Promoting Democracy in Venezuela

Moderated by Thomas Carothers, Vice President for Global Policy, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

November 3, 1999

The group convened to discuss President Hugo Chávez?s "political revolution" and U.S. democracy promotion in Venezuela. Two different interpretations of Chávez and his politics emerged among the participants. Several maintained that although no single event has heralded the onset of dictatorship in Venezuela, Chávez may be forging a path for authoritarian rule: the Constituent Assembly has considered or accepted constitutional changes of dubious democratic character and Chávez has deeply involved the military in governance tasks. Adherents to this view believed that Chávez "pushes the democratic envelope" until the international community becomes disapproving, then retracts to the most undemocratic position it will tolerate. Other participants dissented, stating that these changes were haphazard and did not signal a coordinated move towards authoritarianism. According to this interpretation, Chávez?s overwhelming popular legitimacy gives him a strong mandate to conduct political reform as he sees fit. As long as he does not blatantly overstep democratic norms, the U.S. should give Chávez?s "democratic revolution" the benefit of the doubt.

Much debate surrounded the potential for political opposition to emerge in Venezuela. First, participants recognized that although individuals were positioning themselves within the Constituent Assembly and at the state level to emerge as new opposition once the political reform has run its course, the traditional parties have presented no coherent alternative to the Chávez revolution. Second, it was observed that the political debate in Venezuela is not between "Chavistas" and "Non-Chavistas." Supporters of Chávez are far from ideologically monolithic?divisions have already started to appear in the Constituent Assembly. Third, to be anti-Chávez now is to be perceived as a pawn of the old order. Clearly, political change and anti-corruption are difficult concepts to oppose. As a result, Chávez has not had to confront any serious opposition thus far. Future debates over the substance of future political reform and economic policy, however, are likely to factionalize Chávez?s support, creating opportunities for new opposition to emerge.

The group also debated whether the political institutions created by the new Constitution would provide openings for increased democracy assistance programming. Two concerns were raised. First, Chávez does not really want international aid to help develop democratic institutions, but rather international observers to lend international legitimacy to the "political revolution." Second, the problem of funding "flawed democratic institutions" exists. When supporting new institutions, it is crucial to strengthen their democratic character without strengthening their undemocratic flaws. In Venezuela, this issue may become especially pertinent if donors seek to aid newly created institutions. The group agreed that the most viable approach may be to build upon existing democratic processes and institutions in Venezuela, such as state and local governments.

Participants? policy prescriptions tended to depend on how they viewed Chávez. On one hand, those who believed Chávez is slowly consolidating power in his own person advocated international assistance to ensure that he does not become an autocrat. Advocates of this position, however, were hard-pressed to come up with specific areas in which U.S. assistance could help alleviate their concerns. On the other hand, those who maintained that Chávez is casting a new Venezuelan democracy, albeit not from the U.S. mold, preferred a macro-management approach. According to them, the U.S. could best promote democracy in Venezuela by ensuring that fair elections take place five years from now. In the words of one participant, the U.S. approach should be "trust, but verify." In closing, participants seemed to agree that the U.S. must avoid confrontation with Chávez. So far, Chávez has generated popularity by conducting a series of witch hunts against existing political institutions. In an adversarial confrontation with Chávez, the U.S. would put itself in a position where it could become the biggest witch of all.