The Strategic Dimensions of U.S.–India Relations

IMGXYZ2680IMGZYXIn the first of a series of events previewing President Obama’s November trip to India, Carnegie’s C. Raja Mohan spoke about the overarching structural forces that will shape the U.S.-India relationship in the coming years. He also discussed the domestic and regional pressures that may constrain and inform policy decisions on both sides.  Carnegie’s Ashley J. Tellis moderated.

Global Outlook

International belief in American dominance, which had persisted since the end of the Cold War, is beginning to diminish, Mohan said. As a result, India is becoming an increasingly important partner for the United States in Asia, as both India and the United States work to balance the power of a rising China. With both China and India becoming trading powers, their influence will be felt in traditionally Western domains such as the protection and organization of the maritime commons and the international economic system.

Regional Outlook

Within Asia, there is increasing concern over how the continent will cope with the large militaries, manage the important flashpoints, and integrate the substantial economic engines that must coexist there. Mohan argued that it is better for India to have the United States be part of this discussion of Asia’s future. It is also better for the United States to recognize India as part of Asia as a whole and not just South Asia.

Defense Capabilities in Asia

India is already beginning to assume both a more prominent role and a closer relationship with the United States in Asia, Mohan argued, citing as evidence India’s recent history of defense purchases.  Between 1947 and 2005, India did not purchase a single defense platform from the United States. Over the past five years, however, India has purchased a significant amount of military equipment from the United States. This relationship will only deepen as the United States pares down its own defense expenditures and capabilities in the region, and India fills the resulting gap.