Spain: Post-Attack and Post Election

Transcript by Federal News Service. PDF

MS. MATHEWS: Ladies and gentlemen, I'm Jessica Mathews, president of the Carnegie Endowment. It's a great pleasure to welcome you today, and it's our pleasure and honor to welcome Ana Palacio, foreign minister of Spain -- acting foreign minister today -- to the Endowment. I think there are probably few people from any country, certainly from any European countries, in whom Americans have a more intense interest right now. So it is really a great pleasure for us to be able to host this event. And we're glad to see so many friends here today.

Minister Palacio has been foreign minister of Spain since July of 2002. Before that she was a member of the European Parliament from Spain on the Popular Party's list. While there, she chaired the Committee on Legal Affairs and Internal Market, and also the Parliamentary Committee on Citizens Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs. She was also responsible for the European Parliament's relations with the European Commission. Outside of her public service, she has also been a member of the Board of Governors of the Law Society of Madrid and chair of the European Law Academy's Executive Council.

She is a walking, talking Europe in so many different respects. So she has agreed -- she is going to open with some remarks of hers and then we will have time for an extensive question period afterwords. And we hope you will join me in warmly welcoming Minister Palacio. (Applause.)

MIN. PALACIO: Well, thank you. Thank you all for being here. And may I just begin, and it's not rhetoric, by just stressing the importance of the work carried by the Carnegie Endowment. The Carnegie Endowment is a reference -- is a reference when you speak about freedom, about peace, about the values and principles that found our open society. It is therefore for me a real privilege to address you today.

As the president said, I'm acting foreign minister. My party lost the elections, as you very well know, so in my remarks, in some cases, I will have to have a neutral attitude, which I think I owe to this acting foreign ministry that I am now.

I would like to address a few remarks on what I think is at the core of all our thoughts, which is the 21st century challenge on freedom and security and the transatlantic relations. Let us start by not forgetting that, for 40 years, democratic countries on both sides of the Atlantic coordinated their policy to jointly defend their freedom and their security. It was in this context of the Cold War where the threat of mutual destruction acted as a phony, but in any case perceived, security that Europe started to build up or to integrate. And this is something that we cannot forget because the fact that Europe integrated so much on the economic field and so little on the political field cannot be understood unless we framework it in this reality of the Cold War and the balances, which I think were phony balances, but the balance of these mutual threat of -- threat of mutual destruction.

We all know that, since the demise of the Soviet Union, these links or the reason for these links have progressively waned because for years there was no perception of imminent threat. There was no need or no reason, no ground for these elements of cohesion on which our transatlantic relationship in this field was ground.

Of course, recent years have seen the emergence in Europe of current of thought that just questioned or questions the grounds of this transatlantic relationship. In the first place, Europe and especially in continental Europe, more -- many people -- there is a pervasive feeling that the hegemony of the United States is a threat, which has consequences on how we try to build our European identity. There is -- for many in Europe, this European identity has to be a counterweight or a counterpart or a complement, or, in a way, neutralize some aspect of this hegemony of the United States.

As you very well know, we do -- I -- and I say "I" because

today I'm not representing and -- I'm representing my government, but I am speaking on my own. There are other voices in Europe that think that this European identity, first of all, cannot be built upon negative issues, you cannot be built a healthy identity on being counter or against something; that on the contrary, in order to have more freedom, more prosperity, more security, a better world, we have to go hand in hand with the United States; and that our identity, our European identity, has to be built upon the principles and values that we share with the United States.

Second idea: Throughout Europe, there is a pervasive feeling that the United States, with its approach to or -- antiterrorist policy, is a real threat for international security.

You are aware that the European Commission conveyed a survey where it was very clear that the majority of Europeans thought that the United States -- or perceived the United States as being a threat for peace and security. By the way, it was United States and Israel which were perceived as being a threat to peace and security. This is -- this has to do with what, in the end, is in the background of all these realities, which is that what we are addressing is a war of ideas and perceptions; how the states -- how the United States and its policies are perceived -- is perceived in Europe and at large in the world; how this anti-Americanism, which is a reality nowadays that we have to address, is -- on which basis it is built upon is what is in the background of all these ideas.

I would say that, in a very simplistic approach, from Europe many see the United States as strong but strong with the -- brute strength, but with a lack of legitimacy. It's a bit of a paternalistic approach from the Europeans that see ourselves as the righteous, the ones that have the legitimacy and have the approach which is based on our experience, on our finesse. And that is of course seen from the United States -- many see us Europeans as weak, a bit degenerated intellectually, and not able to address the challenges of this new world which is -- I mean, which is in front of us.

There is another pervasive idea in Europe is that peace is a natural right and that it is endangered by military actions in principle -- as a principle. Therefore, any military approach encounters a, I would say, high-risk ground.

I think that this has to do with us Europeans having the weight of our history, and you in America having a nation that is much more future bounded. There is this clear difference.

