Youth Marginalization and Radicalization Amid the Syrian Crisis

After four years of work, stakeholders are now approaching the “stabilization” phase of the crisis. George Aida, director of Social Development at the Ministry of Social Affairs, Kamel Kosbar, president of the Sidon Syria Relief Union, Haneen Al Sayyed, coordinator at the World Bank Human Development Program, and Mazen Ezzi, editor of Al Modon newspaper, discussed the complex issues arising from Lebanon’s hosting of Syrian refugees. Maha Shuayb, director of the Center for Lebanese Studies, moderated the session.

Welfare Obligations and Aid Provision

• Need for Coordination: Participants stressed the need for greater cooperation and coordination between various stakeholders including, but not limited to, the public and private sectors, civil society organizations, NGOs, and donor bodies, in order to better fulfil welfare obligations to Syrian refugees.
   
• Creating Opportunities: Given the increased risk of radicalization among marginalized groups, programs at the Ministry of Social Affairs aim to turn the negative repercussions of the conflict into positive opportunities, explained Aida. They have taken actions to create the opportunities, such as setting up a database to match employers with young refugees skilled in the suitable area, as well as social activities, seminars, and trainings to adequately prepare those who will take part in Syria’s reconstruction for the challenges they will likely face.
   
• Economic Impact: At the request of the government, the World Bank prepared a report assessing the economic impact of the crisis. The report concluded that the Lebanese economy had lost $7.5 billion and the number of those suffering from poverty increased by 200,000), explained Sayyed. She added that the Lebanese economy was already in a fairly dire state before the crisis erupted, with unemployment as high as 34 percent.
   
• Overcoming Difficulties: Sayyed also mentioned the difficulty of handling a 30 percent increase in population. She commended civil society organizations and NGOs for their performance given the difficulties they face but noted the underlying lack of coordination still impedes progress. She also stressed the importance of establishing a sustainable, rather than ad hoc, system of aid provision and resolving structural issues in the Lebanese labor market relating to low and semi skilled workers’ unemployment.
   
• Refugee Restrictions: Mazen said that regulations and restrictions on refugee entry have led to large numbers of Syrians entering Lebanon illegally. This has the potential to reduce the mobility of all Syrian refugees within Lebanon. Refugees are often subject to arbitrary arrests or accusations of being Islamic State sympathisers, which can encourage refugees to join Islamist and extremist brigades despite their own weak religious sentiment.

Education and Services

• Need for Education: Shuayb explored the problems arising from insufficient coordination between the public and private sectors especially regarding education. Although “private” institutions initially stepped in to plug the gaps in state provided education, this has been scaled back due to reduced funding and program saturation. The public sector now has to take the reins once more but faces additional pressure both in terms of costs and enrolment numbers, explained Shuayb.
   
• Challenges: Shuayb also detailed a number of factors that are negatively influencing the operations of the public sector and Lebanese NGOs, including the lack of a response strategy and development plan, poor monitoring mechanisms, scarcity of funds, and missed financing opportunities, along with sometimes restrictive regulations and donor policies. In response to these challenges, the UN established a coordination body, hosted by the Ministry of Education and Higher Education, for reporting and tracking purposes, as well as defining non-formal education, added Shuayb.
   
• Private Sector Role: Historically, civil society organizations and the private sector played a leading role in providing relief at times of crisis in Lebanon, Kosbar saidThis latest crisis is no different. He added that his organization has established a comprehensive database of every family living in Sidon and supports 9,000 of them. However, the inability of the private sector to absorb large numbers of new students has led to negative repercussions on the Lebanese population as well, he said. This vacuum eventually leads young students to radicalize.

The Syrian conflict has become internationalized, as scores of young Europeans flock from the continent to join the ranks of extremist groups like the Islamic State. Youth radicalization is thus a global, rather than merely local concern.

Mario Abou Zeid, a research analyst at Carnegie, joined Lars Erslev Andersen and Tobias Gemmerlie, both senior researchers at the Danish Institute for International Studies, Jørgen Ilum, police commissioner of the East Jutland police district, and Natascha Jensen, head of the Department of Social Services at the Municipality of Aarhus, to discuss deradicalization efforts. Lina Khatib, director of the Carnegie Middle East Center, moderated the discussion.

Refugee Radicalization

• Types of Radicalization: Abou Zeid suggested that there are two phases to radicalization. First, there is an initial phase of political radicalization, followed by a latter phase of religious radicalization. As international organizations cut their aid levels and Jabhat al Nusra and their ilk emerged as the main providers of aid and support to refugees, radicalization increased, noted Abou Zeid. Islamist movements managed to earn the sympathy and support of refugees, even formerly secular activists. This culminated in the mobilization of several hundred refugees by the Islamic State to fight against the Lebanese Army in Arsal, explained Abou Zeid.
   
• Displacement: Abou Zeid explained that this led Lebanese who did not distinguish between refugees and militants to resent the presence of all Syrians in Lebanon. This, in turn, led to a wave of internal displacement and contributed to the radicalization of the Sunni communities into which the refugees now moved. It was also noted that radicalization among refugees was spurred by the desire of certain individuals to regain their pre-crisis social status.

Deradicalization: Home and Abroad

• Resident Sympathizers: Andersen warned that the greatest security threat to European communities comes from resident sympathizers with opposition groups rather than returning militants, a direct contrast with the popular view. Most of the perpetrators of the Copenhagen and Paris attacks were “home-grown terrorists,” who did not have direct contact with those in conflict zones (although one of the Paris attackers received training in Yemen).
   
• Danish Deradicalization: Anderson outlined the Danish tri-level model of deradicalization. The primary level involves outreach programs and dialogue promotion to make communication easier, the secondary level uses mentors and groups to reach moderate-risk individuals, while the tertiary level involves the extraction and re-integration of high-risk individuals and militants in conflict zones.
   
• Creating Trust: Such a model would have a hard time in the Middle East, participants agreed.  Ilum pointed out one example of why this would be so difficult. In Denmark, 80-90 percent of the population would say that they trust the police, he said. This is not the case in Lebanon.

New Challenges, New Approaches

• Prevention: Ilum stated that Denmark is focused both on fighting crime and preventing it. They use a three pronged strategy of early intervention, a multi-agency approach, and collaboration with city authorities. Close cooperation with frontline teachers and police officers is a critical feature of the approach, explained Ilum.
   
• Factors: Jensen argued that poor living conditions, as well as feelings of exclusion and isolation, are leading factors contributing to an increased risk of radicalization among the youth. Thus ‘Infohouses’ staffed with policemen and social workers were set up to assess each concern and decide on a course of action.
   
• Role of Family: She went on to explore the role of parents in countering radicalization and the need to empower and keep them in contact with the authorities. Parents now contact the police rather than the other way round, she added. Those who return from Syria undergo an assessment of their mental condition and intentions. Those who wish to re-integrate are assisted in doing so to prevent further radicalization.

Conclusions and Concerns

• Counterradicalization: Gemmerlie summarized the key concepts of the Danish “carrot” model of counterradicalization. These include maintaining a healthy dialogue in mosques and the municipality and focusing on targeting criminal actions rather than radical views. He emphasized the incompatibility between democratic principles and fundamentalist ideology is.
   
• Measuring Success: Gemmerlie added that, due to the challenge of constructing a credible counterfactual, it is difficult to attribute with certainty the successes in Denmark to the counterradicalization programs. He added that the large scale expansion of surveillance to identify signs of radicalization carries with it potentially harmful societal effects.