For more than a decade, India has steadily deepened its ties with the Gulf while trying to balance competing interests across the region. But today, that strategy is under strain—thanks to the Iran conflict, shifting regional alignments, a reemerging Pakistan. 

How is India being impacted by the Iran crisis? And what do these geopolitical shifts mean for India’s West Asia policy? 

To discuss these and other questions, Milan is joined on the show this week by Kabir Taneja. Kabir is the Executive Director of the Observer Research Foundation’s Middle East office. He has worked extensively on India’s relations with the Middle East, examining domestic political dynamics, terrorism, non-state militant actors, and the region’s evolving security architecture. He is also the author of The ISIS Peril: The World’s Most Feared Terror Group and Its Shadow on South Asia.

Milan and Kabir discuss India’s emerging political and strategic relationships in the Gulf, the risks the country faces from the Iran conflict, and the potential for India to play a larger regional security role in the Middle East. Plus, the two discuss Pakistan’s frenetic diplomatic maneuvering and the state of Afghanistan-India ties.

Episode notes:

1.     Kabir Taneja, “Pak Is Finally Back In Middle East's 'Good Books'. But Can It Stay There?” NDTV, April 30, 2026.

2.     Kabir Taneja, “How Air Power will Reshape Geopolitics in the Gulf,” ORF Middle East, April 17, 2026.

3.     Kabir Taneja, “A West Asia security rethink amid America’s role,” Hindu, April 2, 2026.

4.     Kabir Taneja, “Reading the tea leaves in the conflict in West Asia,” Hindustan Times, March 10, 2026.

5.     Kabir Taneja, “Navigating Strategic Autonomy: India and the Middle East in a Multipolar World,” February 9, 2026.

6.     Nicolas Blarel, “India Navigates a Divided Middle East,” in Milan Vaishnav, ed. India and a Changing Global Order: Foreign Policy in the Trump 2.0 Era (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2026).

7.     Kabir Taneja, “Between New Delhi & Kabul, a fine balance,” Hindustan Times, October 13, 2025.

Transcript

Note: this is an AI-generated transcript and may contain errors

Milan Vaishnav Welcome to Grand Tamasha, a co-production of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Hindustan Times. I'm your host, Milan Vaishnav. For more than a decade, India has steadily deepened its ties with the Gulf while trying to balance competing interests across the region. But today, that strategy is under strain, thanks to the Iran conflict, shifting regional alignments, and a re-emerging Pakistan. How is India being impacted by the Iran Conflict, and what do these geopolitical shifts mean for India's West Asia policy? To discuss these and other questions, I'm joined on the show today by Kabir Taneja. Kabir is the executive director of the Observer Research Foundation's Middle East Office. He has worked extensively on India's relations with the Middle East, examining domestic political dynamics, terrorism, non-state militant actors, and the region's evolving security architecture. He's also the author of the ISIS Peril, the world's most feared terror group and its shadow on South Asia. I am pleased to welcome him to the podcast for the very first time. Kabir, thanks for taking the time.

Kabir Taneja Thank you Milan. Great to be here.

Milan Vaishnav I want to start with a very macro question that's at the kind of 30,000 feet level because I think it's a good place for us to kind of ground this conversation. You know, India has had very deep economic ties with the Gulf for quite a long time, but the political and strategic relationship has clearly deepened more recently. And so I want start by asking you, you know, what to your mind has changed and what is distinctive, if anything? About how the Modi government has approached the region.

Kabir Taneja You know, just to start with, you're absolutely right that India has had historical ties, civilization ties with a large section of what we call the Middle East today. But the fundamental thing that has changed over the past 15 years that has led this change that we see today is the Indian economy and nothing else. That has really, really sort of opened up this part of the world as far as Gulf interests go, going much beyond energy security or migration or blue-collared workers or white-collar which is the sort of two or three sort of main issues and main interests that sort of underpinned India's relationship with the Gulf for a long period of time. But now they know the Gulf countries started seeing India as an investment opportunity. They started seeing it as a market. They started to seeing India an alternative market to Europe and to the U.S. And this happened in the past 10, 15 years. And of course, you know, India blocking about 6.5 to 7% growth rate on average is a great is great news. For sovereign wealth funds, for example, to plonk their money and to get excellent returns. 1.4 billion people, that's fantastic news for, for example, if you want to sell energy products here, or you want, or whatever you want to sell. So it's the economy that's sort of broken through. Because, you know, let me just take you back to the 90s. The relations weren't that great. Yes, a lot of Indians have worked in the Middle East. But as far as security goes, as far as political relations go. India was not seen as a core interest place. Pakistan always had the upper hand being an Islamic country and of course having very close ties with Gulf nations, but it has been India's breakthrough economy through 1991 to 2026 that has cultivated this new regional outreach that we see everyone enjoy.