Of course, all these are generalizations that are not -- or could be discussed, and I hope that we discuss them later.

Another idea is that in Europe we are seeing the breakup of the traditional national state in favor of a multinational entity. We strongly believe that prosperity and security are bound up with the growing role of bodies, such as the European Union or -- or/and the United Nations. And this is a cultural perspective which is very different. We have this reflection of just that multilateralism is what we are doing among ourselves, so the principle is for us valid in addressing -- as a principle in addressing any issue in the world.

After having these general comments, I think that we have to remind that the transatlantic consensus that emerged during the Cold War cannot, as I said, be taken for granted, as some recent crises -- the NATO crisis, the Iraqi crisis -- have shown. Nevertheless, cooperation between all Western democracies continues to be crucial for the defense of our common interests, principles and values.

Any European country faces a lot of difficulties in tackling dangers domestically and internationally by its own. And we do not have -- or at least we do not have yet -- a common vision, coherent common European vision. We are bound by our different histories, our different perspectives, our different sensitivities, and we do not have institutional framework either -- institutional framework that would be needed to intervene effectively in foreign policy.

So this means that this cooperation -- transatlantic cooperation has another dimension, which must be that this European foreign policy is strengthened in order to have a coherent dialogue with the states.

On the other hand, the process of unification has enabled Europe to put behind us centuries of war and lay the foundations of a high degree of social cohesion. The union should deepen relations between the member states, but it should not be viewed as an alternative to the transatlantic link. The two processes are complementary, because, as Europeans, we are part of a historic community, one defined by principles and values, and which extends far beyond the boundaries of our continent, embracing also countries that were created by Europeans who crossed the oceans to seek new worlds or seek opportunities denied to them here or in Europe.

The linkage between Europe, the United States and Canada was created to counter the Soviet threat. The current risks inherent to the 21st century make it necessary, I believe, to rebuild this consensus, albeit with a different geographical perspective. We should aim to include all the Atlantic democracies.

Latin America is crucial in the process of consolidation of this relationship, and in -- if we believe in an effective multilateralism, we have to acknowledge that in order to reach a critical mass in fora -- as, for instance, the United Nations -- we need these Latin American countries with us.

The nature of today's new threats that are summarized in the threat of terrorism have to be tackled first and foremost, as I have said, in the world of ideas and perceptions. It therefore calls for responses different to those that characterized the Cold War. Our common security depends on addressing some areas and some issues, among which I have identified four.

We have to lay -- to say loud and clear that there is not a difference between "Terrorism" with a capital T, and "terrorism" with a small T; that there is no -- there is not such a thing as international terrorism different from local terrorism; or difference in substance of terrorism because of difference on the excuse used by the terrorists; or even difference because of the scale of their victims; and even less a moral differentiation between terrorists, terrorists that are better and terrorists that are worse. In short, al Qaeda and ETA belong to the same realm. We all are their potential victims, and both kill as means towards a different end, and their objective is to undermine the foundation of our open society.

Second idea. We cannot accept the approach that, through self- depreciating shortcuts and simplifications contrary to reason and rationality, we explain al Qaeda terrorism by linking it to social oppression from the Western countries. That, in the end, would be just a revised version of the confrontation regularly voiced in all times in other contexts. The main characteristic of al Qaeda terrorism is the lack of ideological association to a political message granted on socioeconomic discrimination.

It mainly comes from an open fire that beats on terror in order to confront Islam and the Western world in a simplistic and lethal dialectic. In the end, to look for explanations and causes where there is just hatred is a (sick ?) reaction that, in the last instance, takes the death of civil victims as hostage of this in their responsibilities.

Third idea. All this brings us to the well-grounded idea of the clash of civilizations. I honestly think that this is a simplistic approach, that this simplistic approach is favored by the surface of events. Islam is multidimensional, and first and foremost, a religion of peace. Nevertheless, new interpretations of the Koran by obscurantists and fundamentalist thinkers, especially after the Iranian Revolution, have well established an aggressive, mono- interpretative Islam. Therefore, what we have to tackle is not Huntington's vision, but that of a violent hostility of the Western values by Islamic fundamentalists. These obscurantists will only be solved by the secularization of Muslim societies and the theological renewal of the spirituality -- the bouncing of (humanism and ?) modernization based on strict equal rights for men and women and based on the idea of the universality of the grounds of fundamental right.

In fact, behind this approach of the fundamentalist Islamists, there is this idea that there are no universal values -- that any value, any human right has to be declined according to culture; which is, I think, one of the main issues that we have to face. Accepting that the new values on which liberal democracy is grounded are not the preserve of one single culture or civilization but are universal in nature is, in the end, our common message. Whatever liberal democracy has -- wherever liberal democracy has prevailed, it has taken root with the blessing of those who have benefited from new rights and obligations.

Japan, South Korea and Turkey are examples of non-Western and non- Christian states where development of democracy has earned broad support from the population. Democracy is the only political regime which enjoys legitimacy and is aspired to by most individuals.

