Source: Carnegie

Originally published in the Financial Times on April 28, 2003.

Across most of the Muslim world, one key challenge for US foreign policy has not been changed by the war in Iraq: how to manage relations with client states so they do not collapse or turn hostile.

There are many Muslim states such as Pakistan that, for one reason or another, cannot be invaded and occupied by the US. In the words of one US general: "The military is the hammer in the US toolbox - but not every problem is a nail."

The problem of managing client states is as old as empire itself, and is extremely complex. The fear must now be that, carried away by hubris after their victory, the more radical elements in George W. Bush's administration will underestimate this and overplay their hand, with potentially disastrous results. Too little pressure on your clients and they may not follow your wishes, if a large part of their own populations oppose their doing so. Too much pressure and their humiliating submission to you will be nakedly revealed. Their domestic authority will collapse, they will be overthrown by rebellion and you may then be faced with an almost insoluble dilemma. Pakistan exemplifies this dilemma for the US. On the one hand, from a US point of view it is far from being a fully satisfactory client state. Although some al-Qaeda leaders have been arrested by the Pakistani authorities and handed over to the US, many others are still at large. In the tribal areas along the Afghan frontier, armed support is strong for groups hostile to the US presence in Afghanistan.

Pakistan also continues to support armed Islamist militants in Indian- controlled Kashmir. Promises last year by General Pervez Musharraf, the country's military dictator, have led to a reduction of this support but by no means ended it. Washington's refusal to take a stronger stand against this apparently contributed to the resignation last week of Robert Blackwill, the US ambassador to India.

But if Pakistan is an unsatisfactory US ally in the war against terrorism, it remains a vital one. Its population is more than two-thirds that of the entire Arab world put together; it has a strong tradition of Islamist militancy; its worldwide diaspora has immense potential for spreading militancy and terrorism; and its possession of nuclear weapons both risks nuclear war with India and makes the collapse of the Pakistani state too dangerous to contemplate. Indeed, all these dangers can be contained only by a sufficiently strong Pakistani state.US officials often complain that Pakistan is essentially buying off US pressure by handing over one senior al-Qaeda figure every three months or so. But one senior figure every three months is better than one junior one every six months, let alone none at all.

Of all the issues in US-Pakistani relations, none is more urgent or important than Kashmir. This conflict runs the risk of starting another Indo-Pakistan war, thereby adding still further to the arguments of Islamist extremists that the Muslim world is under siege. The jihad of such extremists against India has gained them the partial support of the Pakistani state, and helped them to spread their influence throughout Pakistani society. In the longer term, Pakistan's cripplingly expensive arms race with India may push it into economic failure.

Mr Blackwill was right to highlight the importance of this issue. But he was wrong to suggest the solution lies essentially in unconditional US support for India. Even if this brought an end to Pakistani support for the militants in Kashmir, the price to the US in terms of the radicalisation of Pakistani society and the diminished authority of the Pakistani government could be far too high. The task the US should undertake is to find a solution that establishes internationally recognised Indian sovereignty over the parts of Kashmir now held by India, while doing the maximum possible save Pakistan's face politically and - together with Europe - help it economically.

The latest speech by Atal Behari Vajpayee, the Indian prime minister, offering a "hand of friendship" to Pakistan, is a hopeful sign. Washington should strongly urge General Musharraf to respond in kind. However, it is unlikely that talks between India and Pakistan will get far without close involvement by the US and a clear US plan for a solution to the conflict. Mr Vajpayee has modified only slightly the proviso of all Indian governments that violence should come to a halt before a settlement.

This gives the possibility to hardliners on both sides to wreck the peace process. That would be a tragedy for India, Pakistan and, of course, the Kashmiris themselves. Given the potential terrorist threats emanating from Pakistan, it might in the long run prove a tragedy for the US as well.