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Secrets of the Economic Success in the Baltic Countries

Thu. January 10th, 2002
On January 10th, 2002, Professor Pekka Sutela delivered a talk at the Carnegie Endowment on the secrets behind the economic success of the three Baltic countries. Dr. Sutela is one of Europe's leading experts on the Russian and the Baltic economies. He has headed the Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in Transition since January 1998. From 1995 to 1997, he was a professor of the Economics of Transition at the University of Helsinki. He has studied the Russian and Baltic economies continuously for the last twenty years and has published extensively in English.

Professor Sutela opened his remarks by pointing out that next year will mark the 10th anniversary of the Estonian Currency Board. Although Latvia and Lithuania did not fix their exchange rates quite so early, all three Baltic states have successfully maintained a fixed value for their currencies for nearly a decade. This is an exception to international experience, and according to Professor Sutela it is but one very important facet of the exceptional economic reform initiatives that the Baltic states have undertaken
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Not only have the Baltics maintained fixed exchange rates for many years, they have also maintained large current account deficits. Concurrently, all three states have pursued financial liberalization with equal vigor. Taken together, these three features of the Baltic economies (fixed exchange rates, large current account deficits and financial liberalization) represent an anomaly among transition economies and, moreover, is a combination that many development experts believed to be a recipe for disaster. In this sense, the Baltic economies present the example of a surprisingly successful and unique system of macroeconomic reform.

Apart from the economic success of the Baltic states, there have been a number of other positive developments in the region. Estonia has closed its privatization board, marking the end of its privatization process. Likewise, the OSCE has closed its office in Estonia and will close its office in Latvia shortly, in recognition of the progress these states have made in dealing with their Russian-speaking minorities. Looking into the future, it seems ever more likely that all three states will be invited to join NATO this year and that membership in the EU will follow after that.

It has become almost commonplace to attribute this success to what Dr. Sutela calls the 'standard explanation', namely that the economic success of the Baltics is due to the good fundamentals of these states, their relatively small budget deficits and, most importantly, to their well-educated labor force. All this may be true, but Dr. Sutela considers this an inadequate explanation of the true secret to the success of the Baltics.

In a word, the key to the success of the Baltics can be found in the small size of their financial markets. All three Baltic republics have almost no market for government debt instruments, only a small inter-bank market, hardly any market for equity and not much of a market for bank debt. As a result, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have all been spared the destabilizing effects of the large but fickle capital flows that have ripped through the markets of other transitioning and developing economies. In effect, the three Baltic states have managed to avoid the sort of speculation that has been at the root of so many the financial crises of the past decade simply because there is very little on which one might speculate in these countries.

The question remains, however, why these states have such small financial markets. In part, Dr. Sutela explained, the size of the financial markets in the Baltic states was by design. As prudent government policies kept budget deficits to a minimum, there was little need for government bonds. But small markets were also simply a result of small economies. This predisposition was re-enforced by unforeseen circumstances like the banking crisis that all three states experienced. In the wake of this crisis, the ownership of most Baltic banks was taken over by foreign entities (namely Nordic banks) who had little incentive to cultivate local markets since they had access to larger financial markets both at home and in the larger economies of Europe.

In the end, the small size of the financial markets in these three countries has not been a problem. This is due, in large part, to the regional approach to development that these states have pursued. Instead of focusing on their economies from a national perspective, all three Baltic states chose fast and deep integration into the North European region and its economies as the key to development as a whole. In turn, this alleviated the burden of having to develop a capital base within each nation by providing access to far larger sources abroad.

The motivation to pursue this regional approach to development stems from the deep-seated desire of each Baltic state to move away from the legacy of the Soviet Union and Russia's influence as quickly as possible. All three states felt that they had been given an historic opportunity to break from their past and that the quickest and best way to do this was through integration into Northern Europe. This specific motivation precludes the possibility of duplication elsewhere but, as Dr. Sutela pointed out, a great number of similarities can be drawn between the Baltic states and Hungary. Much like its northern cousins, Hungary pursued a regional approach to its development that stressed openness and receptivity to foreign capital and it has prospered. In contrast, the Czech Republic emphasized the development of a complete national economy with restrictions on foreign ownership (for good reason) and it has suffered as a result.

As good as the economic performance of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania has been to date, it is not without risks. In Dr. Sutela's view, the greatest risk these states now face is the possibility of developing two-tiered economies. While the small size of the financial markets in the Baltic states has helped to insulate these nations from external shocks, it has also served to limit the amount of credit available for small, local business. The foreign-owned banks have primarily catered to the high-end, big-name clientele in each country and given little credit to small business and local entrepreneurs. Thus, while the big businessmen in the three capitals of the region have little difficulty securing financing, small business and start-ups outside the big cities have few if any alternatives. Over the long term this could lead to a division of society between those with access to foreign capital and those without.

Among the questions that followed, several concerned the attributes of the North European region into which the three Baltic states were being integrated. According to Dr. Sutela, one of the most interesting things about this region was the level of competition exhibited by the Scandinavian countries in getting close to the Baltic states. Instead of opting for a unified cooperative approach to the development of the region, Sweden, Finland and Denmark each competed individually in granting aid to Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. As a result, the cause of regional development was approached with a great deal more vigor and energy than has been the case elsewhere and this contributed mightily to the success of the initiatives that were undertaken. In pointing out the critical contributions made by the states of Scandinavia to the development of the Baltic states, Dr. Sutela stressed that enough could not be made of the American support for these initiatives. In the end, it would not have been possible for countries like Sweden and Finland to act with such certainty and directness towards their neighbors had they not been sure of the American commitment to the region.

Summary by Karlis Kirsis, Junior Fellow, Russian & Eurasian Program.

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.