Milan Vaishnav You know, when you talk about the Gulf, I think it might be useful also for us to disaggregate a little bit, right? I mean, because it is a region with lots of countries, lots of interests, lots of players. As you think about kind of India's prioritization, right, I mean tell us a little about the kind of hierarchy or just clusters of different countries and interests that India has as New Delhi looks out at this region.

Kabir Taneja That's again a great way, an important way to look, how India sees the Middle East or West Asia as you call it in this part of the world. Of course, why I sort of clarified that you call West Asia in the Middle East and no one understands what I'm talking about, right? So I have to sort of, you know, put that gate in the middle. But you know but it's very, it's an interesting outlook. India looks at the region from three poles of power. From the point of view of three poles apart, right? It's the Gulf countries, of course. So largely UAE and Saudi lead that outreach. We've got Israel and we've got Iran. That's basically sort of the division that India looks at, looks towards the Middle East as. Now let me just sort of point out why sort of these three divisions are important and how India actually disengages from the region, from approaching the region as one entity. And instead, you know, outreaches to these three poles of power in a very separate manner. So of course, let me start with Iran, for example, since, you know, it's the… Topic of the month. … flavor of the day, and Iran is a very interesting country to get into this debate because, you know, a lot of times in Delhi we are hearing about, oh, should India mediate, should India not mediate? India has great relations with, you know, the Gulf countries, with Israel, with Iran. What role can it play? If any But it's important to understand how India approaches this and why that really, really doesn't allow mediation to, for example, be an aim that India should be pursuing. Let me just put it bluntly. If you see the Indian structure of the Ministry of External Affairs or our foreign ministry, Iran comes under a desk called PAI, so it's Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran. And that automatically highlights what India's core interest with Iran is. It is not its borders with the Gulf, it is not it's relationship with Israel, it is in fact it's borders with Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia. Now of course you keep start digging that and we can get to that later but the Chabahar port where India is interested in the North-South transportation corridor and number of things and 2021 sort of fall of Afghanistan as well sort of played a key role. Now very quickly let's let me jump to the Gulf. You know the Gulf has had tremendous, you know, historical and civilizational relationship. I think in the broader sort of, you know, West Asian or greater West Asian geography, I think there are about 9 million Indians that work. And a large section of them is concentrated in certain Gulf countries, so Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait. And you know 9 million is more than the population of Sweden, I think. So one of India's core interests and requirements when it comes to, let's say, a conflict in the region is how do you manage a small country of Indians outside the Indian borders? And that's not easy. You can't evacuate 9 million people if there is going to be a clash in the regions. So you have to sort of prepare yourself that the Indian interests are going to be in the crossfire one way or the other. But more than diaspora, it is India's economic relationship with the Gulf that has really really taken off. Let me take the UAE for example, which in my opinion can be classified as the closest relationship we have in the Gulf. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been to UAE seven times I think. And the first time that he went, I think it was in 2015 if I remember correctly, that was the first Indian Prime Minister's visit to the UA in 34 years. You know, and since then he's been there six times. So clearly there has been a conscious decision taken that UAE is a partner that we can rely on, is a part that we want to invest in, and of course is a is a, is a a partner that is key to our both security, political and economic goals in the region. And, and, and you know, I think the, the, the president of the UAE was in, in, in India in January for a day's visit. And both countries already have a $100 billion trade exchange and they have aimed for a $200 billion number by 2030 or 2032, one of those things. And the interesting part here is a good chunk of this trade is non-oil. That means this actual trade of other products, other goods, not just for the UAE, but for the Gulf region or for Africa or for Europe or for whatever it is. So basically, when it comes to the Gulf, it is all about economics, economics, economics, and it's all about geo-economics increasingly. And that's what India's interest is. So if you talk to the defense attaches in our embassies, or you talk to diplomats, they've been given a single aim, which is increase the economic cooperation between India and the Gulf. So that's, as far as economics go, that's where we are concentrated. Now, let me just very quickly jump to Israel so that we cover all three. Core interest areas. Israel is an interesting case because it's largely underpinned by security, it's underpined by defense. India sees Israel as a Walmart for high-end defense technologies. If you see India's history, it's fought wars with Pakistan, it has fought wars with China, outcomes have been varied over the decades. And it has a perpetual requirement and appetite for high-end defense equipment because we have very volatile borders. And I'm not just mentioning China and Pakistan, which are the obvious ones. We always have tensions with Bangladesh. We have tensions on the border of Myanmar. So India requires a heavy bill annually to be spent on defense technologies. And it's not easy to keep. You know, abreast with the technologies because they're so heavily protected by states. But Israel is one country where India has found ease, where it can really, really go and pick up whatever it requires for its defense requirements. And Israel as a state, whether under Netanyahu or any other leader, you can go back to Golda Meier's era, when India had no relations with Israel and no diplomatic relations with Israel, which was set up in 1991. But they were still helping out on defense. So, you know, it's a lot of Israeli cultivation actually of where the relationship is today. But on two fronts, of course, as I said, defense, but of course geopolitics and ideology both play a critical role. India sees Israel in a way that it is looking at its own issues in a mirror. So what happened in October 7, 2023 is very similar to, in Indian psyche, to what happened in 26-11 in Mumbai, or any number of sort of attacks that have happened in Kashmir, when it came to Pahelgaon. So there's an affinity towards the idea that both countries share a common sort of pushback when it comes to their national security requirements. And they really, really bond over that. So I think this is just very broadly and very simply taking three key players in the region. And it's important to see it in this way, in my opinion, that three key layers bring three very different requirements from Indian strategic thought and strategic policy. And they often don't overlap, by the way. So, you know, I, as a scholar, for example, have gone to Iran with an Israeli visa and my passport. I don't think many people can do that. And vice versa, without getting pat-downs for seven hours or something. So, there's an understanding that this is India's position and has been for a long period of time, that India does not take sides when it comes to regional conflicts. And that has really, really sort of weirdly made non-alignment a success story in this part of the world, despite the fact that non-allignment as a concept is a very expired one itself.

