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press release

Verifying North Korean Nuclear Disarmament

published by
Carnegie
 on June 11, 2003

Source: Carnegie

For Immediate Release: June 11, 2003
Contact: Jayne Brady, 202-939-2372, jbrady@ceip.org
or Brandon Yu, 510-295-6128

Verifying North Korean Nuclear Disarmament
New Joint Carnegie-Nautilus Report Explores Technical Options

It is technically possible to verifiably eliminate North Korea's nuclear weapons programs, but doing so gets more difficult as time passes, according to a new joint Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability publication. The report assesses the elimination of North Korea's plutonium production, its incomplete uranium enrichment program and possible verification options. The three papers in the report are "meant to spur discussion and exploration of these complex issues, and give support to efforts to negotiate an agreement that ends the potential for North Korea to directly threaten the security of its neighbors and other countries."

In the first paper, "Freezing and Reversing North Korea's Plutonium Program," Jon Wolfsthal Carnegie associate, examines North Korea's plutonium operations and how a freeze may be verified. He also discusses issues related to the final elimination of North Korea's nuclear capability. The paper provides a "broad view of what hurdles anyone trying to reestablish a freeze might encounter and what uncertainties might remain under such a freeze."

Former State Department official Fred McGoldrick discusses in his paper, "The North Korean Uranium Enrichment Program: A Freeze and Beyond", steps that North Korea could take to reduce international concerns surrounding their clandestine uranium enrichment program. McGoldrick looks to verify that the North Koreans have in fact "frozen" the program and dismantled it and other nuclear weapons activities.

The third and final paper, "North Korea's Nuclear Problem: Political Implications and Inspection Formats," author Seongwhun Cheon provides insight into the political implications of North Korea's nuclear risk-taking and offers possible interim and final solutions to the nuclear inspection issue. Cheon describes the demands being made by North Korea in negotiations with the United States in return for a program freeze.

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is a private, nonprofit organization dedicated to advancing cooperation between nations and promoting active international engagement by the United States. Learn more about the Endowment at www.ceip.org Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability is a private, nonprofit organization that seeks solutions to global problems. Visit the Nautilus Institute online at www.nautilus.org


For a copy of the full report visit www.ceip.org/pubs

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Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.