Domestic and Foreign Policy Challenges in Russia Today

Source: Carnegie

Delivered at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 30, 2002

Grigory Yavlinsky was elected to the Russian Duma in 1993 and was one of the founders of the Yabloko faction. Yabloko is one of the principal democratic parties in Russia and was established as a formal party in the Russian Duma in December 1998. Mr. Yavlinsky has been a leading liberal voice in Russian politics for the past ten years and a critic of the Russian government's crackdown on independent media, excesses in Chechnya, and corruption. He has twice run for the Russian Presidency, in 1996 and in 2000.

Mr. Yavlinsky began his remarks looking back six months to the summer of 2001, describing it as a time when there appeared to be no hope for liberal democrats or pro-Western forces in Russia. Media restrictions were increasing, the war in the Northern Caucasus was continuing with no apparent end, and Russia's foreign policy appeared to be oriented as much towards North Korea, Cuba, Iran, and Iraq as towards rapprochement with the West.

September 11, 2001 was a turning point. Yavlinsky credited Russian President Putin with unequivocally offering Russia's support to the United States with despite little domestic support for this policy among political elites. Yavlinsky believes that Putin's bold step has placed him ahead of the Russian bureaucracy. While Yavlinsky believes Putin made the right choice, he sees a risk for Putin if he remains ahead of the elite consensus on foreign policy. Yavlinsky indirectly referenced former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's position in 1991, which ended in the August 1991 coup. Of course, on the surface, political elites have subsequently fallen behind Putin and voiced support for his pro- U.S. stance.

Yavlinsky examined the reasons behind Putin's choice. Tactically, Russia was also an enemy of the Taliban, and in the summer of 2000, Russia had threatened to strike terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. At the strategic level, the United States and Russia share common interest on a variety of security issues and problems in the world. Yavlinsky quickly listed ten: the Balkans, the Israel-Palestine conflict, the Pakistan-India conflict, the possible collapse of Indonesia, tensions over Taiwan, wars in Africa, the environment, international crime and drug trafficking, North Korea, Iraq, and Iran. All of these issues, he asserted, require Russian cooperation to solve, and there is a confluence of U.S. and Russian interest over many of these security challenges.

Yavlinsky believes the next step must be a qualitatively new relationship between the United States and Russia that should be solidified in a written document. Too often, the United States and other Western countries have focused on a particular leader or group of politicians to support. Inevitably when this group or leader falls apart, so have U.S. - Russian relations. To avoid precisely this scenario from occurring again, the U.S. must treat Russia as a country and strategic ally and not merely look to Putin. While good personal relationships are helpful, and perhaps even a precondition, they are not sufficient.

Yavlinsky briefly mentioned the internal problems that Russia must deal with on its own. He remarked that a stable relationship with the West required an understanding by Russia on basic freedoms and civil liberties. Some challenges for Russia include: the independence of the media and freedom of speech, the independence of the judiciary, the freedom of elections from manipulation, and a system where political ties are not a prerequisite for doing business in Russia. Yavlinsky referred to Russia as a quasi-democracy - a Potemkin village democracy - where the government's manipulation of public opinion by electronic media is so great that it restricts public choice.

Yavlinsky does not believe these problems should stand in the way of a new U.S. - Russia relationship. Not only would a new relationship help stabilize world hot spots, but also it could lead to cooperation on important strategic issues to the United States. Development of Russia's vast oil reserves and its ability to prevent OPEC from monopolizing oil prices could alleviate a vital U.S. security concern. Yavlinsky also mentioned Russia's commitment to non-proliferation and the potential for U.S. - Russian relations to stabilize China as benefits of a new relationship. Yavlinsky indirectly hinted that while many problems can not be solved without Russia, should U.S.-Russian cooperation breakdown this would be to the detriment of many vital interests of the United States.

Yavlinsky also laid out a blueprint of what needed to happen for the relationship to move forward. The first step was Russia's support of the United States after September 11. The second step is an articulated framework describing the new relationship and providing mutual security guarantees, particularly the security of Russian borders. The third step is the introduction into the Russian government of new cadres that support a pro-Western approach to foreign policy. Yavlinsky stressed the importance of moving forward now rather than continuing to wait. He pointed out that Putin was sending strong signals to the United States of his desire for a stronger relationship, with a number of recent policies including: the closure of military bases in Cuba and Vietnam, the patient and balanced reaction to U.S. withdrawal from the ABM, and the balanced reaction to the possibility of NATO expansion into the Baltics. Also, public opinion in Russia has shifted significantly in favor of partnership and alliance with the United States as a result of September 11 and the U.S. - Russian cooperation in Afghanistan.

During the question and answer period, questions for Yavlinsky centered on what Russia wanted and what it could reasonably expect from the United States given current political realities. In response, Yavlinsky emphasized that Putin was not looking to bargain nor was he seeking any quid pro quos. Rather Putin was allying himself with the West for pragmatic reasons - because it was in Russia's strategic interest to do so. If the United States could not move beyond a personal relationship towards a qualitatively different relationship with Russia, both Russia and the United States would be stalemated with the status quo. While not a disaster, Yavlinksy stated that a lack of forward progress could lead to a swing backwards and could imperil Putin domestically.

On a final note, Yavlinsky answered a question in response to the current TV-6 political saga that is currently grabbing headlines in Russia and the Western press. Yavlinsky stated that the situation for independent media was the worst it has been since 1991, and that this was a deep problem for Russia. However, he was quick to stress that it was Russia's problem to deal with and that it should not stand in the way of moving forward in U.S. - Russian relations.

Summary by Marc Fellman, Program Associate, Russia & Eurasia Program.