Study Group: Impact on the Conduct of International Affairs

Impact on the Conduct of International Affairs

Tuesday, March 21, 2000

Having examined in its second session the information revolution’s possible impacts on the international system, the study group turned in its third session to implications for the conduct of foreign policy in the new environment. William Drake began by noting that while today’s information and communication technologies (ICT) provide governments with new opportunities to manage the public profile of issues and policies, achieve organizational efficiencies, and improve the flow of information, there may be a dark side as well. For example, with so much information from so many kinds of sources swirling around in the hypermedia environment, the tasks of both decision-makers in national capitals and diplomats on the ground are becoming increasingly complicated. Crises, mistakes, and other unanticipated events can instantly generate global information frenzies that shorten timeframes, limit options, and complicate inter-state negotiations and relationships.

With these and other considerations in mind, Drake posed three broad questions for the group’s consideration. The first concerned the information revolution’s organizational implications for the foreign policy establishment. Some analysts, for example, argue that the information revolution requires a shift from centralized and hierarchical organizations and decision-making processes to decentralized and flat organizations in which networked virtual teams call the shots. How well, he asked, might these and other lessons from the business world apply to the U.S. Department of State? The second question concerned the decision-making process. The perception or misperception of other governments’ objectives and actions is a central factor shaping foreign policy and national security decisions. Noting that in the past factors like inadequate information, interactive time lags, and distance have lent themselves to misunderstandings and miscalculations, Drake questioned whether the information revolution could change these factors and their impact on the conduct of negotiations, crises, arms races, wars, etc.

Finally, the third question concerned the impact of the turbulent external environment on decision making. In particular, Drake noted that with the rise of global television in the 1980s, there was much debate about the "CNN effect" on foreign policy decision-making. With the Internet and the convergence of digital technologies today and the prospect of increasingly ubiquitous information processing and dissemination tomorrow, one can ask whether there is now a qualitatively different "hypermedia effect" on foreign policy decision-making, or if instead states might learn to limit this effect and even capitalize on the new environment to suit their objectives.

Much of the discussion to follow focused on the first question, the implications of the information revolution for the U.S. Department of State. One point that surfaced repeatedly was the difficulty of adapting to a new information environment in the absence of competitive pressures. "The State Department is like a Chinese state enterprise" in this regard, claimed one participant, arguing that old, inefficient ways of doing things get locked in place and present obstacles to change. Several others agreed that the Department retains a monopoly on diplomacy and faces few incentives for innovation. But many participants challenged the point that the State Department had no competitors, pointing to interagency competition and the degree to which the National Security Council, U.S. Trade Representative, and Department of Commerce have begun to carry out U.S. foreign policy as well. Other countries also provide a degree of competition, and several (such as Singapore) may be exploiting the information revolution better than the U.S. State Department, albeit on a smaller scale. The real danger for the State Department in the information age, however, is not that it will be beaten by a competitor but that it will increasingly be seen as irrelevant and will be bypassed in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy.

Besides the question of competition, the unique culture of the State Department was frequently cited as an impediment to change in the information age. Many participants felt that the Department restricts or classifies more information than necessary, sacrificing the potential efficiencies and improved decision-making that a more open information environment could offer. The traditional training of foreign service officers and the hierarchical structure of decision-making may also stifle innovation. One participant noted a paradox within the Department: significant change must be driven from the top, and yet the Secretary serves more as the President's personal ambassador to the current global "hot spot" than as the one who runs an organization. Others agreed that the State Department's modus operandi complicates far-reaching organizational change. The information revolution normally filters up to higher levels as a specific policy issue--how to facilitate e-commerce in foreign countries, for instance--rather than being examined in systemic terms. The tendency to operate in crisis mode and respond to current events sacrifices long-term planning.

Another participant pointed to a division between high politics and low politics in State Department culture, suggesting that the information revolution falls into the latter realm. In general, he suggested, there is disdain for the private sector within the Department and a feeling that the Internet is less important on a global scale than arms control, peacekeeping, etc. State has had difficulty attracting recruits in the "low politics" sphere, especially in the area of ICT, where qualified applicants weigh a diplomatic career against lucrative opportunities in the private sector. Despite the difficulty of recruiting personnel with high-tech credentials, several participants pointed out that the new generation joining the Department was more technologically literate in general and would eventually shift the culture toward one more comfortable with the information revolution.

Finally, some participants identified budgetary constraints as an impediment to innovation in the information age. One argued that the Department has not received enough money to experiment with changes in the use of ICT and make the mistakes necessary for learning. By contrast, the IRS has had money to spend and has been much more effective at adaptation. Several disagreed that money was a major factor in the State Department's slow adaptation to the information revolution and surmised that it would not have done significantly better if its budget had not been cut. Even if the Department could invest more money in technology, one discussant argued, it would not guarantee better use of ICT or more effective decision-making. Offering a tongue-in-cheek analogy, he claimed that the State Department's web page, with photos of the Secretary and information about the Department, would be like Amazon.com posting the stock price and pictures of CEO Jeff Bezos but offering no sales or interactive services. In reality, both entities employ the same media, but one has learned to use it much more effectively than the other.

