Michael Pettis will be joined by Carnegie’s vice president for studies Douglas H. Paal to address economic factors challenging China and the new leadership that will emerge from the congress. Watch live on Monday, October 2.
As China’s Nineteenth Party Congress approaches, it is important to identify the economic factors that challenge China and the new leadership that will emerge from the congress. How will the Chinese frame their policy choices? How should they? What are the implications for policymakers and business people who will deal with China over the next five years?
Michael Pettis will be joined by Carnegie’s vice president for studies Douglas H. Paal to address these questions on Monday, October 2, 2017 at 9:30 a.m. EST.
This event will be broadcast live from Carnegie in Washington, DC. Watch using the video player embedded below.
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
The decision Americans must make about industrial policy is whether policies that drive the nature and direction of the U.S. economy should be designed at home or abroad by its trade partners. In a hyperglobalized world, trade and industrial policies in one country are transmitted through trade imbalances into their obverse among that country’s trade partners.
A well-functioning trading regime would permit neither the large, persistent trade imbalances that characterize the current global trading system nor the perverse flow of capital from developing economies to advanced economies. Global trade needs new rules that encourage a return to the benefits of free trade and comparative advantage.
If China’s GDP is to continue growing at 4–5 percent for the next decade, either other major economies must be willing to reduce their economies’ investment and manufacturing shares to accommodate China or China must establish policies that cause the locus of growth to shift from investment to domestic consumption. Neither is easy, and the former is very unlikely.
Both Washington and Beijing treat rising debt as a consequence of irresponsible behavior by local institutions. But in China and the United States, rising debt is spurred by policies that have encouraged distortions in the distribution of domestic income. Until these distortions are addressed, both countries must choose between rising debt and rising unemployment.
Beijing’s economic policymakers largely accept that China must rebalance its economy so that growth is driven more by domestic consumption and less by investment. But once China begins to take seriously the need to rebalance its economy, China’s annual GDP growth is unlikely to exceed 2–3 percent for many years, unless there is a substantial increase in the growth rate of consumption.