The Story of Lashkar-e-Taiba

The Washington Post's Pamela Constable and Carnegie’s Stephen Tankel discussed U.S. policy toward Pakistan and Pakistan's relationship with terrorist organizations operating within its borders. In his new book, Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkar-e-Taiba, Tankel traces the development of the Pakistani militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) into an organization with global reach and details why the Pakistani security establishment is unlikely to dismantle its long-time proxy any time soon. As both Tankel and Constable noted, comprehending how LeT why and has grown can provide a window into understanding other Pakistani groups that have expanded in recent years.

Understanding Lashkar-e-Taiba

The secret to understanding LeT’s evolution lies in grasping the two dualities that define it. As Tankel explained: first, it is a missionary and a militant organization; second, it is a pan-Islamist outfit and a Pakistan proxy. Born during the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan, with the help of state support it grew into the most feared militant group in South Asia well as a major social welfare provider in Pakistan. 

• Shared Ideology and Interests: Despite its origins in Afghanistan and participation in foreign fronts such as Bosni-Herzegovina and Iraq, LeT views Kashmir as the most crucial front in a larger jihad against India, through which it hopes to spark a Muslim revolt in the predominantly Hindu state, Tankel said. The compatibility of LeT’s goals with those of the Pakistani military has facilitated close cooperation. 


• The Power of State Support: For much of its history, LeT has been protected by Pakistan’s military establishment and remains its most reliable proxy against Indian influence over disputed territories. As Tankel chronicled in his book how LeT has maintained a legal, above-ground presence through its social welfare organization Jama'at-ud-Da'wah, which has enhanced LeT’s influence. Its on-the-ground presence in relief operations after a recent earthquake in Balochistan and last year’s floods in Punjab have earned LeT goodwill among many Pakistani citizens, Constable added. 


• A Faithful Proxy? Lashkar-e-Taiba’s ongoing activities are deeply intertwined with the strategic objectives of the Pakistani military, Tankel explained. Given India’s relative superiority in the conventional military balance, successive governments in Pakistan have fielded proxy groups to conduct asymmetric warfare against its longstanding rival. Since the 1990s, LeT has emerged as the premier proxy in Pakistan’s campaign against India. For Pakistan, the imperative to check perceived Indian aggression remains paramount. He also noted that LeT remains one of the few organizations not to launch attacks against the state, which contributes to its favorable treatment at the hands of the Pakistani military. 


• A “Schizophrenic” Approach: Faced with threats from both domestic terrorism and external aggression from India, the Pakistani military has adopted a dual approach to managing militant groups, continuing to support or at least cutting deals with pro-state organizations while targeting jihadists who directly attack the state, noted Tankel. 


• Leverage in an Unequal Relationship: Ironically, LeT’s vulnerability as an organization may have contributed to its continued survival, Tankel explained. The Pakistani military maintains substantial leverage over LeT, which has often alienated both militant groups and potential recruits with its doctrinaire brand of Islam. LeT’s above-ground presence in the form of schools and businesses also make for easy targets for a crackdown, although doing so could risk a public backlash.


• Puppets or Rogues: LeT manages to stay on the favorable side of the dividing line, committed to waging jihad externally, against India and, since the middle of the last decade, Coalition forces in Afghanistan.  According to Tankel, LeT’s leadership is under competing pressure from the ISI on one hand to toe remained focused on India as well as Afghanistan, and from members of its rank-and-file on the other to push the envelope and launch transnational attacks against Western interests or engage in terrorist violence in Pakistan. There is evidence the devastating Mumbai attacks in 2008were devised in part to increase LeT’s visibility and draw recruits away from competing groups.


• A Diminished Capacity for Control? In those instances when LeT leaders do not go far enough, some of its members engage in freelancing or unsanctioned operations. Sprawling, transnational networks also heighten the possibility that mid or lower level operatives will organize attacks not endorsed by the higher leadership, Tankel added.