Source: Carnegie
Reprinted from the Spring 2002 issue of the Brown Journal of World Affairs, Volume IX, Issue 1
As the birthplace of the Internet, the United States has grown accustomed to its role as the world's leading information aggregator and disseminator. Many have extolled America's ability to wield not only hard military power but soft power, the less easily quantifiable ability to influence, persuade and shape opinion through culture, diplomacy, and diffuse information flows. Optimistic observers have envisioned the global impact of the information revolution as a technologically enhanced Pax Americana, in which borders disintegrate and democratic values spread rapidly throughout a networked world. Yet since 11 September, policymakers and the public alike have been confronted with the flip side of that assumption. Whether manifested through terrorists pontificating globally on satellite television or seething anti-Americanism on the Internet, the back alleyways of the so-called global village are now bluntly evident.
Policymakers have thus been forced to dismantle some cherished notions, and are beginning to pose in their wake new questions. Has the information revolution truly helped expand U.S. cultural and diplomatic power abroad? Are the technologies thought to be fostering greater global interchange -such as the Internet and satellite television-being used largely to promote ideals of global community, or are they being harnessed by forces bent on communalism? Do information and communication technologies (ICT) enhance global integration or global segregation?
Unfortunately, such starkly framed questions can rarely be satisfied with tidy answers. Analytical assessments, however, are clearly necessary as the United States focuses anew on innovative ways to monitor worldwide opinion and expand public diplomacy programs abroad. Clearly, technology has helped empower all kinds of political actors, whether they comprise individuals, civil society organizations, terrorist cells, or even states and their various institutional components. While past analysis has concentrated heavily on civil society, particularly ICT use by transnational advocacy groups, the events of 11 September and their aftermath have focused policy and academic attention on other ICT users. The questions of which groups or individuals are utilizing ICT, in what fashion, and for what purpose, have become tangibly relevant. Deeper understanding requires examining not only how technology is strategically utilized by terrorist groups-i.e., through steganography, encryption, etc.-but the broader political ramifications of widespread ICT use among various regional or global populations.
It has been argued that the information revolution has helped create a multicentric, fragmented world, in which the concept of sovereignty has retreated in favor of an a-territorial, neo-medieval system of overlapping jurisdictions and loyalties.1 Here, I shall posit that, while the information revolution has indeed helped to de-emphasize sovereignty, enhance global dialogue, and empower transnational advocacy, it has simultaneously amplified the ideological power and cohesion of diaspora communities-physically dispersed populations residing outside their home countries. Through the use of ICT, these diaspora groups can often project and reinforce traditional and nationalistic loyalties. Since these groups can enhance both global community and global communalism, their growing international visibility presents new opportunities and challenges for U.S. foreign policymakers and public diplomacy specialists.
Nation-Building and Nationalism Across Borders
In some cases, the Internet may disproportionately leverage the ideological and political power of diaspora communities relative to native communities, since access may be banned or sparse in the home country. At other times, diaspora communities may engage with wired and informed domestic populations who share common cultural, ethnic, or ideological bonds. Their combined activity can range from extremely broad discussions, fostering ideological and nationalist unity, to promotion of specific political aims such as regime transition in a common homeland. The political goals and discourse promoted by these groups can at times dovetail with civil societal efforts to promote democratic change and global engagement, and at times work in favor of isolation, balkanization, and militant nationalism. States, corporations, and other institutional actors have been increasingly forced to monitor and respond to this activity, posing ramifications for U.S. policy.
Here, three distinct examples-the Burmese, Chinese, and Middle Eastern online communities-help illustrate how the information revolution has facilitated the growing relevance and visibility of these groups on the world stage. In particular, parts of these communities have used the Internet to contribute to direct political action or transnational political discourse with potential policy outcomes for the United States.
In at least one case, a networked diaspora community has combined with transnational civil society to produce tangible results. The seeds of overseas-based political opposition to Burma's government began with a small group of pro-democracy exiles who strenuously opposed what they viewed as an illegitimate regime in power in their native country. Internet use by these exiles, initially through e-mail listservs that shared information on conditions inside the country, formed the catalyst for what grew to become a transnational civil societal movement to delegitimize the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in the eyes of the world. While initially composed primarily of Burmese exiles, the Internet-based Free Burma Movement rapidly expanded to include people who had never been to the country, many of them college students. Now, through the use of listservs, web pages, and email petitions that augment traditional lobbying, various campaigns have linked together to form a transnational movement that has pressured the SPDC and U.S. policymakers to an extent many assert would have been impossible before the Internet.
In fact, what started as a form of protest by exiled, pro-democracy Burmese seeking to instigate political change in their homeland has turned into a prime example of how U.S. institutions and policy can be affected by the snowballing of this community online. Although the campaign has not resulted in large-scale political change in Burma to date, it has successfully shamed U.S. corporations such as PepsiCo and Apple Computer into pulling out of Burma. Scores of U.S. cities have also passed legislation barring contracts with companies doing business with Burma. More recently, in October of 2001, San Francisco-based Pottery Barn decided to pull Burmese-made products from its collection following threats from the Free Burma Coalition to mount protests at the store's outlets nationwide.