Milan Vaishnav Thank you, Kabir, for that kind of tour of the region. Let me just, maybe we can kind of now selectively dive into some of these issues a bit deeper. Let me start with Iran because I think that's obviously the issue in the region that's on everyone's mind. You've written in a recent opinion piece that the Iran conflict could trigger what you call, quote, a total recalibration of West Asia with no clarity on what lies at the end of the tunnel, end quote. Let's just start with, you know, kind of some basic steps here. From India's perspective, what are the first-order risks from this conflict between the United States, Israel, and Iran?

Kabir Taneja Look, from India's perspective, interestingly, the risks remain the same that they always have been from this part of the world. The first and foremost is energy security. India imports about 86% of its hydrocarbon requirements annually. It has a voracious appetite for these fuels. And its economic growth depends on importing in a sustained manner on a daily basis the hydrocarbons that India requires. So, as far as India's immediate concerns are highlighted, it is energy security, energy security, and energy security. How do you get natural gas and oil into Indian shores? Now, the interesting part here is oil is something that India has diversified over the years. Why? Because in 2012, 2013, when we were, well, not we, when the world was negotiating the nuclear deal with Iran. You know, India was under tremendous pressure back then to stop buying Iranian oil. And India thought, well, okay, that's a huge task, that is a huge risk to take, but let's try that. Why do we try that? So that, okay. We take down Iranian imports and hopefully, we build a great constituency in Washington, D.C. To really, really further India-U.S. Relationship into the future. This is when the quad was being built. You know, China, the China question was, was, and always is in front of India's thinking. And India wanted a greater American role to be played in the Indo-Pacific. So they delivered Iran, basically. Now I think the expectation in New Delhi was that it's not common in the US and maybe you can correct me, maybe it is, it's so common in the US that if something like the JCPOA is signed, a new president will come in and tear it apart. So, I think India had bet. On the linearity of American political system and American political ethos and it burned its fingers there. So fast forward a couple of years later, you know, the Americans are very angry with us. Why are you buying Russian oil? And this time, then India, after its Iran experience, was like, well, exactly what we did in Iran. We brought our oil impose to zero and ultimately burned our fingers and we were left with nothing and we will not be able to do that with Russia now. So, you know, it comes down to basically domestic requirements and domestic understanding of Indian politics and the impact that energy actually has that we import from the Middle East. So the closing down of Strait of Hormuz is not good news for India. Now it's been a little bit nonchalant about its position but there is no one that I've met in New Delhi, whether in power or outside power, that says that the blockades being conducted right now by Iran and the US alike are sustainable and will lead to any sort of good outcome for either the region or the global economy. So, you know, it comes down to a very basic fundamental requirement from an Indian perspective that hydrocarbons need to keep flowing in. Energy transition is far, far away. It's not a reality in India yet. We are still putting people on the electricity grid, on the energy grid, you know, after 75 years of independence. And our requirements are different. And at the end of the day, let me just very quickly wrap this up with reminding your audience. That when the first Gulf War started, since this is the third one, or at least is being sort of labeled as the third, when the First Gulf War was started and Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, India didn't rush and condemned what Iraq did. India rushed to Baghdad and gave Saddam Hussain a hug just to secure oil supplies. So that reality hasn't changed yet. And India's policies towards the region first and foremost. Are anchored by energy security and are a requirement for hydrocarbons.

