Maritime Strategy: Security and Governance

China’s investment in its maritime forces has led to a rapid increase in the size and capabilities of the Chinese navy and to China’s rise as a maritime power. The Chinese navy is taking on new missions to protect China’s political and economic interests in the near seas and potentially beyond. But questions have arisen as to how China defines those missions.

The Carnegie-Tsinghua Center and the Institute for Asia Pacific Studies hosted a joint conference on East Asia Maritime Issues. Admiral Yang Yi (Ret.) of the Chinese navy, Abraham Denmark of the Center for a New American Security, Stephanie Klein-Ahlbrandt of the International Crisis Group, Suk-joon Yoon of the ROK Naval War College, and other experts discussed China’s rise and maritime strategy. Liu Ming of the Institute of Asia Pacific Studies moderated.

China’s Maritime Rise

• Context: China had traditionally been a “continental power,” with more focus on the army than the navy. Today, however, China’s economic growth and technological development provides the foundation for a naval build-up. As China’s global role expands, so do the missions and operational capabilities of its maritime forces.
   
• Trajectory: Today, China’s maritime activities include maritime commerce, transportation, and research. Its maritime forces include merchant fleets, scientific research vessels, and naval forces. China’s naval equipment is improving and the operational range of its forces is expanding from coastal defense to high seas operations. In the past fifteen years, China has increased the number of destroyers and attack submarines in its navy and has built an aircraft carrier. However, there is a discrepancy between the strength of the Chinese navy as portrayed in the media and its current strength in reality.
   
• Mission: China’s modern navy has been given the mission of defending national security and territorial integrity and avoiding and deterring conflict. Admiral Yang stated that the navy’s mission is primarily defensive. Denmark commented that the United States worries that the defensive perimeter China seeks to establish includes building zones of exclusivity which would reduce American power and make China the primary regional naval power.

China’s Maritime Strategy

• A Chinese Maritime Strategy: Klein-Ahlbrandt argued that since a number of agencies had a significant role in promulgating South China Sea policy, China lacks a comprehensive maritime strategy. Admiral Yang said that China did not yet have a national maritime strategy, but he discussed it does have separate strategies for issues like Sea Lanes of Communication, the South China Sea, and Taiwan.
   
• Near Seas: Admiral Yang emphasized that, due to their common  reliance on foreign trade, China share the U.S. and Japanese interest in keeping the sea lines of communication open. Denmark stated that the United States perceives China as pursuing a political, economic, and military strategy to build Chinese power in the region and oppose a U.S. forward presence in the near seas and potentially outward from there. French participant Alexandre Sheldon-Duplaix  of the French National Defense University argued that while China seems to be pursuing a Soviet-style bastion strategy in the near seas where China could intercept U.S. operations, Beijing does not seek a forward presence in the Indian Ocean or beyond.
   
• Territorial Disputes: Klein-Albrecht said that if Beijing has a single policy on territorial maritime disputes, it is to move ahead with economic cooperation and hope the disputes are resolved later. Admiral Yang stated that China will not rely on its naval forces for a solution in the South China Sea and that solutions to challenges will be through political means.
   
• The Aircraft Carrier: Sheldon-Duplaix argued that China intended to use the aircraft carrier to extend the operation of its fleet by providing air cover and enable China to establish a bastion in the near seas. Denmark and Admiral Yang both emphasized the political importance of the carrier. Admiral Yang stated that although there is not a clear purpose for the carrier yet, it could be used to provide air coverage to naval forces or in response to a crisis in the Taiwan Straits.

Areas of Conflict

• Sovereignty Disputes: China asserts sovereignty over the islands within the 9-dash line, which conflicts with the claims of other states in the region. U.S. Admiral Eric McVadon stated that the United States does not understand whether China claims the maritime area within the 9-dash line as territorial waters or not. Admiral Yang explained that China asserted sovereignty over the islands and that the waters were a core national interest.
   
