Political Reform in Saudi Arabia

Presenter
Amr Hamzawy, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Discussants
Jamal Khashoggi, Advisor to the Ambassador of the Royal Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the United States

David Ottaway, Washington Post

Moderator
Nathan Brown, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

IMGXYZ474IMGZYXAmr Hamzawy presented his paper “The Saudi Labyrinth: Evaluating the Current Political Opening,” (published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in April 2006) which analyzes the prospects for political reform in Saudi Arabia.

The paper puts forth two main arguments, the first being that reform measures that have been introduced by the ruling establishment in since 2002 have resulted in an unprecedented degree of political dynamism in Saudi politics, a sustained political opening, and thus a higher degree of popular participation in Saudi politics. In addition, attempts to evaluate political reform in Saudi Arabia should take into account the particularity of the Saudi political system and thus refrain from making comparisons to other Arab countries.  A parliament that is fully accountable and has real oversight powers cannot be expected in the short run. Hence, there should be an effort both to lower expectations, and devise more realistic ones that correspond with Saudi realities.

Hamzawy’s presentation explored the structural characteristics of the Saudi political system, reform measures between 2002 and 2005, and potential for further political opening.

Hamzawy argued that the Saudi political scene is characterized by a high degree of concentration of power. There are two main actors, namely the royal family and the religious establishment. Other actors, specifically liberal reformers, moderate Islamists, and remnants of the Islamic awakening movement of the 1970s—albeit scattered and weak—have started to gain more voice as a result of the political opening over the last few years. However, there remains a clear imbalance of power between the royal family and the religious establishment on the one hand, and other political actors.

Second, the relationship between the royal family and the religious establishment should not be reduced to a question who is the more dominant player, especially since this has largely been dependent on the issue that is being negotiated. What is more important is to note that the relationship is primarily a function of religious legitimacy and social control. The religious establishment grants religious legitimacy to the royal family in return for control over vital social spheres, most importantly education and preaching.

Third, the royal family is divided into moderate and conservative factions. The former faction is interested in sustaining the political opening and creating a larger space for citizens’ participation, while the latter prioritizes securitization. Hamzawy argued that the balance of power between the two factions has been moving in the direction of the moderate faction in the last few years, especially King Abdullah’s accession to the throne. This means that there is a certain degree of commitment to reform within the Saudi royal family.

Finally, the Saudi political scene includes three other political actors: liberal reformers; moderate Islamists; and leading religious scholars of the Islamic Awakening movement conservative popular movement that emerged in the 1980s and 90s. Notably, these actors are simply individuals and are not yet part of organized social movements. The first group includes intellectuals, university professors, and opinion makers, who have managed to develop an interesting reform platform and articulate their demands publicly, most significantly by presenting a memorandum for constitutional monarchy in 2003. Moderate Islamists in the Saudi context consist of religious scholars who are critical of the religious establishment. Hamzawy distinguished between Sunni and Shiite components of this group, pointing out that the former take their starting point from reforming the religious establishment itself, while the latter seek to diversify religious based legitimacy by introducing other religious interpretations. The Islamic Awakening movement presented a security challenge to the state but was contained in the second half of the 1990s. In recent years, remnants of the movements have developed a reform platform in recent years. Significantly, there has been a degree of convergence in the platforms of these three actors, which has enabled them to coordinate on some reform issues, and systematically place their demands at the center of the public space. 

Turning to reform measures introduced between 2002 and 2005, Hamzawy highlighted five major areas: the empowerment of the Shura (Consultative) council; the introduction of partial elections to municipal councils; the expansion of civil society; institutionalization of the national dialogue conference; and educational reforms.

The Shura council is a 150-member body charged with advising the King and cabinet upon their request. Its empowerment took two forms, first by the modification of the body’s internal provisions to give members more autonomy in discussing matters, and second by its marked politicization.

The introduction of partial municipal elections—despite the various limitations on the process including the exclusion of women—has served several purposes: The country’s first elections since the 1960s, they have reinvigorated the memory of elections and participation; the election campaigns attracted public attention. In addition, there has been considerable public debate in Saudi Arabia about the possibility of extending the election mechanism to other bodies such as the Shura councils or by making municipal elections fully rather than partially elected.

The expansion of civil society has taken place through the legalization of various human rights organizations and professional syndicates, and the fact that elections to the boards of these bodies were permitted. Albeit limited, this expansion is generally relevant the Saudi context and more particularly because it presents an opening for underprivileged groups such as women and minorities.

The institutionalization of national dialogue conferences—a government initiative which began in 2003 and consisted of regular meetings of diverse groups to discuss political reform issues—has been instrumental in expanding the Saudi public sphere. National dialogue conferences have actually been Saudi Arabia’s main venue for public debates on reform issues, and have been critical in educating the public.

The issue of educational reform is particularly sensitive because it reflects the balance of power between royal family and the religious establishment. Between 2002 and 2005, a very limited number of reforms have been introduced to create a balance between religious and non-religious subjects in the curricula. There measures were, by in large, introduced hesitantly and reluctantly due to the fierce opposition by the religious establishment.

Hamzawy described four main possibilities for sustaining the already existing political opening in Saudi Arabia. The first is to introduce at least partial elections to the Shura council, and there are signs that at least the moderate faction of the royal family is inclined to do so. The second involves sustaining and deepening the expansion of civil society organizations, mainly through allowing liberal reformers and intellectuals to organize, and easing restrictions on Saudi Arabia’s traditional civil society organizations, namely charity organizations, whose activities had been greatly restricted in the aftermath of the 11 September. Other realistic possibilities include the promotion of educational reform and gender equality.

Hamzawy argued that the Saudi political context presents the United States with several challenges. The United States lacks the leverage of economic aid, which could be conditioned on political reform. Given these conditions, there are two entry points for the U.S. government, on the governmental and non-governmental levels. On the governmental level, the United States should take up the cause of reform groups. On the non-governmental level, American and European non-governmental organizations should reach out to their Saudi counterparts, which—for the most part—have been left out of the democracy promotion agenda.

Jamal Khashoggi began by pointing out that there are no popular demands for reform in Saudi Arabia. He expressed doubts about the alleged alliance between the religious establishment and the royal family and contested Hamzawy’s claim about the division within the royal family, arguing that it is normal for any family to have dissenting opinions and pointing out that major decisions within the Saudi royal family are consensual. He also questioned the “alliance” that Hamzawy describes between the royal family and the religious establishment.

David Ottaway commented on the nature of the political actors described by Hamzawy, pointing out that they are all individuals and there was no mention of any kind of social forces or classes at work in the reform process. He raised the question of why merchant families, who have played an important role in Kuwait’s political development are absent from a discussion on Saudi political reform, despite the fact they are a powerful force.
Additionally, he asked whether Saudi women and youth should have been included as political actors. He raised the question of why it is that Saudi Arabia’s reformers are weak, and argued that they depend on government wages.

Hamzawy disagreed with Khashoggi’s explanation for the lack of popular demand for reform, arguing that there is a dialectal relationship between political opening and popular demands for reform, which means that political openings lead to increased popular demands and vice versa. On Ottaway’s point regarding the absence of organized opposition movements, Hamzawy pointed out that reformers remain restricted due to repression and dependence on government salaries.

Synopsis prepared by Dina Bishara, Junior Fellow in the Democracy and Rule of Law Project.