And the fourth and last issue I have pointed out, terrorism cannot be tackled exclusively from a militaristic approach, but it cannot be tackled either exclusively with the criminal law in one hand and the law of the (procedure ?) in the other. In this asymmetric world, response or preventive action could make necessary in the last instance the use of military force. But before, we have to address all the ways and means of diplomacy and of this war of ideas and perceptions. The political, strategical aspects of eventual military implications on the field of antiterrorists have to be carefully addressed because this is one of the main divides about the European perception and the American perception.

We Europeans, we are at fight with terrorists, we fight terrorism. And we -- all the European instruments tend to privilege the judiciary and the police, which means that we address this fight against terrorism, as I said, with a criminal code in one hand and the law of (procedure ?) in the other. And I think that as rule of law states, this is the first approach, and this is the prevalent approach that has to be made. But we cannot forget that we may face interlocutors that are not able to -- or with whom we cannot engage in a dialogue of criminal codes and laws of the (procedure ?). If we have a rogue state or a failing state or a parastatal entity, we may have to address that this approach, which is the first approach of a rule-of-law state, is not effective. And therefore, we Europeans, we have to come to terms with the idea that as a last issue, we cannot forget that the rule of law is grounded on the use of force or the threat of the use of the force.

On the side of the Americans, America is at war with terrorism, and there are issues like Guantanamo which are very difficult to understand coming from a rule of law state. Therefore, I think that in this issue we have to sit down and we have to address it. I think that the reasonable approach, this common approach that is needed in order to have this better world, lies somewhere in taking on board both the European approach, but without forgetting that in the last instance the American approach may have to be taken into consideration.

As I said, we are fighting a war of ideas and perception. Our task must be to focus on putting across to our people the nature of the threats, the most realistic means of combating them, and above all the need for Europe and the United States to stay united in the long term. There are no shortcuts for individuals or states, no way of shirking the issues. In this new international context, nonparty multidimensional organizations like the Carnegie Endowment are therefore vital to coordinate positions and mobilize public opinion.

Thank you. (Applause.)

MS. MATHEWS: Minister Palacio, you've given us a very rich agenda of ideas of your own, and I think we probably could spend the rest our time together on any one of your four ideas.

But we do have a good amount of time now for a discussion. I will call on people, and please do introduce yourself and please wait for a mike, which is right behind there by you.

Q Yes. Anton Chaitkin from Executive Intelligence Review. I think that the -- no evidence was presented either for the bombings being committed by ETA or al Qaeda, and I want to ask you about the -- another approach which we're pursuing, which was explained in The Scotsman right after the bombings, which is the ultra-right in Spain and in Italy -- this is the model of the so-called Strategy of Tension bombings that occurred, as you remember, in Italy in 1980; the Bologna train station earlier, 1974. And we have, in EIR, been -- we have a dossier on a whole synarchist group that's backing them.

You have in Spain Blas Pinar and the ultra-right, the followers of Franco.

MS. MATHEWS: Can you --

Q You have Ms. Mussolini, the granddaughter of the original. And they apparently are pursuing the same goals as they did in Italy.

MS. MATHEWS: Will you frame the question?

Q Yeah.

MS. MATHEWS: Thanks.

Q The question is, how have you been pursuing this approach? How have you been investigating this network, which -- I mean, Blas Pinar is -- his son is now appointed a general in your army since he was already trying to do a coup. Are you investigating these? How are you investigating the ultra-right, which seemed to be the prime candidate for the bombers, actually?

MIN. PALACIO: Well, the investigation goes forward and I'm not as detailed of the investigation. But as far as I know, there is no open investigation line that links or that has the ultra-right, as you have called it, as an author or being involved in these terrible events of March 11th.

MS. MATHEWS: All right, and then we'll --

Q Andrew Pierre, Georgetown University. Thank you very much, Madame Minister, for your very thoughtful remarks. But I'm sure you're expecting to be asked some questions about the outcome of the election in Spain.

So I'd be interested in, first of all, your personal view as to why the election had the outcome that it did; whether it was related, for example, to feelings in Spain about the actions and statements of the government immediately after the Madrid bombing, or whether it was related to more fundamental views about Spain's participation in Iraq?

And in that context, if I could ask you about one particular dimension of this. In parts of the American media and European media, but particularly the American media -- but not all the American media -- an interpretation has been made that the net result of the position of the new, incoming Spanish government has the risk of seeming to be one of appeasement, of giving in to the terrorists.

This is not a view that I particularly share, but I'd be interested as to whether you feel that is the case, or whether one can take another interpretation, being that there was a considerable amount of opposition, as you well know, in Spain to the participation in the coalition and that the Madrid bombings simply put that point of view over the top, in terms of the election outcome. Thank you.

MS. MATHEWS: Andrew, would you just pass the mike to your left, there.

