FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: 09/07/05
CONTACT: Jennifer Linker , 202/939- 2372, jlinker@CarnegieEndowment.org
The bold U.S.-India nuclear deal proposed by President Bush and Prime Minister Singh has exposed important faults in the global nonproliferation regime, in U.S. policy toward India, and in Indian nuclear policy. Unfortunately, the deal was developed so secretively and quickly that it contains major faults of its own, according to George Perkovich, Carnegie Endowment vice president for studies, in his new web-only Policy Outlook, Faulty Promises: The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal. Critiquing elements of the U.S. initiative, Perkovich, author of India’s Nuclear Bomb, the prize-winning history of the Indian nuclear program and U.S. policy toward it, also decries the rigidity of nonproliferation fundamentalists.
Perkovich applauds the Bush Administration for recognizing India’s global importance and seeking to adapt rules of the international nonproliferation regime. Yet, the Administration’s desire to mobilize India to balance Chinese military power in Asia distorts the strategy, as does the Indian government’s obsession with nuclear energy. Perkovich argues that the U.S. should base its partnership with India on the intrinsic value of augmenting the political-economic development of democratic India’s one billion people.
Perkovich warns critics of the deal that unbending defense of existing rules will undermine the nonproliferation regime’s legitimacy. Americans, especially, need to recognize that the five acknowledged nuclear-weapon states already have changed the rules of the nonproliferation regime: “Defending the sanctity of NPT-related rules to deny nuclear technology to a developing country – India – while doing little to defend the sanctity of disarmament commitments is the height of hypocrisy.” There has been surprisingly little outcry on the deal from the developing world, Perkovich argues, because the real concern of developing countries is bridging the divide between the rich and poor world, the technological “haves” and “have nots.” The fact that the U.S. seeks to allow “advanced” technology to go to a poor country is so unusual and welcome that it outweighs the detail that India possesses nuclear weapons.
But the Bush Administration proposal gives India too much without getting much in return. Perkovich says it is “strange and unexplained why an Administration known for being exceptionally unaccommodating to most countries in most international discussions – climate change, Iraq, International Criminal Court, nuclear test ban, etc. – finds it wise to completely accommodate India in this case.” If changes are not made during implementation, U.S. nonproliferation interests will be set back needlessly. He concludes with an alternative deal focused on providing desperately needed nuclear fuel to India.
Link to Policy Outlook: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=17419&prog=zgp&proj=znpp,zsa,zusr
Central Arguments of Paper:
• Two central thrusts of the administration’s initiative deserve support, and two others should be reversed. The administration should be applauded for recognizing India’s global importance and seeking to elevate U.S. relations with it. And the administration is correct to try to adjust the global nuclear non-proliferation regime so that it does not stifle India’s economic development. But the administration is unwise to conceive or frame U.S. partnership with India in terms of balancing China’s power. The looseness of the nuclear “deal,” which if not tightened in the implementation phase, will undermine important non-proliferation objectives without corresponding gains in Indian good will or containment of Chinese influence (p. 3).
• If policies to balance China by bolstering India’s nuclear-weapons capabilities will have the effect of weakening the non-proliferation regime, U.S. security, on balance, will be damaged (p.3).
• India’s capacity and willingness to cooperate with the United States in balancing Chinese power are too uncertain to form the foundation of a strategic partnership. The United States should base its partnership on the intrinsic value of augmenting the political-economic development of democratic India’s one billion people (p. 6).
• U.S. accommodation of the Indian government’s preoccupation with nuclear power will not buy lasting Indian partnership (p. 6).
• The Bush administration has not made a strong case that U.S. interests would suffer significantly if Washington did not accommodate all of India’s nuclear demands and end all non-proliferation restrictions on nuclear commerce with India. It is strange and unexplained why an administration known for being exceptionally unaccommodating to most countries in most international discussions—climate change, Iraq, International Criminal Court, nuclear test ban, and others—finds it wise to completely accommodate India in this case (p. 7).
• One major test of India’s intentions and U.S. seriousness will be when the Indian nuclear establishment proposes to exclude India’s prototype Fast Breeder Reactor and all other research and development facilities from safeguards (p. 10).
• To much of the world, especially non-nuclear weapons states and developing countries, the five acknowledged nuclear-weapon states already have changed the rules of the non-proliferation regime. Thus, defending the sanctity of NPT-related rules to deny nuclear technology to a developing country—India—while doing little to defend the sanctity of disarmament commitments by the world’s most powerful states seems the height of hypocrisy (p. 10).
• No developing countries have denounced the U.S. intention to open foreign supply of nuclear fuel and technology to India! This is profoundly telling (p. 11).
• The most important and direct way to support India’s nuclear development would be for the United States and others to endorse international supply of nuclear fuel to Indian power plants (p. 12).
George Perkovich is vice-president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. An expert on Iran, South Asia, and nuclear weapons, he is the co-author of Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security (Carnegie Endowment, 2005).
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