The Syrian Challenge

Discussants:
Ellen Lust-Okar, Yale University
Reinoud Leenders, University of Amsterdam

Ellen Lust-Okar argued that political reform in Syria is influenced not only by domestic forces but also by regional developments and the policies of Western countries, particularly the United States. At present, those policies are not helping the cause of political reform.

Lust-Okar recalled that when President Bashar al-Assad took power after the death of his father, President Hafiz al-Assad, many within Syria and the international community were hopeful that he would initiate a period of political opening and international cooperation. Bashar’s relative political weakness, youth, and western education also led the Syrian opposition to hope that it had a serious opportunity to become an active political force. Opposition forces were encouraged in this by a period of opening that became known as the Damascus Spring, which took place from the late summer of 2000 to August of 2001 and was marked by calls for reform from civil society and parliamentarians. However, the opening was in fact engineered those close to Bashar, who were attempting to harness liberalizing forces to strengthen the regime, and thus provided only limited opportunities for opposition forces. By 2001, the Ba’ath party hardliners, witnessing calls for reform from within the party itself, decided that liberalization was too dangerous and once again limited debate and repressed dissent. The short domestic opening was paralleled by an opening on the international stage, characterized by post-9/11 cooperation with the United States and closer relations with France.

Lust-Okar described how the Syrian regime has turned away decisively from the early policy of consolidating its position by pursuing a policy of liberalization. Instead, it has jettisoned the old guard politicians and restricted power to Bashar’s inner circle, above all his brother and brother in law, and escalated anti-US rhetoric. The regime has also taken advantage of US criticism to drum up Syrian nationalist sentiment at home and Arab nationalism in the region in order to increase support. Finally, Bashar’s regime has raised fear that increased pressure on the regime would lead to its collapse, the failure of the state and a take-over by radical Islamist movements. For example, the Syrian government allowed expressions of extreme Islamist rhetoric prior to the signing in the United States of the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act in 2003, in an attempt to show the consequences of legislation that aimed at weakening the regime. Similarly, it allowed violence against Western embassies during the protest against the cartoons of the prophet Mohammed in 2006. The regime has also tried to portray itself as the bulwark against the threat of sectarianism in Syria; the government consistently points to violence in Iraq and Lebanon as an example of what might happen in its absence.

These ominous developments in the domestic sphere were matched in the international sphere by a deterioration of relations with the United States and Europe, particularly France. International pressure forced Syria to withdraw its troops from Lebanon. Despite such pressure, and the UN investigation into Syria’s role in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, the regime remains defiant.

Lust-Okar pointed out that limited domestic reforms have taken place over the past several years, with the regime shifting from limited political reform, to administrative and then economic reform. Political reforms include the expanded ability to form associations, changes in political party law, and some gains in terms of media freedom. Economic reforms have aimed to take Syria toward a social market economy, and include reducing subsidies, developing private banks and universities, and changing customs duties. Yet reforms have all been undertaken in a manner intended to shore up the regime. For example, the draft political party law makes it almost impossible for opposition forces to form a political party.

The possibilities for reform, Lust-Okar argued, is limited by the nature of the opposition and its recent evolution. A major division within the opposition exists between those who live inside Syria and those who live elsewhere, characterized by differing views on risk aversion, engagement with the United States, and the need to maintain the stability of the Syrian state. Further divisions exist between Islamists and secularists, between different regional groups and between different personal factions. Over the last few years there has been a number of attempts to bridge the divides, but fragmentation remains a problem.

In the absence of real change in Syria, Lust-Okar outlined its three possible scenarios First, and most likely, is Bashar al-Assad’s continued rule. Second, but improbable, is an internal coup, coming from either pro-Western forces or, should Bashar seem likely to fall from power, the Allawi military elite. Finally, regime collapse cannot be ruled out. In fact, that possibility might increase if the international community pursues real democratic change.

Lust-Okar recommended pressuring Syria not on its regional actions, which only serve to stir Syrian and Arab nationalism, but on its domestic policies. By demonstrating that it takes political reform seriously the United States would encourage the opposition. Domestic and international pressure for change tends to focus on a fairly standard set of reforms: changing electoral party law, reforming the judiciary, enhancing rule of law and lifting martial law. She argued that changing electoral law, perhaps allowing the popular election of Bashar in the 2007 election, is one feasible avenue of reform. Reforms could, on the one hand, guide the Syrian system to one much like that of Egypt. On the other hand, they could lead to regime collapse. Thus it is important that the international community have a contingency plan to maintain the stability of the state and avert possible sectarian discord.

Reinoud Leenders agreed with Lust-Okar’s view of the Syrian political situation, especially the fact that much of its foreign policies are determined by domestic maneuverings, but he elaborated further. He questioned what type of policies Bashar could be expected to pursue and what coalitions he would attempt to form, considering the fact that in consolidating his regime over the past years he has moved against the old guard and lost some of his traditional support. He also questioned Lust-Okar’s assessment of the strength of the regime and expressed concern for her analysis of sectarianism in Syria, pointing out that no party has an uninterested approach to the issue and cautioning that sectarianism can become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

In examining Lust-Okar’s recommendations, Leenders wondered what the potential would be for the United States to move beyond its current unsubtle approach, perhaps forming coalitions with opposition groups or targeting the regime’s core constituency by freezing assets. He also asked her to elaborate on the necessity of encouraging the regime to liberalize, since current U.S. policies have worked quite well in convincing Syria to pull out of Lebanon, transfer assets back to Iraq and control the border. Finally, Leenders questioned the capacity of the United States to sustain such a nuanced approach, and pointed out that U.S. ability to affect change in the Middle East in general and Syria in particular is seriously constrained by the region’s profound skepticism toward the United States. He suggested that her recommendations include means for the United States to restore its legitimacy as a promoter of human rights and democracy in the region. Leenders, doubtful of that possibility, suggested that it might be useful to consider other actors that could have a positive role such as Turkey, China or the European Union.

Synopsis prepared by Meredith Riley, Junior Fellow in the Democracy and Rule of Law Project.