National Security, Thematic Summary, and Closing Thoughts
Tuesday, June 13, 2000
In its sixth and final session, the study group first addressed the impact of the information revolution on national security and then turned to a summary and conclusion based on findings from previous sessions.
I. National Security and Information Warfare
William Drake began by noting that the dramatic impact of the information revolution on national security has been the subject of much scholarly attention. The management of geographically dispersed forces and warfare is increasingly ICT-intensive and reliant on C4I functions, "smart" weaponry, etc. At the same time, the information revolution has raised new threats to national security, such as the vulnerability of information networks and other critical infrastructures to terrorist attacks, hackers, and systems failures. Developments in intelligence operations such as satellite imaging, sensor technology, and network surveillance may raise new threats and opportunities as well. In these and other cases, international asymmetries in the capacities and vulnerabilities of states have the potential to generate new interaction dynamics and to alter the course of international affairs in ways that merit investigation.
Drake suggested that the study group focus its discussion on one particularly relevant aspect of this larger terrain: information warfare and its implications for U.S. strengths and vulnerabilities. In the ensuing discussion, most participants concurred that the United States, as the sole superpower and technological leader of the information revolution, still retains the greatest capacity for offensive information warfare. Many were concerned, however, about increased vulnerability to information attacks by small states and non-state actors.
Several group members pointed to the ill-defined division of responsibility between the U.S. government entities that deal with threats and the increasing difficulty of distinguishing between crimes and acts of war. The current approach to information security is essentially reactive, they argued; the government deals with problems once they occur and is reluctant to allocate money for preventative measures. Much of the problem may be that information-age threats do not fit easily into traditional security categories, and different agencies feel that a response does not fall under their purview. When a foreign entity (which may or may not be state-sponsored) perpetrates an attack on a critical database, is it an act of war or a crime? Does it demand a judicial or military response? Questions of organizational accountability for information-age threats have yet to be settled, and until they are, the United States will remain excessively vulnerable.
Several participants argued that weaker powers would respond asymmetrically to the United States? offensive capacity. One suggested that adversaries might seek to draw the United States into expensive, traditional campaigns to divert its expenditures from new technological development to the fighting of comparatively routine wars. Such an outcome would allow potential enemies more time for technological catch-up. Other participants suggested that smaller states, state-sponsored terrorist groups, and non-state actors may be rapidly developing the capacity to attack the United States at low cost, often by adapting commercially available technology. For example, as rogue states and terrorist groups develop biological weapons capacity that could cause serious economic disruption in the United States, they call into question the ability of the United States to prevent an attack or respond quickly. For such adversaries, deterrence based on second strike capacity may not work. "The notion that we can lose the information game but gracefully recover [with] responses?of overwhelming force," argued one participant, "is fundamentally mistaken."
In contrast, a few participants remained skeptical that the United States faces serious new threats in the information age. The potential for terrorists or rogue states to threaten the U.S. with high-tech weapons has been over-hyped, argued one group member. Recent research has shown that only a small subset of terrorists are willing to die for their cause, and the suicidal ones are less likely to use advanced technology, opting instead for the easiest, cheapest weapons. Even those with the will and resources to pursue high-tech attacks often fail to surmount technological obstacles. Aum Shinrikyo, for instance, had $2 billion and the expertise of some of Japan?s top scientists; it tried biological attacks three times but never killed anyone. Similar obstacles may well apply in the case of information warfare. As for threats by rogue states, one participant expressed confidence in deterrence and argued that an opponent would have to be absolutely crazy to take on the United States without good reason. The question remained, however, as to whether past success with deterrence would continue in a future of new and rapidly changing technologies.
Some group members felt that popular perception of the United States? information capacities (whether accurate or not) may play a significant role in reducing threats. Several participants mentioned the widespread belief that the U.S. government is everywhere and sees everything, evidenced in recent movies such as Enemy of the State and Mission: Impossible 2. Real life examples, such as the speed with which the source of the "I Love You" virus was identified, or the apprehension of potential terrorists entering the United States before New Year?s Eve 2000, reinforce the perception of extensive government knowledge. Likewise, many observers discounted the U.S. government?s claim that the Chinese embassy in Belgrade was bombed in error because they view the U.S. national security apparatus as too technologically advanced to make such a foolish mistake. As one participant put it, "the illusion of our capabilities is our greatest deterrence."