MIN. PALACIO: Well, I think that we need some perspective, especially us because we have been too much involved with events. We need some perspective in order to have a full analysis of what happened and why things happened. What I can share with you today is that we lost elections and the Socialist party won the elections and that this is the result that has to prevail and this result has to prevail over the reasons why. In democracy, the result is what counts.

It is true, nevertheless, that people -- I mean Spaniards -- we went to cast our votes in an emotional, terrible emotional state of shock. And I think that emotions prevailed, as you pointed out in the last part of your intervention or your question. Emotion prevailed over other considerations that were what in a "normal" -- between brackets -- times, the polls were showing. The reasons why people were going to cast a vote or not cast a vote in normal circumstances were absolutely altered by the circumstances of this terrible terrorist attack.

On what I can be very clear is that on this approach -- that the government either hide (sic) information or even lied, we did not.

We did not, and in order to ratify that we have declassified some documents that show that the analysis that was made by our services was that there was -- that there was the fingerprint of ETA in this terrible terrorist attack. This, for us, is absolutely essential that these message is conveyed because we of course accept the result of the elections, but we cannot accept that there is a rewriting of how things happened, and how things happened is very clear.

The government, not only we did not hide any information, but on the contrary we went open with some pieces of information, even with the risk of impinging the investigation. And in the end, you know, I think that people are consistent, and anyone that knows Prime Minister Aznar or Minister Acebes were at the core. The rest of the government, we were in solidarity, but we were not conducting the forefront of these investigations or the messages. You know that you can say many things about both of them, but not that they are not absolutely straightforward and absolutely clear in facing any difficulty or any event.

MS. MATHEWS: Marvin?

Q Marvin Kalb with the Shorenstein Center at Harvard. After the Spanish election there were many commentators in Europe who said that the incoming Spanish government is going to rejoin the old Europe, looking toward France and Germany once again. I wonder what your concept -- given your background you would have some special views on this -- your concept of the new and the old Europe and Spain's role in it.

MIN. PALACIO: Well, thank you because, you know, this is one of these issues which have not helped the perception of the transatlantic relation. I honestly don't think that this approach of new Europe and old Europe is the right approach.

I honestly think that new Europe is the united Europe, united Europe of the 25, plus Romania plus Bulgaria,plus Turkey. Because this is very important for all what we are discussing here today. And old Europe is the divided Europe, the Europe of the Iron Curtain. This is what it is, "old Europe" and "new Europe."

Besides that, I would say that there is a -- we are living through a crucial moment in European construction. We are facing three major challenges. First is to go from the Europe as I mentioned, at least mentioned before, from the Europe of the Cold War that allowed us to be a giant, an economic giant and a political dwarf, to this Europe that has to face these asymmetrical threats. This is the first challenge.

The second challenge is that we have to go from the Europe of the market to the Europe of the citizens. Why? Because we all understand that we have to tackle in common common threats; that we need not just common market and the free circulation of goods and capital, but that we need to address issues as far as illegal immigration or drug trafficking or justice, the pace of justice in business terms. Nowadays a business will have a ruling in a different member state in euros, which makes things quite easy, apparently. But we need to overcome all the difficulties between the judiciaries in order to have a space, without which even the internal market will never be achieved. So we have to face this second challenge, to go from the market to the Europe of the citizens. That's what symbolically, when we address the reform of the treaty as drafting a constitution, we are meaning. Because in the end, this is not a constitution, what we are addressing now; it will be an international treaty formally. But the message is that we have to transcend this level of integration where the framework is in international treaty and go instead towards this idea of constitution, which is an idea of community, which is the prevailing and the future (very ?) idea in Europe.

And there is even a third challenge. It's to go from institutions that were (thought ?) for a small, homogeneous Europe of six rich countries to institutions that have to serve this Europe of the 25 plus Bulgaria plus Romania plus Turkey, plus the challenge of the Balkans that is there.

And in addressing this challenge, in the end we are addressing our boundaries -- geographical -- but also our identity boundaries, and this is why Turkey as a member of the Union is such a -- is an issue which is debated in Europe, strongly debated in Europe.

In this third area -- in this third challenge is the answer to your question. I don't believe, as I said, old Europe versus new Europe as it was used from here, from the States, but what I think we are addressing in addressing this leap forward from Europe of the six to Europe of the 25 is that we have to address, as I mentioned before, on which grounds do we build our identity, and there there is a different approach. There are the ones that want to build this identity strongly on principles and values and a strong transatlantic relationship, and that there are others that want to build this identity much more as a counterweight of the United States, and this is the real divide that we need to overcome.

MS. MATHEWS: We'll take one more at this table, then we'll move.

Q Terry Taylor from the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Perhaps you can tell from my accent I'm a European Union citizen, U.K., living/working in the United States.

