On March 13, in separate statements, Azerbaijan and Armenia said they had finally settled their differences on the text of an agreement to normalize relations for the first time after more than three decades of conflict.
The announcement was described as “historic” by U.S Secretary of State Marco Rubio. European Union High Representative Kaja Kallas called it “a decisive step.” The second statement is a bit nearer the mark. This is one big step forward that stabilizes the South Caucasus—but several more are needed before full peace can be attained.
The international context is critical. As Moscow and Washington negotiate over Ukraine’s future, the Armenians in particular fear a scenario where Russia, unburdened by war, will turn an aggressive gaze on the South Caucasus once again. Agreeing, even in principle, to the text of a bilateral peace agreement to open diplomatic relations between the two adversaries gives Moscow less leverage to interfere.
The progress is chiefly thanks to the persistence of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who has made a series of concessions in pursuit of a deal. The breakthrough came after his team agreed to give ground on two outstanding issues in the twelfth draft of a seventeen-article text that had been negotiated for more than a year.
The new text commits the parties to withdraw, dismiss, or settle legal claims against each other currently filed in international courts, such as the International Court of Justice. They have also agreed not to deploy “third-party forces” on their common border. That precludes a Russian presence on the border but also threatens the future of the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA), the EU’s civilian border monitoring mission whose mandate was recently extended until 2027. EUMA has been a flagship project for both the EU and Armenia, providing reassurance to Armenian civilians in border areas. If Armenia wants to preserve the mission, it will have to agree to major changes to EUMA’s mandate.
One important yet unresolved issue is being negotiated separately: that of connectivity and the modalities for the restoration of road and rail links, especially the route that connects western Azerbaijan with the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan across Armenian territory.
It is worth noting that this is a document about state-to-state normalization, not societal reconciliation. It lacks the elements that usually accompany a historic peace agreement and deal with the legacy of conflict, such as justice mechanisms for war crimes or pledges on the right of return for displaced people.
There is no mention of the issue over which both nations fought two wars, lost thousands of lives, and suffered unbearable pain: the Armenian-majority region of Nagorny Karabakh, recognized internationally as being part of Azerbaijan. That issue was settled by force in September 2023 when Azerbaijan captured Karabakh, and its entire Armenian population of 100,000 people fled. Pashinyan now acknowledges that Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan, and no one expects that the Karabakh Armenians will return home any time soon.
Citing its own past traumas, Baku places a big precondition on final closure of a peace deal by insisting that it can only be signed once Armenia makes changes to its constitution. The Azerbaijani side points to the Armenian constitution’s preamble, which refers to Armenia’s 1990 Declaration of Independence, which in turn references a 1989 resolution on the union of Armenia and Nagorny Karabakh. Azerbaijan says this constitutes a lurking territorial claim that needs to be removed.
The constitution issue is surely fixable with some creative diplomacy—and also because Pashinyan himself wants a new constitution after the next parliamentary election, due in 2026. But Pashinyan has given away a lot, and his pockets are now almost empty. He wants to go into that election telling the public that he has secured a peace agreement—not, as his critics claim, merely capitulated to Azerbaijan. And the harder that Azerbaijan presses on this constitution issue, the harder it will be for Pashinyan to deliver.
Pashinyan presents the decision Armenians face as a fundamental philosophical choice between what he calls “Real Armenia” and “Historic Armenia.”
He essentially tells voters that, having suffered major military defeats to Azerbaijan in 2020 and 2023, Armenia must now accept a new reality: that it must try to make peace with Azerbaijan and Türkiye, open its borders and connections to Europe, and free itself from a dangerous dependence on Russia.
There are many who want him to fail, particularly in the opposition, Armenian diaspora organizations, and Russia.
Nor is Azerbaijan offering a helping hand. Azerbaijani officials say fairly openly that they are in no hurry and believe a peace agreement will benefit Armenia more than Azerbaijan. In public, President Ilham Aliyev never refers to the benefits of peace or says anything positive about Pashinyan. Conflict with Armenia is still instrumentalized to unify the country under his leadership.
Just a few hours before the Azerbaijan Foreign Ministry announced the breakthrough in negotiations, Aliyev gave an aggressive speech in which he repeated the maximalist claims, grievances, and accusations against Armenia he has made for several years. He accused France of arming Armenia to plot war against Azerbaijan and spoke disparagingly about the Armenians’ “new bosses in Brussels.” There was no mention of Russia—but many friendly words for the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump and their shared rejection of the Western liberal order.
What can be done to keep up the momentum for peace? Brussels and Washington can be more proactive in supporting the connectivity agenda and opening of borders in particular. But the key actor is Ankara, which, interestingly, has not yet officially commented on the peace text news.
Ankara currently wants two things at the same time, and sooner or later it will have to choose. Turkish interlocutors say they know that normalization with Armenia makes Türkiye a stronger player in the South Caucasus, loosens Russia’s historical hold over Armenia, and is good for impoverished eastern Turkish border regions. They say Pashinyan is an ideal partner for them. Yet they also say—and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is personally invested in this—that Azerbaijan is a close Turkic brother state and that they must defer to Baku before moving forward.
Turkish officials know that the window of opportunity with Pashinyan could close and that his overtures toward them deserve a more positive response. It is surely time for them to be bolder and announce steps that boost economic ties with Armenia and deliver some benefits for the Pashinyan government, even if they choose not to fully open the border. Turkish leaders can make the argument to their Azerbaijani friends that a more dynamic policy is in their common interest and benefits everyone—except a resurgent Russia and the Armenian opposition.
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