• Freedom of Navigation: The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) describes the right of freedom of navigation on the high seas and in the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of other states. Denmark stated that the U.S. believes China is trying to assert sovereign rights in its EEZs in violation of UNCLOS by trying to exclude U.S. ships. A Chinese Scholar disagreed, arguing that China supports free navigation but believes that, in the EEZs, it does not extend to military exercises or intelligence gathering.
   
• United States Military Activities: Chinese scholars raised the issue of U.S. aircraft flying near China, which they argued caused “sensitive feelings” and implied that the United States viewed China as a strategic enemy, not a partner. Denmark stated that China’s proximity to North Korea means that U.S. planes will fly near China in operations directed at Pyongyang.

Areas for Cooperation

• Keeping SLOCs Open: Protecting maritime commerce by keeping the Sea Lines of Communication open, particularly the Malacca Straits, is vital for China’s national interests. China and other regional powers like the United States and Japan may, therefore, cooperate in providing the public good of free navigation.
   
• Combating Non-Traditional Threats: Chinese and U.S. interests are also aligned respecting piracy, humanitarian assistance, disaster response, and counter-proliferation, and therefore there should be opportunities for cooperation in these areas.
   
• Potential Obstacles: Denmark emphasized that different paradigms of shared responsibility may make cooperation difficult. Admiral Yang stated that China prefers to begin cooperation by resolving strategic issues and the United States by resolving details and that this may obstruct cooperation between the two countries.
   

Since World War II, the United States has maintained a forward maritime presence and, with its allies, secured free navigation around the world. However, China’s growing maritime power has raised new questions concerning U.S. objectives for its maritime dominance and how U.S. and Chinese maritime strategies will interact in East Asia.

At the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center and the Institute for Asia Pacific Studies’s conference on East Asia Maritime Issues, the second panel focused on the United States’ maritime strategy and how it interacts with China’s maritime strategy. Admiral Eric McVadon of the U.S. Navy, Admiral Yang Yi of the PLA Navy, and other American, Chinese, South Korean, and Japanese experts discussed these issues. Carnegie-Tsinghua’s Chen Qi moderated the discussion.

The United States’ Maritime Strategy

The 2007 United States Maritime Strategy announced an integrated strategy for deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime security, and humanitarian assistance, but questions arose among the panelists concerning the true objectives and targets of the strategy.

• Objectives: American participants emphasized that the United States pursues a global strategy to ensure open sea lanes around the world. Some Chinese scholars stated that Beijing worried the true objective of the U.S. strategy is to maintain absolute naval superiority in the region. American participant Abraham Denmark of the Center for a New American Security stated that the United States is concerned that China seeks to become the dominant maritime power in East Asia and thus intends to preserve a forward maritime presence in East Asia and around the world to ensure it can preserve freedom of navigation.
   
• China: Admiral McVadon stated that the U.S. strategy should encourage engagement and partnership with China, but that Washington should also hedge against China having a different vision by honing its military capabilities. Admiral Yang stated that the United States has been a “responsible big power,” but that China was concerned that the United States’ air-sea battle concept was focused on a potential conflict with China, which undermined the potential for military cooperation between the countries. Denmark asked what more the United States could do to reassure China of its benign intentions, and Admiral Yang responded that although U.S. leaders do not say China is a threat, China sees evidence in U.S. Quadrennial Defense Reviews and official government documents.

Potential Conflicts 

The participants discussed areas where U.S. regional maritime strategy could interact with Chinese policies and interests in a way that could create tension between the countries.

• Freedom of Navigation: The United States flies reconnaissance missions over what it considers international waters, which means it carries out exercises and information gathering activities in China’s exclusive economic zones. China objects to these activities. The United States sees China’s objections as an attempt to limit freedom of navigation, while China argues these activities are not included in freedom of navigation and demonstrate lack of respect for or mistrust of China.
   