You're very comprehensive, and I must commend your excellent answer to the last question. It covers a lot of the ground that I was going to ask, which was about the European Union constitution. But I wonder if you could say a little bit more about the European identity, something with -- which I find challenging, and I think this is the key issue to the policy issues across the Atlantic now. As a European Union citizen, I find it hard to envisage separating myself in some geographic sense from the liberal democratic world or straining too much at identity, which I think is very damaging to do that, which seems to be a tendency, when we are part of a liberal democratic world which extends from the United States through Europe, through Spain to Japan, to Australian and so on. And to try to carve out an identity, it seems to me, is a mistaken approach or to emphasize it too much.

So perhaps I am perhaps adding something or reinforcing something you'd like to say about this. But I suppose my question really is, if we strain too much at a European constitution at this stage or for the next few years, will that not be counterproductive given the sharp differences within Europe, and now we're at 25? Is that the wrong route to go down? Isn't that something for the far future and not something we should be straining at right now?

MIN. PALACIO: Well, I think that there are clear dangers, and we see these clear dangers in the reaction that we are seeing in many European countries on the rise of extremism. Even in these last regional elections in France, in the first round, the Le-Pen party got a good result that in the end is grounded, as were the Trotskyist party, which is quite amazing -- that in a country as France, in the presidential elections, there was this huge voting for the Trotskyist party.

I think that all this is exactly what you are saying. These are manifestations of the -- not understanding what Europe -- and just being afraid of this new identity, which is not real, and losing in a very difficult and very threatening world the old -- the old -- roots.

That's why I think that what we are doing is absolutely essential, and I'm a convinced European. I think that we need more Europe.

But we have to be very careful. We have mentioned, as electoral results, France, but Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands was exactly same phenomenon.

So we have to understand that people resent -- they resent many issues about the European Union, and they resent that Brussels is far away and that they are losing their identity, and they are not comfortable.

And as I said, we have to bear in mind that we are very old countries with very old histories and histories of -- in -- within Europe confrontation and bloodshed, but even the vision of the world -- both United Kingdom and Spain, we are -- and in the Netherlands, for instance -- we have always had a transatlantic vision, historically -- ours mainly to Latin America, but it is a transatlantic vision. But other member states have other priorities.

And it is -- first of all, I don't think that we have to lose the advantages that for us are meant by the commonwealth or Spain's relationship with Latin America.

So it is challenging, but the bottom line is that we know that the future lies together in a way or other, and we have to find the better way to make the most comprehensive and effective common policies.

MS. MATHEWS: Please go ahead. I will get to everybody, I promise.

Q Thank you. Madame Minister, my name is Jeffrey Winograd (sp). I edit an independent newsletter called focusisrael.com here in Washington. When you were giving your -- you discussed common security for Europe and certain requirements, four requirements. Amongst them, I found you didn't link any progress in Israel- Palestinian talks, or Israel-Arab talks in the peace process. And then you also said there was no difference between terrorism with a small "t" and a capital "t." And covering Israel-related issues, it's kind of like a breath of fresh air. So my question is, are those your personal views or the views of your government? And if those are only your personal views, what are the views of your government?

MIN. PALACIO: Well, as I said, the views of the government will be the views of the incoming government. I represent the views of my government, the views of the government of Jose Maria Aznar. But our views are nowadays the views of the opposition in Spain, and the opposition of the Parti Popular, which by the way is a very strong one. In this confusion there is a message that has been lost -- is that even in the most difficult of days, there were 10 -- nearly 10 million Spaniards that voted for the Parti Popular; that the Parti Popular -- we did not lose that many voters. The thing is that -- and this addresses the question you asked before -- the thing is that there were new voters that had not voted before; there was a participation that rised (sic), and all these new votes went to the Socialist Party. So my views are the -- I mean, strictly -- in strict terms -- but many views are absolutely shared by the Socialist Party.

The foreign policy in Spain has always been pretty much a state policy, and this goes back, I would say, a long, long time. But in addressing the -- your question on terrorism, I know that there is a tendency, and it is hugely accepted in many media, that ETA terrorists are just separatist -- is a separatist group, as Hamas is just a Palestinian organization, which, first of all, is absolutely inconsistent with what we are doing.

Because we have put both ETA and Hamas in the terrorist list of the United States of America and in the terrorist list of the European Union, which means that 26 of the most stricter countries on the rule of law issues have scrutinized it, and after a long scrutiny have put both Hamas and ETA.

But I know that there is this pervasive idea that there is terrorists with a capital "t", which is al Qaeda, and then local terrorists, and that you have to address -- these are different, these are different. We do not share this vision. And I think that if, as I say, we are consistent with what we say, and we have put in the same list al Qaeda and ETA and Hamas, we have to address these terrorist organizations because of what defines them. First of all, that they abide by no rule, by no rule. You cannot dialogue or negotiate with someone that does not abide by any of your rules. Second is that killing people is just a means towards an end, and that the end is just to convey chaos to undermine the principles and values on which our open societies are based.