Milan Vaishnav So this is a very nice segue, Kabir, to what I wanted to ask you about kind of where things stand today, right? Because one of the things you noted in a recent piece, and we'll link to that op-ed in our show notes, is that Washington is simultaneously, on the one hand, trying to apply pressure on Iran, while on the other hand, you know, exploring diplomacy. Where does that leave India? I mean, should New Delhi? Double down on its engagement with Tehran? Or does it need to tread more cautiously given particularly heightened US sensitivities?

Kabir Taneja Look, I think India has already been very cautious when it comes to trying to balance between the U.S. Interest and the Iranian interest. Now, if there is any expectation that Iran be abandoned from an Indian perspective, I don't think that's a possibility because from an India point of view, we are not looking at Iran as a country in West Asia or the Middle East, we're looking at on an extended neighboring country. It's in our extended neighborhood. Iran's interests with India are on the same pedestal. So, you know, of course, what's happening in the Middle East is going to have a significant impact. But as far as India's interests go, or India's hedging of interests go. Even the Iranians are fully aware that India has a certain, you know, it has certain barriers that it will not be able to cross when it comes to certain issues. India didn't India to this date. Has not condemned the killing of Ayatollah Khamenei, for example, which is a sore point with the Iranians. You know, their supreme leader and the spiritual leader was killed in an airstrike. And yes, the Indian foreign secretary did go a couple of days after the killing to sign the condolences book in the embassy, but there was no, you know, tweet from the prime minister or the foreign minister really condemning it. And that's basically India hedging. That's India basically saying that look we really don't want this to become a huge issue between us and the Americans, especially when a trade deal is lying on President Trump's table and he's just not ready yet to sign it. And Iran is not the hill that we are willing to die on for that kind of impediment into what is a very critical bilateral as far as New Delhi is concerned. And I think at some level, Iranians are extremely pragmatic people. I don't think that... They demand much more from the Indians anyway. The Indians have sort of managed that file fairly well compared to what is required as of today. You know, Iranians have taken out multiple flights from Delhi for medicinal aid and medical aid to take back to Tehran. So India has tried to sort of, you know, pacify that side as well. But you know at Raisina dialog, we had the deputy foreign minister of Iran in person So, you know, despite all that is happening right now, so that shows that India still has that capacity of bringing all these parties to a single room, but for its interest, and not really to try and be a Marvel hero and solve the world's problems.

Milan Vaishnav I want to just pivot back for a second to some of the shifts we're seeing in the kind of Gulf security outlook. You had a piece recently for the Hindu where you said, look, the fact of the matter is that many Gulf states are starting to question this idea of kind of U.S. Reliability. Does this, in your mind, create an opening for India to play a larger role, you know, or are the expectations in the region about India's role? As a kind of regional security provider, still fairly limited.