• Taiwan: National policies toward China create serious tensions in the Sino-U.S. bilateral relationship. One serious issue is the U.S. decision to sell arms to Taiwan. U.S. participant Tom Christensen stated that arms sales were solely intended to prevent China from coercing Taiwan back into the fold, which China says it does not want to do. Other American participants stated that if the United States refused to make sales, it would strengthen nationalist voices in Taiwan and destabilize cross-Strait relations. Admiral Yang stated that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan lead to increased budgets for modernization of the Chinese navy and that the time has come for the U.S. to adopt a “new perspective” on the issue.
   
• Dominant Regional Power Issues: The United States seeks to prevent China from becoming a dominant regional maritime power that can deny other countries access to what the United States considers international waters. The U.S. policy arouses concerns in China over why the United States wants to maintain a military advantage in the region. South Korean participant Suk-joon Yoon of the ROK Naval War College asked what China would do, were it the dominant regional power, to avoid confrontation when North Korea acts threateningly towards South Korea.

Potential for Cooperation

• Pursuit of Common Interests: No nation can respond to emerging international threats alone, so cooperation among states with similar interests is essential. The United States and China have common interests in promoting secure maritime commerce, combating piracy, and providing humanitarian assistance. China’s participation in combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden and intermittent cooperation on North Korea illustrates that the two countries can cooperate effectively when there is a political will. Such cooperation builds confidence between China and the United States, concluded someone.
   
• Multilateral Cooperation: On some issues, multilateral cooperation will be important. Admiral McVaden proposed reviving the idea of a Global Maritime Partnership consisting of an international mixture of ships and other forces to provide security to which almost every country could contribute according to its policies and capabilities.
   
• Threats to Cooperation: In the past, China has broken off cooperation or dialogue with the United States in response to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Chinese scholars also brought up provisions in the U.S. National Defense Appropriations Act that restrict military-to-military cooperation with China. Doubts on each side about the intentions of the other in the region undermine cooperation, the panelists agreed. Admiral McVaden stated that mistrust should be an additional reason for cooperating, not an impediment.
   

Japan has expanded the capabilities and mission of its Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces (JMSDF) to respond to the changing regional security environment. Japan’s maritime strategy continues to be grounded in the U.S.-Japan alliance, but Japan has widened its operational range and focused on new potential challenges to stability and open access. 

The third panel at the conference on East Asia maritime issues co-hosted by the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center and the Institute for Asia Pacific Studies focused on Japan’s maritime strategy and its intersection with U.S. and Chinese policies and objectives. Captain Keiichi Kuno of the JMSDF, Patrick Cronin of the Center for a New American Security, Alexandre Sheldon-Duplaix of the French National Defense University, and other experts discussed these issues. David Winkler of the U.S. Naval Historical Foundation moderated.

Japan’s Maritime Strategy

• Dynamic Defense: Japan is following a dynamic defense strategy under which the JMSDF would pursue dynamic deterrence through continuous surveillance and reconnaissance; build or maintain the capacity to respond immediately to various situations; and undertake proactive activities to improve the security environment. The mission of the JMSDF remains exclusively defense-oriented, but its area of operations has expanded and the level of its participation in maritime activities has increased.
   
• Part of the U.S. Alliance System: Japan’s naval development has been shaped by challenges to the U.S.-led alliance system. During the Cold War, the JMSDF protected U.S. submarines and aircraft carriers in the Pacific and tracked Soviet ships. Post-Cold War, the JMSDF took on new missions like responding to the North Korean threat and operating to support U.S. forces in the Middle East and to contribute to anti-piracy missions. In 2010, in response to what was perceived as additional pressure from China on jurisdictional disputes, Japan announced the dynamic defense strategy and shifted its geographic focus.
   
• Providing Public Goods: Japan sees the U.S.-Japan alliance as a cornerstone of its defense policy and as providing the public goods of stability and secure maritime transport in the region. Japan’s maritime strategy is to support the United States in providing these goods, particularly in securing the Sea Lines of Communication.
   
