The Biological Weapons Threat and Nonproliferation Options

IMGXYZ564IMGZYXAt the release of the CSIS Report “The Biological Weapons Threat and Nonproliferation Options,” Dr. Amy Smithson began by walking the attendees through the survey methodology. Participants in the survey represented three broad groups of individuals: first, current policy makers (both  senior administration officials as well as members of committees of jurisdiction on both sides of the hill); second, former policy makers (individuals who formerly held similar positions to those in the first group); and finally, non-governmental experts with influence on policy through direct connections to policy makers or media. Of the 344 invited parties, 52 participated in the final survey. 

Dr. Smithson next guided the audience through the survey questions on the extent of the threat, then the available policy options, and finally the U.S. government’s performance and future priorities for biological weapons nonproliferation.  With regard to  the biological weapons threat,  73% of participants felt that biological weapons are a major threat, and 27% viewed them as a minor threat. When compared to other forms of WMD, biological weapons were seen as a greater threat than chemical weapons by 74% of respondents and an equal threat by an additional 9%.

Compared to nuclear weapons, 17% viewed BW as a greater threat, and 35% viewed it as the same level of threat. In addition, 58% of respondents believe that the biological weapons threat is increasing somewhat, largely due to the increasing availability of technology and know-how and the creation of new technologies and know-how  in the life sciences. Government transfer of weapons and knowledge to terrorists was not viewed by 90% of respondents as an influential reason for the increasing threat; however, 75% of individuals believe that the most likely  biological weapons proliferation scenario would be small-scale, sporadic biological weapons attacks by terrorists or states to undermine confidence in the government.

With respect to available policy options, respondents were generally highly supportive of measures to reduce proliferation, but their additional comments often noted the lack of political  will to move ahead with most  policies. For instance, 98% of survey participants supported rigorous biosecurity measures and 99% of respondents support strong biosafety measures, but one former policymaker commented: “Individual states should do this and may know their own circumstances best, but the fact of the matter is states won’t take the initiative to do this.”

Likewise, 94% of respondents supported oversight for genetic engineering experiments involving highly infectious pathogens, and 94% support criminalizing biological weapons related activities, but one former policy advisor supported criminalization laws but nonetheless voiced doubts about their effectiveness.  Eighty-nine percent of participants supported a professional code for life scientists emphasizing the special care needed in the dual use field of bioscience; 69% of respondents supported a standard curriculum in the ethics of science, biosafety, and biosecurity for life science students; and 94% supported facility certification of employees in biosecurity and biosafety.  For these topics, a few individuals who supported these policies also recognized  the difficulty of their implementation and one participant questioned the efficacy of professional codes.

The final question in this portion of the survey asked whether the international community should convene negotiations to design on-site inspections and other procedures to monitor the adherence to the 1975 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Here, responses were mixed. Sixty-nine percent of participants answered yes, while 21% answered no, with the remaining 10% choosing “no opinion.” Both yes and no voters commented on the  need for United States leadership in this arena to make the goal become a reality.

The final section of the survey dealt with assessments of U.S. government performance in tackling the issue of biological weapons nonproliferation. In regards to government performance over the last five years, 40% of respondents felt that it was fair, and 31% judged it as poor. No individual selected excellent, and three of the four “very good” votes were from current senior policy makers. One commenter explained their poor rating by saying the government had “no focus on this issue.” In addition, 42% of respondents felt that biological weapons  nonproliferation should be a top policy priority, and 54% felt it should be some priority. In ranking policy options for their usefulness, respondents felt that obligating facilities working with highly infectious pathogens to institute rigorous biosecurity measures and biosafety measures were the most useful policies to be instituted.

Finally, only 21% of respondents believed that individual states enacting their own regulations would be a beneficial approach to the bioweapons nonproliferation. In contrast, 65% supported international biosafety standards, 52% supported international biosecurity standards, 46% supported an international criminalization treaty, and 40% international oversight for genetic engineering research.

Thus, the results of the survey are  that biological weapons are a grave, growing problem, there is strong support for a variety of policy options to reduce the risk of  biological weapons proliferation, and that multilateral approaches to these policies are  more broadly supported than unilateral actions.