Kabir Taneja I would personally very much tend to agree it does open doors. It does open a very rare opportunity for India. See, I'll tell you the problem is that these opportunities, this is not the first time this has happened, where India has the opportunity to step in, you know, to maybe not to provide regional security per se, but be a security actor at least. I think that's an important stepping stone before you can use terminology like providing security to a second country or a third country. India has a fairly meek appetite for risk and that comes from its sort of 60, 70 years of making sure that it is not involved in any great global wars or global conflicts. It has always taken pride in this idea that India has never started wars. And but it has experiences, you know, for example, when it comes to intervening in a second or a third country, you know, the the entire episode with IPKF in Sri Lanka is still quoted to this day as as as a very costly affair of of of interventionism. And and but you know the the other problem that India India sort of faces today is that inside it would really really like to be a power, a great power, if not a superpower. The problem with that. That aim or, you know, achieving that mountain is that it will require a cultural shift in how New Delhi thinks. It will have to adapt to risk a little bit more. And it is working towards that by, let's say, aligning itself with multipolarity or strategic autonomy and multi-alignment. But the problem for India is that, it was preparing for that shift 20 years down life. The opportunity has come today. And unfortunately, in my view, that New Delhi is not fully ready culturally, militarily, economically, to take full advantage of the gaps that we are seeing opening today. And that includes, as you mentioned, let's say providing security in the Red Sea or in the Strait of Hormuz, for example. Right now we are providing security in the Arabian Sea, which is quite different. It's a little bit outside of both the blockades. Uh, so, uh, now- We would very much sort of want to be that country that can provide, you know, the security architecture for our partners and for our allies. But the opportunity has come too early and come too fast. And at the moment, the country is not prepared to take advantage of this. Now, whether that this opportunity comes again in the next 20 years or 50 years or 60 years, I'm not sure. But at this point of time, we are unfortunately not there yet to take full advantage of the gaps in geopolitics that India would love to fulfill, but right now lacks certain capacities to do so.

[…]

Milan Vaishnav You know, one of the looming factors in this conversation that we haven't gotten to yet is Pakistan, and I want to maybe bring us there right now. One of the things you've said in your writing is that Pakistan's return, if you want to call it that, to West Asia, it's kind of good graces, is driven by a certain kind of opportunism amidst this tremendous geopolitical turn, right? And from New Delhi's standpoint, Do you think Pakistan's role kind of significantly alters the kind of regional balance in the long term, or do you think it's really kind of more optics and substance?

Kabir Taneja Look, I don't think Pakistan plays long-term games. I don't think that they have the capacity or the foresight to have a strategy that goes beyond three months. And I'm being very generous with the three months, so no, I think this opportunity for the Pakistanis to play mediator comes at a time when they had to take a loan to pay a loan to the UAE from Saudi Arabia. Yes, they did provide some troops and jets to Saudi Arabia, if the reports are accurate. But they did find themselves in an interestingly cultivated position. So I'll give them that. They put themselves in a position in Washington, D.C., in good places of Trump. They've told Trump, the Board of Peace, which no one talks about now, by the way, is a great endeavor. They have told Trump. Yes, he did stop the India-Pakistan war in 2025. They've told Trump he should get the Nobel Peace Prize. The Pakistanis have done exactly everything that the Indians cannot do. Even if they wanted to do, they cannot do it because it would be a massive backfire domestically here. So the Pakistanis know they have nothing to lose. And when you have nothing lose, you know, it's very, very easy to shoot in the dark and if something sticks, that's great. And that's what's pretty much happened, you now. Let's be honest about this, Pakistanis and the Iranians don't have a great relationship themselves. In 2024, I think 2024 January, they've exchanged fire for about a week. Even like three days ago, Tasnim News, which is closely aligned with the IRGC in Iran, in middle of all of this, had time to release a story that said that they have a terrorism cell coming in from the Pakistani border. The Iranians are using this right now basically because of lack of options. And if the Pakistanis have put themselves in this position to benefit them in the short term and to get into the good graces of the US, but more importantly, to get in to the good graced of the Saudis, let's not kid ourselves that Saudis are a very big silent partner in these talks that have happened in Islamabad. Iran Air, for example, has started commercial operations today, and one of the first flights was to Madinah. So the Saudis don't want to get into this beyond the point, and they're using Pakistan to basically push for these talks. Americans are very happy that this is happening. So are the Iranians, they found a conduit that is able to do so. Now. Short-term gains for Pakistan are great. Why? Because they're in the good graces of, well, almost everyone at this point of time. But does that really fix their institutional long-term problems? Not really. So I don't think, you know, Pakistan invokes a certain public discourse in New Delhi, but I think, I genuinely don't it's that big an issue where, you know, is India losing out to what Pakistan is doing diplomatically? No, I don t think so.