• Environmental Conservation and Development of Resources: The 2007 Basic Act on Ocean Policy called for environmental conservation and sustainable development in Japan’s exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and continental shelf as principles. This includes promoting Japan’s sovereignty claims to offshore islands and the adjacent EEZs in the South China Sea and exploiting the resources there.

Potential Tension with China

• Maritime Disputes: Japan and China both claim sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in the South China Sea. The conflicting sovereignty claims give rise to conflicting resource claims in the area around the islands and conflicting claims about fishing rights, explained someone. Furthermore, Japanese and U.S. conceptions of free navigation sometimes conflict with the Chinese conceptions on issues of military exercises and intelligence gathering.
   
• Obstacles to Resolution: Both Japan and China have strongly held positions on sovereignty grounded in an interpretation of history and of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Both countries have strong interests in protecting their claims to the resources in the adjacent maritime area. Sheldon-Duplaix stated that neither side supports resolution by an international court. A Chinese participant stated that even if both sides agreed to establish a mechanism to resolve the dispute, it is not clear which agency within the Chinese government would have the authority to settle the issue.
   
• Persistent Mistrust: China has criticized Japan’s recent policies in the South China Sea as too militarist and expansionist. Japan has responded that the policies are not new, that the Japanese military budget remains only 1 percent of GDP, and that though the mission is expanding it is still purely defensive. Still, mistrust seems to permeate the relationship; when Chinese participants asked why only 15 of the 200 Chinese personnel sent to assist Japan after the Fukushima-Daiichi disaster were accepted, Japanese participants said that while the government had not known the scale of the disaster and that there were a lot of personnel and ships on the scene already, they did not know why the government had refused help in some cases.

Possibilities for Cooperation

• Combating Non-Traditional Security Threats: Common challenges such as piracy, terrorism, and humanitarian disasters cannot be met alone. Japan leads a range of defense exchange and training programs, joint exercises, port visits, and personnel exchanges with other countries to address these. Captain Kuno stated that the maritime surveillance would be an important area for Sino-Japanese cooperation.
   
• The U.S.-Japan Maritime Cooperation Model: American and Japanese participants stressed the strength of U.S.-Japanese cooperation as a model or goal for other cooperative ventures. In the wake of Fukushima, U.S. and Japanese forces were interoperable and relied on joint use of military bases.

International Paradigms for China’s Maritime Development?

Sheldon-Duplaix suggested that the maritime policies of European countries or Japan during the Cold War might suggest a path for China’s maritime development. He predicted that France’s naval capabilities during the Cold War, which included two aircraft carriers, six nuclear powered ballistic nuclear missile-carrying submarines, and ten fast-attack submarines, would be about what the PLA Navy could realistically achieve in the near future. He also proposed that the Japanese model of beginning with defensive operations close in and expanding outward may preview China’s development as well. Admiral Yang of the PLA Navy remarked that France was “too small” to serve as a model for China.
 

A competitive power dynamic has emerged in the Asian maritime domain as China’s rising naval power meets the U.S. policy of maintaining its power projection capacity. Tensions have also arisen between China and other states in the region over overlapping sovereignty claims in the South and East China Seas. These dynamics make cooperation among the regional powers on common interests more difficult but also more critical for regional and global security.

The Carnegie-Tsinghua Center and the Institute for Asia Pacific Studies held a conference on East Asia maritime issues. For the fourth session, which focused on areas of conflict and cooperation among China, Japan, and the United States, participants included Admiral Kazumine Akimoto of Japan, Gao Lan of the Institute of Asia Pacific Studies, U.S. Admiral Eric McVaden, Jiao Shixin of the Institute of Asia Pacific Studies, and other experts. Princeton professor and former U.S. official Tom Christensen moderated.

