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Tuesday, February 15, 2000
William Drake began the meeting by suggesting that a good starting point for the study group’s inquiry in the weeks ahead would be to discuss the information revolution’s potential effects on the fundamental architecture of world politics. As in any other social domain, the institutional organization of international relations can have a significant and even determinative impact on behavioral processes and outcomes. Hence, before moving on to explore how the information revolution may affect the dynamics within specific issue-areas like military security or international trade, it would useful to consider the systemic features that help to constrain and dispose state action in such contexts.
Drake offered as a baseline from which to depart the conventional view that the international system is structurally anarchic, in that there is no central source of global authority above the sovereign state. The dominant theory of international relations, neorealism, argues that in consequence, the principal systemic source of order and outcomes in international politics is the distribution of material capabilities among nation states (of which unipolarity and U.S. hegemony are the central feature today). But while the distribution of such "hard power" is undoubtedly crucial in many contexts, "soft power" (grounded in immaterial informational, ideological, and persuasive capabilities) is increasingly important as well, and the distribution and exercise of these two forms of power may not coincide entirely.
Moreover, there are arguably three other systemic sources of order and outcomes in international affairs (to which, parenthetically, neorealism is blind by design). The first is global markets, which may have a structural weight that is in tension with the interstate system. The second is the substantive character of the international system’s units--nation states--such as whether they are democratic or authoritarian, and follow a liberal or statist economic model (imagine a unipolar system dominated by the Soviet Union or Nazi Germany instead of the United States). The third is the balance of capabilities and authority between nation-states and non-state actors, such as transnational firms, nongovernmental organizations, and even individuals. Drake suggested that analyzing the changing architecture of international politics requires attention to all these dimensions, and that in this context it would be useful to consider the extent to which the information revolution may be affecting them today.
In line with the above, he suggested that the study group consider the information revolution’s possible implications along four thematic dimensions, and to stimulate discussion posed a series of specific questions about each:
- The primacy of the interstate system vs. transnational forces and the implications for national sovereignty
- The balance of wealth and power (hard and soft) among nation-states
- The character of nation-states, e.g., the global spread of democratization and economic liberalization
- The balance of authority between states and non-state actors
With respect to the first theme, Stephen J. Kobrin of the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania offered a starting point with his presentation "Geography and Cyberspace: Territorial Sovereignty in the Information Age," which took place prior to the study group meeting as a part of the project's lecture series. In the presentation, and also in his 1998 article "Back to the Future: Neomedievalism and the Postmodern Digital World Economy," Kobrin argued that the dynamics of the networked global economy are bringing about fundamental changes in the Westphalian system of sovereign nation-states. Some participants echoed Kobrin's sentiment that the information revolution, and particularly the diffusion and development of the Internet in recent years, has definitively altered the structure of the international system. Several focused on his concept of neomedievalism, agreeing with the notion that the rise of the nation-state was contingent on historical factors and that its decline may come in response to the new dynamics of the information age. One member argued that we may come to view history not as a linear progression but rather as a wheel of time, with new eras taking on the characteristics of previous ones. Drawing an analogy to the medieval roots of the word "outlaw," which implied a realm outside of legal jurisdiction rather than a criminal, he suggested that cyberspace is a trans-territorial domain operating outside of the jurisdiction of national law. Another participant sounded a similar theme, claiming that the Internet is like a new country, to which individuals around the world owe their allegiance because it has empowered them regardless of the nation-state in which they physically reside. One went so far as to argue that the world of nation-states is being steadily dismantled in response to the political and economic dynamics of the information revolution.
Not all participants agreed, however, that the structure of the international system is being fundamentally transformed in the information age. One argued that nations still project conventional power and protect their physical territory, and traditional concerns with the preservation of national sovereignty and security are still the major determinants of international politics. Another concurred that the current focus on the new ways in which states may be losing authority ignores the vast majority of areas in which anarchy, sovereignty, and interstate relations still predominate. One participant repeated a cautionary note about attributing far-reaching political impact to the information revolution when it is still in its early stages. Another, while sympathetic to the idea that the international system is being restructured, stressed that much more empirically-grounded research is needed before we can convincingly move beyond the anecdotal evidence that is frequently offered in support of this view.
