The Russia-Middle East Connection: The Arab Spring and its Impact on Russia’s Muslims

Since the Arab Spring first broke out in December 2011, Russian policymakers have viewed regional developments with more unease than American and Western European governments. Domestically, the Russian state has been in conflict with nationalists from several Muslim majority areas for over two decades. Meanwhile, Islamist parties in the Middle East have emerged as the largest beneficiaries of the Arab Spring, and Russian officials wonder what it means for their relationship with Russia's own Muslim minority.

In order to discuss Russia’s policy in the Middle East and the reaction of the Russian Muslim community to the Arab Spring, the Carnegie Middle East Center hosted a discussion with Alexey Malashenko, the co-chair of the Carnegie Moscow Center’s Religion, Society, and Security Program. Carnegie’s Paul Salem moderated.

Realities in Russia

• Muslim Population in Russia:  Malashenko noted that estimates of the Muslim population in Russia have generally ranged from 3 to 33 million, depending on whether analysts count only devout religious practitioners or include people with cultural affiliations to Islam. He suggested that the real figure stands at 20–21 million Muslims in Russia, over 10 percent of the conutry’s population.
   
• ‘Islam in Russia’ not ‘Russian Islam’: Malashenko stressed that the Muslim population is found across Russia. Moscow, with a Muslim population of over 1.5 million, is the biggest Muslim city in Europe. Other regions across Russia, he added, are home to communities where over 10 to 20 percent of the population is Muslim.
   
• Religious Revival: After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a process of religious revitalization took place among both Orthodox Christians and Russian Muslims, Malashenko stated. The Kremlin has so far failed to take into account the needs and aspirations of the Muslim minority , which has led to political upheaval, he added.
   
• Politicization: Malashenko added that growing Russian and Muslim nationalism has led to religious politicization, and Russian policymakers have yet to seriously tackle this issue.

Muslim Unease with the Kremlin

• Frustration: Malashenko said that Muslims have turned increasingly toward Islam out of frustration with the Kremlin’s policies. He described Islamic terrorism as a final reaction against failed state policies, which so far have failed to improve the social and economic conditions of the Muslim minority in Russia. 
   
• Common Misperceptions: Malashenko countered two common misperceptions about Russian Muslims:
  
  
  1. Federalism Not Separatism: Malashenko stressed that most Muslims want peace and a normal life within the Russian Federation, even if that goal has not yet been reached. Separatists represent a small minority of Russian Muslims, he added.
      
  2. Limited Arab Influence: Malashenko also noted that Arab influence in Russia is virtually absent, despite claims otherwise. Financial support for Muslims is coming entirely from within Russia, he added. 


• Causes of Change: Malashenko attempted to explain the causes of rising Muslim nationalism and religiosity:
  
  
  • Not Tied to Religiosity: Muslim nationalism in regions with high concentrations of Tatars, for example, began growing last year despite this group having a low level of religiosity, Malashenko argued.
     
  • ‘Internationalization of Islam’: Conservative forms of Islam are being introduced with the influx of Muslim migrants from Central Asia and the Caucasus. Malashenko argued that the ‘internationalization of Islam’ has led to more conservative interpretations of Islam taking hold in Russia.

The Kremlin and the Arab Spring

Malashenko argued that the Kremlin did not pay much attention to the Arab Spring when it first broke out, viewing the Middle East and Russian “Muslimhood” as two distinct issues. He explained some of the reasons behind the frustration of Russian Muslims with the Kremlin’s foreign policy: 

• Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab World: As the Muslim Brotherhood rose to power in Egypt and Tunisia, Russian Muslims began wondering why the Kremlin had developed relations with them while ignoring their own community in Russia, Malashenko argued.
   
• Contradictory Kremlin Policies: Russian Muslims noticed that while the Kremlin has developed relations with the Muslim Brotherhood in foreign countries, it continued to consider the group’s branch in Russia as a terrorist organization. Malashenko explained that this inconsistency helps explain growing Muslim political activity in Russia.
   
• Syria: Malashenko stated that Russian Muslims were not paying much attention to Syria at first. In the beginning of 2013, however, Russian Muslims began supporting the Islamic opposition. Malashenko argued that while Russian Muslims were not against Putin or the Russian state, they opposed Bashar al-Assad and even loyal Muslims refused to accept Russian foreign policy toward Damascus. 

Conclusion

Malashenko was reluctant to draw major predictions, but he argued that Russian Islam will continue to grow in influence out of frustration with the Kremlin’s policies and as a result of growing migration from Central Asia. Malashenko also said that many Russians are afraid of Islam and have become more fearful since the outbreak of the Arab Spring, factors that may lead to further conflict.