The Regional Balance of Power

• U.S. Maritime Strategy: As the dominant naval power in East Asia, the United States  and its allies have maintained freedom of navigation and other public goods. The United States seeks to maintain the ability to project its power in the region and to prevent China from having the capacity to deny the United States that ability. Chinese participants saw the U.S. determination to remain the dominant regional military force as related to but distinct from its commitment to freedom of navigation.
   
• U.S. Strategy and ASEAN: Jiao stated that President Obama’s “return to Asia” marked a change in U.S. policy in the region. He argued that Washington is building partnerships with the ASEAN countries in order to recover lost influence, benefit from their economic growth, maintain air dominance to keep watch on China, and take advantage of territorial disputes between China and its neighbors. Christensen argued there was no policy change as the United States had “never left Asia,” adding that the United States supports China’s rise.
   
• Chinese Maritime Strategy: Under China’s “9-dash” line, all of the South China Sea would be a Chinese exclusive economic zone (EEZ. As China’s maritime forces, and therefore its capacity to act on its claims, have expanded, there is increasing concern among other Asian nations. The United States and other countries believe that China is modernizing its navy to enable it to carry out an Anti-Access/Access Denial (A2/AD) strategy in the South China Sea. Admiral Yang Yi of the PLA Navy stated that China would only apply its A2/AD capacity to a conflict in the Taiwan Straits and that the United States had misinterpreted China’s purposes.
   
• Conflict Improbable Despite Competition: Several participants expressed their view that despite the competitive dynamic in the maritime domain, there will be no military confrontation between the United States, Japan, and China. Chinese and Japanese participants expressed their belief that the economic cost of such a confrontation would be so unbearable as to preclude its occurring.

Sovereignty Claims in the Near Seas

China’s disputes with neighboring states concerning territorial claims in the near seas have escalated recently, as has Chinese concern over U.S. involvement in the disputes.

• China’s Disputes: China claims sovereignty over all the islands within the “9-dash line,” encompassing most of the near seas. Some of these islands are also claimed by ASEAN countries, and the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands are also claimed by Japan. Disputes have escalated in recent years as the implementation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and China’s rising maritime power caused China and the other claimant states to promote their claims through statements and development policies. China asserts that its 9-dash line claim dates back to the 1940s, predating UNCLOS, but other countries disagree.
   
• The Role of the United States: Chinese scholars stated that the United States had recently altered its policy by deciding to involve itself China’s territorial disputes. One Chinese scholar described the United States as “breaking its silence” on the Diaoyu island issue by stating the U.S.-Japan security treaty applied to the islands and conducting multilateral military exercises in the near seas. American participants stated that the exercises in question were not related to Diaoyu and that there had been no U.S. policy change because the United States had always held the security treaty applied to territory claimed by Japan.

Opportunities for Cooperation

Participants noted opportunities for cooperation among the regional powers and emphasized the importance of such cooperation for regional and global peace and security.

• Areas for Cooperation: The U.S., Japanese, and Chinese navies are all becoming more modern and powerful, but none can provide regional security goods alone, agreed the participants. They saw opportunities for bilateral and multilateral cooperation to provide commercial maritime security, combat non-traditional security threats, and provide humanitarian or disaster relief.
   
• Mechanisms of Cooperation: McVaden argued that Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi’s 2005 initiative for regional cooperation to combat piracy and the existing Global Military Force proposal could be combined to enhance trust and cooperation among nations. Other U.S. and Chinese participants stated that building blocks like the U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue officer-to-officer cooperation must precede large-scale cooperation. They emphasized the need for increased transparency. One Chinese scholar proposed that China take the first step by pledging not to use force to resolve territorial disputes or interfere with free navigation.
   
• Impediments to Cooperation: American participants stated that China’s use of fishing vessels to pursue its territorial policies in the near seas undermines the potential for cooperation by making it difficult to have officer-to-officer exchanges. They also emphasized that China’s policy of breaking off talks as retaliation undermined cooperation because institutions are brittle and difficult to restart. Chinese perceptions of the United States as interfering in its territorial disputes may also make cooperation more difficult, Chinese participants added.
   