Milan Vaishnav Well, you know, I want to ask you about that because I think that's a question on everybody's mind and in my instinctive gut is also the same as yours, which is I don't think so. Although I have a hard time kind of articulating that case, but I guess let me kind of come at it a slightly different way, right? I mean, a lot of people are writing op-eds and commentaries in the Indian press saying, you India's missed out, this critical opportunity of being a peace broker, of being mediator, of being an interlocutor. Um, do you think that's really true? I mean, do think there was that kind of opening that India could have played perhaps a more deft kind of media role?

Kabir Taneja I think India can play a deaf mediator's role, just not in the Middle East. I think the opportunity for India, if India, I'm not even sure if they wanted to pursue it, to be honest, but if India did want to pursue it, Russia and Ukraine would have been the ideal place to do it. The Middle East, because Russia and the Ukraine was low risk, right? And going back to what I said, that India is not a risk heavy country, it's in its culture. So it's not necessarily an Indian problem. Is an Indian thinking problem. Uh, you know, I often, uh, whenever I'm asked this question, you know, what is India's risk of appetite for risk? You know, I often tell everyone here an answer that they don't like to hear that learn from the Turks. Now, you know, uh India doesn't like Turkey, right? Uh, the relationships is not great because they support Pakistan and so on and so forth. I truly admire Turkey's pension of falling on their face flat out every week, but then getting up and doing it, doing it again. And then falling again, but doing it again, right? So, you know, either you are able to do that or you are, you for whatever dividends, but to inculcate failure is an important diplomatic tool that you should be okay to fail. And you cannot get into mediation unless you're okay to fake. Once we get to that line, I think some of the areas that you can try to do that maybe Russia and Ukraine. You know, it gets much more murkier if you try to do that in your neighborhood. But Russia, Ukraine was far away. You know you really didn't have that much of a skin in that game anyway, at least directly. But you had relationship with both of them and both of them would have turned up. But the Middle East is for you is is delicately balanced in three poles of power, as we discussed earlier. But the important point is that those three poles of power respect your bilateral with each of the poles of the power. Right. And the fact that they are okay with you dealing, the Israelis are okay with us dealing with the Iranians. The Iranians are okay with us, dealing with Israelis. Why would you, you know, rock that boat considering how delicate that region is to you, both ideologically, you know economically, politically and security wise especially when you are sort of seen as a serious economic power to deal with. I think the Middle East would not give you the dividends as far as mediation goes that you would want. And you know, as I said before, it's the only place in the world where non-alignment has ever worked for India. And I think it's wise to make sure that that reality persists.

Milan Vaishnav So, you know, we've covered the Gulf, we have covered Iran. Let me now ask you about the third pole, which is Israel. You know, you quite eloquently spoke about the nature of Israel-India ties and the fact that at the core of it really is this kind of defense and security partnership. And you said that, you now, I can't quite remember your phrasing, but I mean, basically that Israel has really been kind of solicitous of India, right, and really also pushing this idea of how can we do more together and so on and so forth. I want to ask you at kind of two levels, maybe to help us understand the state of play today between India and Israel, right? Because on the one hand, I'm sure that there is some concern in the corridors of power about Israel overreaching, about kind of starting this new conflict, now what you call the Third Gulf War. This is, of course, comes on the heels of tremendous devastation that we've seen in Gaza, a humanitarian disaster that's played out over years. But then at a second level of the kind of the sort of people to people level, right? Like I'm not suggesting that this is an issue that the Ahmadmi is paying a lot of attention to necessarily. But certainly when you're in New Delhi and you talk to people in India, right, I mean, they're quite critical, I find, on balance of what Israel has done in both of these two territories. So maybe just reflect a little bit on how you see. The current state of India-Israel ties, both at the kind of elite level and then maybe at a slightly more popular level.

