EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas is renewing the union’s effort to recalibrate its approach to the South Caucasus, aiming to ensure the region remains within Europe’s strategic orbit.

Thus far, the EU’s approach to Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia has been largely ad hoc and lacked a coherent regional strategy on which long-term engagement can be built. While the bloc has developed bilateral relations with the three countries in various sectors, its broader regional posture has not been cohesive.

Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine temporarily galvanized the EU’s involvement in the region, which was driven not only by the desire to constrain Moscow’s influence but also by a broader ambition to support the South Caucasus countries in taking greater ownership of regional challenges. Yet, that momentum is fading—because Washington is retreating from the region and because the South Caucasus is no longer defined by a simple binary of Russia versus the West.

Now, the growing salience of Iran-Israel tensions and expanding economic linkages across the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Black Sea are increasing the relevance of actors like Turkey.

The EU cannot afford to circumvent Turkey in the region. It is a key transit hub for Caspian energy to Europe and a pivotal bridge between the South Caucasus, Central Asia, and the West through strategic energy and transportation projects. Overlooking Ankara would create unnecessary friction and diminish the impact of EU engagement.

Turkey has reemerged as a key player in European security debates. Its role in NATO, involvement in the Black Sea, and engagement on Ukraine and Syria have underscored Ankara’s continued strategic weight. EU-Turkey cooperation, while often fraught, has gained traction on several fronts. At the same time, Ankara’s long-standing ties and enduring influence in the South Caucasus—once overlooked or viewed with suspicion in Brussels—are now receiving greater acknowledgment.

There is a sense in both Brussels and Ankara that common ground could be found in the region—an alignment that could be mutually beneficial. Yet, such cooperation is unlikely unless Brussels sheds long-held assumptions about Ankara’s regional posture and avoids allowing the issue of the divided island of Cyprus to spill over and undermine the EU’s strategic interests.

One of the most persistent misconceptions concerns the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process. While Baku and Yerevan finalized the text of a peace agreement in March, its signing remains stalled. For Turkey, progress on this front is closely linked to its efforts to normalize ties with Armenia—long seen as the missing link in Turkey’s South Caucasus strategy.

European capitals often view Ankara as a potential broker that is expected to use its leverage over Baku to help seal the deal. Others believe that Azerbaijan, not Turkey, holds the upper hand in the pair’s relationship. Both views oversimplify a complex strategic alliance. Turkey’s hesitation to pressure Baku is not driven primarily by energy dependencies or transactional interests. Rather, it reflects Ankara’s reluctance to jeopardize its ties with a close partner merely to satisfy external expectations or showcase its influence.

What is overlooked is Turkey’s quiet yet consequential diplomacy. Ankara encouraged a more constructive Armenian stance, particularly when the peace agreement with Azerbaijan was being finalized. This role has gone largely unacknowledged in the public discourse in the EU, though it is well understood among policymakers in Brussels. Equally, Ankara has privately urged restraint in Baku, discouraging it from further military action.

There is also a strategic shift underway in Yerevan. Rapprochement with Ankara is not just about reconciling historical grievances; it is increasingly seen as a potential gateway to deeper engagement with the EU and a means of reducing dependence on Russia. Yet, in many EU capitals, support for Armenia continues to derive less from a sober reading of the country’s evolving strategic posture and more from lobbying by elements of the Armenian diaspora that have a much less pragmatic stance on Turkey than the government.

This dynamic is especially pronounced in France, one of Armenia’s most vocal supporters in the EU. In Paris, strained relations with both Ankara and Baku, for reasons extending beyond the South Caucasus, have added a further layer of friction. Any meaningful EU-Turkey partnership in the region will have to navigate this triangle carefully.

Cooperation in the South Caucasus could be particularly promising in supporting the normalization process between Armenia and Azerbaijan. One of the most sensitive yet critical issues is the reopening of transportation and transit routes. This is central to broader regional normalization—not only between Baku and Yerevan but also between Ankara and Yerevan.

Since the end of the 2020 war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, discussions over how to restore this connectivity have stalled. Meanwhile, Russia has sought to retain a role in overseeing any reopening. In this context, the EU could offer added value by promoting a separate agreement on cross-border transportation, backed by financial and technical support. Turkey’s engagement may boost confidence in Baku, which tends to view third-party involvement with suspicion.

Strategic connectivity offers a clear area for EU-Turkey alignment, particularly through the so-called Middle Corridor, a trade and transportation route that links Central Asia and the South Caucasus to Europe via the Caspian Sea and Turkey. Both Brussels and Ankara view this east–west corridor as a critical alternative to Russia-controlled infrastructure, especially since the war in Ukraine.

Finally, the EU and Turkey share an interest in supporting greater regional integration among the three South Caucasus states. Here, Ankara and Brussels could jointly propose and support confidence-building measures and regional dialogue, combining Turkey’s convening capacity with the EU’s political and financial resources. For Brussels, such engagement may also offer a channel for reengaging with Georgia, where relations have deteriorated amid growing concerns over democratic erosion and Tbilisi’s apparent drift from the path toward EU membership.

With shared interests now more visible than ever, EU-Turkey cooperation in the South Caucasus will not emerge by default, but it remains both possible and increasingly necessary. The moment is ripe to move from parallel postures to pragmatic alignment.