Tripoli From the Brink? Addressing the Underlying Challenges , May, 7, 2014

Wed. May 7th, 2014
Beirut

Tripoli has become the focal point for much of the conflict in Lebanon, with the locus of this conflict centered in the Bab al-Tabbaneh and Jabal Mohsen neighborhoods. Due in part to the ongoing fighting and deep-seated hatred between these two communities, as well as the effective absence of the Lebanese state, the instability has had a far more pronounced impact on Tripoli than most areas of Lebanon.

The Carnegie Middle East Center and Human Rights Watch hosted a public conference focusing on the sectarian dynamics and the socioeconomic challenges influencing the conflict in Tripoli in the Bab al-Tabbaneh and Jabal Mohsen neighborhoods. It sought to evaluate the Lebanese state’s response to the Tripoli conflict in terms of security provision, protection of civilians, and socioeconomic relief. During this conference, experts presented the challenges of the internal conflict in Tripoli while juxtaposing it with the larger Lebanese and regional context.

Wed. May 7th, 2014 9:00 AM - 10:00 AM EST

Background on Tripoli

Tripoli is in need of reform and development, struggling with poor socioeconomic conditions, a deteriorating economy, and absent security measures.

The University of Balamand’s Samer Annous, International Crisis Group’s Sahar Atrash, director of the Business Development Organization in Tripoli Fawaz Hamdi, and former mayor of Tripoli Rashid Jamali provided a general overview on Tripoli, including its history, its current socioeconomic and security trends, and suggestions for reform. Atrash chaired the panel. 

  • Poor Socioeconomic Conditions: Jamali listed a number of disturbing statistics, including the fact that 57 percent of Tripoli’s inhabitants live below the upper poverty line, school enrollment is at 55 percent, and unemployment reaches 40 percent among the youth.  However, Hamdi noted that these socioeconomic problems are not unique to Tripoli. The entire northern Lebanon region has similar trends, and the north is home to around 46 percent of Lebanon’s extremely poor population. 
     
  • Migrants: The schism between the old city of Tripoli (downtown) and the new one has created a sense of alienation, where people in the old town do not accept migrants coming from underprivileged areas of the north, added Annous. The reverse is true as well, with migrants feeling isolated from people in the old town.
     
  • Deteriorating Economy: At the beginning of the civil war in 1975, economic hardship grew in Tripoli, particularly after the Iraq Petroleum Company closed its pipelines in the city, Hamdi explained. The economic situation deteriorated further after the start of the Syrian-Palestinian conflict in the 1980s. Today, the harbor of Tripoli handles only 6 percent of Lebanon’s maritime traffic and Beirut accounts for the rest.
     
  • Absent Security Measures: Sunni leaders of Tripoli have financed militants, who, in return, help gather voters, said Annous. He explained the popular discourse in Tripoli is that Hezbollah is the major reason for confrontation. There are, however, deeper socioeconomic roots to the crisis, he contended. Atrash warned that Tripoli is a microcosm of what is happening in Lebanon and that the political system continues to produce renewed crises.
     
  • Need for Reform: Reform and development is required in tourism, agriculture, education, and infrastructure, stated Hamdi. The population must be reduced and land area expanded, he said, adding that he sees a great deal fo potential for the Rachid Karameh area. 

Sahar Atrash

Wed. May 7th, 2014 9:00 AM - 10:00 AM EST

Sectarian Dynamics of the Conflict

The Bab al-Tabbaneh–Jabal Mohsen conflict has revealed the lack of state response to the violence and the ineffectiveness of Tripoli’s security plan.

Human Rights Watch’s Lama Fakih, the Carnegie Middle East Center’s Raphaël Lefèvre, and the Carnegie Middle East Center’s Yezid Sayigh discussed the sectarian dynamics of the conflict and the impact of regional conflicts on Lebanon. Lina Khatib, director of the Carnegie Middle East Center, chaired the panel. 

  • Sunni-Alawite Conflict: There have been increasing attacks targeting the Alawite community in different parts of Tripoli, said Fakih. The violence documented shows that Sunni militants have targeted and destroyed shops owned by Jabal Mohsen residents. In other instances, gunmen have demanded money from shop owners in exchange for protection.
     
  • State Response to Violence: Only 20 percent of those who have perpetrated attacks arrested ,even when the perpetrators are identified by victims, continued Fakih, stating that the government’s response to both the generalized attacks and the targeted attacks has been weak.
     
  • A Divide Between Leaders and People: There is a growing divide between political leaders and the people of Tripoli, said Lefèvre, noting that the latest security plan did not reverse underlying dynamics in the city. To the contrary, the security plan has increased the gap between politicians and militias, he noted. Resentment from Bab al-Tabbaneh militants towards the March 14 party for a perceived withdrawal of their support has shifted allegiances towards alternative (and perhaps more extremist) political groups, concluded Lefèvre.
     
