Does Anti-Americanism Matter to American Foreign Policy?

Respondents:
Támas Dávid-Barrett, Budapest Economics
Ivan Krastev, CEU Open Society Centre
Alexander Rondos, former Ambassador at Large, Greece

Moderator:
Thomas Carothers, Carnegie Endowment for International PeaceIMGXYZ430IMGZYX

Thomas Carothers opened the debate by pointing out that although anti-Americanism has a long history, it has recently been distinctly on the rise. Examinations of this recent surge have so far focused on three things: 1) what is anti-Americanism? 2) is it increasing and if so, where and how? 3) and why is anti-Americanism increasing?  He said that this debate would go one step further by examining how significant anti-Americanism actually is to American foreign policy.
  
Tod Lindberg began by pointing out that anti-Americanism is a complicated subject, prone to facile generalizations and superficial assumptions.  In the sphere of U.S. domestic politics, those on the Democratic side tend to overstate its effects while those on the Republican side tend to understate its effects.  Although public opinion polls overwhelming show the decline of America’s standing in the world, Lindberg called into question their accuracy and their ability to measure the actual effects of anti-Americanism.  Drawing upon forthcoming work of Keohane and Katzenstein, he defined anti-Americanism as a prejudicial view of the United States that predisposes one to look at U.S. policy in an unfavorable light.  And, he outlined a typology of the many different strains of anti-Americanism in the world: liberal anti-Americanism, sovereign nationalist anti-Americanism, radical anti-Americanism, cultural elitist anti-Americanism, and legacy anti-Americanism.
 
Lindberg then argued that there is little hard evidence that anti-Americanism significantly affects American foreign policy. There are three main areas in which anti-Americanism is commonly cited as having consequences for U.S. foreign policy: spurring terrorism, hurting U.S. businesses abroad, and making it harder for the U.S. government to achieve its policy goals. In the first, anti-Americanism is often cited as motivating terrorism and aiding the recruitment of members to terrorist organizations, promoting populations willing to aid and abet terrorist organizations, and preventing global cooperation against terrorism. While acknowledging the drawing power of anti-Americanism, particularly after the Iraq war, Lindberg stated that potential terrorists are attracted to terrorist organizations and populations are willing to support them not only because of people’s dislike for the United States, but also because of the attraction of radical terrorist ideologies. And anti-Americanism has not undermined global cooperation against terrorism because most countries recognize the commonality of interests inherent in counterterrorism efforts.

Nor does Lindberg find that anti-Americanism has a significant economic impact.  On the one hand, there is some evidence of anti-Americanism making itself felt on the economic front in the form of boycotts of U.S. goods and a global wariness of U.S. businesses.  Moreover, U.S. corporations are taking the specter of anti-Americanism seriously and have started to emphasize their local ties instead of their global ones.  On the other hand, he asserted, such evidence is merely anecdotal and there is no solid basis for the view that anti-Americanism hurts U.S. business abroad.
 
With regard to policy implementation, Lindberg stated that anti-Americanism’s political impact is more complicated than it at first seems.  For many foreign political leaders, anti-Americanism is easy to express and is useful for domestic purposes.  He cited, however, the global cooperation on counterterrorism issues after September 11th as evidence that anti-Americanism has not impeded American policy effectiveness as extensively as many feel it has.

Finally, Lindberg addressed the issue of what to do about anti-Americanism. He asserted that some of its causes are simply not addressable. Foremost is that the United States exercises global dominance, and no one in the United States will voluntarily pursue policies to undermine that position.  In addition, much anti-Americanism is directed against exceptional U.S. positions on issues such as landmines, the International Criminal Court, and support for Israel, which he stated were both “well-rounded” policy positions and inescapable facts of the U.S. political landscape. What is addressable, however, is U.S. public diplomacy, which he views as currently incomplete and thus the basis for two policy recommendations. First, he suggested that the United States follow a “shut up and listen” strategy and base its diplomacy less on stating its own positions and more on listening to the positions of other actors, giving them the courtesy and respect of a genuine hearing. It should conduct listening tours, frankly address past grievances, and look for opportunities to be of help on the world stage. Second, he asserts that U.S. public diplomacy should be modeled more after a sales campaign than a public relations campaign, taking local circumstances into account in order to listen to the “buyer” and more effectively target the U.S. message.
 
Alexander Rondos began his reply with a first-hand account of how he and many foreign actors aligned with U.S. values have been publicly and privately compromised by the growing anti-American fervor. Those who share the values of the United States are beginning to fear its blessing because anti-Americanism has become a serious operational problem.  He praised Lindberg’s typology of anti-Americanism, but called for greater attention to the issue of differentiation between substantive anti-Americanism and the identification of America as a symbol of other issues such as capitalism or Christianity.  Anti-Americanism is often conflated with opposition to the West or the ‘other’; it is Rondos’s instinct that the United States has lately begun to nationalize and thus discredit otherwise universal values such as democracy and human rights.  He pointed out that the United States must indeed make tough choices between being popular and being politically effective; yet, policy problems arise when collaborators in other societies can no longer collaborate because of a severe lack of popularity. Rondos also highlighted the fact that anti-Americanism is not a static issue. Many actors have begun to oppose U.S. policy by using the United States’s own policy instruments, such as movements of money, civil society, political parties and democratic institutions.

Támas Dávid-Barrett addressed the economic consequences of anti-Americanism and concluded that it is becoming a problem not for the industrialized economy of the United States, but for developing economies of other countries. He first observed that anti-Americanism has had little effect in the private sector, but it has had some effect in the public sector.  He cited two examples as evidence: the Hungarian government recently chose to buy fighter planes from the UK instead of the United States at higher cost, and in 2003 Middle Eastern banks began diverting their partnerships from English and American banks to Continental banks.  His second observation was that anti-Americanism has caused a backlash against neo-liberal macroeconomic policies because the neo-liberal toolbox is viewed as having a distinctly American label. Domestic Chinese economists knew they should adopt a wide band in which to float their currency, but Beijing refused to institute that policy because it would be seen as a concession to the United States.  The anti-neo-liberal trend has also cropped up in Latin America, where countries have begun adopting statist policies of Fidel Castro; the discrediting of neo-liberalism will be a huge problem for post-Communist countries.  If these troubling developments continue, Dávid-Barrett sees the emerging global economy going the way of segmentation and regionalization instead of an economically sounder global integration.
   
Ivan Krastev praised Lindberg’s work for shifting the anti-Americanism debate away from the issue of the sources of anti-Americanism, an issue about which useful generalization is impossible because anti-Americanism is always contextual.  In fact, the strength of anti-Americanism is its emptiness. It is a catch-all platform for those whose own platforms and ideology have been discredited; as such it has become a political resource for those in other societies needing a combative ideology. He disagreed with Lindberg’s policy recommendations and suggested that anti-Americanism is an image problem only in the long term. It is true that the United States must act to curb the anti-American socialization of younger generations, but the most pressing problem in the short term is ensuring that the United States can accomplish its policy goals.  He echoed Rondos in highlighting the choice between pursuing public policy and cultivating public perception.  He warned that the United States might find it more and more necessary to “license anti-Americanism” as a policy resource to gain the cooperation of foreign politicians, as did the Bush administration in the case of Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi over the Iraq war.  And, he argued that the America’s greatest hope in countering anti-Americanism was to seek out and ally with what he called “anti-anti-Americanism” among those who need the cooperation of the United States.   

Synopsis prepared by Meredith Riley, Junior Fellow in the Democracy and Rule of Law Project