The Impact of Current Events in Uzbekistan

Remarks

What exactly occurred in Andijan remains unknown. No clear sequence of events can be confirmed since independent media was barred from the city. The non-governmental reports come from questionable sources and their content is sometimes contradictory. It is clear, however, that the event was a tragedy--745 deaths, including women and children, have been reported by credible eye-witnesses. Many of these victims are people who came to one of Andijian’s central squares to see and voice their concerns to visiting President Karimov, who ordered the use of force but does not seem to have been present to witness its use.

An independent international committee must be set up to investigate what occurred and whether excessive force was used against the population. Unfortunately, the history of the unreformed security forces in the CIS in general and in Uzbekistan’s repressive, semi-authoritarian regime in particular means that such a commission may well reach an affirmative conclusion.

The Uzbek government has labeled the insurgency as an Islamic revolt instigated by extremists. Indeed, members of groups that seek to make a Jihad might have taken part in the robbery of the weapons cache, and while some of the protesters probably included those who want to live in a caliphate rather than a secular society, the overwhelming majority of the thousands of people who spilled into the streets came to protest against the social injustices and to voice their frustrations with the economic conditions that they live under.

Little is known about the group, Akromiya, blamed by the government as the initiator of these events, save that it is a fringe group of the Hizb ut-Tahrir, which split from that organization as early as 1996 and favors an even more rigid kind of Qur’anic interpretation than the Hizb ut-Tahrir. It is based in Andijian. The Uzbek government claims that the businessmen freed during the prison attack supported Akromiya through an Islamic charity that they funded. The relatives of the businessmen maintain that they were imprisoned because they refused to pay bribes and sell their businesses to corrupt officials. Both of these scenarios are plausible in Uzbekistan.

There are Islamic militants in the Ferghana Valley. Andijan was home to a cleric, Abuh’ Vali, who disappeared in 1994 presumably with the help of Uzbek security forces, but whose supporters remain, and some of them became armed militants. His son, Ibn Abuh’ Vali is a potential mobilizing figure; he has kept his father’s speeches in circulation for years and has recently returned to the region from more distant exile. Also, during the attack, a number of prisoners, who were arrested for ties with the IMU were also released. Their potential role in the jail-break and subsequent events also needs to be investigated.

The international community is still grappling with how to form the proper policy response to recent developments in Uzbekistan.

While the specific events in Andijan came as a surprise to many, the government of Uzbekistan’s response was entirely predictable. There was no question that President Islam Karimov would use force to stop the uprising, rather than flee or resign.

The US and Great Britain have supported President Karimov for years and should not act surprised by the bloodshed.

Uzbekistan is at a tipping point. It is time to push President Karimov to adopt political (freedom of media, assembly, and political participation) and judicial system reforms. It is imperative that economic reforms are undertaken simultaneously; political reforms without economic reforms will most likely lead to the overthrow of the present regime. This is dangerous because Uzbekistan does not have a secular elite to take power like in Georgia or Ukraine. If President Karimov is ousted, the country would face a task of political reconstruction that is not unlike that confronted by Iraq after Saddam Hussein’s ouster. But it would do this without the same degree of international engagement.

The Uzbek government cannot control the Uzbek population solely through the use of force. Protests in one or two cities can be put down using this strategy, but the families of the victims are now mobilized and ordinary Uzbeks will learn the truth about what occurred in Andijan. The next spark will set off uprisings in cities throughout the country, which will topple the regime. With no group clearly strong enough to take power, the situation would resemble the 1992-1997 civil war period in Tajikistan. The ensuing chaos would be the worst outcome for Uzbekistan.

Three other scenarios are foreseeable for Uzbekistan. First, if President Karimov adopts economic reforms, especially those with immediate effects, like liberalizing prices for wheat and cotton and replacing the 35 to 40 percent business tax with a flat tax, farmers as well as the entrepreneurial class will be appeased and the crisis will be at least temporarily averted. Further, longer-term, reforms should follow, such as reforms in land distribution and trade regulations. Combined with political reforms, this is the best strategy President Karimov could choose for Uzbekistan.

The last two scenarios are variants of the Romanian model, in which the regime removes the president in order to remain in power. In Uzbekistan, the power ministries could take power, and since these people are the current rent-seekers, economic reforms are unlikely to occur. If no reforms are made, the state would likely then turn to using more Islamic ideology to appeal to the Uzbek "national values", which is the only way for them to justify taking power.

Q&A

Q: Can the US and Russia influence President Karimov?

