Source: The New Republic Online
As Fidel Castro battles for his life following serious intestinal surgery, the Bush administration seems to be stepping up pressure on Cuba, trying to promote a rapid transition to democracy after el Presidente puffs his last cigar. In a report on Cuba presented in July by a high-level presidential commission, appointees laid out a scenario in which a post-Fidel Cuba would embrace multiparty elections and use American assistance to build a free market economy. The White House has appointed a "Cuba transition coordinator," a hard-line former congressional aide named Caleb McCarry, and approved handing him nearly $80 million every two years to "hasten a transition" to democracy.
Of course, calling for Cuba libre plays well in Florida, a crucial state for any Republican presidential campaign, and some administration officials and exiles clearly support fast democratization on the island. (In a recent piece on Cuba in The New Yorker, Jon Lee Anderson interviews one prominent exile who tells him that Castro "must be brought down by armed force.") But, behind the heated rhetoric, the administration and some of its Cuban-American allies actually may prefer a slower, more gradual transition in Cuba. And that might be the wisest policy of all.
On the surface, the Bush White House seems as hard-line as possible on Cuba. In 2003, the White House tightened rules on visits to the island by family members, researchers, and aid organizations, and it slashed the amount of remittances Cubans in the United States could send back to their families. That same year, the administration created the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, which produced the post-Fidel report and prompted the creation of McCarry's post. The commission envisions a wave of Cuban-American exiles and American technocrats swooping into a post-Fidel Cuba, creating new banks, rebuilding the physical infrastructure, and teaching Cubans about electoral democracy. Several Cuba experts believe the White House has made it a top administration priority to ensure that Raúl Castro, Fidel's brother, does not consolidate control when Fidel dies.
But dig deeper. The White House's key Cuban-American allies offer far narrower visions of a post-Fidel island. Florida Senator Mel Martinez, the most prominent Cuban-American Republican, told Anderson that he learned from trips to postwar Iraq that a quick, forced transition won't work. "A governmental structure must remain in place," Martinez argued. "As in Iraq, in Cuba there are those with blood on their hands. But that's not everyone." In another interview, this time with The Economist, Martinez went further, arguing that Cuban-Americans should stay calm and treat change on the island with patience, rather than pushing for rapid regime change. "I think people need to keep their emotions in check," Martinez argued.
Even the administration does not act as tough as it talks. In recent weeks, the White House has actually relaxed some immigration restrictions on Cubans, making it easier for a limited number of Cubans to come to the United States. This is the wrong thing to do if the White House is trying to precipitate a Cuban collapse, since allowing some outflow will reduce pressure on Havana's government.
The broader Cuban-American community has also become less predictably strident than in past years. The first generation of fighters who fled the island is passing away, and many of those that remain alive have mellowed, paying less attention to their homeland. Alberto Beguiristain, a 72-year-old exile who once assisted the Bay of Pigs invasion, recently told Time that he no longer dreams of getting on a speedboat when Fidel dies and roaring back to Cuba. Elena Freyre, head of the Cuban-American Defense League, an exile organization in Miami, agreed, telling Time that "90 percent of [Cubans exiles] no longer desire to go back and live there."
A moderate policy makes sense. Of course, no one wishes on Cubans a life like they have today under Fidel, where some people struggle to eat, civil society leaders get tossed in jail, and hard-line young adherents of el Presidente emulate Red Guards in their fierce destruction of Castro opponents. But rapid regime change in Cuba might not benefit Cubans or the United States. As has occurred during other periods of political transition in Cuba, rapid regime change could result in an orgy of bloodletting, especially if a post-Fidel regime tried, like American viceroy L. Paul Bremer in Iraq, to quickly purge former supporters of Castro. Unlike in Iraq, thousands of miles from the United States, violence in Cuba could create an exodus to Florida--exactly what the Bush administration does not want.
Worse, in a post-Fidel Cuba where various interest groups struggle for power, democrats could find themselves undermined by their association with Washington, on a nationalistic island conditioned by years of anti-American rhetoric. Referring to McCarry's $80 million fund, Cuban democracy activist Manuel Cuesta Morúa told The Boston Globe, "Those are 80 million arguments for the Cuban government" to portray democrats as tools of the United States. "This is putting gasoline on the fire," Elizardo Sanchez, another activist, told the Chicago Tribune.
To be sure, a gradual transition is not terrific. The admittedly brutal Raúl or another transitional figure could increase Cuba's dependence on China, which has cultivated close relations with Fidel's brother. (China today is Cuba's second-largest trading partner.) But Raúl also has a reputation for greater pragmatism, and, if he learns from China's economic transition, he could promote gradual liberalization of the Cuban economy. This would require greater commercial ties to the United States, and it would give Washington time to help wean Cuba from the hard-line group of ministers devoted to ensuring what Anderson described as a continuation of Castro's revolution without Fidel.
Washington could use even a moderately improved relationship with Cuba, since it is losing the entire region. The Bush administration came into office in 2001 vowing to make Latin America a priority of the administration, and many Latin Americans placed high hopes on the governor from a U.S. border state. But, since September 11, Bush has almost completely ignored the Western Hemisphere. Not surprisingly, in polls across Latin America, Bush often enjoys a popularity rating of less than 25 percent. With even a slightly better situation in Cuba, those numbers might once again climb out of the basement.
Joshua Kurlantzick is a special correspondent for The New Republic.