The Burmese case illustrates how ICT can augment an exiled community's political aims through connecting that group with the organizational power of Western pro-democracy activists. To a lesser degree, this has also been the case with the overseas or ethnic Chinese online community, which is often more vocal in its criticism of the policies of the People's Republic of China than the country's own residents, who fear government retribution. As with Burma, overseas dissidents leverage their influence by joining forces with international human rights groups, who use the Internet to inform foreign publics and lobby governments and corporations. Others use e-mail to connect with pro-democracy activists residing inside China in the hopes of generating political change from within, although this practice is closely scrutinized by the Chinese government.
Recently, however, it appears the Chinese government is less worried about the efforts of overseas pro-democracy dissidents than the potentially explosive fusion of diasporic online Chinese nationalism with mainland Chinese nationalism. As Hughes notes, during the May 1998 riots targeting ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, the Internet enabled overseas Chinese to spread both accurate and false information about the attacks, spurring Chinese all over the world to protest. Although the mainland Chinese press remained close-lipped about the events in Jakarta, the Internet helped to inform and politicize Internet users in the People's Republic, culminating in a student-led demonstration in Beijing to protest the government's lack of action toward Indonesia.2 The rapid evolution from overseas Chinese fist-shaking to concrete protest at the center of power both surprised and worried Chinese leaders.
Because of recent rapid Internet growth inside China, domestic web bulletin boards and chat rooms are proving to be another staging ground for this phenomenon. In 1999, the state-sponsored People's Daily newspaper set up a web forum, entitled "Strong Country Forum," to stoke nationalism after the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. That and other web forums witnessed an outpouring of vitriolic jingoism and anti-Americanism following the downing of the U.S. EP-3 plane on Hainan Island in 2001, while similar postings also rose in volume following the 11 September terrorist attacks on the United States. On both occasions, official censors struggled to keep up with the scope and scale of comments, often deleting the most extreme anti-American postings.
Such incidents illustrate how the Internet has helped mesh overseas and domestic dissatisfaction with the Chinese government, while amplifying, however artificially, nationalistic sentiment. When dissatisfaction and nationalism overlap, they can place significant pressures on the Chinese leadership, which has historically used nationalism to bolster its public support and divert attention from domestic problems. The leadership is still trying to finesse the delicate line between massaging nationalism to boost regime legitimacy, and inadvertently encouraging overly militant public opinion that questions the regime's qualifications and capacity to lead. Although the opinions expressed online may not necessarily represent those of the domestic or overseas ethnic Chinese population at large, web forums have undoubtedly helped magnify nationalistic, and recently anti-American, public opinion.
Online Chinese nationalism thus poses ramifications for U.S. foreign policy. Domestic and overseas Chinese nationalistic sentiment is often manifested in calls for the Chinese leadership to take a tougher foreign policy course against perceived American hegemony. Although the authoritarian Chinese government is under no obligation to take account of popular opinion, its desire to avoid mass unrest means its policy choices are increasingly influenced by popular sentiment, which it is beginning to monitor through the Internet. The leadership is currently trying to dampen anti-Americanism in an effort to improve relations with the United States, but it may well find that it has nurtured a phenomenon, at least domestically, that could restrict future diplomatic options.
Pan-Arab nationalism has also historically threatened the authoritarian regimes of the Middle East. Since Internet use within the Middle East itself is still relatively low, domestic online nationalism does not appear to be a worrying factor for the leadership of many of the region's authoritarian regimes. As is the case with China and Burma, overseas dissidents play a role in helping to rally overseas opposition to Middle Eastern governments. London-based Saudi Arabian dissidents, for example, use web sites, chat rooms, and virtual lectures to keep in constant touch with followers back home. Despite their efforts, however, dissidents looking to change political structures in the Middle East have seen little reward for their efforts.
Yet, on a more general level, the visibility of both domestic and overseas Arab opinion has been enhanced by the information revolution. The global Middle Eastern diaspora has been active in using ICT to help construct and relay nationalistic, pan-Arab or pan-Islamist sentiment, thus making it visible and relevant to foreign overseas policymakers. Politically oriented Middle Eastern-themed newsgroups have been around for over ten years. Regional Middle East newspapers have also created online presences that contribute to news and debate. Apart from the Internet, satellite television and other "mid-tech" media play a part in fostering nationalistic or pan-Arab political discourse both inside and outside the Middle East.3 As some scholars note, the emergence of satellite television and other ICT has transformed the so-called "Arab street" from a figment of the imagination into reality.4
In the wake of 11 September, this discourse has become a force that U.S. foreign policymakers must monitor and engage. Recently, Middle Eastern diaspora groups-who, unlike residents of authoritarian Middle Eastern countries, are not under speech restrictions-have made use of the Internet and other technologies to express their predominantly negative views on American foreign policy and conduct in the ongoing war on terrorism. Some groups have expressed virulently anti-American opinion, inciting followers to holy war against the United States. At the same time, these groups tend to be equally vocal in their criticism of the leadership and government structures of Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes.
