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Regional Security in the Southern Caucasus: The View From Stepanakert

Tue. March 9th, 1999

Meeting Report
March 9, 1999

Speaker: Naira Melkumian, Foreign Minister of Nagorno-Karabakh

Minister Melkumian identified the development of a regional security regime among Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh as the most urgent task for ensuring security in the Southern Caucasus. Stressing the importance of removing the causes of the conflict rather than merely its consequences, Melkumian called on the parties involved and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe?s Minsk Group to "fight the inertia of mindsets which preclude comprehensive and multi-faceted approaches to years-old conflicts."

Melkumian outlined three stages in the security building process of Karabakh. The first stage, from 1990-1994, was the armed conflict with Azerbaijan and the formation of mechanisms of defense for Karabakh Armenians. The second stage, from 1994-1988, was the stabilization of the state and the rehabilitation of society through the establishment of law and order. The third and present stage is the creation of prerequisites to the establishment of confidence and cooperation between the parties necessary for a regional security regime. She pointed out that the formal cease-fire agreement became possible only after Karabakh was accepted as a participant in the negotiations in 1994.

While Nagorno-Karabakh "has no pretense to all the rights of internationally recognized states," Melkumian stated, it does expect that a sub-regional security regime will recognize the following four principles. The first is the recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh?s right to security and international assurances in a framework that precludes its isolation. Second, a provision of international guarantees and rapid response capabilities to assure the unimpeded functioning of the system governing relationships among the security subjects. Third, international legitimization of Nagorno-Karabakh?s armed forces and their incorporation in sub-regional arms control agreements. Fourth, the adoption of trilateral agreements governing non-aggression, the peaceful settlements of disputes, the creation of heavy armaments-free zones at interstate perimeters, and military cooperation.

Melkumian praised the inclusion of the concept of "half-recognized states" in current political lexicon. She attributes the new term to political analysts? cognizance of the idea of the indivisibility of security, which considers not only mutual respect for one another?s security concerns, but also mutual responsibility. Therefore parties seeking to resolve the conflict must recognize Nagorno-Karabakh?s security needs as an ethno-territorial nation-state. In other words, according to Melkumian, Nagorno-Karabakh?s "security issue is a projection of its future political status." In the model of the future that Melkumian envisages, the security of the subjects would be guaranteed by a joint system that prevents the limitation or disruption of one another?s rights through clearly formulated treaty relationships. As a consequence, she added, natural preconditions for integration would also be created.

Melkumian said that Nagorno-Karabakh will not compromise the following aspects of its national defense in the process of developing a sub-regional security regime: the right to have its own armed forces; defense of its security frontier; strategic cooperation with states in the sub-region directed at assuring transparency and building confidence; and implementation of obligations accepted in the context of the sub-regional security regime. Melkumian said that it is unacceptable for Nagorno-Karabakh?s security to depend solely on guarantees from Azerbaijan. However, she believes that security guarantees given to Nagorno-Karabakh should not come at the expense of limiting Azerbaijani sovereignty.

Aside from occasional violations of the cease-fire, the last few years have demonstrated the possibility of peaceful co-existence between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh, said Melkumian. This is largely due to the international public?s efforts to understand the nature of the conflict. Melkumian noted that the international community no longer describes efforts to resolve the issue as assistance to Azerbaijan in solving an "internal problem."

Melkumian praised the November 1998 proposal of the OSCE Minsk Group, based on the "common state" idea, which in her view demonstrates that the mediators now recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as a security subject, rather than as an object. The OSCE proposal calls for the creation of a common state to be formed by the Azerbaijani government as one party and Karabakh Armenians as the other. Melkumian cites Azerbaijan?s rejection of the recent OSCE proposal as an example of its unwillingness to negotiate the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. By contrast, Azerbaijan accepted the OSCE?s 1997 proposal, which according to Melkumian would have required Karabakh to retreat from territories that it considers its security corridor before negotiations could begin.

In response to a question concerning the role of Caspian energy politics in the debate about a security regime in the Southern Caucasus, Melkumian said that oil has become a de-stabilizing factor in the region. Disputes over the transport and division of oil are crippling the process of state building, causing some leaders to adopt increasingly authoritarian postures. She speculated that the recent assassination attempt on Georgian President Edward Shevardnadze was possibly linked to disputes over the routing of new pipelines in the region.

When asked about the role of Russia in the Karabakh conflict, Melkumian likened Russia?s involvement in the Caucasus to its role in Central Asia. Both regions are in Russia?s perceived spheres of influence, where its imperial ambitions are most evident, according to Melkumian. Knowing that these sentiments still exist in Russia, the Soviet successor states in the region should take care not to pursue policies that might agitate Russian nationalism, Melkumian warned. For example, in the spirit of Azerbaijan?s efforts to demonstrate that it is a pro-Western state that welcomes foreign investment, Vafa Guluzade (President Aliev?s advisor) called for the stationing of NATO troops in Baku. Such empty pronouncements do nothing but illicit unnecessary nationalistic reactions in Russia, said Melkumian.

Melkumian disputed the view that Russia favors Armenia over Azerbaijan in the conflict. She noted that Russia has represented Azerbaijan?s interests on many occasions, particularly right after the breakup of the Soviet Union, when Russia left vast arms and munitions to Azerbaijan. By contrast, she said, Russia did not leave even a single plane for Armenia.

Asked to speculate on the consequences of Russian disengagement for the Southern Caucasus, Melkumian said that Russia?s participation, per se, is not necessary for a solution in the region and noted that its involvement is no greater than that of the United States or France. The US, according to Melkumian, is in fact more active in the region and has the resources to come up with original solutions to conflicts.

Summary by Liz Reisch

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.