Source: Carnegie
For Immediate Release: June 27, 2002
Contact: Scott Nathanson, 202-939-2211, snathanson@ceip.org
Independent Councils no Silver Bullet for Judicial Reform
2nd in Rule of Law Series Finds Flaws in Latin American Experiment
Promoting the rule of law has become a key element of efforts to promote security, democracy, and development across the globe. The United States and other developed nations have increasingly advocated the establishment of independent judicial councils to free legal systems throughout the developing world from their legacies of cronyism and corruption. In Do Judicial Councils Further Judicial Reform?, the second working paper of the Carnegie Endowment's Rule of Law series, Linn Hammergren provides the first comprehensive analysis of Latin America's experiment with these councils. Drawing on 15 years of experience on rule of law programs in the Americas, she argues that these councils alone are not the panacea that can cure all judicial ills.
Judicial councils are of European origin, and Hammergren notes that reformers both within the region and foreign aid community assert, with little empirical evidence, that councils would lessen the pressures of the patronage system deeply imbedded throughout Latin governments. Certain councils, such as those in Colombia, Ecuador, and Mexico, even leaped beyond the European mandate to include budgetary and administrative duties, attempting to further free judges to focus on the law.
Unlike Europe, however, Hammergren asserts that until a basic respect for the integrity of the rule of law is established, judicial councils in Latin America are as much at risk of corruption and cronyism as any other institution. Hammergren concludes that the concept's greatest flaw is not with the councils themselves. "At minimum, councils may be the least bad among the alternative solutions for a series of common problems. However, in and of itself, the creation of a council is no guarantee that problems will be resolved. The greatest flaw of the council model is the expectation that the rest is automatic. It demonstrably is not, and where reformers believe otherwise, they are likely to be sorely disappointed."
Thomas Carothers, Vice President for Studies and co-director of the Democracy and Rule of Law Project notes that this important lesson should be observed well beyond the borders of Latin America. "…They represent an important opportunity for learning about the utility of this approach to judicial reform, with great potential relevance to countries in other regions that may contemplate the creation of such institutions in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Asia, and elsewhere," he writes.
To request a copy of this paper contact pubs@ceip.org or visit www.ceip.org/pubs.
Linn Hammegren is a senior public sector management specialist in the World Bank Latin America regional department, working in the areas of judicial reform and anti-corruption.
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