The new executive authority is unlikely to transcend Libya’s institutional divisions, nor break with well-established patterns of intense factional competition within the government.

Washington must get tough on violations of the UN arms embargo and hold Libya’s warring sides accountable for their conduct; it must also pursue a more inclusive governance framework for Libya’s future—one that does not include Haftar.

Without a firm constitutional basis, early elections in Libya would not only produce a government whose legitimacy is contested even more widely, but also leave the door open for another strongman to rise to power.

The new U.S. administration needs to send strong signals to forces on all sides of the Libya conflict, as well as their foreign patrons, and make clear that a political settlement presents the only viable path out of the chaos.

Any strategy to combat the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Libya should aim to bridge Libyan political divides while channeling assistance in a way that promotes cooperation between rival forces.

At its core, the fighting in Libya is about two centers of power vying for the mantle of legitimacy in a country devoid of any workable institutions.

Nearly three years after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi, Libya is in the throes of a bitter civil war. Its political and security institutions are split along complex fault lines that defy easy categorization.

State complicity with organized crime is at the heart of instability in the Sahel and Sahara region, fomenting conflict and fueling the rise of al-Qaeda.

Far from signaling the country's disintegration, the Barqa Conference reveals that the real debates are over decentralization not autonomy.