How can China, Japan, and the United States cooperate to provide public goods in the East Asia maritime domain and diffuse tensions and build trust among their governments? There are several areas where multinational cooperation is necessary to promote shared goals and where states’ overlapping strategic interests are not involved. There are also areas where tension seems out of proportion to the likely gains of any state and should be diffused.

The Carnegie-Tsinghua Center and the Institute for Asia Pacific Studies held a conference on maritime issues in East Asia. Albert Shimkus of the U.S. Naval War College, Hiroko Maeda of Japan’s PHP Institute, Wang Duanyong of Shanghai International Studies University, Christine Parthemore of the Center for a New American Security, Li Mingjiang of Nanyang Technical University, and other experts in the field discussed maritime development and policy coordination among the regional powers. Patrick Cronin of the Center for a New American Security moderated.

Potential Avenues of Cooperation

Cooperation is essential to promoting regional security and to building positive relationships among countries. Participants identified areas where cooperation should be productive and feasible.

• Medical Cooperation: There is great potential for collaboration and cooperation in health care delivery systems in disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, because all regional powers have an interest in promoting a stable environment and no country has the capacity to address issue alone, agreed participants. Shimkus proposed a multilateral effort based on a sovereign country’s request for assistance that would involve joint training and delivery of medical aid. Such a program would build trust between the assisting countries in addition to supporting the beneficiary country.
   
• Non-Traditional Security Threats: Transnational non-traditional security threats require multilateral cooperation, and national interests are aligned in this area, added participants. One participant cited Prime Minister Koizumi’s multilateral cooperation program to combat piracy as a potential model, stating that incidents of piracy in Southeast Asia have decreased since 2006. China and the United States have also cooperated battling piracy in the Gulf of Aden.
   
• Technology and Scientific Research: The energy resources in the South China Sea will require deepwater and ultra-deepwater drilling to extract. The Deepwater Horizon disaster illustrates the danger of such drilling, and the United States should share its technological and regulatory experiences and lessons with other countries to avoid future catastrophic failures. The United States should also cooperate with other countries on oceanographic research on the course of climate change that could be used to bolster coastal infrastructure and adapt to changes, added another participant. Such research is essential and less politically contentious than security cooperation.

Diffusing Tensions

Participants also identified several areas where the predominating competitive dynamic could be moderated.

• Halt Futile Energy Competition: Parthemore stated that the actual capacity of the energy reserves in the region is insufficient to justify destabilizing energy competition. Based on the current reserve-to-production ratio, BP estimates that proven reserves will run out in 14.4 years, and even the most optimistic data sets predict 20-30 years. Furthermore, tar-sands and deepwater oil exploration are the most expensive forms of oil production, and Exxon predicts that relatively soon oil drilling in the region will not be cost-effective relative to types of renewable energy. She emphasized that other trends related to climate change—collapsing fisheries, destruction of agricultural land, and displacement of people—will have a much greater effect on the economies and populations in the region.
   
• Increase Transparency: Participants from the United States, Singapore, and Japan expressed concern that China was ambiguous concerning what rights it claims over the waters within the 9-dash line. Li argued that the only claim that accords with history and international law is a claim of sovereignty over the islands within the line and rights governed by United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea over the waters. He argued that China should formally clarify its claim to prove its peaceful intentions and create room for joint development and piece-by-piece resolution. Maeda added that China should promote maritime stability and multilateral dialogue by explaining its maritime goals, renouncing settlement by force, and increasing transparency concerning its naval build-up.

The East Asia maritime domain presents opportunities for both conflict and cooperation, and the policies that the regional powers pursue will have profound implications for regional and global security and stability. Some of the tensions that have arisen are based on conflicting national strategies and must be controlled, while others can be resolved or avoided by dialogue and confidence building. There are also opportunities for cooperation to promote common goals that could also have positive effects on the overall relations between the countries.

