Obama’s Asia Policy: His First 100 Days

IMGXYZ1327IMGZYXPresident Obama’s first 100 days have been marked by both departures from and continuations of the Bush administration’s Asian foreign policy. To explore the challenges facing the new administration, Carnegie Beijing and the China Reform Forum co-sponsored a conference with leading China, Russia and Middle East experts.

The United States and China

There was a general consensus among the experts that President Obama’s Asia policy will differ from that of the Bush administration. First, Obama’s philosophy on governance and foreign affairs is less ideological than his predecessor’s was. Obama has expressed an openness to collaboration and multilateralism. Second, President Obama is capable of being an agent of change, if only by virtue of his unique background and his personal history in Asia.

In spite of the general agreement to expect change, much of the discussion focused on relations between the United States and China, where the least change has been seen so far. Robert Sutter foresaw a continuation in the dominance of the United State in Asia. This dominance is a reaction to the power of China; countries in the region maintain ties with the United States in case China becomes “aggressive.” Although U.S.-Sino relations remain one of the most important bilateral partnerships in the world, the Obama administration has pushed China behind other urgent priorities, including the economy, Afghanistan, Pakistan and North Korea. China has not taken an active role in these situations, and its leadership is not ready to do so. Even China’s willingness to collaborate on global financial recovery efforts and six-party talks stem from a set of narrowly defined self-interests, and only incidentally benefit global efforts.

Similarly, on climate change, China may not be ready to back up rhetoric with policy, and Chinese inaction would ultimately hamstring U.S. efforts to address environmental issues. Obama would face difficulty in Congress if China doesn’t commit to anything concrete or costly. Sutter agreed with Han Feng, who described China as “very good at process but poor on results.”

However, the United States may have unrealistic expectations of China’s capability as a global partner. Wang Suolao believed that U.S. expectations of China have traditionally been accompanied by a failure to treat China like the superpower it is. An examination of PRC global partnerships would reveal that China is a constructive and valuable partner. Others in the discussion suggested that the United States makes demands on its international partners without considering their global interests.

These conflicting views of China’s role are difficult to reconcile. The United States recognizes China’s important position in the world -- and the sixty ongoing dialogues between the two countries stand as proof of that recognition – but U.S. expectations will, inevitably, remain low if China refuses to take greater responsibility in issues of importance to the United States.

The United States and Russia

The past few decades of U.S.-Russian relations have been turbulent. Russia resented the Clinton administration for failing to support Yeltsin financially, and Bush’s critiques of an autocratic Putin brought on a dramatic chill in bilateral relations. Moreover, the policies of the United States on Iraq, NATO expansion, missile defense systems, military bases in Central Asia, and Russia’s regional aggression have all led to the need to “reset” U.S.-Russian relations.

It is a good time for a thaw in U.S.-Russian relations. Russia has suffered enormously during the financial crisis; as Kathryn Stoner-Weiss described the situation, Medvedev “can no longer afford to do nothing and Putin can no longer do everything.” The drop in oil prices have made clear that Putin’s authoritarianism was not responsible for Russia’s economic growth, and the subsequent rise in oil prices does not guarantee a repeat of an “economic miracle.”

Stoner-Weiss identified five areas in which the two countries could find space for communication and collaboration. First, both Putin and Medvedev have shown support for supporting international trade rules. Second, the United States is likely to hold off on supporting NATO expansion in Georgia or Ukraine – which is a major irritant to Russia – because neither country is ready for it. Third, Obama is likely not to press the issue of missile defense in Poland or the Czech Republic, because the United States needs Russian cooperation on Afghanistan and Iran, and an improvement with Iran could invalidate the need for a European missile defense. Fourth, both sides have shown interest in moving to reduce nuclear stockpiles. Fifth, given Medvedev’s public commitments to cleaning up corruption and legal violations, Obama has an opportunity to encourage greater rule of law, possibly linking this encouragement to financial incentives.

The United States and the Middle East

It is harder to be optimistic about the situation in the Middle East. Paul Salem, Director of the Carnegie Middle East Center, outlined the challenges facing the region. He described the lack of regional order – the powers in the region are all either at war with each other or plagued with internal conflict. The structural challenges are also great: the Middle East has the highest rate of population growth in the world, the second highest unemployment rate, the youngest population in the world, a 30% illiteracy rate, and severe marginalization of women. Dauntingly, it will need 100 million jobs in the next few years just to absorb the young people entering the workforce.

The Obama administration must address at least three major conflicts in the region. The first is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  The relations between Israel and Palestine worsened during the Bush terms, leading to the recently elected Netanyahu government, which Salem suggested is not expected to last long, and a lack of a single legitimate government among Palestinians. The Obama administration also faces the problem of Iran. After the elections have concluded, it remains an open question whether or not the Iranian leadership will be willing to engage with the U.S. Finally, the ongoing tension between Israel and Syria threatens an outbreak of greater violence.  If the administration can push the Israelis to make peace, Salem suggested, it could be a “game-changer” for the region.  

Others shared in Salem’s pessimism. Characterizing the United States’ Middle East policy as one of “remarkable change, remarkable continuity and remarkable problems,” Wang Suolao pointed out that Obama has promised a new age of engagement while also pledging to continue the United States’ special relationship with Israel. Whether or not the administration can balance these two commitments remains to be seen.

There are, however, some glimmers of hope. Salem said that, although Obama inherited wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, a crisis in Iran, and a stalled Israeli peace process, the president brings to the region a worldview that could be more effective than his predecessor’s. Obama himself is also a potential “change factor” in Middle East relations. His charisma, background, and ability to speak to identity politics may help him repair the damage done by Bush, Cheney, and Rumsfeld.

Regardless of the challenges, the United States’ interest in the Middle East is ultimately tied to geopolitics. The Obama administration cannot disengage from the region. Without the presence of the United States, Iran may become too dominant, and no country in the region wants such an outcome.

Conclusions

Although Obama’s administration is still in its early stages and only beginning to enact regional policies, the trend has been towards rational multilateralism. Sincere international engagement has been stressed, as the United States also attempts to handle the economic crisis.

The financial crisis is changing the world strategic map–some powers are rising and others declining. Yet despite the shifting landscape, Obama must negotiate a long list of foreign policy challenges, in Asia and across the world.