interests, export more security than it dares to do today.”
Source: “Mützenich gegen engere Kooperation,” ZDF, February 15, 2020, https://www.zdf.de/nachrichten/heute/atomare-abschreckung-muetzenich-gegen-engere-kooperation-100.html.
Origin: German broadcaster; unknown author; written in German
Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]
Position: Neutral [Reporting]/Reject [Citations on Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“SPD faction leader Rolf Mützenich is against closer German-French cooperation in nuclear deterrence. Rather, he said, France, too, must take steps towards abolishing its nuclear arsenal.

President Emmanuel Macron had announced that he wanted disarmament and arms control. This must "be reflected in French politics in the near future", Mützenich demanded.”
Source: Konstantin von Hammerstein, “Emmanuel Macron bei der Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz: ‘Ich bin nicht frustriert, ich bin ungeduldig,’” Der Spiegel, February 15, 2020, https://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/emmanuel-macron-bei-der-muenchner-sicherheitskonferenz-stunde-der-wahrheit-ist-gekommen-a-89262353-7d46-4a92-a30d-1e61e7267199.
Origin: German news website; German author (journalist); written in German
Type: Reporting
Position: Neutral [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“Before he gave his keynote address to the Paris École de guerre last week on French nuclear strategy, Macron also sent his emissaries to Berlin. They wanted to know what the German government would think if the president offered the Germans a strategic dialogue on nuclear deterrence. The message from the Chancellery was clear: not much. He'd better keep the Germans out. Macron followed the advice. In his speech, the Germans were now no longer explicitly mentioned, instead he offered a strategic dialogue to the "European partners" who were "ready for it".”
Source: Andreas Noll, “Macrons deutsche Abschreckung,” Deutsche Welle, February 15, 2020, https://www.dw.com/de/macrons-deutsche-abschreckung/a-52389670.
Origin: German broadcaster; German author (journalist); written in German
Type: Reporting
Position: Neutral [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“It is also theoretically possible that both governments are further along in the nuclear issue than previously known. In a Bundestag report, scientists do not rule out the possibility that Paris and Berlin also dealt with the issue of nuclear weapons in non-public additions to the Aachen Friendship Treaty with France last year.

The German population seems to take some pleasure in this logic. According to a survey by the Körber Foundation, 40 percent of Germans would approve of a nuclear umbrella by France or Great Britain - only 22 percent would say the same about the Americans' existing protective umbrella.”
Source: Marcus Pindur, “Deutschland muss international mehr Verantwortung übernehmen,” Deutschlandfunk, February 16, 2020, https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/aussen-und-sicherheitspolitik-deutschland-muss.720.de.html?dram:article_id=470414.
Origin: German broadcaster; German author (journalist); written in German
Type: Op-ed/Analysis
Position: Affirm [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“But why does the federal government not take Macron’s word and enter a dialogue? The standard argument in such cases is that this weakens the alliance with the USA and thus the deterrent effect of the American nuclear umbrella. But during these times, with this President in the White House, it is time for Germany to prepare itself for a differently structured world. This also includes strengthening the European pillar in NATO. And that pillar would certainly be strengthened if Berlin were to participate in any way in the financing and maintenance of the force de frappe, the French nuclear weapons. …

President Steinmeier was right to point out that the alliance with the USA remains vital for Europe. But even after a President Trump, the willingness of the Americans to bear the costs of maintaining global order will not grow again to the extent of the Cold War. Europeans will have to bear a greater share of the burden of deterrence than they do today.”
Source: “Atomare Abschreckung: AKK offen für Dialog mit Macron,” Redationsnetzwerk Deutschland, February 20, 2020, https://www.rnd.de/politik/atomare-abschreckung-akk-offen-fur-dialog-mit-macron-NARTHFHYZM2J5DD65HBZX6CO7Q.html.
Origin: German news agency; unknown author; written in German
Type: Reporting [incl. Citations]
Position: Neutral [Reporting]/Contemplate [Citations on Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“Defence Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer signals interest in the Paris offer for closer cooperation on nuclear deterrence. "I believe that we must begin this strategic dialogue," the CDU politician said in Paris [on Thursday]. However, she said that the talks were only at the very beginning; one had to discuss what this meant in concrete terms.

Germany is still under the "American nuclear umbrella" and is part of a nuclear sharing - she does not see that this should change fundamentally, said Kramp-Karrenbauer.”
Source: Oliver Meier, “Why Germany won’t build its own nuclear weapons and remains skeptical of Eurodeterrent,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 21, 2020, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2020.1728967?needAccess=true.
Origin: U.S. journal; German author (academic); written in English
Type: Analysis
Position: Reject [Eurodeterrent]/Reject [German deterrent]
Key Quotes:
“Arguments for German acquisition of nuclear weapons have gained no traction among German decision makers, as this would require multiple costly and radical shifts of Berlin’s foreign and security policies. German-French convergence on the role of nuclear weapons in European security is a necessary – though not necessarily sufficient – precondition for a strengthened nuclear dimension to the EU’s security and defense policies. However, the different nuclear cultures in France and Germany, French aversion to nuclear consultations, and inter-European divisions on the role of nuclear weapons make it unlikely that Germany will support a Eurodeterrent anytime soon.”
Source: Tom Enders, “Wir müssen über Nuklearwaffen reden,” Die Zeit, March 4, 2020, https://www.zeit.de/2020/11/atomwaffen-eu-frankreich-abschreckung-aufruestung-verteidigung/komplettansicht.
Origin: German newspaper; German author (former Head of Airbus); written in German
Type: Op-ed
Position: Affirm [Eurodeterrent]
Key Quotes:
“But the German government cannot ignore a rapidly changing reality. On the contrary, to put it plainly: in times of a crumbling transatlantic alliance, in which the US administration views foreign policy more as a balance sheet than a long-term investment, the time is ripe for a bold step into a new European security architecture. It includes its own nuclear umbrella.”

Correction: The text originally identified Roderich Kiesewetter as chairman of the Bundestag’s Committee on Foreign Affairs. This has been corrected to special representative for foreign affairs of the German Bundestag’s Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.