But yes, yes, I think we have to address this perception that there are terrorists that are morally in a higher level of the scale and other terrorists that are in a lower level of the scale. I honestly -- I don't think this is correct, and I don't think this is the right approach for us Westerners or for us that fight for these open societies, for these principles and values that found the rule of law, the rule of law states. And Israel is a rule of law state. And sometimes we forget also that, that Israel is a democracy, is a rule of law state, which does not mean that we do not have to denounce Israel when Israel trespasses the rule of law -- and Israel does trespass the rule of law -- but we cannot forget either that Israel is a democracy and Israel is a rule-of-law state.

MS. MATHEWS: In the back.

Q Hello. My name is Maria. I'm with Congressman Mike Honda of the U.S. Congress. And the question is, you mentioned that Latin America was crucial to creating critical mass regarding security. Can you address a little bit more that issue and also if -- as to how to do it and if there has been any steps regarding that? And also, which do you think are the countries that would be crucial to this crucial process of creation of a critical mass? Thanks.

MIN. PALACIO: Well, as the gentleman pointed out, my co-European citizen, there is a liberal democratic world. And he mentioned Australia. He mentioned Japan. And we have to include Latin America.

What do I mean by saying that we need Latin America in order to reach a critical mass in international fora? I think that the big challenge that we are facing is in the -- the bottom line is about these values, these human rights or the values on which our democracies are grounded. And as I see it, in the last instance, the debate is, are these values universal? Are some of these values universal? Or are they to be declined according to culture?

Latin America -- with all of us, we think that there are universal values that are valid all over the world, in all society. Among them, one of the basic ones is equal rights for men and women, which is in the end the basic social -- and yes, we need Latin America.

And we have to here to convey two remarks. First is the process of integration of the Americas, which is a very important process that is going on and that has also to do with all that. Second is the rising importance of the Hispano community in the United States. And we need this strength. We need in this -- in addressing this battle, because, as I said, this is a battle of ideas and perceptions.

And in Latin America -- which was not true in the '70s -- in Latin America nowadays, with all the difficulties that some countries are undergoing, but there is a struggle for democracy. There is a struggle for consolidating institutions. There is a struggle for consolidating these societies on which we have to pay attention.

MS. MATHEWS: All right. In the back and then we'll come up here, and then Mike and --

Q I'm Al Milliken, affiliated with Washington Independent Writers. Since Spain historically has a much different history with Islam than the rest of Europe, how do you evaluate how Spaniards view Islam as opposed to the rest of Europe? And do you see Muslims viewing Spain differently than the rest of Europe since Islam had such a dominating influence in Spain's past that didn't exist through the rest of Europe? For example, could the hesitation of the Spanish government to blame anyone acting in the name of Islam for terrorist activity have anything to do with the not so always easy coexisting peace that has happened between Muslims and Christians for a number of centuries now?

MIN. PALACIO: Well, it is true that, opposed to the rest of Europe -- I don't know because it depends on what you mean when you say Europe. I personally think that Europe, which for me is the European Union, is a project based on consensus, on value shared, on sharing values and principles. Therefore, I honestly think that Turkey belongs to this project, and Turkey is a Muslim society and has a very strong profile.

But if I understand you well, it's true that Spain has an Arab Muslim influence that is not present in the neighboring European countries. That is true. Which does not mean that in Spain we are -- we have been that aware in the last centuries, and let's not forget that we have to go back to the end of the 15th century in order to find the last Arabs in the peninsula. As I say, we have lived just -- I would say that -- I wouldn't say that going against our roots, our Arab Muslim roots, but forgetting about them or just turning our back towards this reality, which is a clear and strong reality that is in our monuments, that is in our language there are many words that come from the Arab, and that in the end is in things that you cannot perceive.

If you go to Toledo and you see the fountains and you see the gardens, you understand that we cannot negate our roots, our Arab Muslim roots. But we have just -- (we live ?) far from this reality.

What is true is that now al Qaeda and these extremist Islamic groups, they tend to speak of Spain as al-Andalus, so in a -- al- Andalus is the name of Spain under the Arabs. And they tend to think that besides any other consideration, Spain is a territory that has to be reconquered, which is for us, Europeans in general, and Spaniards in particular, is an awkward idea, but it is present in many of these messages by bin Laden or members of al Qaeda, this message comes once and again.

What I think is that Spain can play a key role. Spain, by recovering these roots that are so present in Spain and in our culture and in our feelings of our Arab Muslim past, we can play a role of being a kind of conveyor belt, because we are Europeans, but we belong -- geostrategically and historically we have strong ties to the southern border of Mediterranean; we cannot forget that we are just 14 kilometers away from Morocco and that we have a long-standing cultural relationship and people going back and forth this Strait of Gibraltar. And at the same time, being Europeans, being entrenched in this Mediterranean, we have this transatlantic, transatlantic (bind ?) and link that until now was mainly Latin American, but that is more and more also with the United States because no Spaniard and no European should forget that the only cultural border that is moving in the world is the cultural border of the Hispanos that is going north in the United States.

So I think that Spain in this -- in the challenges of this 21st century can play the role of this platform that is at the same time European, at the same time very Mediterranean, and at the same time vocationally transatlantic.