On the second theme of the changing balance of wealth and power among nation-states, much of the discussion centered on the concept of soft power, which analysts like Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye define as the ability to achieve outcomes through attraction rather than coercion. Participants disagreed as to whether soft power could be successfully deployed through deliberate state policy; some felt that it was primarily a byproduct of a strong civil society and market system and an attractive ideology and culture, while others felt that states could actively create and project it. There was similar disagreement on the relationship between hard and soft power. Several participants felt that the U.S. and other states with significant hard power would retain a soft power advantage for the foreseeable future, while others felt that the distributions of hard and soft power were more asymmetrical. One argued that several small states have projected soft power adroitly, including Taiwan, Israel, and even Estonia.
Several participants added new twists to the soft power debate, which to date has centered on the implications for American primacy. One focused on the nature of the target regime in a soft power campaign. Offering the examples of Burma and China, which have proven resistant to pressure and public opinion on human rights, he claimed that "for soft power to work you have to be able to be embarrassed." Others argued that the transparency of democratic regimes is itself a source of soft power in the information age, whereas secrecy may limit the power of less open systems of government. One participant focused on economic elements of power, suggesting that the increasing amount of capital tied up in non-physical commodities will have implications for the shifting distribution of hard and soft power among nation-states. Another departed from the state-to-state dimension of the soft power debate, focusing instead on non-state actors. Offering the example of recent U.S. intervention in conflicts from Rwanda to Kosovo, she argued that soft power is about which warring faction can get its story told in the global public sphere, a question strongly tied to the growing influence of the media in international affairs.
On the third topic, the information revolution's potential effects on the character of nation-states, the discussion focused in particular on the global spread of democracy. Much of the popular discourse on the political impact of the information revolution has trumpeted its democratizing potential, but many such arguments tend to "black box" the relationship between information and communication technologies and political outcomes, i.e., implying a causal link without necessarily demonstrating how it operates. Nevertheless, many commentators remain convinced that the information revolution is fostering the triumph of Western-style economic and political liberalism. In this vein, several study group participants supported the view that the difficult-to-control nature of the Internet would further democracy around the world. In particular, one pointed to the use of other technologies, such as short-wave radio, to support democratic opposition in the Soviet bloc, suggesting that we will hear similar accounts in the future of the Internet's impact in such authoritarian regimes as Burma.
Others were more skeptical, however, about the all-good-things-go-together optimism that has accompanied the spread of the Internet. One participant argued that in predicting the Internet's effect on democratization, one must look not only at the nature of the technology but also at the character of the target regime. In China, for instance, the Falun Gong have effectively used e-mail to organize mass protests, but the regime has long proven resistant to such pressure, both domestically and internationally. Others pointed out that there is much talk of the medium's potential for government surveillance, disinformation, and demagoguery. One argued that democratization involves more than the downfall of authoritarian regimes, and that to truly gauge the Internet's impact on the spread of democracy, we must examine its potential to build the political culture and broad acceptance of civic values that uphold a democratic system.
Finally, with respect to the fourth theme, everyone in the study group seemed to agree that the information revolution has increased the influence of civil society and the private sector in international affairs. Participants offered myriad examples to support their points. One mentioned the 1992 environmental treaty signed by the Bush administration, against its wishes but following the dictates of global public opinion. Others pointed to the growing influence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and their use of ICT in campaigns to support or oppose recent international treaties, such as the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), the ban on landmines, and the establishment of an international criminal court. Many participants credited the Internet in particular with facilitating the rise of new non-state actors. One noted the role of Internet-organized student protests in the downfall of Suharto in Indonesia; another pointed to the growing influence and substantial economic weight of dot-com corporations. A third mentioned Ford Motor Company's recent move to supply its workers with subsidized computers and Internet access, suggesting that wired labor will form powerful new coalitions with other opponents of economic globalization. Whether the growing influence of non-state actors actually constitutes a shift in power or authority away from the nation-state, however, was a question left undetermined.
Rapporteur’s Report prepared by Taylor Boas