Judy Dempsey
{
"authors": [
"Judy Dempsey"
],
"type": "commentary",
"blog": "Strategic Europe",
"centerAffiliationAll": "",
"centers": [
"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
"Carnegie Europe"
],
"collections": [
"Europe’s Eastern Neighborhood",
"EU Integration and Enlargement"
],
"englishNewsletterAll": "",
"nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
"primaryCenter": "Carnegie Europe",
"programAffiliation": "",
"programs": [],
"projects": [],
"regions": [
"Russia",
"Europe",
"Eastern Europe",
"Ukraine",
"Western Europe"
],
"topics": [
"Foreign Policy",
"Security",
"EU"
]
}Source: Getty
Putin is Banking on Europe’s Divisions Over Russia
The parliamentary election setback for President Macron and bickering inside the German and Italian coalitions play into Moscow’s hands. If EU member states falter over Ukraine, European security will be jeopardized.
There was that moment of much-needed euphoria in Ukraine when on June 16 the leaders of France, Germany, Italy, and Romania together visited the country and expressed support for its application to join the EU. All that’s needed now is a unanimous yes from European leaders who meet on June 23-24.
Membership is a long way off. But psychologically and politically, this is what Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky needed as the Russian military pounds eastern Ukraine, forcibly deports thousands of children, and wages an intense propaganda campaign in areas under its control.
As for the Kremlin’s reaction to Ukraine one day joining the EU, it shrugged off the changing relationship between Kyiv and Brussels.
And no wonder. President Vladimir Putin need only look at the unfolding political and economic developments in Europe to see how his fortunes are shifting.
The outcome of the French parliamentary election in which President Emmanuel Macron lost his absolute majority will put domestic issues at the top of the agenda in Paris.
One of the leaders of the opposition is now Jean-Luc Mélenchon, a hard-left wing politician who is known for his anti-American, Euroskeptic, and Kremlin-friendly views. The other is Marine Le Pen’s, leader of the National Rally that did remarkably well. It now dominates the far right.
Over in Berlin, the Green vice-chancellor and economy minister, Robert Habeck, announced the reopening of coal plants to offset Russia’s decision to sharply reduce gas supplies. Just think what Green voters will think about that. Meanwhile, in Rome, Prime Minister Mario Draghi’s coalition is bitterly divided over sending arms shipments to Ukraine.
There’s a common thread linking Berlin, Paris, and Rome. It is about their relationship with Russia.
The leaders of these three founding members of the EU are loath to admit that de facto, Europe is at war with Russia. As it is, several countries are delivering weapon systems to Ukraine and even the EU as an institution is doing so, too.
Yet President Macron, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, and Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi prefer to see Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine as a crisis of relations with Moscow that could one day be repaired. As Macron likes to remind his interlocutors: humiliating Russia is not a good idea.
This is the crux of Europe’s policy toward Russia. Germany, along with France, are reluctant to accept that Russia, apart from trying to destroy Ukraine, has overturned the post–Cold War status quo. Putin’s threats to use nuclear weapons are his attempts to scare and neutralize Germany.
Yet as long as Berlin does not unambiguously abandon its Ostpolitik, or eastern policy, that is based on the idea of bringing Russia closer to Europe and ensuring the continent’s stability, there can be no coherent European policy toward Russia.
So while it’s all very well giving Ukraine candidate status, what is needed is a new mindset when it comes to Russia. At the moment, there is no such common mindset. Poland, Sweden, and the Baltic states, by virtue of their history with Russia and their location, understand what the war in Ukraine means not only for the existence of that country but also for Europe’s security.
Indeed, a Russian victory would give Putin the confidence to exploit a certain longing within Scholz’s Social Democratic Party and Germany’s left wing generally to overcome what they see as a crisis of relations with Moscow. For them, keeping the channels of communication open is a must. Furthermore, don’t underestimate the yearning by the German left for some kind of new security architecture that would involve Russia.
Few would argue against the need for Europe to take an unjaundiced, unideological look at the weak state of its security and defense preparedness. But any new security architecture, with NATO on board, can only be forged from a position of strength and unity. Otherwise, Russia could set the terms.
That is why Germany’s and France’s current and future policy toward Russia is so fundamental. And just as fundamentally, Ukraine must have the possibility to negotiate the end of this appalling war from a position of strength. If neither are givens, Europe’s security will be dangerously compromised.
About the Author
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Carnegie Europe
Dempsey is a nonresident senior fellow at Carnegie Europe
- Europe Needs to Hear What America is SayingCommentary
- Babiš’s Victory in Czechia Is Not a Turning Point for European PopulistsCommentary
Judy Dempsey
Recent Work
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
More Work from Strategic Europe
- Taking the Pulse: Is France’s New Nuclear Doctrine Ambitious Enough?Commentary
French President Emmanuel Macron has unveiled his country’s new nuclear doctrine. Are the changes he has made enough to reassure France’s European partners in the current geopolitical context?
Rym Momtaz, ed.
- The EU Needs a Third Way in IranCommentary
European reactions to the war in Iran have lost sight of wider political dynamics. The EU must position itself for the next phase of the crisis without giving up on its principles.
Richard Youngs
- Global Instability Makes Europe More Attractive, Not LessCommentary
Europe isn’t as weak in the new geopolitics of power as many would believe. But to leverage its assets and claim a sphere of influence, Brussels must stop undercutting itself.
Dimitar Bechev
- Europe on Iran: Gone with the WindCommentary
Europe’s reaction to the war in Iran has been disunited and meek, a far cry from its previously leading role in diplomacy with Tehran. To avoid being condemned to the sidelines while escalation continues, Brussels needs to stand up for international law.
Pierre Vimont
- Taking the Pulse: Can European Defense Survive the Death of FCAS?Commentary
France and Germany’s failure to agree on the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) raises questions about European defense. Amid industrial rivalries and competing strategic cultures, what does the future of European military industrial projects look like?
Rym Momtaz, ed.