REQUIRED IMAGE

REQUIRED IMAGE

event

U.S. -Russian Strategic Nuclear Weapons Experts Meeting

Tue. February 5th, 2002

This seminar focused on the Bush Administration's recently released Nuclear Posture Review and the subsequent Russian Reaction. In addition, the two panelists discussed the prospects for the May summit between Presidents Bush and Putin and the on-going process between the two governments aimed at a negotiated agreement on strategic nuclear reductions.

Summary of Rose Gottemoeller's Remarks.

Positive Elements in the Nuclear Posture Review:

  • It was a major step for President Bush to reduce the number of U.S. strategic weapons to around 2000, the 'sacred threshold' that sustains the U.S. triad of strategic nuclear forces. Bush's announcement to reduce nuclear numbers to a level between 1700 and 2200 is significant, even if it will be slow in coming. This major compromise within the U.S. government, however, results in an enormous hedgeforce. Nevertheless, the reductions are a major sea change. Moreover, since reviews will take place every two years, the pace of reductions could even increase.
  • The creation of the hedge, despite its drawbacks, is in effect, a gigantic early deactivation effort. Warheads will come off launch vehicles and their operational readiness will move to a lower level. This is a major de-alerting process that has never before been accomplished. Ironically, this will be a unilateral U.S. deactivation, since Russia is under no obligation to follow suit. Traditionally, deactivation had been viewed as a stabilizing force in the U.S.-Russian (Soviet) context. Moreover, systems removed from delivery vehicles many times lose budgetary support and simply fade away.
  • Targeting: although the Nuclear Posture Review emphasizes the value of nuclear weapons in U.S. military strategy, it does move away from the Cold War massive nuclear standoff. The U.S. is undergoing a series re-examination of the targeting system and process, with increasing targets set in 'rogue states' and fewer in Russia. Also, the SIOP is also being restructured from a single war plan with massive retaliation to more discreet, smaller, more flexible targets.

*She also noted that an additional plus was the Bush Administration's decision not to count what they call 'phantom warheads' and to focus on real actually deployed and operational strategic offensive warheads.

Negative Elements in the Nuclear Posture Review:

  • The Nuclear Posture Review places an increased emphasis on the utility of nuclear weapons in U.S. military strategy, even though it includes a long discussion on the growing emphasis on advanced conventional weapons. While the Nuclear Posture Review explicitly calls for shifting some former nuclear missions to the conventional arena, the review continues to expand the potential role of nuclear weapons in deterring potential adversaries, including those that might threaten to or actually use chemical or biological weapons. Although the review emphasized that the administration was not planning to develop new nuclear weapons, the phrase was conditioned with the words "at this time," suggesting the commitment might only be temporary.
  • An issue related to the first negative aspect of the Nuclear Posture Review is that the policy breaks with the decades-old commitment to steadily, if slowly, reduce the role and number of strategic nuclear weapons as contained in the U.S. commitments under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Although the NPT and the U.S. commitment to it has included efforts to end the arms race and reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons, JD Crouch's briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review included three potential options for the future size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal: accelerate reductions, slow reductions or reverse reductions. With these comments, the U.S. appeared to be walking away from its commitments adopted in the NPT and at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.
  • The hedge in the U.S. nuclear arsenal is still largely based on the notion that Russia may be a resurgent threat and that China may emerge as a peer competitor in the next 10-15 years. This seems to contradict the notion expressed by President Bush, that the Cold War is over and that the U.S. and Russia are building a fundamentally new strategic framework. This rationale is the same forwarded by President Clinton in his 1994 NPR. Such an approach, Gottemoeller seems dated.



Summary of Alexei Arbatov's Remarks.

Unlike Rose Gottemoeller, Alexei Arbatov did not believe that the United States and Russia would have either an agreement or a treaty after Bush and Putin meet next May. Rather, they would take another "step forward", issue a declaration on further reductions down to specified warhead levels.

"Is this good or bad?" Arbatov asked. After the September 11th terrorist attacks and the superbly executed operation in Afghanistan, the United States returned to unilateralism in even a more exacerbated form. The U.S.-Russian negotiation channel lost its relevance. Negotiations on strategic force reductions use to lead to "barter deals". Today there is no substance left for negotiating. Russia made a unilateral decision to reduce and modify its strategic nuclear triad and is left with only one option, unconditionally accept the American position. The best Russia can do is to work out a sound policy on the development of strategic nuclear forces and see if in a few years from now, resumption of strategic dialogue with the United States can continue. Another logical move on Russia's part would be to initiate dialogue with the U.S. on tactical nuclear weapons. The idea that TNWs can compensate for deteriorated strategic force is ungrounded. TNWs are perhaps the only leverage Russia has at its disposal that would bring the United States back to the negotiating table.

In Arbatov's view, the Pentagon's explanation of the Nuclear Posture Review leads one to a conclusion that the nuclear deterrence policy is being transformed to respond to multiple threats and becoming "softer." He continues to believe that it remains at the core of American military policy.

Planned reductions will mean elimination of launchers and platforms for Russia and downloading of warheads for the United States (only MX missiles and four strategic submarines will be eliminated) thus leading to huge asymmetry. At 2000-warhead operational force, removed and stored warheads will carry significant weight.

Why does the United States want to keep the warheads? Arbatov offers three possible explanations:

  • It is cheaper to store than to destroy;
  • Essentially, SIOP is not reviewed but divided in two parts. First part will foresee employment of 1700 to 2200 operational warheads. Second part will envision use of the downloaded warheads;
  • Warheads in reserve will be a guarantee against Russian strategic build-up in response to the deployment of missile defense system in the United States or massive deployment of offensive nuclear weapons by China. Warhead elimination. Russian officials insist that removed warheads be destroyed but apparently are not thinking about the complexity of the issue.

Warhead elimination will open up two Pandora boxes. An agreement to destroy even one warhead will require control of all storage and assembly facilities. Warheads for Russian tactical and strategic systems are often stored at the same storage sites (so called S-Facilities). Secondly, the issue of warhead elimination will inevitably raise the question of monitoring assembly/disassembly facilities [to which the Russian side is not ready to agree to]. These two issues will prevent the two sides from reaching a serious agreement.

Click Here to Return to Proliferation News and Resources

Addition Resources:

United States
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
event speakers

Jon Wolfsthal

Nonresident Scholar, Nuclear Policy Program

Jon Wolfsthal was a nonresident scholar with the Nuclear Policy Program.

Rose Gottemoeller

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Nuclear Policy Program

Rose Gottemoeller is a nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program. She also serves as lecturer at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution.