Introduction

The Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV), India’s third-generation launch vehicle, is a multi-orbit launch vehicle capable of launching several payloads into low Earth orbits (LEO), sun-synchronous orbits, and geosynchronous transfer orbits. From launching the Chandrayaan-1 in 2008 and the Mangalyaan in 2013, to the record single launch of 104 satellites in 2017, the PSLV has established itself as India’s space launch “workhorse.” Since its establishment in 1994, the PSLV has launched sixty-four missions, of which fifty-nine have been successful, one partially successful, and four unaccomplished.

For the first time in its history, the PSLV experienced a consecutive mission failure on January 12, 2026, leading to a barrage of public criticism, opinions, and concerns over its reliability. At this juncture, this commentary explores the implications of this incident on India’s space sector and how India’s space program can effectively address issues that contributed to this incident.

How Does the PSLV Incident Currently Affect India’s Space Sector?

An anomaly was detected during the third stage of the January PSLV-C62 mission (C62), similar to one observed in the previously unaccomplished PSLV-C61 (C61) mission in May 2025.

Following the C61 mission’s failure, the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) formed a Failure Analysis Committee (FAC) to identify corrections, and the C62 mission was noted to have followed its recommendations. The C62 mission is also reported to have included seven Mission Readiness Reviews, the highest so far for PSLVs, and hundreds of technical evaluations across relevant ISRO centers. Despite rigorous corrective measures, anomalies persisted in the third stage, causing successive setbacks and raising multiple concerns—Will the PSLV emerge successful in its next launch? Will it remain a reliable launch vehicle for India? How can its reliability be restored?  Four key problems in the medium term emerge from this incident that must be addressed.

The PSLV is Irreplaceable

The PSLV is likely irreplaceable for now, since it is central to India’s strategic space missions. As a multi-orbital launch vehicle, the PSLV caters to the growing imperative of launching India’s strategic missions, involving both civil and military applications, from Earth observation to space-based intelligence surveillance reconnaissance (ISR), and communication to positioning, navigation, and timing. For example, the C61 mission that failed in May 2025 carried the EOS-09, a synthetic aperture radar satellite that would gather remote sensing data across sectors for the next five years. The C62 mission carried a hyperspectral earth observation satellite developed by the Defence Research & Development Organization (DRDO) for space-based ISR. Failure to deploy these satellites is expected to impact India’s strategic capabilities, oriented towards its national security. It has been noted that it may take two to three years to replace the strategic satellites lost in the two missions, disrupting India’s space-based military capabilities and preparedness.

Further, the inability of the PSLV to operate as intended may affect India’s planned strategic space programs like Space Based Surveillance-3, involving fifty-two satellites, and the Navigation with Indian Constellation (NavIC) program that needs restoration and expansion.

The PSLV is Cost Efficient

The second problem is the commercial aspect. The PSLV is among the few reliable launch services available globally. Within India’s own fleet, at $21 million to $31 million (approximately ₹193 crore to ₹284 crore) per launch at $8,500 (approximately ₹7.79 lakh) per kilogram, operating a PSLV is cheaper than the Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV), that costs around $47 million (approximately ₹431 crore) per launch to the LEO, at $10,000 to 12,000 (approximately ₹9.17 lakh to ₹11.00 lakh) per kilogram. Thus, the PSLV is often a preferred launch option amongst India’s growing private space sector.

Globally, both the SpaceX Falcon 9 and Falcon Heavy provides more cost-efficient launch options to the LEO than the PSLV and GSLV at $2,720 to 3,720 (₹2.49 lakh to ₹3.41 lakh) and $ 1,500 (₹1.38 lakh) per kilogram, respectively. However, unlike the PSLV, the Falcon 9 has a 50-kilogram minimum order, making it difficult for startups to avail it if their payload mass is generally below the requirement.[1] Thus, disruptions to the PSLV, if unresolved, will make it harder for burgeoning Indian startups to access space and make it a costly affair for them, affecting their timelines and pursuantly, cash flow. If unresolved in the long term, it may compel startups to shift to other launch service providers to meet their timelines.

Absence of Insurance Coverage and Related Implications

Third, the absence of insurance coverage for those availing ISRO’s services and its related implications.

The C62 mission is the ninth dedicated commercial mission by New Space India Limited (NSIL), ISRO’s commercial arm. Apart from the primary payload, the EOS-N1, the C62 mission also carried fifteen co-passenger satellites, of which seven were from Indian entities and eight from Thailand, Nepal, France, Spain, Brazil, and the U.K. None of the Indian companies insured their satellites aboard C62 due to a lack of cost-friendly insurance schemes. Among the foreign payloads, only GISTDA, the Thai space agency’s payload, was insured. This implies that the respective space operators would bear the cost of loss, and the Indian government would bear it for EOS-N1. The lack of cost-friendly insurance options within India for upstream space activities suggests the need for policy and regulatory reforms.

The PSLV’s Role in Facilitating India’s International Cooperation and Diplomacy

Having carried over 400 foreign satellite customers from thirty-four countries, this was the first time the PSLV failed to launch commercial payloads, including non-Indian ones. Currently, space launch is an integral part of India’s strategic partnerships, as recently witnessed during the GSLV’s NISAR launch or the recent initiative with the UAE for a joint space infrastructure development. If issues with the PSLV remain unresolved, it may affect India’s space diplomacy programs with countries looking to cooperate on space launch infrastructure and services.

Failure as Part of Progress

Failure of a launch vehicle is part of the progress, and space exploration always remains challenging, regardless of the maturity level attained by technologies. China’s trusted Long March Rocket-3B, with over 300 launches, failed in January 2026 after it faced a third-stage anomaly. Meanwhile, Japan’s H4 launch vehicle also failed in December 2025 despite having successfully executed five launches since its inception. While public opinions and criticisms have followed the PSLV incident, history suggests that major space-faring countries have experienced similar losses despite established cadence. In India’s case, its first experimental launch, the SLV-3E1, an all-solid 4-stage vehicle launched in August 1979, was only partially successful. Within a year, India became the sixth member of an exclusive group of space-faring nations after it successfully launched the SLV-3E2, placing the Rohini Satellite in the intended orbit.

Only two other instances of India’s launch vehicle failing successively have been recorded—In 2010 with the GSLV-Mk II, and back in the 1980s with the ASLV-01 and ASLV-02.[2] ISRO returned strongly after each setback and the PSLV continues to maintain a 92 percent success rate, second only to the LVM-3, with a 100 percent success rate.

The Way Ahead for India’s Space Program

Firstly, with multiple military satellites lost in the previous year aboard the PSLV, it would be pertinent for India’s Defence Space Agency and the DRDO to develop their own launch capabilities for launching smaller and strategic payloads with a lesser turnaround time for imminent operational requirements. A step towards this is the successful testing of Project VEDA (Vehicle for Defence Application), a planned launch vehicle program, to bolster India’s defense space launch capabilities and military preparedness in the next few years.

Secondly, the ISRO has its task cut out for simultaneously getting the PSLV back on track while continuing to invest in its frontier and strategic programs, many of which are already facing timeline delays. In the last few years, there have been plans to gradually shift commercial launch operations to the private sector through NSIL to ensure that ISRO and its resources prioritize strategic missions like the development of the next generation launch vehicle for technically challenging missions.

NSIL is procuring five PSLVs from a private consortium, with the first one planned for 2026. A successful manufacture and launch of PSLVs by private companies, even if delayed, would allow ISRO to invest resources into frontier strategic programs.

Finally, maintaining clear communication channels will help restore confidence both internally and abroad. In 2024, IN-SPACe released an integrated launch manifesto for 2023–24 and 2024–25 detailing all the launches planned by ISRO, NSIL, and various non-governmental entities. A similar manifesto for 2025–26 and 2026–27 that details the PSLV’s involvement in future planned missions would provide a functional timeline for various end-users, including those involved in strategic programs. While criticisms remain for withholding the C-61 mission FAC report, a report or its detailed summary for the C-62 mission failure, if a FAC is re-constituted, may assuage concerns regarding the PSLV’s heritage.

Consecutive setbacks of the C61 and C62 may have momentarily disrupted the PSLV, but it does not erase three decades of orbital excellence. Unhindered private manufacturing, a clear launch roadmap, and communication will help ISRO restore public confidence. The space sector remains confident that ISRO can emerge from this period of scrutiny more refined and technologically advanced.

[1] Author’s interactions with representatives from the Indian space industry, January 2026

[2] Author’s analysis based on publicly available information.