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AGENDA OF THE MEETING
WELCOME AND OVERVIEW
Larry Cohen
Executive Vice President, Communications Workers of AmericaSandra Polaski
Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
KEYNOTE REMARKS
Francisco Hernandez Juarez
President, Telephone Workers Union of the Mexican Republic
COMMENTARY
Maria Xelhauntzi-López
National University of Mexico (UNAM)Carlos Rico
Minister for Political Affairs, Embassy of the Mexican RepublicAlfonso Oñate
Executive Director, North American Commission for Labor CooperationLewis Karesh
Secretary, National Administration Office, US Dept. of Labor
AUDIENCE DISCUSSION
RECEPTION
SUMMARY OF THE MEETING
On September 30, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Communication Workers of America sponsored a panel discussion on labor relations in Mexico, proposed labor law reform, and the implications for democratic development in Mexico.
Keynote speaker Francisco Hernandez Juarez, President of the Telephone Workers Union of the Mexican Republic, and panelist Maria Xelhauntzi-López from the National University of Mexico argued that there are deeply rooted problems with labor relations in Mexico, problems that require legislative and systemic reform if Mexico is to make real strides on such diverse fronts as democracy and productivity. At the heart of these problems lies the protection contract, an arrangement reached between a labor union official or lawyer and an employer - without the input and generally without the knowledge of workers - designed to protect the employer from the claims of workers and from independent unions. According to Hernandez Juarez and Xelhauntzi-López , the labor leaders or lawyers involved receive payoffs from the company in exchange for orchestrating such protection. Government officials have failed to monitor whether a union exists and has the backing of its workers, allowing protection contracts to continue for years and even be inherited by family members. The problem is compounded by the fact that basic information about labor contracts in kept secret with the government's acquiescence. Protection contracts tend to fall below the minimum levels established by Mexican labor law (e.g. in salaries, benefits, working conditions); moreover, they make it prohibitively difficult for workers to organize a union that genuinely represents their interests. By preventing democratic dialogue between a company and employees, protection contracts not only affect workers, but also adversely affect the flexibility, productivity and competitiveness of Mexican industry. With the number of protection contracts estimated as high as 90% of the 600,000 registered collective bargaining agreements, Hernandez Juarez and Xelhauntzi-López characterized the reform of the Mexican labor system as critical for the nation's democratic, social, and economic development. In addition, they noted the emergence on greater international cooperation between unions, particularly between US and Mexican unions.
The other panelists acknowledged that protection contracts are a serious problem and that labor law reform is a necessary priority in Mexico. However, their commentaries and assessment of prospects for a solution varied.
Carlos Rico, Minister for Political Affairs of the Embassy of the Mexican Republic in Washington, observed that labor law reform lies at the crossroads of several fundamental transformations that Mexico currently faces. He included among these Mexico's economic transformation since the coming into force of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), as well as the rapidly changing global economy, in which tough competition for investment should be won on the basis of increasing labor productivity, rather than by wage depression. He also pointed to the transformation of Mexico's political system, from one in which the executive branch could depend on pro forma approval of its policies by the legislature to one in which legislative consensus must be built. He argued that it was this very growth of democracy that made needed labor law reform so difficult to achieve. The government now had to construct a legislative majority from among the strong, competing interests involved in order to proceed with labor law reform. Nonetheless, he said, the Mexican government will introduce a labor law reform proposal within weeks.
Alfonso Oñate, Executive Director of the North American Commission for Labor Cooperation, emphasized that institutional change in labor relations will require changes in diverse areas and that the parties should not be stymied by what he described as a "fetishism" of form and law. Speaking in his personal capacity, Oñate suggested that some of the needed reforms are already being put into place - including a recent transparency law and steps taken to dismantle the corporatist state. Oñate suggested that under the law as it now stands, certain changes in the administration of collective agreements could be undertaken that would do a great deal to undermine protection contracts and advance more democratic labor relations. For example, authorities could begin to require that trade unions seeking to register a contract provide evidence that employees know of its existence and have shown their support for particular union leaders.
Lewis Karesh, Secretary of the National Administration Office, US Department of Labor, mentioned several notable differences between labor law in Mexico and the U.S. that created an environment in which protection contracts could exist. They included: (1) Mexico's union registration requirement, which does not exist in the U.S., and had sometimes impeded creation of new unions; (2) the structure of Conciliation and Arbitration boards, or Juntas, at the local and national levels; and (3) elections to determine whether workers wish to be represented by a union, which in Mexico usually involve open voting rather than the secret ballot used in the U.S. He noted a positive trend in that more purely administrative processes are increasingly used for union registration. However there are continuing concerns that the decisions of Juntas are often politically influenced rather than legally based. Mr. Karesh linked the persistence of protection contracts in part with a lack of internal union democracy in some unions. Like several of his fellow panelists, Mr. Karesh also suggested that NAFTA and its labor side agreement have contributed to dialogue on these issues, which the Mexican government has demonstrated a willingness to address.
Mr. Hernandez Juarez subsequently provided details of a comprehensive
labor reform proposal by his labor federation, the Union Nacional de Trabajadores
(UNT), which calls for: (1) establishing labor judges as part of the judicial
branch, rather than the current system of Juntas which answer to the Secretariat
of Labor; (2) instituting an independent "public registry of unions and
collective bargaining agreements," so that the Secretary of Labor does
not hold the authority to determine which are recognized; and (3) constitutional
changes to give government workers the right to strike and to allow the Secretariat
of Labor to be monitored by the Mexican Human Rights Commission.