Kabir Taneja So, you know, so basically, I think just to start with, I think it's important to understand that the Ahmadmi in India is actually now very interested of how India's position, what India's postures are when it comes to global conflicts, what and how is India being perceived outside, you know. So, where Prime Minister Modi travels, and what kind of bilaterals we have. So you know the Iran war has been extremely, extremely well covered here. Uh... You know they've been correspondence in in israel they've been correspondence on the ground which is very rare from indian media perspective considering the cost implications of of of sending journalists abroad these days uh... But uh... Now you know uh... The the narrative wars have come to people's phones so people are people are very very very engaged and and simultaneously the interesting part uh... From my point of view is that you know there's a lot of support for israel in india And going back to. To what I said, it comes from India's sort of shared interest of how we have dealt with terrorism for a long period of time and not just about terrorism or cross-border terrorism which we have from the Pakistani side. The fact that India has been raising its voice against terrorism for about 40-45 years at the United Nations, at multilateral forums without much implication or without much support. Is a commonality Indians often see with Israel, right? So yes, the images coming out of Gaza actually, even with the most ardent admirers and supporters of Israel's security apparatus were like, okay, on the Gaza front, maybe they've gone too far. And we're not understanding what the strategy is of flattering everything. So it's actually become a little bit more delicate than it used to be earlier. Earlier it was all sort of bells and whistles, defense technologies, very good people-to-people ties. Air India was the first airline to use Saudi airspace to reach Israel and run a commercial sector between Delhi and Tel Aviv. So India has played that role as well, of with sort of bringing trying to sort of bridge the gap between the Arab countries and Israel itself, but, you know, with what's happening in the region, there is interest in the sense that there is a lot of support, but there is lot of pushback as well. From an Indian perspective, the bilateral is very simple. I think a lot of support comes for Israel because they do see the commonalities of how we deal with cross-border terrorism and how they deal with cross-borad terrorism when it comes to Hamas or Hezbollah and so on and so forth. The interesting part is that, you know, when it comes to security cooperation, it gets much more convoluted and complicated. Israel has been asking us to ban Hamas for a long period of time, which we haven't done. Why? Because of legal reasons, you know, from an Indian perspective, the group needs to be active in India to be banned by the Home Ministry. But of course, I think there can be a domestic pushback as well, especially from the Muslim community. People forget that we are the third largest Muslim population on the planet. So it has to be very delicately balanced. Yes, India will go to the multilateral forums and condemn these acts. It will go and support Israel at the UN vote at times, but when it comes to a very bilateral level, again, the domestic security concerns here, you know, often Trump, what the requirement of a bilateral like India and Israel could be. And Israel is very, very, you know, aware of that. But when it come to, when it comes to sort of on the ideological front as well, there are affinities right now, One is a Jewish country, one is a Hindu majority country that does play out as a commonality when it comes to fighting, let's say, Islamist extremism or terrorism. It's seen as a comment target of both countries and both countries' public has also sort of seen that the amount of support they get on these issues has not been great over the years. So, that automatically has formed a bridge. Between the two Prime Minister Modi was in Israel not too long ago. I can't remember. I think it was January Maybe or February, but I mean just before this just before the war started Before the conflict started so, you know, so that that bilateral sort of remains on a very strong very strong Predestinal, but i think this is also the first time the first Time in a conflict where India's actually also let Israel known no office reservations on on on the kind of Warfare taking place and what's happened in Gaza? These communications have been sort of shared with Israel over the past many, many months now. So it's a balancing act for India as well when it comes to Israel's current perception in the global discourse. And what happens in Gaza now, people watch unfiltered on their phones. So what people are consuming is not coming through editors, it's not coming you know checks and balances and that also shapes policy in a certain way where it's not all hunky-dory with Israel and sometimes you have to talk hard as well.

Milan Vaishnav So, you know, Kabir, earlier you had said that, you know, the Middle East or West Asia is kind of the one region where India's non-alignment strategy policy has worked well. And you know we've been talking this whole conversation about this very delicate balancing act between Israel, Iran, the Gulf. You know, I think one question that some people ask sometimes and again it's reflected in some of the commentary we're seeing them out of India is, you know. Is India reaching the limits of what the external affairs minister likes to call multi-alignment, right? Or do you think that in this region of the world, India has no choice but to continue hedging on all sides?

