Coalition urges Senate to Reject Easy Export of Bomb-Grade Uranium

Source: Carnegie

For Immediate Release: Tuesday, June 3, 2003
Contacts:
Nuclear Control Institute
Alan Kuperman (202) 248-1153
Paul Leventhal (202) 822-8444

Union of Concerned Scientists
Edwin Lyman (202) 223-6133

BROAD COALITION URGES SENATE TO REJECT PLAN TO EASE EXPORTS OF BOMB-GRADE URANIUM
House-Passed Energy Bill Would "Increase the Risk of Nuclear Terrorism"

WASHINGTON - A broad coalition of public-interest groups, university professors, and former government officials of both parties today urged the U.S. Senate to reject House-passed energy legislation that would loosen restrictions on exports of bomb-grade uranium.

Writing to Senator Pete Domenici (R-NM), the coalition characterized the legislation as a "dangerous provision" that would "increase the risk of nuclear terrorism." The Senate is scheduled to resume consideration of the energy bill today.

The offending provision, sponsored in the House by Rep. Richard Burr (R-NC), would repeal a major restriction on export of weapon-usable, highly enriched uranium (HEU) sponsored more than a decade ago by then-Rep. (now Senator) Charles Schumer (D-NY). That 1992 law intended to phase out all such commerce to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism. It bars export of bomb-grade uranium, except on an interim basis to facilities that are actively pursuing conversion to low-enriched uranium (LEU), which cannot be used to make a Hiroshima-type bomb.

The Burr Amendment would eliminate this export restriction on pharmaceutical companies that use bomb-grade uranium to produce medical isotopes. The coalition contends that production of such isotopes can and should be achieved using the safer, low-enriched uranium, thereby eliminating the risk of nuclear terrorism. The letter states: "We support the use of medical isotopes, but this legislation is not necessary to ensure their supply."

The letter identifies the Burr Amendment, and a similar effort by Senator Kit Bond (R-MO), as "special-interest provisions aimed mainly at benefiting a single foreign isotope producer, MDS Nordion of Canada" - the primary recipient of U.S. bomb-grade exports. The Canadian company could readily convert its production process to the safer uranium, according to the coalition, citing research by the U.S. Argonne National Laboratory. However, the letter says Nordion has refused to cooperate for more than a year.

According to the coalition, "Worldwide, such isotope production now annually requires some 50-100 kg of fresh HEU, sufficient for at least one nuclear weapon of a simple design, or several of a more sophisticated design." Such exports were expected to be phased out under current law but likely would increase under the House-passed legislation, according to the coalition. The letter notes that nuclear waste from processing the medical isotopes also remains weapons-grade and accumulates at production sites, further increasing the risk of nuclear terrorism.

The letter also notes that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has never denied an HEU export license to Nordion under the current law. Thus, it states, "Rather than ensuring the supply of medical isotopes, the main effect of the Burr and Bond amendments would be to perpetuate dangerous commerce in bomb-grade uranium and increase the risk that this material will find its way into terrorist hands."

The letter underscores that the House legislation would undermine a 25-year policy of phasing out bomb-grade uranium commerce just when the threat of catastrophic terror is greater than ever. "For Congress now to undermine this longstanding U.S. effort to prevent nuclear terrorism flies in the face of the Bush Administration's stated determination to protect our country from weapons of mass destruction."

The signers of the letter include Fred Ikle, undersecretary of defense in the Reagan Administration; Henry Sokolski, deputy for nonproliferation policy in the office of the secretary of defense in the first Bush Administration; Frank von Hippel, assistant director for national security in the office of science and technology policy in the Clinton Administration; Jessica Matthews, president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; and two former commissioners of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Peter Bradford and Victor Gilinsky. The letter and a related op-ed are attached. The full list of signers is appended below (in alphabetical order):

• Peter Bradford, Former Commissioner, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
• Matthew Bunn, Senior Research Associate, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
• Tom Cochran, Director, Nuclear Program, Natural Resources Defense Council
• Charles Ferguson, Scientist-in-Residence, Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies (organization shown for identification purposes only)
• Victor Gilinsky, Former Commissioner, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
• Fred C. Ikle, Undersecretary of Defense (Policy) in the Reagan Administration, and Director of the US Arms Control Agency in the Ford Administration
• Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director, Arms Control Association
• Alan Kuperman, Assistant Professor of International Relations, Johns Hopkins University
• Paul Leventhal, Founding President, Nuclear Control Institute
• Edwin Lyman, Senior Scientist, Union of Concerned Scientists
• Jessica Mathews, President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
• Marvin Miller, Senior Scientist Emeritus, Center for International Studies, MIT
• Ivan Oelrich, Federation of American Scientists
• Christopher Paine, Natural Resources Defense Council
• Henry Sokolski, Executive Director, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
• Frank Von Hippel, Professor of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University