Turning to the second question, participants addressed the issue of misperception and miscalculation in foreign policy decision-making. Several rejected the idea that more information and more channels for real-time communication have increased policymakers' understanding of foreign governments and their intentions. Many discussants pointed out that more data and information does not necessarily increase knowledge and accurate analysis, nor does it reduce psychological impediments to decision-making. While most agreed that the hypermedia environment had not rendered decision-making any easier, participants differed on whether it had made the process harder. Some felt that it had, pointing to the overwhelming deluge of data that policymakers must weigh in making their decisions. Others saw this deluge as essentially neutral, arguing that governments can ignore information that does not support the policy they want to implement. One participant argued that increases in the quantity of information available to policymakers would have facilitated more intelligent decision-making, if not for the accompanying demand that decisions be made in less time and with less deliberation.

On the third question, the discussion began with the much debated "CNN effect." Several participants suggested that global television has indeed complicated decision-making and issue management and may even compel governments to undertake actions that they might otherwise avoid. But other participants felt that the CNN effect is often overstated. Several argued that governments with specific policy goals can screen out distracting sources of information. One claimed that pervasive news coverage can sway foreign policy decisions only in the absence of decisive leadership, when policymakers are uncertain about their response to a particular issue. Even this statement was too strong for another participant, who claimed that international news reporting has declined sharply and that CNN has a small regular audience outside of crises. If the U.S. public is not interested in foreign policy, she argued, how can CNN drive it?

Many of the discussants focused on the question of humanitarian intervention, looking at whether television coverage had prompted action by an otherwise reluctant United States. Most felt that the CNN effect is over-hyped in this regard. One claimed that CNN began covering Somalia because the government made it a key policy issue, not the other way around; another pointed out that CNN showed atrocities in Bosnia from the beginning of the conflict in 1992, but there was no push for intervention until 1995. Television news does have an effect, he argued, but does not necessarily for action. The general consensus among study group members seemed to be that news media could put an issue on the table but could not determine how the government would respond. Moving beyond the decision to intervene, one participant asked if the CNN effect altered the way governments act once committed to a conflict. In modern warfare, both sides understand that they will be scrutinized by a global audience, and they may seek to tailor their actions to television coverage. On this question, many seemed to attribute a greater impact to news media.

Turning from television to the contemporary environment of Internet-based network convergence and ubiquitous information, study group members considered whether there might be a "hypermedia effect," with information from a variety of distributed sources exerting a potentially novel impact on international affairs. Participants felt that such a hypermedia effect is likely to be different from the CNN effect in several ways: by empowering a wide range of actors to distribute audio and visual information over the Internet (i.e., "webcasting"), by increasing the sheer quantity of foreign policy-related information, and by reducing editorial filters and eliminating intermediaries that ensure accuracy of such information. On the first point, one participant mentioned the oft-invoked examples of NGOs and activists protesting the policies of the WTO, IMF, and World Bank. In the age of the Internet, he argued, popular perception has become more important than reality, and international financial institutions are forced to respond differently to attacks on their image. Several others extrapolated this line of thinking, suggesting that the future ability of NGOs, activists, and even terrorists to send out streaming video on the Internet will multiply the dynamics that email and web pages have introduced.

At the same time that the information revolution empowers new voices, it increases the overall quantity of information and dilutes the influence of any one voice. In the information age, argued one participant, the explosion of information coincides with a scarcity of attention. When everyone is a broadcaster, all are forced to compete to get their stories told. Furthermore, as new sources of information proliferate, nothing ensures that the information they provide will be accurate or well-analyzed. People already assume that everything they see on CNN is the truth, argued one participant, and CNN has rules and editorial filters that at least attempt to ensure the accuracy of information. Many new broadcasters of the information age, not subject to comparable restraints, will disseminate even more inaccurate information that may be interpreted as reality. Another participant raised the example of space imagery, a resource once monopolized by governments. Now, with the advent of high-resolution commercial imaging satellites, more people may have access to images, but without expertise they can easily misinterpret them.

Not all participants were as concerned about the potentially negative impacts of information overload and disintermediation. One suggested that younger generations grow up more skeptical of all sources of information and would assume, for instance, that a digital photograph could easily have been altered. Others claimed that the branding of new media would distinguish between reliable and unreliable sources. With streaming media, one claimed, familiar names such as Yahoo! and America Online will introduce news services that compete with CNN but are still subject to editorial filters; other sources of information will still exist, but a respected brand name will confer legitimacy.

Rapporteur’s Report prepared by Taylor Boas