The example of satellite television station Al-Jazeera, whose programming reaches Arabic-speaking audiences worldwide, may best illustrate how ICT can be simultaneously interpreted as an instrument of both global engagement and communalism. Prior to 11 September, the independent Qatar-based station was lauded in the West as being one of the few media operations in the Middle East that dared criticize the region's authoritarian regimes. After 11 September, the anti-American tone of its programming was increasingly criticized by the U.S. government, and the station slowly became perceived by the United States as a force contributing to greater global balkanization. Although it is debatable whether Al-Jazeera accurately conveys the opinion of the "Arab street," it has certainly been successful in casting itself as representative of that constituency's concerns and viewpoints, especially to mainstream U.S. audiences and policymakers. Its growing influence is the reason high-level U.S. officials now make an effort to appear on its programs.
While much of the attention here has concentrated on ethnic or diaspora groups and their influence, it should be noted that the information revolution can also empower specific individuals to reach and affect a global audience. No doubt the most celebrated instance of the moment is Osama bin Laden himself, whose media savvy and targeted use of older ICT such as videotapes has broadened the range of his audience while taking both the U.S. government and private broadcast networks by surprise. His strategic use of ICT has demonstrated that even individuals with few traditional information resources at their fingertips can use technology to reach and galvanize a global audience.
Implications for U.S. Policy
Enhanced in their reach by the information revolution, diaspora communities are emerging as forces of soft power in their own right, both promoting global dialogue and contributing to worldwide balkanization. The juxtaposition of the two is not necessarily a contradiction, since the effects of technology are rarely if ever unidirectional. As Anderson notes, globalization in the information realm may reverse some trends associated with nationalism, while augmenting others.5 Whether characterized as forces for worldwide cohesion or fragmentation, the various discourses and their policy outcomes have warranted increased attention from U.S. policymakers and the private sector.
At the same time, ICT-amplified diasporic discourse, regardless of its nature, does not necessarily represent the entirety of any particular community, or even its majority. It is perhaps easy, particularly when confronted with extremely polemical narratives on satellite television, online forums, or elsewhere, to ascribe those views to an entire community. For example, viewed through the prism of government-monitored chat rooms, Chinese nationalism may appear to be a much larger or at times smaller phenomenon in Chinese society than it actually is. Yet this type of political communication represents only a portion of the community of Chinese Internet users, which itself is an elite minority. The so-called global digital divide, or gap between technological haves and have-nots, ensures an irregularity of participation that should be noted in any discussion of global trends.
That said, these groups can provide U.S. policymakers with a window into the attitudes and political advocacy positions of influential populations. The unevenness of the information revolution may disproportionately facilitate the discourse and actions of a relatively privileged community, but by the same token, these groups may be trendsetters, foreshadowing mass sentiment on the horizon. Diaspora members-particularly in the three examples laid out in this essay- tend to be better educated, more informed about the world, and likely to set agendas in discussion and debate.
So what can U.S. foreign policymakers and public diplomacy practitioners learn from these groups? In recent years, U.S. public diplomacy efforts have tended to concentrate on the leadership and policy elites of other countries, while outreach to mass audiences has declined. Passive forms of communication have been highlighted over active ones. While this approach has undergone much rethinking since September 2001, U.S. public diplomacy specialists still appear to be unsure about the best ways to utilize ICT to connect anew with targeted global audiences.
The ICT-facilitated influence of diaspora groups is not only a noteworthy political current in its own right, but may provide an important example of how to effectively project and retain soft power despite a relative lack of resources. As a nation with immense information resources, the United States should be studying and perhaps copying from relevant examples, doing all it can to utilize its own touted soft power. Ultimately, policymakers should bear in mind that if America does not effectively craft its image in a globalizing, information-rich world, there are others more than happy to take up the task-with the potential for significantly different results.
Notes
1. For instance, see Ronald J. Deibert, Parchment, Printing, and Hypermedia; Communication in World Order Transformation. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997, and Stephen Kobrin, "Back to the Future: Neomedievalism and the Postmodern Digital World Economy," Journal of International Affairs 51.2 (Spring 1998): 361-6.
2. Christopher Rene Hughes, "Nationalism in Chinese Cyberspace," Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Spring-Summer, Vol. 13, No. 2.
3. Jon B. Alterman, "The Middle East's Information Revolution," Current History, January 2000.
4. John Kifner, "The New Power of Arab Public Opinion," New York Times, 11 November 2001.
5. "New Media & Globalization in the Internet Age," keynote speech by Jon Anderson at the Middle East Virtual Community (MEViC) Inaugural Conference, 1-15 August 2000.
Ms. Kalathil is an associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington D.C. and co-author of a forthcoming book on authoritarian regimes and the Internet.