Kabir Taneja No, I think India has choices. You know, you could not hedge. You could take a very, very clear line one way or the other. But it would not be to our benefit. You know, I don't see how going completely one way, whether it's with the Gulf countries or whether it is with Iran or whether with Israel benefits us. The fact that all of these players in the region have appreciated for decades that India actually does not take positions. On regional conflicts and approaches each and every relationship on a very bilateral level rather than seeing Iran through the through the lens of Israel or rather seeing Israel through the lengths of Iran. You know, just the fact that India does not enter those conversations has benefited us. Now what we are talking about is should India enter. And that's a broader question, does India want to be a global heavyweight when it comes to geopolitics? Does it want to a global power? Does it wants to be great power? If it does want to do that, which I believe it does, at some point of time, we would be at that Robert Frost juncture, where you would have to decide which path to take. We have been taking one path for the past about 70 years, but for things to change, you may have to take the other path. And the other path has a lot of risks. Now, are you prepared to take those risks on? On a geopolitical level, those risks can be mitigated easily. I don't think that's a big problem. On a domestic level is where the problem lies and where the challenge lies. How do you manage your domestic politics, your domestic security and your position in domestic politics whichever party you may be from? When it comes to these kinds of conversations. The Indian National Congress, for example, tried to make Gaza a big issue as an opposition in the parliament, but really didn't stick beyond the point. Everyone has their sort of understandings on whatever happens in the Middle East usually has a direct impact on Indian domestic politics. I don't think what happens in U.S. Technically really has that much of a domestic political impact, but what happens in the Middle East definitely does. And those are the core calculations. Now for us to be a great power, maybe those core, the variables of what our core calculations are may have to change and slightly move away from a little bit more of grand strategy rather than how to win the next elections. So, you know, if you're going down That part. Of that has been created by Mr. Frost for us, great. But if you're not, then we are of course, going to be a little bit behind schedule when it comes to India as a great power.

Milan Vaishnav Do we take the road less traveled or not is the question. Kabir, let me just maybe bring this conversation to an end by asking you about one other country that you've written about and thought about, and it's in that first kind of bucket you mentioned. You have Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan, and you had written a piece not too long ago in the Hindustan Times about India Afghanistan relations. And I think maybe just to help us kind of figure out where to place it, you know, how do we think about Afghanistan in the context of India's West Asia strategy? Right? Like, is it a separate track entirely? Is it increasingly interconnected with the rest? Where do you see it fit in at this point in time?

Kabir Taneja Look, Afghanistan is a bit of an oddball show now. You know, even in the Gulf countries, no one is really, really going gung-ho about making sure that Afghanistan is is a paramount country of interest. But having said that, it remains a paramound country of interests for both India and Iran. You know the Iranians have, I think, the most successful in with the Taliban since 2021. They have the deepest relationship with the Taliban and have cultivated this relationship with the Talibans since 2021. And why is that important? That's important because till the late 1990s, Iran was fighting the Taliban, and was pushing back against the Taliban by supporting Ahmad Shah Massoud and the Northern Alliance and so on and so forth. But from an Iranian perspective, the calculation is we have to make sure in no point in future, can the US or Western powers make a comeback? In Afghanistan, as far as the military goes, so that your entire border is sort of safe on one side, at least. And from an Indian perspective, look, what happened in 2021 was less than ideal. We only invited the Taliban to visit Delhi, I think, late last year, and that was not an easy visit for anyone. There was a lot of complications. It was a long visit. I think it was seven, eight days of onerous mutaki. Interim Foreign Minister Muthaki. So India is still very much testing waters. But however, with the Taliban's sort of own, you know, familial feuds taking place in Pakistan, let's not forget Pakistan is fighting a very, very sort of under-the-radar conflict with the Taliban itself on its borders, on its tribal borders. And the Taliban is in not too good shape. When it comes to dealing with the Pakistanis from an Indian point of view and an Iranian point of you, that's of interest, right? So for India, that's much more interesting rather than Iran's problems with Israel or Iran's problem with the Gulf. Those are the conflicts that India does not enter as far as its interests go. But if the Taliban and the Iranians both, let's say for hypothetically at least, are not in great books of Pakistan and they're having troubles on the borders. And they're trying to sort of contain Pakistani interests within certain sections. That's where India's interests would also align and be kept at. So as far as the Taliban outreach goes, it's very pragmatic, it is very realist. Otherwise it's a very hard sell in India that you have normalized relationship with the Taliban. And we saw that. With the press conference fiasco during Mutaki's visit when no female journalists were allowed to go in, that created a whole issue. So Afghanistan, not a huge country of concern at this point of time at least in the Gulf, but a very, very big country of concern for the Iranians. And of course, from an Indian point of view, with respect to his bilateral with Iran.

Milan Vaishnav My guest on the show this week is Kabir Taneja. He is the executive director of the ORF Middle East Office. He has worked extensively on India's relationships in the Middle East. Kabir, I think, you know, just providing us at the outset with the framing of how to think about West Asia and disaggregate it into these different groups was immensely helpful. And then not leaving us with that, but then helping us dive deep into each of these three buckets. I really appreciate it. Thank you so much for taking the time.

Kabir Taneja Thank you so much.