  • Salafists in Tripoli: The security plan seems to be based on the assumption that stopping the clashes between Bab al-Tabbaneh and Jabal Mohsen is going to reduce the local appeal of Salafi Jihadism, said Lefèvre. This assumption overlooks the fact that Salafist groups were always a minority in the fight against Jabal Mohsen; the conflict that drives recruitment for Jihadist groups is in Syria, not Tripoli. Salafism is a very heterogeneous movement; in a city population of 6,000, they account for half of the population (3,000). However, they are bitterly divided among those who receive support from Qatar and those from Saudi Arabia, as well as over whether to send fighters to Syria, said Lefèvre.
     
  • Impact of Regional Conflicts: Reaching an agreement regarding Iran’s nuclear program would significantly ease tensions in the region, said Sayigh. However, if no understanding is reached, then the proxy wars between Iran and Saudi Arabia will continue, he predicted. 
     
  • Recommendations: Human Rights Watch recommends that economic grievances in the city be resolved, that conflicting sides should meet and reconcile to resolve issues like poverty, and that compensation for losses is necessary, noted Fakih. Furthermore, Sayigh said that either the central government must devise a plan to reconstruct the city economically or the North Governorate must be given the authority to help develop the region. 

Raphaël Lefèvre

Nonresident Scholar, Middle East Center

Wed. May 7th, 2014 9:00 AM - 10:00 AM EST

State Response and Policy Options

Tripoli—with the assistance of the central government—must no longer be used as a battleground for political forces. A systematic infrastructure and economic development plan is needed.

Representative of the Ministry of Justice Ahmad Al Ayoubi, representative of the High Relief Council of Tripoli Adib Eit, Khaldoun El Sharif, adviser to the former prime minister Najib Mikati, member of Tripoli’s municipal council Chamseen Mohammad, and judge and activist based in Tripoli Nabil Sari discussed the state’s response to violence and policy options. Nadim Houry, deputy director of Human Rights Watch’s Middle East and North Africa division and director of the Beirut office, chaired the panel. 

  • Ministry of Justice: The Ministry of Justice has two main objectives: holding culprits equally accountable for their actions and guaranteeing that those accused are given their rights and a proper defense in court, said Al Ayoubi.
     
  • Higher Relief Council: The Higher Relieve Council has been involved in Tripoli since the start of the clashes in 2008, said Eit. Compensation plans were put in place for the residents of Jabal Mohsen and Bab al-Tabbaneh, and families of those injured or killed in the clashes were compensated. After the end of the clashes, the objective of the council was to carry out investigations into the affected areas to obtain an estimate on total damages and to distribute food and medical aid to those most affected by the clashes, said Eit. 
     
  • Judiciary: Sari explained that judiciary’s role is to go after those actors directly responsible for the clashes, as well as those who initially provoked the violence. There will not be peace until the judiciary system in Lebanon becomes independent from the political one, added Sari. 
     
  • Recommendations for Infrastructure Development: Restoration and development plans are urgently needed to fight poverty in the city, said Eit. Setting up a crisis unit for the city of Tripoli in cooperation with the Lebanese government is also a priority. Mohammad added that a well-structured plan is needed in Tripoli–merely rebuilding after each round of violence is not enough. He added that the first step is to stop using Tripoli as a battleground for political forces. A strategy to develop the city cannot be put forward by Tripolitan politicians alone; support is needed from the central government, asserted El Sharif. 
     
  • Recommendations for Economic Development: El Sharif said that Sunnis in Lebanon are not marginalized because of a lack of leadership, but rather from a lack of initiative. The conflict is not to blame on single individuals–funding is coming from larger organizations and regional powers, said El Sharif. Creating jobs is the biggest priority for prompting the economic and social development of Tripoli, he said, explaining that Tripoli’s harbor could play an important role in the city’s development. Mohammaded concluded that banks should not blacklist residents of Jabal Mohsen and Bab al-Tabbaneh areas and added that employment opportunities are needed for those taking part or affected by the clashes.

Adib Eit

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
event speakers

Ahmad Al Ayoubi

Samer Annous

Samer Annous is chairman of the English department at the University of Balamand.

Sahar Atrash

Adib Eit

Khaldoun El Sharif

Lama Fakih

Lama Fakih is Human Rights Watch’s Middle East and North Africa director and the director of the Beirut office.

Fawaz Hamdi

Nadim Houry

Houry is the executive director of the Arab Reform Initiative.

Rashid Jemali

Lina Khatib

Director, Middle East Center

Khatib was director of the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut. Previously, she was the co-founding head of the Program on Arab Reform and Democracy at Stanford University’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law.

Raphaël Lefèvre

Nonresident Scholar, Middle East Center

Raphaël Lefèvre was a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Middle East Center, where his research focuses on Sunni Islamist movements in Lebanon.

Chamseen Mohammad

Nabil Sari

Yezid Sayigh

Senior Fellow, Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center

Yezid Sayigh is a senior fellow at the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, where he leads the program on Civil-Military Relations in Arab States (CMRAS). His work focuses on the comparative political and economic roles of Arab armed forces, the impact of war on states and societies, the politics of postconflict reconstruction and security sector transformation in Arab transitions, and authoritarian resurgence.