Q Thank you. Carl Gershman from the National Endowment for Democracy. Actually, my question had to do with that same subject of the historic claim on Spain from the Muslim world. You know, you said that the last Arabs left at the end of the 15th century and, well, they're now returning. And I think that this has a lot to do with the issue that you talked about earlier of the threat to European identity and has a lot to do with the emergence of Le-Pen and Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands, because Europe faces a problem of how does it deal with a growing Muslim minority, especially in the context of a demographic crisis, where European birthrates are dipping very low. I mean, do you see this issue of how to manage a growing Muslim minority within Spain, and also within other European countries, as a serious problem which is a potential threat? And how do you relate this also to how Spain will deal with the problem of terrorism if it has a minority -- Spain and Europe -- if it has a minority that it does not want to offend by seeming to take too tough a stand against terrorism?

MIN. PALACIO: Well, I fully agree with you that one of the big challenges we face in Europe is how to integrate these growing Muslim communities -- that are more and more Spaniard are Muslim, and more and more French and more and more Germans. And you mentioned demography, and it is obvious that this plays a role. And it is true that this is perceived as a threat by the citizens that are the population of non-Muslim roots and we have to tackle -- how? How do I see that we can tackle? First of all, let me insist that this is one of the outstriking (sic) differences between Europe and the United States, because you seem not to have these problems, or at least you handle them in an easier, more natural way. And I think that this is also rooted to this idea that America is future, and when you come here you come towards the future and you aim to the future. And this helps this integration. Europe is mainly past.

Of course, this is a generalization, but the width of our history is such that it is a kind of barrier for clear integration. And we have to tackle that.

For me, this is one of the reasons why having Turkey with us in the --in our common project is so important, because in the end, the problem is that these Muslim communities tend -- and you mentioned the scarf issue and many -- the arranged marriages that are still a reality in our Muslim communities, this idea of arranged marriages, of girls forced to leave school at early ages. They do not accept or abide by this, the -- our common values and rules.

And this is why it is so important that we get Turkey in, because we -- Turkey would demonstrate that a Muslim society can first accept the same project, the same political project that we accept for ourselves. That is based on religion being a private issue. So a secular -- and what all that this means of "order publique" -- it's public order, but it's not public order -- of all the values that are entrenched in -- as the foundations of our societies.

Second, that we have a market economy. And a Muslim community, a Muslim society can abide by the rules of this liberal open-market economy.

Third, democracy and all the consequences.

And fourth, that our banner is the rule of law, our banner is human rights. And Turkey with us will help this -- I'm sure, all this process, and it's badly needed, because there is no foreseen reverse of demography. And I -- more than 60 percent of the newborns in Brussels are of foreign origin and mainly -- and "Mohammed" was the most popular name for boys in the last years, has been the most popular, which is quite telling about these realities.

So I fully agree that this is a big challenge, and we need Turkey with us.

And the other thing that I think it's very important is -- and Turkey plays also a key role -- is that we Europeans -- we have to forget about what we have been doing until now.

Until now, Europe had two neighborhood policies: one more intense, better with Europeans for European neighbors; and another different, let's say more distant, with the southern border, with the Arab Muslim of the southern border of the Mediterranean. We need just to go as far in our relations with these countries as we can go with the European neighbors, and we need that because we need, in the end -- this is linked to this American project of the greater Middle East -- in the end, we have to bet at least societies accepting this open- society approach and accepting the principles and values because in the end -- and let's go back to terrorists -- if we want to go with a criminal code or law of the procedure, we need to have an interlocutor that can dialogue with us.

So we need to have a common ground not just on economic field, but also security, intelligence sharing, police cooperation. For all these you need a framework, a framework that in the end is principles and values. Secular societies is just this idea of principles and values, but I fully agree with you: this is probably the main -- the biggest challenge of us Europeans.

MS. MATHEWS: The gentleman right there has been waiting.

Q Thank you very much.

Pana Mariev (ph), embassy of Belarus. Madame, thank you very much for your very systematic presentation. And my problem is like this. Different nations have --

MS. MATHEWS: Okay.

Q Different nations have different interests. These differences might be actually very small, but when nations are being drawn into one rather rigid structure these differences might become rather acute. So do you think that, to a certain extent, this is the case of modern Europe, maybe the case of some instances of transatlantic relations? And if so, what you would propose to solve the problem?

Thank you very much.

MIN. PALACIO: Well, if I have understood your question, you are addressing another very interesting question and very real in Europe, is that, in a way, citizens perceive that they are missing a closer level of administration with which they can identify themselves, and that as I said Europe or Brussels is very far away. And behind your question, the answer would be the regional approach in Europe, the regionalization. The Europe that stresses that one of our main capitals is our diversity and that we have to preserve this diversity, and in doing so, we get into a lot of cumbersome procedures, as for instance translation as we keep all official languages, which is not easy. But this is an answer. I will not go as far as saying that this is THE answer, but this is an effort in order to preserve what is our identity, which is diversity, diversity within this common identity of Europe.