II. Study Group Thematic Summary
Following the discussion of national security, William Drake presented a thematic summary of issues the study group had addressed in previous sessions. To understand the impact of the information revolution on world politics, he suggested, one must begin with an examination of conceptual frameworks. In its most narrow sense, the information revolution can be viewed as simply involving progressive technical change. Alternatively, it can be viewed as a process of interconnected, contested, and contingent shifts in the political, social, economic, and conceptual organization and control of both ICTs and ICT-enabled activities. However one conceives of the information revolution, it is important to avoid technological determinism and recognize the central role of human agency in driving the changes, while simultaneously acknowledging that unintended consequences are widespread. Additionally, one must acknowledge that the spread of the information revolution, however defined, has been highly uneven across countries and economic sectors, so there are analytical and policy risks to generalizing based on conditions in the United States. Overall, Drake noted, it is important to avoid reductionist and overly general explanations and to consider mediating factors, intervening conditions, and environmental constraints when evaluating the societal impact of the information revolution.
In previous sessions, the study group found that the information revolution has many implications for the structure of the international system. First, it has allowed an ever-widening array of transnational process and actors to challenge the absolute authority of nation-states and the centrality of their interactions to outcomes in world politics. However, it is unclear whether this dynamic constitutes (or will constitute) a structural shift from anarchy and sovereignty to neo-medievalism or multi-centricity. Second, the information revolution also has implications for the international distribution of power. Hard power based on material capacities remains essential, but soft power (the ability to achieve outcomes through attraction rather than coercion) has become increasingly important and has begun to figure prominently in the exercise of statecraft. Both states and non-state actors may exercise soft power, and states that are not powerful in the traditional sense may possess and project soft power. Finally, the information revolution can pose challenges to authoritarian regimes but has not necessarily been an independent factor in the democratization process to date. The impact of the information revolution on economic liberalization has been more definite and will likely continue to be significant.
Beyond its impact on the structure of the international system, the information revolution has a number of effects in specific issue-areas of world politics. In its examination of the conduct of international affairs, the study group focused on the organization and effectiveness of U.S. diplomacy and the process of foreign policy decision-making. Most members agreed that the State Department has been particularly slow to adapt to the organizational implications of the information revolution. Reasons for this lag may include limited competitive pressures, a culture of top-down information control, a division between high and low politics, and budgetary constraints. Some felt that the Department risks losing its monopoly on foreign affairs in the information age, as other entities such as the National Security Agency and Department of Commerce take over foreign policy functions.
In the area of foreign-policy decision-making, the group addressed the "CNN effect" of global television news and the "hypermedia effect" of the Internet and converging ICTs. Most members felt that the CNN effect can put new policy issues on the table but cannot determine how governments will respond. Once involved in a conflict, however, the certainty of global television coverage can influence how governments act. Participants also addressed the potential for miscalculation and misperception in the new hypermedia environment. Most agreed that the information revolution has not reduced or eliminated these factors and in some cases may even make the problem worse. Finally, the group found that the hypermedia effect is likely to be different from the CNN effect in several ways. It will allow webcasting by a broad range of actors, increase the quantity of foreign policy-related information, and reduce the intermediary editorial filters that normally promote the accuracy of information.
In the economic arena, the study group addressed the "new economy" and the global digital divide. Despite (or because of) being analytically loose, the new economy concept has emerged as the most popular attempt to express the impact of the information age on national and global economies. Yet it remains unclear whether the information revolution marks an economic change on par with the industrial revolution, thus necessitating a fundamentally new paradigm, or if the current changes simply form part of an ongoing process, which cannot be categorized as a wholesale transformation to a fundamentally new state. As for the global digital divide, the international debate may have focused too much on relative disparities in connectivity and access across countries, arguably resulting in misguided policy prescriptions. National and multilateral strategies to promote digital development must look simultaneously at institutional and economic reform, education, entrepreneurship, and a host of other factors in the developing countries? transition to knowledge societies.
