Dismantling Nuclear Submarines

Dr. Susan Koch, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary of Energy for Nonproliferation and National Security

Carnegie Moscow Center
2 June 1999

Dr. Susan Koch, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

Thank you very much. I think if Dr. Gottemoeller and I limited our remarks to our joint work on the dismantlement of general-purpose nuclear-powered submarines, our presentations could be fairly short.

The problem of general-purpose submarines and their fuel here in Russia is one that our two governments have discussed for some time, but thus far without any specific conclusion. We have certainly recognized the difficulty of the problem, but have been somewhat constrained: first by other priorities and secondly by the size of the problem of general-purpose nuclear-powered submarines and of knowing where to begin. Finally, and I believe quite wisely, our governments agreed in March to form a joint U.S.-Russian interagency working group that would assess the problem of submarines awaiting dismantlement and the problem of the disposition of their fuel, as well as develop cost and schedule estimates for that disposition. So, in short, we agreed to study this very large issue together, so that we could have a shared knowledge base and a shared analytic base as the essential foundation for any future cooperation.

We have just begun this process, with the result that there really is not anything concrete to report yet, except that there is considerable interest in our government and in other governments with helping Russia address this problem. We also benefit in two important ways from the cooperation that has been going on, beginning in 1993. Thanks to many people in this room, who are far more expert on this subject than I [am], we have learned how to work together very efficiently, very productively, and very ambitiously. Second, much of our ongoing cooperation will be able to contribute in very specific, very concrete ways to the disposition of general-purpose submarines and their fuel.

The part of the overall picture in which I am directly involved is our cooperation on dismantlement of strategic ballistic missile-carrying submarines. That cooperation began in 1993, and it began as fairly small. The cooperative threat reduction Nunn-Lugar program provided some equipment, for example to cut steel or process metal, for the three dismantlement shipyards designated by Russia for the START dismantlements. Over time, the Russian government provided our CTR people access to the shipyards, and more direct interaction with the shipyard personnel and the relevant ministerial personnel to have free joint discussions of additional requirements. That initially [led] to an expansion of the provision of equipment, and then, in the last two years, to a change in the nature of our cooperation. First, we agreed on both sides that CTR should contract directly with these three shipyards for the elimination of an agreed list of strategic ballistic-missile-carrying submarines. Seven submarines have already completed their elimination, or are in the process of the same under contract, and we have completed contracts on the elimination of eight more that should be completed next summer. Basically the elimination takes a year, and so we contract in one summer for contracts that will be completed next summer. There are current plans for the elimination to be completed till (?) the year 2002 of a total of 31 SSBNs.

The other major area of growth of [?]. When the ballistic missile submarine work is completed, the equipment, the improvements to the dismantlement shipyards, and the procedures that both sides learned for how to do this work most effectively, will be available for general-purpose submarines.

The other major area of growth in this cooperation has been with regard to the spent fuel from the dismantled SSBNs. We have done some work together on developing and constructing shipping and storage containers for the fuel, and hope very soon to complete an agreement and associated contracts for the complete disposition of the spent fuel from the first 15 dismantled SSBNs. Because of the urgency of the task, the fuel from up to those 15 submarines will be reprocessed. And we want to work closely with the Ministry for Atomic Energy to try to develop options for long-term dry storage for the remaining submarines. We are also working on cooperation for fuel off-loading - - short-term storage at the dismantlement shipyards; again, it is work that will be fully available for general-purpose submarines.

So with your indulgence, I will close by repeating myself that we do not know yet what the full range of cooperation may be between the United States and Russia, and between Russia and other governments regarding general purpose submarines. But we do know that much of what we have already done in the SSBN area will be directly applicable, both in a substantive sense from actual equipment, and not unimportantly in a procedural sense as well.

 

Dr. Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary of Energy for Nonproliferation and National Security

Thank you. - - at the Carnegie Center again, I always take a lot away from these meeting, they are always extremely useful for forming my own thinking, and so I appreciate seeing so many colleagues here.

Without repeating what Susan said, I thought I would begin by emphasizing a few general points, then talk a little bit about the special DoE role, and finally in particular talk about some of the beginning steps that we have been taking with regard to this subject of disposal of general-purpose submarines.

The first point I would like to emphasize is that this is very much an interagency effort on both sides. It is no accident that both the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy are cooperating in a close partnership here, and we had across the table today a very impressive group of interagency representatives on the Russian side as well.