MS. MATHEWS: Ariel (sp), we'll give you the last question.

Q Thank you. Madame Minister, I want to thank you very much for, A, putting the plug for war of ideas and perceptions that both of us wrote about; and B, for your unequivocal and tough stance on denouncing any kind of terrorism. I hope there are people from the State Department here who hear that.

I want to ask you about the Mediterranean dialogue and the statement that is being prepared for the NATO summit in Istanbul, as well as the Barcelona process that you are hosting. You, as a lawyer, had some very interesting things to say about the priorities and shortcomings, difficulties and necessity to fight against terrorism through the code of procedure and the criminal code.

To what extent do you see both the expansion of the southern dimension of the EU and NATO and the American participation in that as tools, especially as we found out this morning the modest effort of the Arab summit -- that was expected to declare continuation of reform, including women's rights, economic reform, rule of law -- has failed and that summit is being postponed now?

Thank you.

MIN. PALACIO: Well, you know that I agree with you. But let me elaborate, because you have given me the possibility to elaborate a bit on this idea of the Greater Middle East, its advantages and also the shortcomings we see from Europe of this approach.

First of all, seen from Washington it may be true that there is no such a difference between Morocco and Yemen, but I can assure you that seen from Europe, it has nothing to do. And even in this globalized world, geography counts. And of course for us Europeans, our southern Mediterranean border is of key strategical and security importance. By this, what I want to mean is that what I expect is that this initiative of a Greater Middle East, which has a lot of usable ideas or a lot of good ideas, for instance, all these ideas that go towards opening these societies, helping these societies in the secularization process, in this, -- well, getting equal rights for women or just having a better democracy and better human rights are good.

But what we do not -- what we cannot afford, us Europeans, is that this project, that is a long-term project that is not for today, just slow down -- slows down other initiatives that are purely aimed at the southern border, which for us are very important.

And you have mentioned NATO. As you remember, in last ministerial summit there was an initiative to have a structured dialogue with southern border -- Mediterranean countries with NATO, and go a step forward because now there is a very weak dialogue. But Enduring Freedom, for instance, this Strait of Gibraltar, Morocco participated while common initiative NATO, and as I say with Morocco has shown the advantages of having a more structured dialogue to go a step forward with these southern Mediterranean countries. What is the reality now is that because of this launching of this Greater Middle East Initiative, then this other initiative that was in the pipeline has been slowed down. We honestly expect, us Europeans -- and I think that in this there is a consensus among Europeans -- that we have to go forward with these initiatives. This is the first issue.

The second issue is that we have to be complimentary; that we Europeans, we have to keep our programs as, for instance, these Barcelona programs and these new neighborhood approach policy that bets on having more security and more dialogue, a stronger dialogue and stronger ties in many fields besides the field of economy. As you know, we aim at a free market area in 2010 in the Mediterranean, which is not easy. But right now we miss only Syria in order to complete the agreements with these countries between the European Union and all the countries that border the Mediterranean. So this is the second idea.

The third idea is that, as I have mentioned, we have to be realistic.

There is -- Westerners, and especially Americans, are perceived by these societies as being one-sided, as being -- well, patronizing or even imposing. We have to work in cooperation with these countries. And we have to work in cooperation bearing in mind that it is not true that one size fits all; that the dialogue that we have to have with Morocco is not the same dialogue that we can launch with, I don't know, Libya, for instance. But we need these dialogues, all of them. And we need to understand that this is a tailor-made program and that it is a tailor-made program and a program in which we need cooperation.

And now I will address one question that I forgot to address -- the importance of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. We all know that in order to have a healthy relationship between all of us and the Mediterranean we need to overcome this conflict. We need to make steps towards a peaceful solution, and a peaceful, lasting solution based on the two states -- based on the two states existing within secure and viable boundaries; and this, I think, is without doubt a very important issue to address. As I don't think that we can accept that the Palestinian conflict is the cause for terrorism, because I don't think that this is right, we have to address the Palestinian- Israeli conflict, or the Arab-Israeli conflict in general, as an issue in itself that is necessary in order to have constructive and fruitful relationship between the two sides of the Mediterranean, between the Muslim world and the Western world, between the Arab world and the Western world.

And this is our -- I would say, one of the main challenges that we are facing, and I hope that there too we can seek together -- us Europeans, you Americans -- and we can discuss and come to terms. Because it's not a matter of imposing from one side or trying to overcome the other side, it is a matter of just complement each other and go hand in hand, as I said, because our common challenge is to have a better world and a world with more freedom, more security and more prosperity.

MS. MATHEWS: Madame Minister, you've given us an enormous amount to think about. And I am sure I speak for everybody here when I say that we look forward to when we can welcome you back to Washington to help all of us who think about ideas here think them through in these important areas. Thank you so much.

(Applause.) END.