A: Neither country can use the stick approach with President Karimov. Three years ago, when talks of building the US base in Uzbekistan symbolized the possibility of a new international presence for President Karimov, it might have been used as a lever; today, however, President Karimov no longer views the base as essential.
Over the past few years President Karimov has grown closer to Russia but has not become its client maintaining a strong sense of independence in negotiations. Furthermore, considering its own history, Russia is not likely to press Uzbekistan over the question of excessive force.
Severing connection with President Karimov and making him into an international pariah is a counterproductive strategy. He is proud of gaining independence for the people once ruled by Timur, and he can be persuaded to change his opinions if someone could convince him of the risks Uzbekistan faces if reform is not undertaken. This task is extremely difficult because he is surrounded by a circle of sycophants whose livelihoods depend on maintaining the current order. To move President Karimov someone he considers his equal must first convince him of the imminent disaster that awaits Uzbekistan and then provide a package of sticks and carrots to stimulate the reform process.

Q: Could President Karimov use conscription to wage war on his people even if the insurgence spreads?

A: It is true that the power ministries (the police and military) offer opportunities for social mobility otherwise unavailable to Uzbeks from poor families. Therefore, in the short term there will be no problems getting recruits. But if massive protests grow and spread, the army will reach a breaking point.

Q: What impact do the events in Uzbekistan have on neighboring Central Asian countries?

A: Obviously, chaos in Uzbekistan creates enormous security implications for its neighbors. The government of Kyrgyzstan suffered a shock as refugees poured into Osh and Jalalabad. The Kyrgyz presidential election is upcoming and since ethnic Uzbeks make up over one quarter of the population, the refugees could not be refused. This is likely to add fuel to the North vs. South debates that will consume Kyrgyzstan during the elections. Tajikistan’s government is already fragile and would not withstand chaos in Uzbekistan. In Kazakhstan, democratic reforms are likely to be curtailed and the South militarized if the crisis in Uzbekistan deepens. In short, reforms in the entire Caspian Region will suffer.

Q: Which of the economic reforms bears the least compliance cost for President Karimov?

A: The flat income tax could be enacted easily, and truly freeing the cotton and wheat prices (there were false moves before) may seem as a symbolic gesture but really is one with great potential consequence. Both of these reforms would get people working and off the streets.
For long-term structural reforms funding can be obtained from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Islamic banking groups, without having to substantially change these organizations guide-lines for funding. This is less true of the IMF or World Bank. Compromise will have to be made, but if these institutions agree to split the grant payments over the duration of the loan term, some development could occur.

Q: How realistic is an independent investigation committee without Uzbek support?

A: President Karimov has allowed some western press into Andijan, so he can hopefully be brought around to the idea of an independent investigation. He is a member of OSCE, and this institution should set up such a committee with Uzbek input.
Also, an independent commission would likely discredit the power ministries by revealing their incompetence in carrying out President Karimov’s orders to dispel the protesters, killing women and children. Such information would help the President gain leverage in his relationship with these ministries.

Q: Will Bush’s global democracy policy lead the US to issue a strong response to the crisis in Uzbekistan?

A: Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has embraced the issue; however, a correct rhetorical response without concrete policies is inadequate. It is difficult to deal with the Uzbek regime. For instance, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) put Uzbekistan on notice for missing set targets two years ago and then, after the warning period elapsed with no changes, pulled out their funds.

Q: Is the international community jumping the gun by assuming that "excessive force" was used, especially with established terrorist activity in Uzbekistan?

A: It is true that the more democratic the society the easier it is for the international community to accept the use of force. Uzbekistan will have to overcome a much higher threshold to convince the international community that the use of force was necessary than a more politically free and transparent country.

Q: How much does Uzbekistan’s role in the fight against terror influence the US response?

A: The US is not dependent on Uzbekistan—the base there is no longer critical for either side. There has been a consistent US policy since 1991 to pressure Uzbekistan on human rights abuses. The major problem is how to help without worsening the situation.

Q: How likely is Uzbekistan to follow a Chinese model of reform: economic without political?

A: In the beginning of the 1990s, the Uzbeks in particular were interested in the Chinese model of development. But such a model is unlikely to work in Central Asia because of cultural differences. Secretary of State Rice made an important point in her recent speech, stating that democratic reform helps create safety valves, without which people’s frustrations blow into crisis.

Summary prepared by Roman Ginzburg, Junior Fellow with the Russian and Eurasian program at the Carnegie Endowment.