Europe's Lessons for East Asian Integration

IMGXYZ1256IMGZYXThe European Union sees itself as offering “a cultural and governance ideal” for nascent and aspiring regional blocs.  Carnegie Beijing co-sponsored a May 4-5 conference on comparative regionalism to explore the EU’s universality and the lessons, if it works, for East Asian integration.

Is the EU Model Universal?

Though the EU may serve as “a cultural and governance ideal,” few are as uncertain and divided over its future than Europeans themselves.  In his discussion of the methodological issues that arise in evaluating European integration, Emil J. Kirchner (see the attached document for a list of participants and discussion topics) noted that seemingly interchangeable words — for example, “cooperation” and ”integration” — often have very different ideological interpretations, suggesting continued uncertainty over the EU’s future.  Michael Gehler, discussed some recent events that have fueled that sentiment — for example, the failure to ratify an EU Constitution and the debate over whether the EU should expand — and noted that Europe’s feelings toward integration have historically oscillated “violently” from fervor to “euro-sclerosis.”

Participants did agree, however, that the EU sees itself as possessing enormous cultural and normative power.  Its identity as a political actor is imbued with the EU’s founding principles: the rule of law, “fundamental freedoms,” and democracy.  How universal is EU governance?  Could East Asia replicate it?

Enforcing Compliance

There was general agreement that the EU could serve as a model towards which East Asia aspires.  Feng Shaolei said that one of its major strengths lies in aiding the individual as well as society.  He lamented the absence of this duality in East Asia, which, he argued, emphasizes only affluence at the individual level and economic and political stability at the regional level as proof of development.

Part of EU’s ability to “nourish” the well-being of its citizens lies in its ability to codify behavior among member countries.  In contrast, the current East Asian mechanism for regional cooperation, ASEAN+3, has prioritized non-interference in members’ internal affairs.  The “ASEAN Way” relies on members to enforce directives themselves, and agreements are largely confined to economics and trade.  This stringent non-interference policy has sometimes shaken ASEAN’s credibility, like in the case of Myanmar, whose human rights abuses have been a longstanding source of EU-ASEAN tension.

Limitations of Exporting the EU Model

That tension underscores some fundamental differences between EU and East Asian philosophies.  Specifically, it illustrates the difficulties that East Asia would have in embracing the spirit that ostensibly grips — and theoretically defines — Europe.  Most participants believed that East Asia would be unable to mimic, let alone import wholesale, the EU model because of questions relating to sovereignty and culture.

Sovereignty

Uwe Wissenbach outlined three goals that drove European integration: to make war structurally impossible through economic integration, to achieve prosperity and solidarity, and to become more competitive in a globalizing world.  Achieving these goals required the creation and institutionalization of legal and economic mechanisms at the intergovernmental and supranational levels.  These mechanisms require EU members to abdicate voluntarily some of their sovereignty.  ASEAN institutions, on the other hand, are strictly intergovernmental and, as a result, toothless.  The organization’s concern over sovereignty has limited its ability to develop mechanisms that could promote fuller integration.  Liu Wenxiu voiced her doubts that ASEAN could even fulfill its present goal — economic integration — without binding directives and some elements of a supranational structure. 

East Asian suspicion of supranational bodies is rooted in memories of colonization and unresolved disputes.  Where Franco-German reconciliation facilitated European integration, Japan’s wartime aggression and failure to make amends have complicated regional relations.  Furthermore, borders remain contentious, with Thailand and Cambodia trading fire over this issue as recently as April.

Marked asymmetries in economic, military, and political influence also hinder regional integration.  Japan accounts for one-half of East Asia’s GDP, and China accounts for one-third; South Korea ranks third, and ASEAN last.  Dai Bingran noted that such inequities make it difficult to distribute benefits as well as responsibilities.  Furthermore, despite its friendly-neighbor policies, China’s growing military influence has raised concerns in the region.  Participants suggested that China’s foreign policy proceeds almost entirely from self-interest: why would it accede to regional agreements when it can accomplish its objectives more effectively through bilateral ones?  Lastly, the U.S. presence in Asia stokes China’s belief that America is colluding with East Asian countries to prevent China’s rise.

Culture

Many participants noted that replicating the EU model in East Asia would be difficult culturally.  Some said that European integration was made easier by a shared history — Lajos Racz cited Greek culture, the Roman Empire, Christianity, and the Enlightenment as important elements.  Feng Shaolei said that achieving integration in East Asia would be vastly more complicated given the “lack of common historical, political, and cultural tradition, lack of experience in cooperation…combined with their different perceptions of national interests and internal strife in the region.”

Not everyone shared this pessimism.  Dai Bingran said that “East Asian countries are often said to be of similar cultural origins, which should make mutual understanding easier, especially in terms of their basic values.”  He said that this should be true even if cultural similarity tends to “stimulate…narrow and exclusive nationalisms” — or, in the words of Shi Yinhong, “mutually antagonistic nationalisms” — rather than unity.  Some participants wondered whether the supposed cultural obstacles to East Asian integration were being exaggerated, and questioned whether they were any more insurmountable than the ones that Europe had to confront.  Conflict in Asia has been confined to a handful of incidents in the last few hundred years whereas Europe was at war with itself for centuries.  Even if nationalism is a problem, many agreed that it may not hinder long-run integration; in fact, Chen Xiaolu suggested that it was European nationalism that ultimately drove modernization and, later, integration.
     
Conclusions

Institutional cooperation in East Asia is designed to be intergovernmental as opposed to supranational.  Forum participants stressed that this type of cooperation is neither capable of creating a coordinated regional actor nor of fulfilling ambitions for unified regional security policies and true economic integration.  While political union is not a precondition for successful regional integration, neither are markets.  Regional actors such as ASEAN or future institutional arrangements aimed at promoting regional integration must possess both purpose and leadership. 

This event was the second in a series of conferences that Carnegie Beijing has co-sponsored with the Centre for European Studies at Remin University of China about the European Union’s process of integration and its global implications.

Please click here for a list of participants and discussion topics.