Between Religion and Politics

IMGXYZ2700IMGZYXIn their new book Between Religion and Politics, Carnegie’s Nathan J. Brown and Amr Hamzawy analyze Islamist movements in Egypt, Morocco, Yemen, Jordan, Palestine, and Kuwait, and how these movements have failed to satisfy their political and religious constituencies. The Carnegie Endowment hosted Brown and Hamzawy to discuss their findings. Carnegie’s Marwan Muasher moderated.

The Rise of Islamist Parties

Islamist parties in many Arab countries have roots as broad, multifaceted movements that both perform religious and social functions and have political wings. Given the repressive political context within which most of these parties are forced to operate, few within the movements expected to achieve immediate or substantial electoral success.

• Early Success: In the early 2000s, Islamist parties began to participate more frequently in elections and with real successes. Some analysts suspected that if Islamist parties were to run in transparent, free elections, they would win majorities in many Arab states. 
   
• Responses to Islamist Success: The burgeoning electoral success of Islamist parties caused debates within both Western policy circles and the authoritarian states where Islamists were participating. The Western policy discussion was largely framed in terms of whether to engage these parties. The regimes in the region reacted with both security and political concerns. While some regimes believed these parties could be politically co-opted and corrupted, others used security measures to suppress the parties.

Their political success created a debate within Islamist opposition groups themselves. This tension within Islamist movements can be understood by contrasting the situations of Hamas in Palestine and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. 

Hamas and Governing Gaza

• Early Years: Hamas originally arose as a social resistance movement in the 1980s. Influenced by the early Muslim Brotherhood’s emphasis on religion, it turned to political activism years later. 
   
• The Advent of Elections: With the initiation of the Oslo process, the nascent Palestinian state held its first elections. While not flatly rejecting elections as part of the democratic process, Hamas chose not to participate in elections that it viewed as illegitimate because they were part of the Oslo process. 
   
• After Oslo: Following the second intifada, Hamas decided to participate in elections. Although not expecting to win, the movement was aided by the corrupt and unpopular rule of Fatah. It used a three-prong strategy that emphasized resistance, reform, and governance. In the January 2006 elections, Hamas won 74 of 132 seats.
   
• The Experience of Governance: In June 2007, Hamas seized control of Gaza but has been suppressed in the West Bank.  Brown suggested that “the experience of Hamas demonstrates that the ideology of Islamist movements is often too vague to guide or predict their behavior. While Hamas’ rhetoric has focused on resistance, reform, and governance, its behavior since the election has emphasized some of these aspects above others. In effect, Hamas has deemphasized the more incendiary aspects of the movement and focused on governing Gaza. 

Although Hamas has not decided whether it will return long term to its roots as a resistance-oriented movement, its participation in the political process has led it to emphasize governance in the short term, Brown said. Ultimately, the experience of Hamas demonstrates that Islamist parties with broad, resistance-focused ideologies can recalibrate their focus when faced with an institutional role. 

The Muslim Brotherhood and Participation

According to Hamzawy, the Muslim Brotherhood’s experience in the political process has gone through two distinct phases: its participation before 2005 and that after its landmark showing in the 2005 parliamentary elections. 

• 2005: In the lead up to the 2005 elections, the Muslim Brotherhood took several steps to become a more active participant in the political process. These included:

  • Presenting a reform initiative in which it endorsed democracy. 

  • Entering into dialogue with non-Islamist groups. 

  • Demonstrating a new pragmatism on foreign policy and domestic issues. Prioritizing political activism over social and religious activism, and deemphasizing ideological issues (such as the implementation of Shari’a. 

  • Moving a group of political activists to the forefront of its leadership and presenting them as candidates. 

• Electoral Victory: The Brotherhood took advantage of an unusually open political environment in 2005 and won 88 seats, comprising 20 percent of the National Assembly. It thus had the largest opposition bloc representation in modern Egyptian political history.
   
• Post-2006: The regime enacted a host of repressive initiatives between 2006 and 2010. In response, the Brotherhood started to reverse many of the steps it had taken in 2005 as it became mired in an internal debate over its future in politics. While some members called for the Brotherhood to continue its political participation, others believed the movement should return to its socio-religious focus. 
   
• A Return: The Brotherhood retreated from its 2005 position. The political activists in the movement lost prominence, exemplified by the election of the new Brotherhood General Guide, Mohammed Badie, who hails from a social and religious activism background. As a result, the movement has emphasized ideology over pragmatism, and focused more on Shari’a and addressing internal debates than on reaching out to other opposition groups.
   
• Transformation: Hamzawy suggested that four factors explain the Brotherhood’s transformation following the 2005 elections: 
  1. The domestic context: While the Egyptian population was hopeful the political system would change after the elections, these hopes have since withered as the regime’s repressive measures have increased.
      
  2. Internal Struggles: The Brotherhood’s internal debate regarding participation placed great strain on unity of the movement.
      
  3. Limited gains: Despite its 88 seats in the parliament, the Brotherhood was unable to claim any substantial legislative successes.
      
  4. Wider domestic environment: Other opposition groups have distanced themselves from the Brotherhood since 2007. 

The cases of Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood exemplify the struggles and strains that political participation has placed on Islamist movements, Brown and Hamzawy contended. Furthermore, the tension between political activism and the more traditional religious and social activism of Islamist movements shows no signs of abating. Despite their lack of legislative success, Islamist movements have learned much from their parliamentary participation in regard to party structure and organization, Brown and Hamzawy added. Ultimately, however, they concluded that Islamist movements’ experience with participation, both good and bad, has not led to significant ideological moderation.