In the socio-cultural realm, the study group addressed the empowerment of civil societal organizations and the impact of the information revolution on national cultures. The information revolution has undoubtedly enhanced the ability of civil societal or advocacy organizations?both formal groups and informal, swarming networks?to exercise influence in international affairs. Disagreement persists, however, about the importance of traditional face-to-face contacts in mobilizing and sustaining such networks. As for cultural impact, the group felt that the information revolution does not result in an overall pattern of cultural homogenization, although pressures for homogenization do exist alongside pressures for fragmentation and diversity. Even so, nations appropriate global cultural forms, ideas, and information in accordance with local conditions, often changing their meaning in the process. Furthermore, the Internet is fundamentally different from traditional media systems and provides greater latitude for the production and preservation of local content. English may be the dominant language on the Internet, but the growth of material in other languages appears to indicate a pattern of increasing online heterogeneity.
III. Closing Thoughts
Following the thematic summary, Drake asked the study group to highlight what key issues they had taken away from previous discussions and what they felt to be the information revolution?s major implications for world politics. Several participants raised a point that had surfaced repeatedly in various prior meetings?the empowerment of non-state actors in international affairs. Governments still have important roles to play, they agreed, but there are now significant tasks that they cannot do well and should consider ceding to the private or third sector. In addition, one member argued, governments should seek to engage the non-state world in cooperative partnerships that can enhance effective governance, rather than set the stage for deadlock between combative NGOs and unresponsive authorities.
Several other comments centered around the theme of decentralization of power and authority. One participant acknowledged this trend as a major dynamic of the information revolution but cautioned that in the context of political power, change may not be unidirectional. The information revolution may place pressures for democratization on authoritarian regimes, but it may also empower authoritarian leaders in certain ways. In this context, she suggested, it would be worthwhile to study how the information revolution has affected U.S. democracy assistance abroad. A second participant addressed a related topic, the shifting boundaries of authority, responsibility, and capability within governments themselves. This particular trend is evident in the realm of national security, for instance, where it is uncertain whether the Department of Justice or the Department of Defense should respond to information attacks.
Other study group members addressed the increasing importance of soft power in world politics. One participant highlighted the significance of international public diplomacy in a world where ideas and norms are increasingly influential in shaping international behavior. Corporations, NGOs, states, and other actors increasingly accept international standards of human rights, democracy, and other values. As such, U.S. foreign policy should seek to reinforce these ideas at a global level. Similarly, several group members argued that openness is a source of strength for governments in the information age. One participant cautioned against excessive transparency, believing that some restriction of information would always be necessary, but he emphasized that competition of ideas is the key to effective governance. As an example, he proposed that all government agencies seek to make meetings available on streaming video. This would include classified meetings, which would be restricted to approved viewers but still capable of reaching a wider audience within this community.
Another participant suggested that a major question running through various issue-areas in the information age is that of "revolution or evolution." Has the development of new ICTs introduced fundamentally new dynamics into world politics that demand completely retooled government policy? Or do the trends of today form more of a continuum with past dynamics, calling for a government response that it quantitatively, but not qualitatively, different? For instance, if governments accept the revolutionary "new economy" paradigm, they should respond with new macroeconomic policies, encouraging more rapid growth and discarding old worries of inflation or downturns in the business cycle. If they view ICTs? economic impact as more evolutionary than revolutionary, their policy response might seek to reign in economies that may be overheating by conventional measures.
Group members raised several other themes as well. One participant highlighted the significance of the global digital divide, suggesting U.S. tax credits for companies that address global disparities in access to and use of ICTs. A second pointed to the growing influence of the private sector in information-age policymaking, as exemplified by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).
Rapporteur?s Report prepared by Taylor Boas