In addition to this being an interagency effort, I believe that it has the potential to be a very impressive international effort as well. On Friday in Brussels we invited a group of countries, the G8 countries, to attend the meeting and talk about some of the cooperation that may be possible on the threat reduction subjects in Russian and the NIS as a whole. I think in this area particularly we have already seen interest, as you know, from the Japanese and the Norwegians in participating in this work, and I think other partners are quite possible as well.

Another point, in a more general vein, is that there is considerable interest on Capitol Hill, particularly on the Senate side, in pursuing cooperation on the disposition of submarines. The Senate has asked the executive branch in its branch reporting, within just the last few days, to work with the Russian side to prepare a report on what cooperation we might undertake in this area. I consider this a significant change, because historically the Senate and Congress as a whole has really emphasized the strategic platforms and has been much less willing to consider cooperation on the general purpose platforms. So to me this is a significant change in atmosphere on Capitol Hill. I should underscore, however, that they have not yet agreed to give any financial resources for this effort. They have asked us to look at it very seriously, but I do not want to give you the impression that budget decisions already have been made. But as I said I do find it significant that they have asked us to look at this question in a serious way. I also wanted to point out that there is a relationship to President Clinton’s extended threat reduction initiative - in January of this year President Clinton proposed enhanced support for cooperation on threat reduction in Russia and the NIS as a whole. This initiative in the budget terms has received a very good support this year. We just have been up to the Hill and had our budgets. Well, usually they get worked over by the Senate and the House of Representatives, but this year in terms of asking for new support for threat reduction cooperation, we had a very good result, and I think that is good for further work with the Congress on this specific subject.

I would like to turn from general comments to talk about the special DoE role in this arena. DoE has management responsibility in the United States for the spent nuclear fuel. DoE has roughly 2600 metric tonnes of heavy metal spent nuclear fuel stored throughout the DoE complex in the U.S. 20 metric tonnes of special nuclear material is also being returned to the United States from 41 countries around the world under program that we call the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactor Program. Because of this responsibility, we have significant experience in management of spent nuclear fuel, including handling, treatment, packaging, transportation, storage, safeguarding, and ultimate disposal.

Currently we are using this experience here in Russia on several projects to provide material protection, control, and accounting support for the storage of attractive nuclear material in the Navy. The Russian Federation Navy uses HEU fuel for its submarines, and this material is categorized as weapons usable, so is very much relevant to the MPC&A program’s goal of reducing the risk of proliferation by strengthening the security of nuclear materials. Our projects currently focus on physical protection and accountancy of fuel rods from the time they are delivered to the Navy up to the time the Navy enters the fuel rods into ships, so these are fresh fuel activities. We have also begun to consider some spent fuel, or irradiated naval fuel, which retains its HEU designation within 10 years of reactor’s shut-down; it may be cool enough to become a non-proliferation risk. That is, in IAEA terms, it is no longer self-protecting. So most of our work is on the fresh fuel side, but we are beginning to consider and have a smaller amount of work looking at fresh fuel MPC&A problems (?). I just comment that we developed a very good working relationship with Russian Federation Navy. I think it has been a good overall effort on the project, and teams have overall a smooth working relationship.

To end, I would like to turn to the specifics of the beginning steps that we are taking with regard to this problem of general-purpose submarine dismantlement. Under the Umbrella of our MPC&A cooperation, we agreed to participate in a scoping study to look at the larger feasibility and create the conditions for a larger feasibility study on building a facility at shipyard 49 of the Pacific Fleet in Kamchatka. Shipyard 49 would be a facility designed for the purpose of unloading spent fuel for Pacific Fleet platforms at Kamchatka. So we will, we have now essentially finished this scoping study and the time is approaching to look at the question of the larger feasibility and engineering study that will have to take place. This is an area like the DoD projects, rather than the works that we have going on so far under the MPC&A program. We foresee that, at a minimum, technical assistance and surplus specialized equipment could be provided to work on the problem of disposition of general-purpose submarines. But we are just at the beginning stages of defining what larger joint work we will undertake if it proves to feasible, and those are decisions for both our governments to take. I must say our interagency teams took upon themselves the responsibility of assessing the problem, and then it will be up to the Russian Federation government and the government of the United States to decide what cooperation could and should go forward from this point. So we, as Susan said, are very much at the beginning stage.

Thank you.