As part of a conference on East Asia maritime issues hosted by the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center and the Institute for Asia Pacific Studies, panelists focused on issues of conflict and potential cooperation mechanisms among the states in the region. They included Hong Nong of China’s National Institute for South China Sea Studies, Li Nan of the U.S. Naval War College, David Winkler of the Naval Historical Foundation, Xue Chen of the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, and other experts from the United States, China, Japan, and South Korea. Admiral Kazumine Akimoto of Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Forces moderated.

Disputes in the South and East China Seas

• Territorial Claims: The Republic of China asserted its claim over the territory contained within the 9-dash line in 1941, and the People’s Republic of China asserts that it is the successor to that claim and that China has never relinquished it although it has not always been able to enforce it. Chinese participants stated that China asserts sovereignty over the islands and bases its claims over the waters on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)but also expects other countries to recognize Chinese historical rights. Meanwhile, Japan and other claimant states in the South China Sea advance competing interpretations of history and UNCLOS. In 2002, the parties in the South China Sea pledged non-escalation of the disputes.
   
• Claims of Rights in the EEZs: The Impeccable incident of 2009, when the U.S. ocean surveillance ship was shadowed and harassed by the Chinese navy, brought to the fore the question of what rights freedom of navigation grants when traveling in the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of other states. Chinese participants asserted that China respects freedom of navigation in its EEZs but that such freedom does not include military activities such as exercises and intelligence gathering under UNCLOS. U.S. participants asserted that freedom of navigation in the EEZs, as protected by UNCLOS, includes intelligence collection and peaceful activities, as it does on the high seas.
   
• The Role of the United States: China perceives U.S. declarations and military exercises since 2009 as evidencing a desire to “internationalize” the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, while the United States asserts it  remains committed to a peaceful solution between the parties. China also perceives a change in U.S. policy in supporting the Japanese side of the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute, while the United States asserts it sided with Japan as a legal matter years ago and remains committed to peaceful resolution. China rejects a U.S. role in the South China Sea issues and seeks bilateral resolution of the disputes, but the ASEAN countries insist that China treats them as a block for the purposes of resolution, and, faced with China’s refusal to do so, have been receptive the statements by U.S. officials.
   
• Policy Options for China and the United States: There are real differences in national interest that cannot be solved merely by reducing misunderstandingbut different policies can ameliorate or exacerbate these differences. Xue stated that China could adopt a passive approach of developing counter-intelligence systems to foil U.S. intelligence collection operations and referring disputes to the Strategic Economic Dialogue or some similar body, or it could adopt a pro-active approach such as it employed during the Impeccable Incident. U.S. participant Abraham Denmark stated that harassing ships is a dangerous and unproductive strategy for resolving disputes. South Korean participant Suk-joon Yoon proposed that the United States could unilaterally stop large-scale military exercises in China’s EEZs. U.S. Admiral Eric McVaden emphasized the history of the U.S. commitment to protecting the full range of activities allowed under freedom of navigation.

Areas for Cooperation and Dialogue

• Non-Traditional Security Threats: China’s contribution to anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden illustrates the potential for multilateral cooperation among the regional actors where their interests are aligned. China participates by protecting its ships, contributing satellite-based tracking and communication, and cooperating with other militaries by sharing information and conducting joint exercises. Li Nan proposed that this might offer a template for multilateral anti-piracy cooperation in the East China Sea, where China could contribute to building the capacity of the littoral states in the Malacca Straights.
   
• Submarine Collision: Winkler stated that submarine collision between the United States and China is inevitable and that dialogue and confidence-building in advance are necessary to ensure it is handled well. He argued that Soviet-U.S. military-to-military dialogue during the Cold War offered a model for how the United States and China could handle such an incident—through military-to-military exchanges bolstered by training operations to build confidence and prepare for submarine rescue operations.