Is the Chinese Revolution Dead?

IMGXYZ454IMGZYXOn March 6, 2006, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace hosted a meeting entitled “Is the Chinese Revolution Dead?” The speaker was Elizabeth J. Perry, Henry Rosovsky Professor of Government at Harvard University. Carnegie’s Minxin Pei moderated the discussion. A summary of the event follows.

In her remarks, Dr. Perry argued that China’s past revolutionary experience exercises an important influence over contemporary politics. The patterns and promises of Mao’s revolution continue to loom large in the beliefs and behaviors of protestors and state officials alike. The so-called “transitional regime” has been able hold onto power for the three decades since Mao’s death precisely because it has retained and reinvented many aspects of China’s revolution. While the composition of the Chinese elite has changed dramatically as they have become more educated, the structure of the party-state has remained stable.

In particular, Dr. Perry asserted that the Chinese leadership has excelled at the technique of revolutionary mobilization and demobilization, which involves identifying and intensifying social tensions in ways that increase the power and influence of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The CCP has also been able to apply a “divide and conquer” strategy to the process of state consolidation. During the 1950s-1970s, the party utilized a policy of “controlled polarization,” which provided the framework for huge mass movements. This strategy survived Mao’s death: Even during the Tiananmen protests, people marched with their work unit. This reliance on a state-provided identity allows for the rapid mobilization and demobilization of the public and prevents social movements from posing major threats to the state.

The policies of former Chinese President Jiang Zemin exhibited several revolutionary characteristics. Jiang utilized the “divide and rule” philosophy against the Falun Gong, the Chinese democracy movement, and to overcome strikes. Groups such as the Falun Gong were termed “anti-revolutionary.” Moreover, the mobilization of the public to defeat SARS relied on Mao-era mobilization techniques such as the use of neighborhood committees to enforce Chinese government stipulations.

Furthermore, Dr. Perry suggested that current Chinese leaders try to actively instill a revolutionary sense among the people, elites, and government officials. For example, citizens are encouraged to partake in “red tourism,” in which they vacation at spots with Communist significance. Similarly, elites are encouraged to get in touch with their revolutionary roots at special retreats. This reflects the “state-promoted glorification of revolutionary tradition.”

This revolutionary rhetoric is utilized not only by Chinese leaders, but also by contemporary protest movements. Rather than seeing modern protest movements as proto-revolutionary attempts to overthrow the government, Dr. Perry argues they should be seen as efforts by aggrieved citizens, who draw creatively on the language of revolution in order to shame the government into following its promises.

Dr. Perry rejected the view, supported by many Western analysts, that the recent increase in protests indicates that China is reaching a significant turning point in state-society relations at which the state will no longer be able to control society in the way it once did, given the citizenry’s growing sense of their rights. While Dr. Perry agreed that protestors invoke the language of law, she argued they do so because state propaganda promotes the idea of “state-offered rights.” Chinese citizens exhibit increasing “rules consciousness” rather than “rights consciousness.” The Chinese government’s successful crackdown on the Tiananmen and Falun Gong protests indicates its continuing ability to contain mass protests.

Question and Answer Session

Q: Why do you disagree with the view of many Western scholars that the existence of 80,000 protests in China in the past year is evidence of a breakdown in the state and suggests the possibility that China might fail?

A: First, the statement that there have been 80,000 protests in the past year may not be accurate. It is difficult to obtain accurate data about the number of protests in China, as in other countries. Second, historically speaking, there are other moments in Chinese history in which many Chinese people protested. The numbers do suggest an increase in the size and scope of the protests, but they have no predicative power regarding when there might be a great political change in China. The most important factor is not the size or scope of the protests, but the identities of the people who are protesting and the nature of their relationship with the state.

Q:  How do you evaluate whether a change constitutes a “revolutionary change?” What causes a revolutionary change?

A: A revolutionary change is a fundamental alteration in the composition of a political system – how it operates and how it claims sovereignty. The reason a revolutionary change occurs is different for each case. Nevertheless, an increase in the size and scope of protests is not a clear indication of an impending revolution.

Q: Is the Chinese political system ever likely to change? What are the objective factors that could cause a change? What evidence would suggest the political system had changed from one of “rules consciousness” to one of “rights consciousness?”

A: One does not need evidence of rights consciousness to argue that the Chinese political system is changing. The focus on rights consciousness is caused by the American perspective on the relationship between rights and the state. In the American conception, rights are innate. In the Chinese conception, rights are granted to the individual by the state.

Indications that the Chinese political system is changing would include evidence that different types of groups (which may form based on shared geography, occupations, or education backgrounds) were starting to unite and that the state was allowing them to do so. Jiang Zemin came down harshly on the Falun Gong protestors precisely because he recognized the threat posed by their diversity. Similarly, although the Chinese Democracy Party was once registered with the state, once the Chinese leaders saw that it was diverse and widespread, and that it was organizing workers, the state reacted harshly. A change in state-society relations might occur if the state was no longer willing or able to control social movements and if the movements identified and capitalized on common interests across categories.

Q: Does the Chinese people’s increasing recourse to the legal system indicate a major change in the Chinese state?

A: China has possessed well-educated elites for much of its history. The early Maoist period was an outlier in that respect. Recent research has found that the legal system was more often utilized in earlier periods, such as the late imperial period, than previously thought. Like now, people utilized the system, even though they knew it was corrupt, because in doing so they gained some legitimacy for trying to address the problem through the proper channels. Today, some people may utilize the legal system because they think it might actually be effective.

Q: Have groups in China that are attempting to assert themselves utilized new information technologies? Are they likely to do so in the future?

A: New information technologies have been extremely important for both protestors and state officials. It is difficult to say which group has benefited more. For example, the Falun Gong movement organized through the Internet. Cell phones and political Internet chat rooms are also popular. Earlier, during the Tiananmen protests, democracy activists utilized the fax machine to share information with people in the West. All of these technologies are important because they enable people to connect. But the Chinese state has been remarkably successful in its efforts to control the Internet.

Summary prepared by Danielle Cohen, Junior Fellow with the China Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.