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Changes in the Arab World and Prospects for the Future

Wed. May 11th, 2011
Beijing

IMGXYZ3635IMGZYXThe Arab Spring uprisings have wrought a fundamental change in how citizens in the Arab world view themselves, the state, and their future, ushering in a paradigm shift toward citizenship, democracy, and social justice. These revolutions are united by common underlying causes, catalytic events, and goals, but the prospects for successful democratic transitions vary greatly across the different countries in the region. Although the revolutions were fundamentally domestic in orientation, the outcomes may have profound impacts on regional stability and balance of power issues. 

The Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy hosted a roundtable discussion on the changes occurring in the Middle East and North Africa and their likely effects on regional and global affairs. Paul Salem, director of the Carnegie Middle East Center, visited Beijing to discuss these issues with Chinese scholars, experts, and former Chinese ambassadors.  Carnegie-Tsinghua’s Paul Haenle moderated the discussion.

Triggering a Revolution

Salem argued that a new era has emerged. The success of the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt has altered how citizens in the Arab world view themselves in relation to their governments. 
  • History at Play: The Arab states currently experiencing revolutions were all founded in the middle of the twentieth century on a one-party revolutionary model, Salem explained. In this model, the government’s legitimacy was based on its promise to deliver the party’s ideology of economic growth and success on nationalist goals. In the following decades, however, the party lost its influence and the governments effectively evolved into family dictatorships. To legitimize themselves, the leaders adopted a veneer of democracy, but always without undertaking true reform. Ultimately, Salem concluded, these governments failed to deliver both on their revolutionary promises and on promises of democracy.
     
  • Underlying Socioeconomic Factors: Large numbers of unemployed youth, combined with lackluster and stagnant economic growth, created discontent, especially among the highly educated, Salem said. The corruption of the Arab regimes only exacerbated the tensions created by unemployment and limited economic growth.
     
  • The Catalyst: One young man’s self-immolation in Tunisia on December 17th, 2011 triggered an uprising, which then spread to Egypt and other states in a few months, Salem stated. Arab television facilitated the spread of the movement and social networking sites enabled young people to organize. A consciousness of the spreading revolution was heightened by the fact that one of revolutions occurred in Egypt, a country that has always held a central position in the Arab world. The uprisings also had a shared ideology of promoting democracy and replacing autocratic rule as the dominant political paradigm.

Future Projections in the Arab Countries

Salem asserted that the prospects for reform, collapse, or a return to the status quo vary across the countries of the region, based on the strength and character of the governments and the cohesion of the state.
  • States in Transition: Over the next couple years, Egypt and Tunisia may make the transition to some kind of democracy, although their path will certainly be difficult, Salem said. The new Egyptian government will face significant challenges, especially considering the gap between the high expectations of the Egyptian people and the struggling global economy. The new Egyptian government will have to choose between adopting reforms to create jobs in the long run and hoping the people will be patient, and opting for government spending to create jobs immediately without addressing deeper economic problems, Salem said. 
     
  • States in Peril: Libya, Syria, and Yemen are in danger of failure or collapse, although the prospects are different in each country, Salem said. He predicted that Gaddafi’s “months are limited,” but added that Libya is a sufficiently united country that it will be able to withstand the crisis. In Syria, the regime has mismanaged both promised reforms and the crackdown. If the Assad regime falls, it is possible that civil war will break out along ethnic and religious lines. Such civil war, based on ethnic and tribal divisions, is also a possibility in Yemen, a country where al-Qaeda could play an even more significant role.
     
  • States Likely to Weather the Storm: The monarchies of the region--the Gulf Cooperation Council states, Morocco, and Jordan--were less affected by the revolutions, Salem explained. As monarchies, the states never promised democracy or social justice and, therefore, they never failed to deliver on such promises. In some of the monarchies, democratic reforms had actually progressed further than in the so-called “democracies,” since the king, whose position was secure, had been more willing to reform. Although the monarchies were not directly threatened by this series of revolutions, Salem warned that they may face another wave of uprisings if Egypt emerges as a model for democracy in the Arab world. Saudi Arabia in particularly is threatened by the idea of a democratic-Islamic model. As a result, it has acted to support other Islamic-authoritarian states, including sending Saudi Arabian troops to Bahrain to quell protests.
     
  • Political Islam: A striking feature that surprised many Muslims was the democratic, not Islamic, undertones of the revolutions, Salem said. If democracy replaces political Islam as the ideology of reform, the Islamists may move in a more moderate and pluralist direction to maintain popularity. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood will likely achieve a large bloc in parliament but not a majority, nor the presidency, Salem predicted. This will allow the Brotherhood to play a role in deciding its own development without the West feeling threatened and without the Brotherhood assuming responsibility for Egypt’s future.

Ramifications for International Relations

  • Restoring Egypt’s Leadership Position: The revolution in Egypt restored the country to the leadership role that it lost in 1979 with the Camp David Accords declaring peace with Israel. Egypt demonstrated its renewed leadership by opening the border with Gaza and facilitating the reunion of Fatah and Hamas, Salem said. If Egypt continues this role, and undergoes a successful democratic revolution, it will diminish the influence of both Turkey and Iran, he added.
     
  • Syria’s Deciding Choice: If the Syrian regime falls, Iran’s influence in the region will diminish, Salem argued. Furthermore, Turkey will be forced to abandon its ‘zero problems with neighbors’ outlook if Syria collapses and will have to take sides in Middle Eastern politics.
     
  • Uncertain Impact on the Balance of Influence: Generally, U.S. influence has declined in the region with the increased independence of Egypt. However, the fall of the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes did not significantly alter their nations’ overarching foreign policy goals, and the United States will continue to be the most influential external player. Tehran expected the revolutions to increase its own influence, but this did not transpire and no country affected by an uprising has moved closer to Iran.
     
  • The ‘New’ China: In the Arab world, China is seen as a revolutionary authoritarian regime that, unlike the Arab states, succeeded in delivering on its promises, Salem said. Prior to the revolutions, there was a positive feeling towards China as a country that stood up to the West, which supported dictators during the Cold War. However, after the revolutions, Arabs are increasingly accusing China of caring more about its business than the people of the region, Salem warned.
Salem concluded by quoting Lenin to express the magnitude of the change: “There are decades where nothing happens; and there are weeks where decades happen.”
 
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
event speakers

Paul Salem

Director and Senior Associate, Middle East Center

Salem was director of the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, Lebanon. He works and publishes on the regional and international relations of the Middle East as well as issues of political development and democratization in the Arab world.

Paul Haenle

Maurice R. Greenberg Director’s Chair, Carnegie China

Paul Haenle held the Maurice R. Greenberg Director’s Chair at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and is a visiting senior research fellow at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore. He served as the White House China director on the National Security Council staffs of former presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama.