Political Developments in Saudi Arabia

Opening Presentation
Amr Hamzawy, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Commentators
Saleh Al Mani, King Saud University
Assad Shamlan, Institute of Diplomatic Studies

Moderator
Hisham Melham, Annahar Newspaper, Lebanon

Amr Hamzawy began by arguing that although Saudi Arabia is not in the center of scholarly debate on Arab political reform, political reform in Saudi Arabia is nonetheless important given the country’s regional and religious significance. He then set out three important considerations for evaluating political reform in Saudi context.  First, gradualism will be a necessary feature of political reform in Saudi Arabia. Second, municipal politics are central to understanding Saudi politics.  Third, there is an absence of popular demand for reform in comparison to other Arab countries, such as Egypt, Morocco, and Lebanon.  The debate on political reform in the kingdom is thus confined to key political actors, which include the royal family, the religious establishment, conservative Islamists, and reformers.

The royal family can be divided into two wings, one that is inclined to embrace a gradual opening up, and another that prioritizes securitization. The official religious establishment comprises two factions, a dominant conservative bloc and a liberal-minded yet marginal bloc. Hamzawy was skeptical of the claim, often made by reformers in Saudi Arabia, that the royal family can control the religious establishment. Recently-instituted reforms have not influenced the functional relationship between the royal family and the religious establishment.  The religious establishment remains in control of the three vital spheres of education, the judiciary, and preaching. In addition to the royal family and the religious establishment, the two giants in the Saudi political scene, there are conservative Islamists, who are increasingly becoming a relevant political actor and were very successful in the March 2005 municipal elections. While they are critical of royal family and the religious establishment, they are careful to maintain their ties with them. Reformers, the fourth political actor, can be divided into liberals—such as academics and journalists—and liberal Islamists, who usually are religious scholars or activists from different backgrounds.  The dilemma of reformers is that they have neither a constituency nor a roadmap for reform.  Limiting themselves to either a maximalist or a minimalist approach, they have yet to develop a viable roadmap.

Hamzawy then identified three factors that influence the interplay between the four main actors in Saudi politics: regional debates on political reform; socio-economic conditions; and militant Islamism. He emphasized that militant Islamist groups do not constitute a political actor; they simply influence the interplay between and within different political actors, such as the contending fractions of the royal family.

Finally, Hamzawy discussed what might constitute significant political reform in Saudi Arabia. He argued that there are two key potential reforms steps. At the institutional level, a possibility for reform might be extending the composition of the Shura council and the competence of both the Shura (Consultative) council and partially-elected municipal councils. Extending the scope the operations of non-governmental organizations and legalizing them represents another potential area for significant reform.

Saleh Al Mani argued that the issue of political reform in Saudi Arabia must be tackled from two perspectives: the élan for reform and the modality of reform.  According to recent polls, Saudi Arabian society is a predominantly conservative society, a large segment of which is attached to the religious establishment.  He concurred with Hamzawy that political reform in Saudi Arabia has mostly been top-down, but argued that there is also some increasing change from within as a result of the expansion of the middle class. Al Mani contended that the corporate state model can be useful in analyzing the regime’s attempts to reach out to and absorb new constituencies into the political domain and thus establish a national identity. The most recent example of this is the integration of Shiites of Medina into the national dialogue.  The notion of nation-building is thus still in evolution. While the religious establishment is generally opposed to the regime’s efforts incorporate new elements into the political sphere, there are some voices within the religious establishment that do question the rigidity of that position.

In trying to analyze the significance of reform in Saudi Arabia, Assad Shamlan distinguished between two types of reforms, statecraft or technocratic reforms and reforms that are part of larger, comprehensive project of change. He suggested the latter is a more accurate description of the recent developments in Saudi Arabia, the project being anti-extremism. The official discourse portrays extremism as a challenge to the state’s security. Incremental reforms in the economy, education, and culture were introduced within the framework of combating extremism. 

Shamlan also emphasized the existence of structural conditions conducive to reform in Saudi Arabia. He pointed to increasing domestic calls for reform and argued that despite its various shortcomings, the U.S. broader Middle East Initiative introduced a new polarization in the region between reforming regimes and stagnant regimes. This, Shamlan argued, forced the Saudi regime to choose the path of reform. The threat to meaningful reform comes from different understandings of what reform means. While the state might see reform as a means to strengthen itself vis-à-vis regional and international powers, reformers perceive reform as a means of empowering society vis-à-vis the state. Shamlan then pointed out common misconceptions in the debate on political reform in Saudi Arabia, such as exaggerating the division within the royal family. Different factions of the royal family, such as those aligned with King Abdullah or Prince Nayef, have been working together for years and have developed mechanisms to deal with each other. Despite their disagreements, both factions realize that what is at stake is the perpetuation of their rule.

During the question and answer period, Al Mani elaborated on his discussion of the corporate state. He argued that the democratization model is not a useful model for analyzing the Middle East and that the traditional corporatist model is more relevant.  According to this model, the state would first recognize the leader and a certain group, then use that leader to penetrate the group. When asked about the role of outside actors in pushing reform in the kingdom, al Mani argued that external pressure can create a backlash and thus it might be wise for Washington to scale down on its pressures for reforms. In response to Shamlan’s comments, Hamzawy said he agreed with Shamlan’s analysis of the use of anti-extremism as a framework to institute reforms, but differed on calling it a project or roadmap for reform.  The logic of using the framework of combating terrorism to introduce reforms is flawed because it requires the royal family to seek the support of the religious establishment and in turn lose the necessary leverage to press the religious establishment to accept more reforms.