The Acronym Institute published a report, Worse than Irrelevant? British Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century, addressing the future ofBritain’s nuclear weapons system and outlining potential replacement options for the existing stockpile.

Britain’s decision will have important ramifications for the nonproliferation regime and the commitment of nuclear weapons states towards their disarmament obligations under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The report calls for a comprehensive review ofBritain’s security and defense strategies, taking into accountBritain’s commitment to nonproliferation and the efficacy of nuclear deterrence in the changing security environment of the 21^st century. The report contrasts the nuclear threats of the Cold War with the predominant security challenges in today’s post-Cold War environment such as climate change and environmental degradation, terrorism, poverty, transnational illicit trade, and failing states. The authors conclude that nuclear weapons have no useful role in protecting against today’s security challenges, adding that nuclear weapons are “not merely irrelevant,” but that they “have the potential to add greatly to other threats, notably terrorism, organised crime and trafficking.” (Read More)

In a new report, Atoms for War?: U.S.-Indian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and India’s Nuclear Arsenal, Carnegie Senior Associate Ashley J. Tellis argues empirically that natural uranium resources do not limitIndia's potential nuclear arsenal and that any limitations inIndia's nuclear fuel stockpile stem from short-term problems that, in fact, give theU.S.little leverage overIndia.  Tellis argues that Indian policy-makers display no intention nor practice of dramatically building up their nuclear weapon arsenal and that the proposed U.S.-India deal will not causeIndiato do so or augment its capacity to do so in significant ways.

The report states thatIndiais not seeking to maximize its nuclear arsenal as demonstrated byIndia’s decision to produce far less fissile material than its capacity allows given its natural uranium reserves. Tellis argues thatIndia’s short-term deficiency of uranium fuel is due to technical hindrances in its uranium mining and milling practices. He maintains thatIndiahas the capability to rectify this shortcoming independently.

Tellis also addresses the contentious issue of whether the deal violates Article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. He states that the NPT legally allows for nuclear cooperation between nuclear-weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states on safeguarded facilities, even if the country has not committed to full-scope safeguards. Tellis asserts that critiques that the U.S.-India nuclear deal violates Article I lead “inexorably to the conclusion that no party to the NPT should have any economic intercourse withIndiawhatsoever, because the resulting gains from trade would inevitably free up some domestic Indian resources that would be of use toNew Delhi’s weapons program.”

To access the full report, click here. 

The best estimates indicate that Iran is 5-10 years away from the ability to enrich enough weapons-grade uranium for a nuclear weapon. But there are major uncertainties with these estimates. One worst-case scenario could have Iran with a nuclear bomb at the end of 2009, but that assumes that Iran does not encounter any of the technical problems that typically plague such programs.

In a February 14 letter to Congress, six nonproliferation experts and former government officials detailed the serious problems with the proposed US-India nuclear deal. Their core concern is thatU.S.trade and cooperation would directly assistIndia’s nuclear weapons program. This would violate existingU.S.laws and theU.S.commitment in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty “not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” 

The experts say, “Building upon the already strong U.S.-Indian partnership is an important goal, and we remain convinced that it can be achieved without underminingU.S.leadership efforts to prevent the proliferation of the world’s most dangerous weapons.”

They caution, however, that “on balance,India’s commitments under the current terms of the proposed arrangement do not justify making far-reaching exceptions toU.S.law and international nonproliferation norms. At a minimum, this requires permanent, facility-specific safeguards on a mutually agreed and broad list of current and future civil Indian nuclear facilities and material, as well a cutoff of Indian fissile material production for weapons.”

For a pdf of the seven-page letter, click here.

United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan warned in a major speech last week that “we cannot continue to lurch from crisis to crisis, until the [NPT] regime is buried beneath a cascade of nuclear proliferation.”

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s first visit to China since taking office is designed to promote dialogue with China’s military. Some recent administration reports and statements argue that China is building up its nuclear forces and is a growing threat to international security. Rumsfeld’s visit comes ahead of President George W. Bush’s scheduled visit to China in November. For current data and analysis of China’s strategic forces, we have provided an excerpt from the China chapter in Carnegie’s recent publication, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear Biological, and Chemical Threats. (Read More)

Sixty-six years ago this month, Albert Einstein sent an urgent letter to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt.   “It may become possible,” he warned, “to set up a nuclear chain reaction in a large mass of uranium, by which vast amounts of power and large quantities of new radium like elements would be generated. Now it appears almost certain that this could be achieved in the immediate future.”  The military consequences were obvious.  “This new phenomenon would also lead to the construction of bombs, and it is conceivable -- though much less certain -- that extremely powerful bombs of a new type may thus be constructed. A single bomb of this type, carried by boat and exploded in a port, might very well destroy the whole port together with some of the surrounding territory.”  Worse, the Nazis might already be hard at work on just such a project,  “I understand that Germany has actually stopped the sale of uranium from the Czechoslovakian mines, which she has taken over.” (Read More)

The staggering 19-kiloton magnitude of the Trinity explosion surpassed even the expectations of Los Alamos Director J. Robert Oppenheimer. Sixty years ago this week, Los Alamos scientists tested the first nuclear weapon at the Trinity Site near Alamogordo, New Mexico. The test, which General Leslie Groves described as "a blinding flash of light," was a milestone of the Manhattan Project, the first large-scale effort to build a nuclear bomb. The unqualified military and scientific achievement of the Trinity test led to the devastating bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, cementing the decisive U.S. victory over Japan in World War II. Trinity brought to fruition the complex, multi-pronged effort to organize fissile materials production, perfect bomb designs, assemble the fissile materials in weapons, and stage the first successful test of an implosion-type weapon. (Read More)

U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan calls in a new report for states to renew efforts to improve verification and enforcement measures in the nuclear nonproliferation regime.